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Abstract 
The world's earthquake problem is increasing without a change in the earth's geology. 
Human suffering during earthquakes is almost entirely caused by man-made structures. This 
is mainly because the world's population is fast increasing and previously unoccupied areas 
arc now being inhabited without much attention being given to vulnerability of the building 
sites and construction techniques. Such buildings cannot withstand even moderate 
earthquakes. 
Earthquake fatality records show that most of the losses to life occur in low-income and lower 
middle-income countries. Economic losses due to earthquakes arc usually large in high-
income countries. The financial impact of earthquake disasters is greater in poorer countries, 
who find serious problems in rebuilding their towns and villages after a disaster. Most 
government-implemented reconstruction programmes in low-income and lower middle-income 
countries have failed because they did not meet the socio-economic needs of the earthquake-
victims. Consequently a majority of such communities were obliged to live in vulnerable 
houses. 
The lack of acceptability of most reconstruction programmes emphasised the need to 
investigate and analyse the associated problems. This has been performed by studying a 
recently implemented programme. lt was intended to review the earthquake-victims' response 
to the programme and what should be done to introduce efficient and effective earthquake-
resistant construction strategies in the hazard-prone areas. For this purpose, field work was 
carried out in the Republic of Yemen to study the reconstruction programme undertaken after 
the 1982 earthquake. 
The research findings suggest that reconstruction programmes will be implemented more 
efficiently and effectively, if the people living in earthquake-affected area arc aware of the 
hazard and they manage the location, design and construction of their houses using safe 
techniques. The study proposes certain measures for adoption by the governments of such 
countries to mitigate the risk of disasters in earthquake-prone areas. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
"Natural disasters such as earthquakes are part of the environment in which we live. 
We cannot eliminate them but if we work together we shall be able to limit the losses 
of life and the destruction they cause." 
(Jan Eliasson, 1983) 
Mankind is striving, from times unknown, for its basic and essential needs of water, 
food and shelter. 'Food, water and shelter are primary needs for human survival' 
(Franceys, 1991 ). Even in the remotest areas of the world, where advanced technical 
skills and conventional building materials are not available, the man has made some 
kind of shelter to serve his purpose. He has found some water and food, no matter how 
little it might be, to ensure his survival. The design and appearance of shelter may 
differ from area to area depending upon climate, type and availability of local materials 
and needs and affordability of the individual. Shelter may vary from snow-made igloos 
in the North Pole to thatched huts in Africa; from cloth-made tents in Sahara to mud 
houses in South Asia; or from boat houses in the Far East to mountain caves in the 
Middle East. In all cases these abodes do provide shelter and a feeling of safety to 
their occupants. For advancement and development however other infrastructure, such 
as schools, roads, hospitals, water supply, sanitation, irrigation and industry are also 
necessary. Like health and environment, infrastructure is an important area in which 
government policy and finance play an important part because of its impact on 
economic development and human welfare (The World Bank, 1994). 
The people living in high or upper middle-income countries1 are already privileged to 
have the benefits of minimum risk and acceptable physical infrastructure. In recent 
years the low-income and lower middle-income countries have made substantial 
investments in infrastructure achieving encouraging gains form the householders and 
producers by providing them shelters and access to services such as safe water, 
1 The World Bank (1994) classifies world economies into the following groups: 
1. Low-income: GNP per capita less than US$ 675 or less; 
2. Lower middle-income: GNP per capita US$ 676 to 2,695; 
3. Higher middle-income: GNP per capita US$ 2,696 to 8,355; and 
4. High-income: GNP per capita US$ 8,356 and above. 
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sanitation, electric power, telecommunication and transport. These investments amount 
to US$ 200 billion per year and are about 4% of their total output or about 20% of their 
total investment. Even more infrastructure investments and expansion of services are 
needed to extend the reach of services to the people living in rural areas and to the poor 
(The World Bank, 1994). The countries which cannot afford to finance these 
development programmes through their own resources depend on foreign assistance. 
What is usually overlooked in the low-income or lower middle income countries is the 
safety of the infrastructure against natural hazards such as earthquakes, cyclones, 
tsunamis, tornadoes and floods. This is because of inadequate awareness and lack of 
technical and financial resources at the government and peoples' level. The disasters, 
caused by these hazards, are not uncommon and quite often we learn that a certain part 
of the world is devastated by one such disaster causing great loss of life and damage 
to property. Each year, in several areas of the world, natural disasters cause loss of life 
and a great deal of damage especially to low-cost and self-built houses. The 
devastation caused by natural hazards in low-income countries is overwhelming. 
When natural disasters hit low-income or lower middle-income countries, the effects are 
far more catastrophic when compared to the upper middle-income and high-income 
countries. In such countries hazard monitoring systems are efficient, the people are 
literate and well aware of the consequences of the natural hazards, and building controls 
for the safety of infrastructure are strictly applied against earthquakes and other natural 
hazards. Such structures are expensive, because of the high safety standards prescribed 
in the building codes, but they are affordable in high-income countries. In contrast, 
literacy levels and natural hazard awareness in the poorer countries is usually low. 
Hazard monitoring systems and building controls in such countries are either non-
existent or not strictly applied. It is estimated that as much as 95% of loss of human 
life due to natural disasters occurs in low-income countries (Davis, 1978). Among all 
natural hazards, earthquakes, probably receive the highest priority, because of their 
unpredictability and the rising amount of losses in recent years. As such the focus of 
this research is on identifying no-cost or low-cost strategies to mitigate earthquake 
losses in low-income and lower-middle-income countries. 
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1.1 Earthquakes 
Eanhquakes are regarded to be one of the most formidable and widely spread threats 
to human life and property around the world since ancient times (UNDRO, 1978). The 
suddenness of their occurrence with the accompanying terrifying noise, the violence of 
movements which in a few moments turn a living city into a pile of rubble contribute 
to man's fear and helplessness. Quite often they initiate some other hazards, such as 
tsunamis, landslides, fires, liquefaction and land subsiding. When earthquakes devastate 
cities or other populated regions they destroy buildings, disrupt systems of transport and 
communication and sometimes start fires which further aggravate the catastrophe and 
increase the ultimate death toll (Raphael, 1986). 
It is estimated that since the year 1000 AD more than five million people have expired 
in earthquakes. These estimates vary because of lack of any reliable record of 
earthquakes until the beginning of the twentieth century. According to one estimate 
about 350,000 people perished during the period 1926 through 1950 which gives the 
average figure of 15,200 victims per year. Some other estimates suggest the average 
annual death toll in earthquakes is about 24,000 (UNDRO, 1978). This figure seems 
to have significantly increased in the last quarter of this century. Table 1.1 shows 
estimated victim figures of some of the most fatal eanhquake disasters and how the 
disaster casualties have increased in recent years. 
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TABLE 1.1: Significant earthquake disasters in history 
Year I..Dcation Country Number of Dead 
742 Marib Yemen .. 
856 Comilh Greece 45,000 
1038 Shensi China 23,000 
1057 Chihli China 25,000 
1268 Silicia Asia Minor 60,000 
1290 Chihli China 100,000 
1293 Kamakura Japan 30,000 
1531 Lisbon Portugal 30,000 
1556 Shan-tee China 830,000 
1693 Sicily lraly 60,000 
1730 Hokkaido Japan 137,000 
1737 Calcutta India 300,000 
1755 Lisbon Portugal 60,000 
1783 Calabria lraly 50,000 
1797 .. Peru/Equador 40,000 
1868 .. Peru/Equador 40,000 
1908 Messina Italy 83,000 
1920 Kansu China 200,000 
1923 Tokyo Japan 99,331 
1935 Queua Pakistan 25,000 
1939 .. Chile 28,000 
1970 Chimbote Peru 66,794 
1976 Tangshan China 242.469 
1988 .. Armenia 25,000 
1990 .. Iran 40,000 
1992 Marathawada India 20,000 
1995 Kobe Japan 5,470 
1995 Neftgorsk Russia 2.000 
Sources: UNDRO, 1978; Bolt, 1978; Cobum and Spence, 1992; Newsweek, 6/1995. 
The time interval between disasters is often quite irregular which adds to the 
unpredictability of the earthquakes. The example of Italy is notable where four serious 
earthquakes occurred between 1905 and 1930 with a total of 120,000 victims. After 
that no big disaster took place until 1976 in Friuli. In several other countries subject 
to earthquakes (Yugoslavia, Morocco,) only one serious earthquake has occurred during 
the current century. In some other countries such as China, Romania, India, Mexico 
and Japan two or more such disasters have taken place in the same period. This 
irregularity stresses the need to study earthquake risk over long periods covering several 
hundred years. 
The loss of life and property are far greater in low-income or lower middle-income 
countries, as compared to the upper middle-income or high-income countries, mainly 
because of low public awareness of the earthquake hazard and vulnerability of the 
infrastructure. The sharp rise in population and the tendency of the rural population to 
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move to urban centres in the poorer countries, in the hope of jobs and better living 
condition, is probably one of the reasons for higher death toll in earthquakes, 
particularly when the epicentre is near large cities (UNDRO, 1978). This has already 
happened in China, Guatemala, Turkey, Romania, Algeria, Iran and India. The 
traditional infrastructure in such countries is usually not capable of resisting even 
moderate earthquakes. The risk of serious damage from earthquakes has reduced in the 
richer earthquake-prone countries because of technological advancement, application of 
building codes for earthquake-resistant designs, and the peoples awareness of the 
possible disaster. 
The seismicity of the earth has not changed but two important phenomena have 
converged in the recent past. The first is a natural cause as a consequence of which 
certain seismic foci (or hypocentre) have been close to densely populated areas. The 
second cause is that population growth in the low-income and lower middle-income 
countries has resulted in rapid expansion of urban and semi-urban areas, the growth of 
which is neither planned nor controlled. The combination of these two phenomena is 
causing and will continue to cause severe human and property losses. It is therefore 
essential that not only the growth of towns and cites should be planned but it should 
also be controlled in such a way that risks against earthquakes and other natural hazards 
are minimised. Taking these considerations in urban and rural development and 
reconstruction involves several factors, such as establishing building standards, the 
methods of construction, the location of buildings and other infrastructure, and the use 
of land. The need of planning for location of new human settlements becomes all the 
more important in view of the long-term disaster risks. While considering how to 
minimise earthquakes losses, it is necessary to take into account our knowledge of the 
natural hazard and the technical means by which human lives and property can be 
protected against the imminent danger. The appearance and size of the structures are 
also equally important considerations, which vary according to the socio-economic, 
socio-cultural and climatic needs of each area. 
While earthquakes and other natural hazards cannot be stopped, it is essential to plan 
and prepare in advance against them in order to minimise the resultant damage. 
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1.2 Preparedness and planning 
Awareness about earthquakes and other natural hazards and the amount of devastation 
they cause seems to have improved in recent years on a global basis. The last few 
years have seen growing understanding of disasters and their consequences among the 
governments and the peoples, around the world (UNDRO, 1982). In the face of 
increasing social and economic cost of natural disasters in low-income countries, the 
donors and the disaster-prone countries, have made some efforts to: 
a) improve understanding of natural hazards; 
b) estimate the hazard risks more precisely; 
c) improve the quality of post-disaster relief; and 
d) take adequate preparedness measures to mitigate the hazard losses. 
Progress in achieving the above goals has however been slow because of some chronic 
and inherent problems in the low-income countries as mentioned in the foregoing 
paragraphs. Other problems include degradation of environments, economic recession 
and poorly coordinated development and reconstroction planning. The magnitude of 
human suffering in disaster prone low-income and lower middle-income countries 
suggests that the relief measures and post disaster activities are not sufficient (UNDRO, 
1976). According to some estimates more than one hundred countries, which achieved 
independence in the last four decades, are in the low-income bracket (Khawaja and 
Malik, 1992). Millions of people in these countries are living in abject poverty without 
adequate food, shelter, education and health-care facilities. The suffering is further 
aggravated by their lack of awareness about natural disasters. When disasters strike 
these areas and cause heavy life and property losses, the majority of the people regard 
them as "acts of God". Many people in such countries believe that human efforts 
cannot withstand against an inevitable divine activity. 
UNDRO (1982) discourages this resigned attitude by making the following comments: 
a) natural disasters, such as earthquakes, are not merely "acts of God" but are 
aggravated by human error and lack of foresight; 
b) disaster relief can be made more effective through systemised planning and 
management; and 
c) pre-disaster planning helps to reduce some of the severest effects of disasters. 
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While global efforts in providing relief supplies to disaster-affected areas have 
considerably improved, enough progress has not been made in the development and 
reconstruction of safe infrastructure in the disaster areas. This is mainly due to the 
general lack of hazard awareness, lack of resources, and quite often the lack of 
commitment in the governments of the hazard-prone poorer countries. What is even 
less valued among all related issues is that infrastructure is the end result of a long 
chain of social, economic, technological, environmental, political and other interactions. 
What is further ignored is that the government implemented infrastructure building 
programmes in such areas, are merely a process rather than the product. DHV 
Consultants (1989) noted during the post earthquake reconstruction programme in 
Dhamar, that construction of new houses under self-help programme was not their only 
target. The programme was also meant to transfer knowledge on earthquake resistant 
building techniques and to stimulate the local economy. 
Review of the information available in some of the disaster-affected areas, suggests that 
the magnitude of human suffering in these areas is immense and relief measures and 
post disaster activities are insufficient. The process to educate the people and the 
leaders for prevention against future disasters and also for overall social and economic 
development remains a priority. Therefore, whatever the difficulties might be, efforts 
to prepare for disasters and proper planning for development and reconstruction 
activities must continue. 
1.3 Development and reconstruction 
Development or advancement in poorer countries faces many serious problems such as 
lack of resources, fast increasing population, low literacy, etc. The efforts for 
development are further frustrated by natural calamities, which frequently take a heavy 
toll on life and property. Rehabilitation of victims and reconstruction of infrastructure 
in such disaster-affected areas become immediate needs, whereas re-allocation of the 
limited resources causes a blow to the national economies and adversely affects the 
development plans. The reconstruction process presents a multiple-objective approach 
which aims at not only providing safe and economical infrastructure to the victims, but 
also in addressing their environmental and social needs (Muhanna, 1989). The effects 
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of disasters are no doubt immense in tenns of human life, but their influence on social 
and economic development of the country are also of great consequence. Losses caused 
by natural disasters such as earthquakes, off-set the momentum of national economic 
development process for a number of years, in most of the disaster prone low-income 
countries. 
The Oxford dictionary defines reconstruction as the process of constructing a structure 
again. However the real purpose of reconstruction in disaster-affected areas is more 
than simply restoring the status quo. It requires rebuilding the infrastructure in the 
disaster-affected area in such a way, that the infrastructure is not only safer against any 
future hazard, but also culturally acceptable and financially affordable to the local 
people. When the above considerations are ignored the reaction of the victims is 
indifferent or lukewarm which does not produce the desired results of the efforts and 
resources involved. The conservative attitude of the disaster-affected people about their 
shelter needs, has been repeatedly been observed by experts. Davis (1978) commented 
that when a tidal wave demolished a village, or an earthquake reduced a town to a heap 
of rubble, it was logical to believe that the victims will prefer move to safer shelters, 
away from the disaster area. In reality however the local population usually prefers to 
stay in the same area and build similar houses as before, from the material recovered 
from the rubble. This is because of socio-economic reasons such as moving the village 
above flood level could mean giving up fishing rights or loosing fertile lands. Raphael 
(1986) commented on people's attachment to their traditions and custom by saying that 
cultural factors often strongly influence the way in which people can accept new 
shelters. Similarly adopting earthquake-resistant designs could mean expensive 
structures which may be alien in appearance, uncomfortable for the local climate and 
economically unaffordable. These factors of everyday importance weigh heavily against 
a disaster hazard which may be repeated once in ten years or more. 
Reconstruction with alien technolcgies may demand skills and materials that are 
unavailable in the area. It is easy for experts to say when visiting a disaster affected 
area, that the failure occurred due to heavy roofs, or insufficient bond between walls 
and the roofs (Davis, 1978). Acting on this advice, making light roofs and providing 
a good bond between walls and roofs, may not be easy for the poor man in a low-
8 
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income country who has to depend on his own meagre resources in building a safe 
house. When we compare a traditional local house, vulnerable to earthquakes, with a 
safe house designed by experts, the comparison is usually not as straight forward as it 
would appear to be. While the safe house will have a lightweight roof and somewhat 
unfamiliar design the structure will usually require expensive insulation to avoid 
extreme temperatures. On the other hand the traditional house built with thick walls 
and heavy roofs, though unsafe against earthquakes, provides everyday comfort to the 
inhabitant at a low price, for which local materials and skills are easily available. 
When these benefits are compared with the experts prescribed safety measures against 
earthquake hazards, which might come once in several years and may have become 
history in the memories of local residents, the choice is not too difficult. 
After a disaster, most of the survivors want to return to their area and start 
reconstruction of the damaged houses as soon as possible (Geipel, 1982). Their reaction 
to any new technology is that of suspicion in terms of higher cost and unsuitability for 
their needs. In most of the disaster prone low-income countries people attach less 
importance to vulnerability of their traditional houses than to relatively higher cost of 
the earthquake resistant houses which they find economically unaffordable. 
In most of the low-income countries, particularly in the rural areas, people live in self-
made low-cost houses. The design of these houses is usually not based on sound 
engineering techniques. The materials used are those which are locally available at 
minimal prices. This is mainly due to the fact that the common man, with his limited 
resources, can afford to spend only a small amount on his shelter. Such buildings have 
some common features, such as low-strength cement-sand blocks or unburnt clay bricks 
commonly called adobe material, weak mortars, heavy and usually overloaded roof 
structures and no ties between the roofs and walls. Such buildings or shelters are built 
by the local unskilled or semi-skilled labour using primitive building techniques. Non-
engineered buildings made of earthen materials and low-strength masonry have usually 
varying and unpredictable properties, detailing and workmanship (Krawlinker, 1986). 
Other infrastructure such as roads, health centres, water supply and sanitation works 
also fall short of their respective standards and requirements in the low-income and 
lower middle-income countries. The Military Governor of Kano State, Nigeria, 
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acknowledged this in the 15th WEDC Conference of 1989, by mentioning that not only 
shelters but roads, water supply, sanitation, schools and other infrastructure were 
inadequate to meet the common demand of the people living in the low-income 
countries. While such countries strive hard to provide even the bare minimum of these 
facilities to their population, which may take several years, powers of nature such as 
earthquakes can destroy all efforts within a few moments. 
Discussing similar circumstances in other parts of the world, Thompson (1986) observed 
that the progress in information dissemination and community involvement for 
preparedness for natural hazards was far less than desired. 
Davis (1978) summarised the considerations faced by the governments and donors, 
involved in rehabilitation and reconstruction after a disaster, as follows: 
a) long-term planning needs for preparedness and response in the face of a disaster; 
b) difficulties in moving the people to less vulnerable areas; 
c) natural resistance of the victims to safe but unfamiliar and probably more 
expensive building techniques; and 
d) to educate the victims that disasters like earthquakes are not simply "acts of 
God". 
The World Bank (1994) estimates show that over 70 per cent, more than 4 billion of 
the population of the world lives in low-income countries. With increasing life 
expectancy and little control on growth rate, the total population figure is expected to 
be double by the turn of century. It is estimated that nearly 80 per cent of this figure 
will comprise population of low-income or lower middle-income countries. This will 
create a high demand for the necessities of life such as food, water, shelter, health 
facilities, transport, etc in these countries. To get these basic facilities the need for 
infrastructure development cannot be overemphasised. Shah et al (1990) observed that 
the need for integrated development of the rural areas, including necessary infrastructure 
eg roads, water supply, electricity, primary education and health-care was 
overwhelming. It is important that this infrastructure should be able to withstand the 
effects of earthquakes and other natural hazards. Low-income countries, who struggle 
to provide even the basic infrastructure to their people, can hardly afford to start 
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rebuilding these facilities once again, after a natural disaster has devastated a certain 
area. 
1.4 Problem statement 
Earthquakes, which can be far more devastating than other natural hazards offer an 
immense challenge to the world and mitigation of this risk should receive priority. The 
dangers of earthquakes are among the worst of natural disasters (Muhanna, 1989). 
While other natural hazards such as cyclones, floods, droughts and fire are caused by 
natural forces above the surface of earth they can be predicted much more precisely 
than earthquakes. Also these hazards follow a relatively established pattern of 
probability and their areas of activity are better defined. Disasters caused by natural 
hazards, other than earthquakes, are mainly because of inability of the concerned low-
income governments to take precautionary measures in spite of predictions and warnings 
by meteorological centres. On the other hand earthquakes originate below the surface 
of earth and it is almost impossible to predict them accurately. Their duration is only 
a few seconds but in this short duration even moderate earthquakes can cause heavy 
losses of life and infrastructure in low-income countries where structures are seldom 
based on earthquake-resistant designs. The loss of human life and injuries, sometimes 
causing permanent disability, are the most tragic consequences of earthquakes but the 
economic consequences are far reaching. Major earthquakes cause a devastating, and 
sometimes irreparable, blow to the victim countries' economy in which infrastructure 
is completely or partially damaged (Coburn and Spence, 1992). The most obvious 
consequence is destruction of the built environment which was developed over a period 
of several decades or centuries in some cases. Private homes, offices, shops, business 
centres, schools, hospitals, monuments and places of historical and cultural heritage are 
destroyed in a matter of seconds. The lifeline infrastructure such as roads, railways, 
water, sanitation, gas and electricity are damaged causing serious problems of 
communications and supplies. As a result people are not only rendered homeless but 
a number of them, specially in the private sector, also lose their jobs. In severe cases 
of earthquake destruction, rehabilitation and rebuilding of the environment may take 
several years. The historical and cultural heritage might never be recovered. The 
economic impact can be far reaching causing a reduction in the gross national product 
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(GNP), and an increase in unemployment and inflation. It is forecast that a severe 
earthquake in a major financial centre such as Tokyo, New York or London can 
destabilise the international monetary system. Table 1.2 shows economic losses 
suffered during some recent major earthquakes. 
Table 1.2: Economic losses suffered in some recent earthquakes 
Country Affected area Year Loss GNP that Loss in 
($bn) year ($bn) GNP(%) 
Nicaragua Managua I972 2.0 5.0 40.0 
Guatemala Guatemala City 1976 1.1 6.1 18.0 
China Tang-shang 1976 6.0 400.0 1.5 
Rumania Bucharest 1977 0.8 26.7 3.0 
Yugoslavia Montenegro 1979 2.2 22.0 10.0 
Italy Campania 1980 45.0 661.8 6.8 
Mexico Mexico City 1985 5.0 166.7 3.0 
Greece Kalamata 1986 0.8 40.0 2.0 
El Salvador San Salvador 1986 1.5 4.8 31.0 
Armenia Armenia 1988 17.0 566.7 3.0 
USA Loma Prieta 1989 8.0 4,705.8 0.2 
Iran Manjil 1990 7.2 100.0 7.2 
Philippines Luzon 1990 1.5 55.1 2.7 
USA Northridge 1994 30.0 6,259.9 0.5 
Japan Kobe 1995 200.0 4,214.2 4.8 
Source: Coburn and Spence, 1992; Newsweek 1/1994 and 6/1995. 
There is no doubt that preparedness for earthquakes is extremely important to minimise 
life and property losses during the catastrophe. The need for preparedness for 
earthquakes is extremely important in view of the rapidly increasing problems and 
disasters caused by earthquakes around the world (Spence and Coburn, 1987). About 
20 earthquakes of large magnitude occur every year of which 10-20% take place in 
mid-ocean. A good number of the remaining 80-90% occur in uninhabited areas or 
deep below the earth crust and therefore do not cause any appreciable harm to human 
life and property. However, as the world's population is increasing and previously 
uninhabited areas being settled in at a fast pace, the risk of earthquake disaster is also 
increasing. Table 1.3 shows the increasing propensity for earthquakes to cause damage. 
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Table 1.3 Fatal earthquakes by decade 
Period Number of Fatal earthquakes Earthquakes 
earthquakes with Magnitude* causing above 
above 6 (%) 1,000 deaths (%) 
1900-1910 191 34 9.5 
1910-1920 146 33 15.5 
1920-1930 189 43 13.0 
1930-1940 202 49 14.0 
1940-1950 188 52 22.0 
1950-1960 212 49 9.0 
1960-1970 228 62 12.0 
1970-1980 223 54 25.0 
1980-1990 181 60 22.5 
Magnitude*: Earthquake magnitude measured on Richter Scale. 
Source: Coburn and Spence, 1992. 
The concerned governments, earth scientists and engineers should necessarily draw and 
implement plans for mitigation of earthquake disasters. At the same time however, 
earthquakes can devastate an area not prepared for the hazard. This could be due to 
several reasons such as lack of resources of the concerned governments, long duration 
since the last such incident which may have faded its consequences in the memories of 
the people, peoples lack of information about the preparedness measures, peoples' and 
governments' disregard of such measures thinking that earthquakes are merely "acts of 
God" which cannot be controlled. In such circumstances, proper planning and 
management, with community involvement, are essential tools for post earthquake relief 
and reconstruction work to make best possible use of the available resources. 
1.5 General objectives of the study 
The major objectives of the study are as follows: 
1.5.1 Initial responses: Initial responses of the government and the earthquake-
affected people, and the extent of their willingness to undertake the post-disaster relief 
work. 
1.5.2 Planning: To evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the government's 
planning process adapted to examine the compatibility of the reconstruction programme 
with respect to severity of the situation faced by the victims. 
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1.5.3 Programme implementation: To analyse as to what extent the objectives of the 
reconstruction programme were realised, and to identify issues and constraints which 
inhibited efficient and effective implementation of the programme. 
1.5.4 Community management: To ascertain the role of the earthquake-affected 
community in different phases of the reconstruction programme with the intention to 
elaborate how community management can significantly enhance effectiveness and 
acceptability of such programmes. 
1.5.5 Recommendations: To propose recommendations for developing and 
implementing future reconstruction programmes for Yemen in particular, and other 
countries facing similar problems in general. 
1.6 The earthquake disaster and the reconstruction programme 
Yemen was hit by a disastrous earthquake in 1982, causing heavy damage to life and 
property in a vast area. The earthquake and the following reconstruction programme 
provided an interesting case for technical and social study and research where the focus 
groups were the earthquake-affected people, beneficiaries of the reconstruction 
programme and the government engineers who implemented the reconstruction 
programme (Krueger, 1994). 
The Republic of Yemen is a low-income country. The World Bank, United Nations and 
other international agencies place Yemen among the list of the least developed countries 
(The World Bank, 1994). This category is assigned to those countries which not only 
have a low per capita income, but also where the chances of future economic 
development are not very bright. The socio-economic profile of Yemen and the post-
earthquake reconstruction programme are discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. Only 
a brief introductory paragraph is presented here for initial understanding of the case 
study. 
The Republic of Yemen has a long history of earthquakes. The first recorded 
information on an earthquake disaster dates back to the seventh century which caused 
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the collapse of the historical Marib dam. Some of the existing centuries-old multi-
storeyed buildings contain all round wooden ring beams at different intervals. This 
shows that due consideration was made by ancient designers for safety against 
earthquakes. Most of the latter-day earthquakes, however, do not seem to have caused 
any appreciable damage as almost all of them either occurred in the low population 
areas, or in the sea near the Yemeni coast (Table 4.1). Secondly, continuous depletion 
of forest resources caused scarcity of wood and the cost became prohibitive for any 
major use in house building. Thirdly the people developed a taste for architectural 
decoration and gradually general appearance of the buildings became more significant 
in building designs then overall strength and resistance against earthquakes (Figure 1.1 ). 
The use of wood was restricted to ornamental purposes only. Under these 
circumstances when a moderate earthquake, of 5.8 magnitude on Richter scale, struck 
Dhamar governorate in December 1982, it caused a heavy loss of life and property 
damage. 
Field studies carried out in the earthquake affected areas of Yemen, during 1992-1995, 
revealed the Jack of hazard awareness among the local people. It was also noted that 
there was hardly any preparedness to mitigate the risk of a similar disaster in the future, 
at the government's or the people's level. The main emphasis of the government 
implemented reconstruction programme focused on providing a certain number of 
earthquake-resistant infrastructure designed by foreign experts. A look at most of this 
infrastructure suggests that the local resources were not fully utilised. The earthquake 
victims, whose local knowledge and experience in construction was an important 
resource, were ignored in the relief and reconstruction processes. This therapeutic or 
manipulative approach made the programme less acceptable, and therefore less 
sustainable (Choguill et al, 1995). The reconstruction programme could not be 
completed as initially announced and a large number of the earthquake victims had to 
revert back to their vulnerable traditional houses for different reasons. This situation 
provided an interesting and important topic for detailed study. 
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Figure I. 1: Architectural decoration is a sal ient feature 1n traditional buildings in 
Yemen 
Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
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1.7 Study procedure and research methodology 
The methodological framework to realise the above study objectives is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 7. In brief, the study requires collection and analyses of extensive 
data on different aspects of the reconstruction programme designed and implemented 
in Dhamar Govemorate of Yemen. The required data and information was collected 
from: 
a) various published and unpublished sources mainly available m Yemen and 
Pakistan, and at the Loughborough University of Technology; 
b) interviews with the earthquake victims (or the intended beneficiaries of the 
reconstruction programme; 
c) interviews with the sheikhs of the earthquake-affected communities; 
d) interviews with the government officials who participated in the reconstruction 
programme; 
e) technical measurements in the field; and 
f) discussions with some expert in the related subjects. 
For this purpose a set of detailed questionnaires were prepared for use in the field 
(Annex 1). The data collected through questionnaires was evaluated and statistically 
analysed in the light of the pre-defined objective verifiable indexes (OYis). The OYis 
for each study objective are described in Chapter 7. 
1.8 The research 
The research postulates that relief measures or reconstruction work in the disaster area, 
is the outcome of a process consisting of the following three steps: 
a) assessment of the nature and extent of damages caused by the disaster; 
b) preparation of detailed plans to provide necessary assistance to the victims, both 
in short term and long term, inc luding securing and allocation of resources 
necessary to implement the plan; and 
c) implementation and management of the relief and reconstruction programme. 
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1.9 The hypothesis 
It is vital that there should be full understanding and unanimity among the victims, 
government and donors on issues related to safety of the infrastructure as well as its 
acceptability and affordability at the beneficiary level to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness of the reconstruction programme. Within this broad framework the 
present study aims to show that life and infrastructure losses can be mitigated, and the 
reconstruction work can be implemented efficiently and effectively, in the low-income 
and lower middle-income countries, located in earthquake zones through: 
a) adept management and mobilisation of resources; and 
b) motivation of the victims concerning hazard awareness, and their adaptation of 
earthquake-resistant techniques. 
These considerations lead to the following hypothesis to be investigated that: 
'Efficient and effective reconstruction in an earthquake zone cannot be undertaken 
without community management' . 
The following definitions are used for different terms used in this hypothesis: 
Efficient: the infrastructure built with least cost, in minimal time 
and affordable for the local community; 
Effective: 
Reconstruction: i) 
ii) 
iii) 
Community management: 
the infrastructure which is risk minimising, fully utili sed, 
acceptable to the beneficiaries, and provides full 
coverage; 
undertaking new construction to replace the collapsed 
infrastructure which cannot be economically repaired; 
repairing and restoring the existing infrastructure which 
suffered repairable damage during the disas ter; 
strengthening the existing vulnerable infrastructure, which 
apparently did not suffer any damage but may present a 
potential risk in a future earthquake; 
close involvement and participation of the beneficiary 
community in every stage of the short-term and long-term 
relief work , such as planning, siting, designing and 
implementation of the reconstruction programme; 
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The world's earthquake zones are described in detail in 
Chapter 2. It will be sufficient to say here, that the areas 
where a moderate to severe earthquakes can be expected 
anytime in a given interval of time, according to 
seismicity of a particular area. 
This hypothesis is intended to have a universal application, but the earthquake problem 
is not as serious in the richer countries as it is in the poorer co untries. The 
communities in the former category of countries usually have high literacy, hazard 
awareness, adequate resources and independence to take decisions. The situation is 
almost reverse in most of the low-income and lower middle-income countries, where 
literacy levels are low, hazard awareness is almost non-existent, and the communities 
do not usually have significant independence in decision taking. The focus of this study 
is therefore mainly on the communities of the latter category. 
1.10 Review of the existing literature 
There was not much concern about the seismicity of Yemen before the 1982 
Earthquake. According to the seismicity records (chapter 4), there had not been any 
disastrous earthquakes in the country in the past several hundred years. This led to the 
people concentrating more on decorating their houses rather than caring for their safety 
against earthquakes. There was no reli able system of monitoring in the country. 
When the earthquake occurred in 1982 it took the government and the people of 
Yemen, as well as the experts by surpri se. This perhaps one of the reasons that there 
was not much literature available regarding the seismicity of Yemen or vulnerability of 
the Yemeni buildings. Although the subject of earthquakes is discussed in detail in 
chapter 2 but seismic studies is not the topic of di scussion of this thesis. Some of the 
experts who conducted seismic studies after the earthquake are Shu 'lan (1989), AI-
Salim (1993), etc. 
After the earthquake, different types of reconstruction strategies were applied in the 
earthquake affected areas and various studies were made by different agencies. 
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One of these strategies was introduced by Oxfam, an in ternational NGO, working under 
the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) assistance programme. This 
strategy mainly concentrated on studying the traditional housing in the disaster area, 
identifying their vulnerability against the hazard, and training of the local builders in 
earthquake-res istant building techniques. A lot of useful literature was produced during 
and after the implementation of this programme such as Aysan (1983, 1985), Leslie 
(1983, 1984 and 1986), and Cobum and Leslie (1985). This material provides a lot of 
basic information and statistics about the earthquake and the training programme. There 
is however not much comment on the other building programmes in these studies. 
The other strategy of aided self-help housing was implemented under the European 
assistance programme in which a Dutch consultant, DHV played the lead role. In this 
programme the earthquake victims were supposed to conrribute land, locally available 
materials, and unskilled labour while the rest of the cost was born by the project. 
Organisers of this programme also produced useful material about the traditional 
Yemeni buildings but the focus in these studies remained on the self-help programme. 
Salient among these studies are Yulto (1986), SCREAA (1986), DHV (1988 and 1989), 
Dijkgraaf (1989), Jaghman (1989) Van Dijkhuzen (1989), and Kassem (1989). 
Another strategy was used by the Arab countries which provided the largest number of 
housing and other infrastructure in the disaster area (for derail see chapter 4). Under 
this strategy turnkey houses were provided to the victims. There is hardly any literature 
available on this programme except for some project reports mainly discussing the cost 
and structural designs of this infrastructure. 
The post-disaster technical assistance provided by the Government of India also resulted 
in the production of very useful material. This main topic of discussion i n these studies 
was the structural strength of Yemeni buildings and the methods of repairing them. The 
study material was provided by Arya (1985, 1991 and 1994) and Al-Shamie (1989). 
Apart from this some UN agencies such as UNCDF (1989 and 1991) UNICEF (1985), 
UNCHS (1987), UN/DHA (1985) and some individuals such as Buwalda e t al (1992), 
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Barakat (1993), ere also produced useful literature but most of it concentrated on the 
social aspects, water supply an other issues. 
It should be admitted that there was not much progress the study of disaster 
management and earthquake protection measures. The earthquakes of Turkey (1970), 
Yemen (1982) and others encouraged the experts to concentrate on vulnerability of the 
traditional buildings in low-income countries and low-cost protection measures against 
earthquakes and other natural hazards. Some of the remarkable contributions in this 
regard have come from Coburn and Hughes (1983), Cobum (1986), Spence and Coburn 
(1987), Cob urn and Spence (1992) and Arya (1994 ). This literature provides a lor of 
good information about the increasing risk of earthquake disasters and technical mainly 
technical solutions for improving the existing building stock in low-income countries. 
There is however nor enough comment in these srudies about hazard awareness of the 
people living in such areas. Some other experts, such as Davis (1978), generally 
mentioned the need for hazard awareness among the people living in hazard-prone 
areas. 
In Yemen the principal sources of information were the UN offices, various government 
offices involved in the reconstruction programme and the Oxfam office. Almost all 
these offices had kept there records very poorly and the researcher sometimes had to 
look into the waste dumps in these offices to look for any useful material. Only 
UNJCEF was found better organised but there information was more related to the 
water supply and health aspects. 
The review of thi s literature led to the study of Iiterarure on other programmes and 
strategies related to reconstruction, low-cost housing, community-based infrastructure 
projects, preparedness, disaster management, risk management, etc. The literature 
reviewed was wrirren by various authors, such as Office of Foreign Disaster Relief of 
USAID (1981), Aysan and Oliver (1987), Merriman and Browicr (1993), Aysan (1993), 
Wassef (1993) , Paul et al (1993) , Davis (1978, 1981 , 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995), Key 
(1995), and Davis and Lambert (1995). 
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The study of this literature gave the researcher an opportunity to review a number of 
reconstruction programmes around the world. It was noted that many of these 
programmes failed to achieve their main objectives of providing efficient, effective and 
sustainable infrastructure in the disaster areas. Detailed discussion on some of these 
programmes exists in chapter 6. Some other programmes are briefly discussed below. 
The post-cyclone disaster reconsrruction programme in Andhra Pradesh, India was 
undertaken by the government of Andhra Pradesh and some NGOs. The government 
provided the financial support and guidelines for safe construction. According to Reddy 
(1995), an official of the government agency responsible for programme 
implementation, the programme was successfull y implemented. The beneficiaries 
participated in the construction stage. 1t is not known whether this project proved to 
be sustainable because the cost of such construction seems to be beyond the capacity 
of a common man in India. 
The self-help reconstruction programme, after the 1983 Popayan earthquake in 
Columbia was undertaken by a government- sponsored agency SENA , and achieved 
mixed results (Wilches-Chaux, 1995). This programme mainly concentrated on training 
of the local artisans in earthquake-resistant construction. The programme was accepted 
by only a small percentage of the victims for socio-economic reasons. 
The rural housing project, after the 1987 earthquake in Equador, was jointly 
implemented by the Inrer-American De velopment Bank (IDB), the government of 
Equador and UNCHS/Habitat (Jordan, 1995). This programme failed in general to meet 
its objectives. The concerned government implementing agency, the Ministry of Social 
Welfare, was very centralised and was not in favour of community management. The 
distribution of houses was carried out under political pressure. The result was that 
many victims did not receive any shelter while some others, who were not the disaster 
victims, became the beneficiaries. This project created a negative impact on the 
victims. 
The post-disaster reconstruction programme, after the 1986 earthquake in El Salvador 
was undertaken by the government, with the assistance of USAID (Clark, 1995). The 
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disaster victims had an active role in this programme. Years later, when the 
government support was withdrawn, the project proved to be unsustainable. 
A similar programme in Jamaica, after the Hurricane Andrew disaster in 1988, also 
failed co produce any lasting results because of the lack of commitment by the 
implementing agencies (Oliver-Smith and Parker, 1995). 
There are several other examples such as the post-flood rural rehabilitation programme 
in Jamaica (Hodges, 1995), the Alro-Mayo reconstruction plan in Peru (Maskrey, 1995), 
the Philippines core shelter housing programme (Cory, 1995), disaster-resistant housing 
programme in the Solomon Islands and the Pacific (Boyle, 1995), the Dhamar building 
education project (Cory, 1995), etc, which can be quoted as examples. This literature 
review suggests that any reconstruction strategies may not create any lasting impact if 
they do not consider: 
a) hazard awareness of the disaster victims; 
b) the victims' social, culrural and economic conditions; and 
c) the role of the communiry in decision taking regarding location, design, size and 
construction of the infrastructure. 
Many of these studies concentrated on the technical aspects of the reconstruction 
programmes, or the low-cost housing programmes, and gave lower priority co the 
feelings of the disaster victims. It was therefore considered necessary for this thesis to 
study a reconsouction approach focusing principally on the people living in the hazard 
area, their socio-economic life, their general beliefs and concepts about safe ty, and 
identifying local solutions for safer homes. The main purpose of this study was eo 
supplement the work of other researchers in the management and mitigation of natural 
disasters. Detailed discussions on this aspect are given in the final chapters. 
1.11 Organisation of the study 
As this study is mainly concerned with planning and management of resources for 
development and reconstruction work in low-income and lower middle-income countries 
prone to earthquakes, it seems appropriate to discuss the causes and probability of 
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earthquakes, common perceptions, losses to life and property during earthquakes and 
various responses to face the usuall y enormous challenge of rehabilitation work in the 
devastated area. 
General organisation of the study is shown m Figure 1.2. The followi ng is a brief 
introduction of the chapters to follow. 
Chapter 2 provides detailed discussion on earthquakes, their causes, probability, possible 
loss of life and damage to property, general responses of the victims, governments and 
donors, flaws in various approaches usually adopted in the post earthquake development 
and reconstruction work and the need for efficient and effective designs for 
reconstruction in earthquake zones. 
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Gene r al observations I n i tia l litera ture rev i ew 
Research topic se l ection 
Hypothesis formulation 
Contact with experts Detailed literature review 
Preliminary evaluat i on Stat i stical analysis 
Results and discussion 
Conclusions and recommendations 
Figure 1.2: Organisation of the study 
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Chapter 3 gives a profile of the Republic of Yemen which covers general description 
of the country, physical features, economy, culture and traditions and main concerns of 
the government and local communities. This detailed look at the country's profile was 
found necessary to point out that success of any development or reconstruction work 
in any area heavily depends on due consideration of the local custom, culture, climate 
and other socio-economic factors. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the 1982 earthquake in Yemen and the subsequent 
reconstruction programme. The chapter begins with the historical background of 
earthquakes in the country and goes on to describe the 1982 earthquake and responses 
of the surviving community, government and donors. In a case study approach the 
chapter critically examines the infrastructure existing in Dhamar before the earthquake 
which proved to be the main cause of heavy human and property losses, and the post-
earthquake development and reconstruction programme. 
Chapter 5 discusses the major considerations for earthquake resistant designs for 
different types of materials. 
Chapter 6 deals with identification, assessment and management of risk for earthquake 
resistant design of infrastructure in seismic areas with respect to their acceptability and 
affordability by the survivors and presents some typical designs for Yemen. 
Chapter 7 gives details of the research design. The di scussion leads to explaining the 
problem statement, objectives of the study, formulation of the hypotheses and the 
methodological framework for data collection, evaluation and analysis. 
Chapter 8 presents the data collected from the field and evaluates on rhe basis of 
general observa tion and calculations. 
Chapter 9 is entirely based on statistical testing of the field data and the inferences 
drawn as a result of the analysis. 
Chapter 10 summarises the results and discussions derived from the previous chapters. 
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Chapter 11 starts with drawing conclusions from chapter I 0 and finally presents 
recommendations for future construction and reconstruction work in the eanhquake zone 
in Yemen. These recommendations are intended for other countries as well, faced with 
the same problems as Yemen. 
Summary 
Powers of nature are a menace to human life and property. Among natural hazards, 
earthquakes are considered to be one of the most serious threat to mankind mainly 
because of their unpredictabi!ity and enormity. Most of the damage caused in 
earthquake disasters is due to the man-made structures. The poorer countries suffer 
most in such disasters. Government implemented reconstruction programmes in such 
countries have generally failed to provide adequate and suitable infrastructure in the 
earthquake-affected areas. These problems provided valid objectives and a hypothesis 
for research . The Republic of Yemen, where an earthquake occurred in 1982 and where 
the government implemented a reconstruction programme, provided an opportunity for 
a case study. The chapter briefly introduces the study process followed in compilation 
of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
THE EARTHQUAKE HAZARD 
"What happens to us is irrelevant to the world geology, but what happens to the world 
geology is not irrelevant to us". (Hugh MacDiarmid, 1990) 
Our planet earth is undergoing continuous changes since its creation. Changing the 
shape of earth through powerful and often hostile forces, such as earthquakes, 
volcanoes, whirlwinds, tornadoes, floods, etc, is a natural phenomena (National 
Geographic Society, 1978). Earthquake is reckoned as the most serious among natural 
hazards since it cannot be correctly predicted and can occur anywhere anytime. The 
legends regarding ancient cities of Troy in Greece and Taxila in Pakistan suggest that 
these civilised cities were destroyed by earthquakes (Coburn and Spence, 1992). Most 
people experience once or more, an earthquake in their lifetime (Gere and Shah, 1984). 
It is a terrifying experience. Most earthquakes last for only two or three seconds but 
if the shaking effect continues for a longer duration, the effects can be devastating. The 
feeling of the floor under our feet giving way, the fear of the buildings and other heavy 
objects falling on us gives a very uneasy feeling. Those few moments of fear, anxiety 
and uncertainty give an exaggerated perception about the duration of earthquake. 
Talking about human perception of the duration of earthquake Darwin (1959) related 
his experience, during the Voyage of the Beagle, that although the tremor on the South 
American coast lasted for only a few seconds, the time appeared to be much longer. 
An earthquake is a natural phenomenon which creates an urge to panic. It is a 
tremendous force which originates from within earth and can cause violent convulsions 
on the earth's surface and shakes buildings to the ground in a matter of seconds. The 
slightest tremor can cause great fear because very few people are knowledgeable about 
earthquakes (Healy , 1969). Those who have any knowledge or previous experience of 
earthquakes, take refuge under the tables or door lintels, in the corner of rooms, or in 
open areas. The inexperienced people get panicky and suffer injuries or the loss of life 
by trying to take refuge on the top of roofs or trees, or by the side of buildings which 
are vulnerable and exposed to danger. 
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2.1 Life and infrastructure losses during earthquakes 
Loss of life and infrastructure in earthquakes is usually extensive (Horne, 1983). 
Earthquakes causing the highest number of fatalities are usually in those places with 
high population density and vulnerable buildings made of low strength materials with 
poor workmanship and without any consideration to resist lateral forces produced during 
an earthquake. This situation is quite familiar in low-income or lower middle-income 
countr:ies. Some idea of the cost and quality of buildings involved in these fatal 
incidents can be obtained by comparing the economic losses inflicted by the earthquakes 
with human life losses (Cobum and Spence 1992). While in China the economic losses 
are in the vicinity of US$ I ,000 for every life lost, the economic losses in USA are over 
million for every fatality. 
Table 2.1: Major earthquake - affected countries of the world 
Earthquake ranking No of fatal Total No of earthquakes which Return 
and countries earthquakes estimated killed more than period 
1900-1995 deaths in ]()()() 10000 100000 years 
1 China 151 609,550 17 7 2 0.6 
2 Japan 79 178,500 8 1 1 1 
3 Italy 43 127,902 6 2 2 
4 Iran 82 117,764 15 4 I 
5 Turkey 110 73,967 14 I 1 
6 CIS 46 71,022 5 3 2 
7 Peru 53 70,382 2 I 2 
8 Pakistan 18 61,773 I I 5 
9 Chile 34 36,020 4 1 3 
10 Indonesia 48 25,526 2 I 2 
11 Guatemala 14 25,195 2 1 7 
12 India 21 22,739 2 1 4 
13 Nicaragua 3 13,550 I 1 31 
14 Morocco 2 12,013 1 1 46 
15 Nepal 4 11 ,571 I I 23 
16 Philippines 24 10,128 2 4 
17 Mexico 44 8,525 2 2 
18 Taiwan 49 8,423 3 2 
19 Ecuador 26 8,133 3 4 
20 Argentina 12 5,589 1 8 
21 Algeria 20 5,144 2 5 
22 Yemen 3 4,300 2 31 
Sources: I. Coburn & Spence, 1992; 2. Newsweek, 1/1995. 
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Many factors, such as lack of awareness of the governments and people about 
earthquakes and the implied devastation, inadequate designs of infrastructure and lack 
of maintenance are attributed to be the main causes for heavy losses during an 
earthquake. Earthquake-prone countries want to reduce their life and economic losses. 
This requires some understanding of the different aspects of earthquake occurrence by 
all those concerned with earthquake protection. Table 2.1 gives a list of the world's 
major earthquake countries and the loss of life in this century. 
It is estimated on a global basis that one in 8,000 people lose their lives in earthquakes 
and about one in 800 receive injuries of various degrees. These fatalities are caused 
by various incidents, such as fires, tsunamis, rock falls, landslides, and other secondary 
hazards after the earthquakes (Coburn and Spence, 1992). The main cause of loss of 
life in earthquakes, up to 50% sometimes, is however the collapse of buildings. 
Masonry buildings made of rubble stone, adobe, rammed earth, non-reinforced clay 
bricks or concrete block with poor bond, are prone to collapse during earthquakes of 
even moderate intensity. 
In advanced countries, where awareness of the earthquake hazard and the need for 
safety measures is generally higher than the developing countries, the losses are far less 
because of the following main reasons: 
a) early information dissemination from the agencies responsible for seismological 
studies and research; 
b) awareness and preparedness of the concerned governments and local population 
in case of disaster; and 
c) precautionary and safety measures considered in the design of infrastructure. 
Table 2 .2 shows some significant earthquakes of the century and the devastation caused 
by them. 
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Year 
1905 
1906 
1906 
1908 
1920 
1923 
1927 
1934 
1935 
1939 
1960 
1970 
1976 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1986 
1988 
1990 
199 1 
1992 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1995 
Sources: 
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Table 2.2: Significant earthquakes of the century 
Country Richter Loss of Other losses 
Magnilude l ife 
India 8.6 19,000 Long fault in Kashmir Valley; Kangra 
Town fu lly destroyed 
USA 8.3 500 220,000 homeless; heavy losses to 
in f mstruc tu re 
Ecuador 8.9 1,000 Long duration of over three minutes; 
vast area destroyed 
lt.al y 7.5 58,000 98% buildings in Messina destroyed 
China 8.5 200,000 Landslide destroyed many towns and 
villages in Ningxia 
Japan 8.3 99,33 1 Major destruction in Tokyo and 
Yokohama including fi re 
China 8.3 40,9 12 Heavy property losses 
India 8.4 10,700 L and subsidence and foundation 
sctl.lement in Bihar 
Pakistan 7.6 25,000 Quetta city infrastructure completely 
destroyed 
Chi le 8.3 28,000 Chi l lan C ity destroyed. 100,000 people 
homeless 
Chile 8.5 2,230 6 1 deaths in Hawaii and 120 in Japan due 
to Tsunami 
Peru 7.8 66.794 R(X),OOO people homeless; 18,000 buried 
in landslide 
China 7.7 242,469 Over 1,0<Xl,O(X) homeless 
A lgeria 7.3 5,000 Large faull in A I-A snam. 200,000 people 
homeless 
Yemen 6.0 2.800 Rural infrastructure damaged earthquake 
and landslides 
T urkey 6.9 2,000 Rural inf rastructure destroyed 
El-Salvador 6.0 1,000 16,000 injured; 150,000 homeless 
Armenia 6.9 24 ,944 500,000 homeless 
Iran 7.5 40,000 60,000 injured; 50,000 homeless 
Yemen 4.6 Few 11 ,700 homes destroyed; 200,000 
homeless 
Indonesia 7.5 2,080 2,000 injured; 100,000 homeless 
Egypt 5.9 561 20,000 homeless 
India 6.5 20,000 fnfrastructure in 50 villages wiped out; 
140,000 homeless 
USA 6.7 57 L os Angeles infrastructure destroyed; 
100,000 homeless. American continent's 
cosUiest earthquake with about US$30 
bill ion losses 
Japan 6.9 5,470 33,000 injured; 350,000 homeless; 
world 's cosl!iest earthquake with losses 
estimated at US$ 150 bill ion 
Russia 7.5 2,000 two-th irds popu lation of Neftegorsk and 
the entire infrastructure wiped our 
Polyahov, 1974; Gere & Shah, 1984; Coburn and Spe nce, 1992; 
UN/DHA, 1993; TIME International 1/ 1994 and 11/1995; Newsweek 
l/1995; The Economist, 4/ 1995; New Civil Engineer l/1995. 
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The frequency of disasters is increasing with the passage of time. Each time the losses, 
both in terms of life and infrastructure, are also on the increase. This is because of the 
fact that over 75% of the Latin American population lives in makeshift and vulnerable 
accommodation (UN Habi tat, 1976). Almost the same is true about Asia, where almost 
three-quarters of the entire world's population lives. It is estimated that during the 
twelve months between 1970 and 1971 , over 51 disasters occurred which claimed 
500,000 lives and dislocated some 68 million people. Earthquake disaster projection 
carried out for two well known seismic areas, for San Francisco and Tokyo, are given 
in the following Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
Table 2.3: Earthquake disaster projection in San Francisco, USA. 
Estimated consequences of 
Earthquake features 1906 earthquake eanhquake in the near 
future 
Magnitude (Scale) 8.3 (Richter) 8.3 (Richter) 
Population 400,000 3, 100,000 
Deaths 500 8,750 (22,000 injured) 
Homeless 220,000 500,000 
Damage Entire commercial and 100,000 homes unusable 
industrial centre destroyed. 
55% of houses destroyed 
Source: Davis, 1978 
Table 2.4: Earthquake disaster projection in Tokyo, Japan. 
Estimated consequences of 
Earthquake features 1923 earthquake earthquake in near future 
Magnitude (Scale) 8.3 (Richter) 8.3 (Richter) 
Population 400,000 12 million 
Deaths 500 8,750 (22,000 injured) 
Homeless 140,000 500,000 to 1 million 
Damage 40% of buildings Total destruction in 2 km 
destroyed. Total loss radius around epicentre. 
estimated at US$3 billion 50% destruction in 5 km 
radius. 
Source: Davis, 1978 
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The above predictions are in respect of two most advanced and high-income countries 
where losses can be expected to be minimal because of earthquake resistant design of 
buildings and the peoples' and governments' awareness, preparedness and resources. 
The losses in low-income countries can be expected to be manifold in comparison to 
the above figures. 
2.2 What is an earthquake? 
Earthquakes, one of the most significant natural hazards, belong to those systematic 
interactions between man and nature, which cause catastrophic results at times and yet 
man has no control over them (Geipel, 1991). Mankind has been encountering this 
catastrophe from times unknown. It is only in the twentieth century that we have begun 
to understand the earthquakes and their causes (Coburn and Spence, 1992). Earthquakes 
can now be measured, analysed and mapped. 
The following paragraphs discuss in some detail the ancient beliefs, the modern theories 
and the extent of destruction caused by the earthquakes. 
The people in many countries still regard natural hazards, particularly earthquakes, as 
the 'acts of God' (Gist and Lubin, 1989). These people generally believe, that it is not 
possible to escape the divine punishment. From man's earliest days his very survival 
was dependent on the great elemental powers, such as water, wind, sun and earth 
(Davis, 1978). Each is vital for his survival and yet each can threaten his hold on the 
planet's surface. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes and floods 
have been commonly referred as 'acts of God' because even today we find ourselves 
helpless to avert them (Gist and Lubin, 1989). An earthquake, or for that matter, any 
other natural hazard becomes a disaster only when it hits a populated area (Coburn and 
Spence, I 992). 
Various religious and superstitious beliefs exist in different parts of the world, and 
different imaginary reasons have been given for earthquakes, such as wrath of the gods 
and the subsequent divine punishment. A Japanese myth is quite well known for 
describing the tremors of earthquakes as caused by the capri cious napping of a giant 
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catfish living at the bottom of earth (Figure 2.1). Human mind has however continued 
to search for logical answers. Healy (1969) observed that various myths and religious 
explanations could not satisfy the natural scientific curiosity about the causes of 
earthquakes. The first non-superstitious theory was probably presented by Aristotle 
(Gere and Shah, 1984). He defined earthquakes as a result of suction of polluted winds 
of the atmosphere through the caverns and crevices and other holes on the surface of 
earth. He believed that these winds were ignited by heat below the earth's surface and 
evicted under great pressure causing earthquake tremors and volcanic eruption. This 
view continued to hold ground for several centuries until the new theories based on 
geological investigations gave scientific reasons for the earthquakes. 
Darwin (1959) may also have developed some idea about the modern theories of plate 
tectonics when he commented that a severe earthquake can at once destroy the symbol 
of our oldest associations with the earth. The very emblem of solidity and strength 
moves beneath our feet like a thin crust over a fluid. These rational explanations led 
the scientists to concentrate on the causes of earthquakes from within the earth itself. 
Figure 2.1: 
~itHii{Ihf 
lt 
11,\ 
One of the early superstitious beliefs regarding 1causes of earthquakes. The God-
Superior from lhe Kashima shrine, Japan, tells the daimyoj in to drive down the pivot 
stone hard on lhe Edo (Tokyo) earthquake namazu (catfish) to warn other earthquakes. 
Each of the onlooking namazu~is an historical earthquake. From lefl, Kwanto, Osaka, 
Koshu, Echigo, Odawara, and Sado earthquakes. 
Source: Bolt, 1978. 
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2.3 Causes of earthquakes 
Experts have been studying earthquakes for years but a convincing theory has still not 
been developed (Healy, 1969). Many theories are published since the study of 
earthquakes became an independent science subject called seismology. Seismologists 
agree that the earth's crust moves almost continuously (Figure 2.2). The reasons for 
these movements are not agreed upon by all experts but there is a general consensus 
that most earthquakes occur because of the simple reason that our planet is not the dead 
slab of rock many people once believed it to be. The metallic core of earth is covered 
by a layer of slowly churning mantle of rock which remains in plastic condition due to 
excessive heat and pressure (Grove, 1992). The mantle is topped by the cold, rigid and 
relatively thin layer of earth crust ranging from about 70 kilometres under the oceans 
to about 150 kilometres under the continents. This crust or earth cover is not in one 
piece but a combination of hundreds of thousands of fragments, known as the 'tectonic 
plates' (Horne, 1979). These plates range in width from a few hundred to several 
thousand kilometres. The underneath pressures cause constant movement of these plates 
at the rate of a few centimetres per year. This movement is caused partly by pressures 
in the molten materials under the crust plates and partly by the rotation of earth. In 
some areas the new crust material, under pressure from the molten interior, tends to fill 
the empty spaces by pushing away the adjoining plates. In other areas the plates slide 
past or push against one another. Such movements release energy in the form of 
seismic (derived from the Greek word seismos) waves. The difference in movements 
of tectonic plates, whatever the circumstances leading to this phenomena, causes an 
earthquake (Melham, 1978). Geologists have found out that edges of the plates are 
most prone to earthquakes and those countries or towns, which are located along the 
edges of tectonic plates, are more vulnerable to di sasters. Therefore along a fault line 
deep inside the earth' s surface may result in surface faulting. The resulting crack on 
the surface of the earth gives a viewer visual experience of the earthquake (Amold and 
Reitherman, 1982). 
The earth 's crust is being gradually displaced at the margins of the plates presumably 
by convection currents in the upper mantle. Bell (1983) describes that differential 
displacements give ri se to elastic strains which eventually surpass the strength of the 
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A cross-section of earth based on seismological evidence. The outer 
shell consists of a rocky mantle that has structural discontinuities in its 
upper part and at its lower boundary that are capable of reflecting or 
modifying earthquake waves. Below the mantle an outer fluid core 
surrounds a solid kernel at the Earth's centre; between the two is a 
transition shell. 
Source: Bolt, 1982 
rocks above and a fault is created. As a consequence the strain is partly or wholly 
neutralised and an earthquake occurs. Occasionally minor earthquakes occur in stable 
parts of the world. 
Another simplified explanation of the circumstances causing earthquakes is given by 
Otsuka ( 1980). According to him an earthquake is the result of any sudden 
displacement of the earth's crust either on or beneath its surface. The causes of the 
displacement may be natural or artificial or both. The term is however restricted to 
movements of natural origin and to those which take place below the earth's surface. 
Thus the tremors caused by wind or sea waves, landslides or rockfalls, cannot be 
regarded as earthquakes. 
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Not all earthquakes are caused by nature. There are several artificial causes, such as 
nuclear tests, artificial reservoirs created by construction of dams or pumping water into 
deep wells, which have triggered small earthquakes in different parts of the world, 
particularly those areas which are prone to earthquakes (Gere and Shah, 1984). It is 
widely believed, in the cases of artificial reservoirs and deep wells, that water from 
these sources lubricates the faults which reduces friction between the underlying crust 
plates. The result is more earthquakes but usually of low magnitude. Geologists 
believe that while eliminating earthquakes in seismic zones seems impossible there is, 
at least in theory, a possibility of controlling major earthquakes by artificially creating 
several harmless earthquakes of low intensity (Melham, 1978). People living in fault 
zones will experience frequent tremors strong enough to draw their attention but not 
strong enough to cause any damage. 
2.4 The seismic zones 
World geology does not show any changes and major seismic activity occurs in the 
same regions. Earthquake locations may however change within a region . Sometimes 
earthquakes may occur where they are least expected such as the Kobe earthquake of 
1995 (The Economist, 1995). 
The world seismic map prepared after the study of over 700 strongest earthquakes and 
those with unexpected locations describes the major seismic zones as follows (UNDRO, 
1978): 
2.4.1 Circum-Pacific seismic belt: 80% of the total seismic energy is released in this 
zone. The main areas and countries covered in this zone are the eastern coast of Japan, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Guam, New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tonga and New 
Zealand. All types of shallow, intermediate and deep earthquakes occur in this zone. 
This classification is based on the depth of focus of an earthquake and is discussed in 
detail in section 2. 7. 
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On the western coast of the Pacific Ocean Mexico, Alaska, California, Belleny Islands 
in Antarctica, the Gulf of California, Easter Island, the Galapagos Islands and the 
Aleutin Islands are covered in this seismic zone. 
2.4.2 Trans-Asiatic seismic zone: South European countries such as Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Turkey and Cyprus, all North African countries such as Morocco, Algeria and 
Egypt, some Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen and Iran, South Asian countries 
such as Pakistan and India, and Far Eastern countries such as Burma and Indonesia are 
included in this zone. Mostly shallow and intermediate earthquakes occur in this zone. 
2.4.3 Mid-ocean rifts zone: This zone is located between the Indo-Atlantic and Indo-
Antarctic rifts. Long fracture lines dividing the Atlantic ocean and the Indian Ocean 
are believed to be the main cause of frequently occurring sha llow earthquakes of 
moderate magnitude in this zone. 
Apart from these major zones there are some small and narrow active seismic zones 
which are responsible for earthquakes in Australia, Philippines, Eurasia, Africa, inner 
Pacific and the Antarctica. 
2.5 Hypocentre or focus 
Earthquake is a phenomena produced by sudden changes inside the earth. The origin 
of an earthquake where faulting and energy release first begins in all directions is called 
hypocentre or focus (Figure 2.3). Hypocentre is not limited to a point but sometimes 
may have considerable length or volume (Architectural Institute of Japan, 1970). The 
depth of hypocentre varies from a few kilometres to several hundred kilometres. Severe 
earthquakes causing serious damage to life and infrastructure can have their hypocentres 
shallower than 50 kilometres. 
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Figure 2.3: Block diagram showing isoseismal lines and their relation to epicentre 
and hypocentre. 
Source: Bell , 1983 
2.6 Epicentre 
Epicentre is a point on the earth's surface vertically above the hypocentre (Amold and 
Reitherman, 1982). Since the faulting plane is not necessarily vertical, and the fault 
may rupture along a considerable distance, shaking at the epicentre may not be the most 
intense. Earthquake foci are confined within a limited zone of the earth above and their 
maximum recorded depth is 700 kilometres. 
2.7 Classification of earthquakes 
Earthquakes seldom occur at the earth surface. Precise determination of their depth still 
remains a problem for the seismologists. In fact most earthquakes occur within 25 
kilometres from the earth surface. In view of its significance! the depth of foc i or 
hypocentre is used as a basis to classify earthquakes. Bell ( 1983) categorised the types 
of earthquakes as follows (Figure 2.4): 
a) those occurring within 70 km from the earth surface are ca lled shallow; 
b) those occurring between 70 to 300 km depth are classified as intermediate; and 
c) those between 300 to 700 km depth are known as deep. 
This classification is also accepted by the United Nations (UNDRO, 1978). 
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Large earthquakes cause powerful shock waves which travel all over the world. The 
shock near the epicentre is short-lived and does not remain for more than a few 
seconds, but with the increasing distance, the vibrations last longer. The vibrations of 
a shallow earthquake are strong but they do not travel far from the epicentre. On the 
other hand shock waves emiuing from a deep earthquake are usually weak but they 
cover much wider areas. 
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of earthquake epicentres 
Source: Bell, 1983 
2.8 Earthquake waves 
? (l 
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The ground motion transmitted from rhe hypocentre through the interior of eanh and 
under the base of a building has a random fonn but also somerimes has an emphatic 
direction (Amold and Reithennan, 1982). The motion originates in four we ll defined 
types of waves created by a faulr rupture as described below (Figure 2.5). 
2.8. 1 P waves: The primary waves (or longitudinal waves), commonly known as rhe 
P waves, are the fastes£ and travel at a speed of about 8 km/sec or 18,000 mph and 
arrive first to cause the damage. These waves ttre like sound waves which in the 
process of their spreading out alternately pull and push at the ground. Most of the 
damage is caused by these waves. 
35 
---- ---- ---
P wave l Compressions 
(a) Jf/~~8&& ~ 
S wave · 
~~~ ~ ~'~--.....;  1- ~lT$~tA . 
... L> ~-~ ~r._ :;,;.;.;: ~ ~ 
..... I•· -; ~~,-~~~ ~~ ~ ~[~~~~ 
... ~~~ · ~ ~~ ~~n~ 
... ~ ~ ........ ~ -.....G Ftr:I ~-----_t~:~rLLS ~ . 
...... 
~ 
Douh lc amplitndt' 
Wavelength 
(b ) ~~m~., .. ~ 
Love wave 
,_,t:::)..., 
·l ·-· l I·• 
lcl ~~~T~~~AA®MEJ~ 
Rayleigh wave 
r 
Figure 2.5 : 
- ~ I - . 
' 1 
The earthquake waves 
Source: Bolt, 1988 
I h V ,• 
~~ • • I ' . ~: " - ' • ... 
·' , ~ ~ . ~. fi ... \, 
36 
Chap1er Two 
~I 
l~l 
• 1n• a;.;ro~-: 
., '" l ~ . .. . 
• 11; • 
- _j 
Chapter Two 
2.8.2 S waves: The secondary or S waves (also known as the transverse waves) shear 
the earth's surface sideways at right angles to the''ilirection of travel. 
L 
2 .8.3 Love waves: These waves are similar to the S waves but do not cause any 
vertical displacement. They move the ground from side to side horiwntally parallel to 
the surface of earth, at right angles to the direction of propagation and produce 
horiwntal shaking. 
2.8.4 Raleigh waves: These are also surface waves which cause the disturbed earth 
material to move both vertically and horizontally in a vertical plane pointing in the 
direction in which the waves are travelling. Of the two surface waves, the Love waves 
travel faster than the raleigh waves. 
2.9 Seismic risk and earthquake prediction 
The study of regional seismicity and with the help of seismic maps its is possible to 
indicate the regions or areas where next earthquakes will occur. What is however 
difficult is to specify the exact place, time and magnitude of a future earthquake and 
whether it will be mild or di sastrous (The Economist, 1995). 
The records of earthquake intensity show that, every year on average, twenty 
earthquakes of high magnitude and over one hundred of moderate magnitude occur in 
different parts of the world (Table 2.5). This showed that one major earthquake can be 
expected on the surface of earth once in every three days (Al-Shamie, 1989). Although 
earthquakes are reported from almost all over the world their probable areas of activity 
are the regions of recent mountain building and the global rift system that is along the 
edges of tectonic plates which form the earth's crust (Figure 2.6) (Bell, 1983). 
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Table 2.5: Estimated world-wide earthquakes in a year 
Magnitude M 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
Average number of eanhquakes equal to or 
above M given in the last column 
2 
20 
100 
3,000 
15,000 
above 100,000 
Source: Bolt, 1982. 
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Geologists have well defined the seismic zones of the world (Figure 2. 7). In severe 
earthquake wnes the probability of an eanhquake is always greater where it may be 
repeated once in every 50 to 70 years . This does not mean that once an earthquake has 
occurred the area is safe for the next 50 or 70 years. Probability means that chances 
of the disaster are one in fifty to one in seventy every year. Gere and Shah (1984) 
observed that the longer the safe period passing since the last earthquake, the greater 
the probability of the next one. The probability estimates only inform us that the 
people and infrastructure in a particular area are at a risk of an earthquake and planning 
for their safety should be undertaken. 
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Figure 2.7: World map showing relation between the major tectonic plates and 
earthquakes and volcanoes 
Source: Bolt, 1977 
The most important object of seismology and earthquake engineering is to mitigate 
earthquake disas ters and as far as possible, to prevent them from occurring (Hattori, 
1980). For these purposes the topics of earthquake prediction, estimation of earthquake 
motions and the amount of earthquake damage and measures against earthquake 
disasters have become important research subjects in recent years. 
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The ideal solution for estimation of earthquake motions is to be able to predict the 
earthquake with sharp accuracy (Hattori, 1980). Efforts to successfully predict and 
prevent earthquakes have been made since the 1950s when seismology provided a 
theoretical framework for the process of earthquake occurrence. It is however realised 
that the development of conditions which trigger an earthquake is far more complex 
than expected. Although a few earthquake predictions have been successful in the past, 
by and large the subject remains as illusive as ever. 
In spite of all modem research and laboratory work, it is still not possible to positively 
predict an earthquake with accuracy (Melham, 1978). While theoretically it is possible 
to have an earthquake anywhere at any time, the probability in most places is so low 
that the hazard cannot be considered as a threat for everyday purpose. 
Sometimes the signals are strong and obvious to predict an earthquake such as the 
earthquake of Haicheng in China (1975), with a magnitude of 7.3, was successfully 
predicted and major life losses were prevented by leading the people out of their homes 
and into open fields. The traditional type of infrastructure, in Haicheng area, was 
however completely destroyed in this disaster. 
Most of the time earthquakes have taken the engineers and scientists by complete 
surprise because there were no prior signals. The recent earthquakes of Marathawada 
in India (1993), Northbridge in the USA (1994) and Kobe in Japan (1995) are among 
the examples where there were no prior indications of the event (The Economist, 
l/1995). 
In view of many uncertainties linked with earthquakes, successful predictions are few. 
Some famous signals, successfully deployed in the past to predict earthquakes, include 
the following: 
· a) unusual animal behaviour (Figure 2.8); 
b) rising of water level in the wells; 
c) tilting of land surface; 
d) changes in the electrical resistance of the ground; 
e) fluctuation in the magnetic field; 
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f) changes in the seismic wave velocities; 
g) rise in the temperature of hot springs in the area; and 
h) increased discharge from hot springs. 
Can Animals Predict Earthquakes? 
Figure 2.8: Unusual animal behaviour is considered as one of the earthquake 
prediction signals 
Source: Gere and Shah, 1984 
Long-tenn prediction of earthquakes will make it possible to: 
a) strengthen the structures of existing buildings; 
b) make regulations for land use and earthquake resistant building designs; 
c) create public awareness for safety rules and preventive measures; and 
d) for planning relief plans. 
Short-tenn prediction will help to: 
a) mobilise relief work in the event of a di saster; 
b) organise evacuation of endangered buildings and other areas; 
c) temporarily close down those industries and factories which may aggravate the 
disaster; and 
d) evacuate low-lying coastal areas which may be susceptible to tsunamis. 
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2.10 Earthquake measurements 
Human efforts have long been focused on estimating and measuring the earthquake 
forces in order to form an idea about the possible extent of damage they may cause and 
to take any preparatory measures. The energy released in earthquakes travels through 
the ground in the form of waves (Section 2.6) which somewhat resembles movement 
of the sea-waves. In large earthquakes these waves can actually be seen. Various 
definitions related to the measurement of earthquakes are given in the following 
paragraphs: 
2.1 0.1 Ground motion: During an earthquake the ground rapidly moves in a complex 
way in both horizontal and vertical directions. This movement is called ground motion. 
2.10.2 Seismograph: The instrument which measures and records ground motions is 
called a seismograph. The first effective seismograph was built just before the 
beginning of the twentieth century (Bolt, 1978). The present instruments are more 
sophisticated and record their readings photographically or electro-magnetically on a 
tape as compared to the old instruments which used ink-pens for writing their readings 
on rotating drums (Figure 2.9). These instruments work in such a way that a mass is 
freely suspended from a frame fixed on the ground. This free suspension of the mass 
makes it independent of the motion of the frame. When the fixed frame is shaken by 
earthquake waves, the inertia of the mass forces it to Jag behind the motion of the 
frame. This relative motion is duly recorded. The strong-motion modern seismographs 
are called accelerometers or acce/erographs (Arnold and Reitherman, 1982). They 
record the nearby rather than the distant ground motions directly . The graph which they 
produce is called an accelerogram. These instruments are placed so as to record 
movements along the two horizontal axes and one vertical. Three measures are 
recorded in each direction and they are of major interest in earthquake study. These 
measures are called velocity, acceleration, and displacement. 
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2.10.3 Seismogram: The chart or record in any other form carrying readings of a 
seismograph is called a seismogram. For recording different directions of the 
earthquake waves a number of instruments are used with different positions of the 
hanging mass. Very sensitive instruments can record earthquake magnitudes as low as 
minus two (-2) which is equivalent to the shock created by the dropping of a brick from 
a table to the ground. 
2.10.4 Accelerogram: It is the modem version of a seismogram (Figure 2.10). While 
the seismogram is a chart prepared by an automatic ink-pen, an accelerogram provides 
a picture of the ground shaking. The arrival of P wave starts the motion. The S wave 
is next to arrive. The rime interval between the arrival of P and S waves helps to 
calculate the distance between the instrument and the earthquake focus. The duration 
of strong earthquake motions can be clearly seen from the accelerogram and the 
maximum wave amplitude can be measured directly in millimetres. The ground 
acceleration is calculated by relating amplitude to time. Velocity and displacement are 
mathematically calculated by integrating the acceleration record once and twice, 
respectively. 
time 
t" 'F'j' '''l"'lw''l''"j' *I";; j'll 'f"i*'ilii'j""l" ''j SeC 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Figure 2.10: Typical accelerogram 
Source: Bolt, 1977 
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2.10.5 Velocity: The rate of ground motion is called velocity (Figure 2.11). It is 
measured in centimetres per second (cm/sec). 
15} GROUNO VELOCITV ]1\f'~~-
15 ··-·--13·71najsec. 
Figure 2.11 : Typical earthquake velocity diagram 
Source: Bolt, 1977 
2.10.6 Acceleration : It is the rate of change of velocity. When acceleration is 
multiplied with mass, the result is the inertia force which the building must resist in 
order to remain intact. Acceleration is usually represented by g which is the 
acceleration of a free falling body due to earth 's gravity at a rate of 980 centimetres per 
second per second (cm/sec/sec) or 32 feet/second/second (ft/sec/sec) (Figure 2.12). The 
peak ground acceleration (PGA) is the maximum value of acceleration at any instant 
during the ground motion. The maximum accelerations may range from 0.5 g to 2 g. 
GROUND ACCELERATION ~:l~ 
0·3 --------0·32g 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
TIME (sec.) 
Figure 2.12: Typical earthquake acceleration diagram 
Source: Bolt, 1977 
The data on intensive earth movements close to the epicentre are of great value fm 
earthquake engineers and seismologists. Direct measurement of the acceleration of 
earth motion and the study of its frequency spectrum or response spectrum are 
important for an engineer's calculations which assist him in the design of structures 
(UNORO, 1978). 
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2.10.7 Duration: The duration of earthquake shaking is measured in terms of the length 
of time during which the acceleration peaks exceeded a certain amplitude. The duration 
varies from a few seconds to a minute or more in strong ground shaking. The longer 
the duration of earth shaking the more destructive the earthquake will be (Coburn and 
Spence, 1992). 
2.10.8 Frequency: It is the number of times the ground moves backwards and forwards 
in one second during an earthquake. 
2.10.9 Inertia forces : Ground motion created by an earthquake does not act on a 
building like a force directly hitting the walls such as strong winds (Arnold and 
Reitherman, 1982). The effect on buildings and other infrastructure is rather internal 
generated by inertial forces which are the result of vibration of the building mass. 
Inertial forces are the product of mass and acceleration (Newton's formula: Force = 
mass x acceleration). Acceleration is already described in para 2.10.6 whereas mass is 
a function of the weight of the building. This is why earthquake-resistant designs have 
emphasis on light weight construction. 
2.10.10 Period: All buildings vibrate to various degrees when jolted by an earthquake 
depending upon their flexibility . The swaying backwards and forwards in a given time 
is called a cycle. The duration in which a cycle is completed is known as period. 
2.10.11 Damping: The swaymg of a building continues for some time after the 
disturbance is finished. This swaying also dies away after a while. The rate at which 
the swaying decreases after the end of the disturbance is called damping and is very 
important in structural designs. 
2.10.12 Resonance: The swaying of ground and the structure above it at a certain point 
is usually different. While the swaying of ground cannot be altered, the swaying of a 
building can be controlled through design. If these two movements coincide then the 
dimensions of the swing become larger and the structure is said to resonate. This 
phenomena increases loads on the building . 
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2.10.13 Displacement: It is the distance by which a particle object is removed from its 
original or at-rest position and is measured in centimecres or inches (Figure 2.13). 
Figure 2.13: Typical displacement diagram 
Source: Bolt, 1977 
2.10.14 Torsion: Torsion is the result of loads created by inertia forces of an 
earthquake and the resistance offered by walls and frames of a building. Torsion tries 
to rotate a building if the loads and resi stance are acentric. Detailed explanation of 
torsion is that earthquake inertia forces tend to horizontally accelerate the particles of 
a mass. This force can be described as the horizontal equivalent of gravity force. 
Sometimes the movement of particles is vertical also but it is of lesser significance. If 
the mass in a floor is uniformly distributed, the resultant force of horizontal acceleration 
of all its particles is exerted through centre of the floor. If the resultant of resistance 
provided by walls and frames pushes back through this point and counters the resultant 
of loads directly, a dynamic balance is maintained. If the direction of the resistance and 
the loads is not the same, horizontal rotation or torsion will occur which will tend to 
rotate the building. If the mass is eccentrically disposed the earthquake load will also 
be acentric. An earthquake generates a load only because of the presence of mass and 
the amount of load is directly proportional to mass. If the load is acentric, the 
resistance should also be acentric so that the location of the centre of mass and the 
centre of resis tance are at the same point and torsion is avoided. This is the principle 
which designers use for countering torsion. 
2.10. 15 Magnitude: The magnitude of an earthquake is a measure of its total size, the 
energy generated at its source or focus as estimated from laboratory observations 
(Cobum and Spence, 1992). This term is used to describe the earthquake as a whole 
and is different from 'earthquake intensity ' which is defined in Section 2.1 0.16. 
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The size of an earthquake is related to the amount of elastic energy release in the 
process of fault rupture. The energy release from an earthquake is like an explosion 
being detonated below ground with the magnitude being the measure of the energy 
release. 
A number of magnitude scales are in use but the oldest and most commonly used is the 
Richter scale (M1) defined by Professor Charles Richter (Figure 2.14). He proved that 
the magnitude of an earthquake can be measured by instruments (Gere and Shah, 1984). 
Richter devised a logarithmic scale in 1935 to compare the magnitude of earthquakes 
in California. His method has since been widely in use, with some modifications, all 
over the world. Richter related the magnitude of a tectonic earthquake, to the total 
amount of elastic energy released, when the over-strained rocks under pressure suddenly 
give way by generating shock waves. The severest recorded earthquake was of 
magnitude 8.9. Such earthquakes release about 700,000 times the energy of a mild 
earthquake (Bell, 1983). 
Categories of earthquake vis-a-vis their magnitudes are given in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6: Earthquake magnitude and relevant effects 
Richter Magnitude Category Remarks 
2.0 and be low Mild Not generally felt 
3.0 Mild Felt by some; no losses 
4.0 Mild Felt by most; no major losses 
5.0 Moderate Minor structural damage 
6.0 Major Major damage to earthquake non-
resistant structures 
7.0 Severe Major damage to all infrastructure 
8.0 and above Great Total damage 
Source: Gere and Shah; 1984. 
This scale is based on the logarithm of amplitude of the largest swing recorded by a 
standard seismograph (Coburn and Spence, 1992). Different types of seismic waves are 
emitted in different earthquakes. In general the definition of magnitude which best 
correlates with the surface effects of earthquakes is the surface wave magnitude Ms 
because it is the surface waves which are most harmful to buildings. 
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To dctennine Richter magnitude at varying distances from the epicentre, 
connect on the chart: (A ) the maximum ampli tude recorded by a 
standard seismometer and (B) the distance of seismometer from the 
epicentre of the earthquake (or difference in arriva l times of P and S 
waves) by (C) a straight line, and (D) read the magniwdc off the centre 
scale. 
Source: Bolt. I <J?X 
A general guide for easier understanding of the earthquake magnitude, the approx imate 
amoun t of energy release and poss ible damage is provided by Coburn and Spence 
( I <J<J2) as fol lows: 
,.. Magnitude less than 4.5: An earthquake of this magnitude (Richter scale) 
represe nts about I os kilojulcs of energy rel ease or about I 0 tons o f T NT 
exploded underground. It is very rare for an earthquake of less than 4.5 
magnitudc 10 cause damagc al though it might be felt in a large area depending 
upon 1he tk:plh of 1hc earthquake. Earthquakes of magni tude 3 or less are 
difficu lt to be recorded by seismographs unless they arc placed closc to the 
cvcnt. A shallow carthquakc of 4.) magnitude can be ft:lt in a rad ius of abou t 
) () to I ()() km from its cpiccntrc. 
ChurJttr T11 'o 
.. Magnitude 4.5 to 5.5 (local earthquakes): An earthquake of 5.5 magnitude is 
equi valen t to energy release of abou t I ()'' ki loju les or I ,(XXl tons of TNT 
expl<xlcd underground. Earthquakes of 5.0 to 5.5 magnitude may cause damage 
if they arc sha llow and if the resu ltan t intens ity is high enough to shake fragile 
buildings 1n the vicinity. Earthq uakes of magnitude up 10 5.5 can occur 
anyw11l.: re 111 the world ie even in an.::.~s not known for tec tonic act ivity. An 
ea rthquakl: of 5.5 magnitude may he fe lt in an area spreading over lOO to 2(X) 
km radius . 
Magnitude 6.0 to 7.0 (large earthquakes) : The earthquakes of this magn itude 
represe nt an energy release ra ng ing from 1010 to 1012 kilojulcs or a sub-surface 
explos ion of 6,000 tons of TNT. An atomic bomb explosion also comes under 
thi s cat<.:gory. If large earthquakes of magnitude 6.0 and above occur at shallow 
depths, they may cause intensities of V III to X causing heavy damage and 
des truc tion in the vil lages and towns near the epicentre. Deep ea rthquakes of 
large magnitude an.~ merely pan of the earth's tectonic process and do not 
usuall y cause any damage above ground. About 200 large earthquakes occur 
each year. An carthqu;1kc of magnitude 7.0 if occurring close to the :wrf;1cc of 
th~,; ea rth . can be felt at d istances ) ()() h. m away from the epicentre. 
.. Magnitude 7.0 to X.9 (g•·cat ea rthqua kes): Energy release from earthquakes 
of magnitude X.O to X.tJ is in the ra nge of I 017 to I o'·1 kilojoulcs wh ich is 
equi va lent to sub-surface detonat ion of 4(Xl atomic bombs or one hydroge n 
bomb. (irca t earthquakes release large amo unts of energy and arc the 
consequence of long li near fau lt s rupturing at one time. Such earthquakes arc 
highl y destruct ive because of the h i~h intensitics produn.:d by th em. o 
infrastructure can he expected to with'-lantl great earthquakes . Only one ewnt 
of magnitude ~(() is recorded in the hi:-tory of earthquakes. 
2. 10. 1() Intensit y: Int ens ity can k dcfillL'tl as a measure of the k it L·fkc ts nf an 
earthquake on humans. infraslrtll"lllrL' and olhcr o bjl'L"IS. 11 diffe rs frolll rhr r ;lnhq 11ah · 
magnitude which is a lllL';lslll\ ' pf lh L· earthquake itse lf a ltiHH I ~h thl· 111\lSt seVL' I\' 
earthquakes CaU Se dc vas t;ltiOil Of ;11\';JS OVL'r 2 .) ()() sq h.m Or llH ll\' hlll 111\hl affn·t only 
. ) I) 
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ten :- of square kilometres. Tht purpost.: of introducing intensity scak is to express the 
:-e\t.:ri ty of earthquakt.: trt.:mor ft.:lt through human perception , responses of various 
ohjects such as bui ldings and other infrastruc ture (Otsuka. 19XO). 
Tht:re arc two me th<xis of studying earthquake effects. The first is through observation 
which is furt her confi rmed through the second method of analysing the earthquake 
effects on tht.: ground, on buildings and on human beings. Observed effects arc those 
whic h are nott.:d wi thou t using any special inst rumen ts (UNDRO. 197X). Earthquake 
imcnsity depends on human perception of the damage caused by such event. The 
earthquakes occurring bcfort.: thc twcn tit.:th century. when there were no instruments to 
mcasure tht.:m. arc known as the historic earthquakes. Description of the effects of 
these events is thc only evidence which has helped scientists in approximately 
detcrmining their t.:picentres and magnitudes and in tkfining the scisrnicity of different 
regio ns around the world . 
Earthq uakes perceptible to human beings arc calkd macroseismic. The area over which 
human observation can be made largely varies and depends on the seismic ene rgy 
deve loped at the epicentre and depth of the epicentre. It is difficult to exactly define 
the lim its of perception of an earthquake . Individual perception and description of an 
ev~.: nt varies from one observer to another. lt is. therefore, necessa ry to take an average 
of the information received from ditlcn.:nt observers. Progressive efforts have been 
made to deve lop scales of intensi ty which arc universally applica ble. 
2.10. 1(). 1 l ntcnsit\' scales: Scientists have presented va nous scales such as the 
Ross i-Forcl ( l XX) ). Mcrcal li ( ll)()2) and Cancami (1903) for measureme nt of the 
intc.:n sity of c.:a rt hquakcs. T he.: most widely used intensit y scale is the Mod ified Mcrca lli 
(M \1) scak which was first imroduct:d hy Wood and cumann in 19.\1 and la ter 
modified hy Charlcs Richter in 11))() (0tsu~a. 11JXO). The Medvcdcv-Sponheuer-Karnic 
(MSK) scale was introduced in Jl)7() . lt is a further modifica tion of the MM sca le and 
is frequen tly used in 1-:uropc . The Jap:trlesc Mctcoro logical Agt·ncy (JMJ\ ) use a 
smallcr (sc.:wn-point ) scak. 
) () 
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All scales describe lower degrees of intensity almost in the same way as follows: 
1: Shock not felt; 
11 : Shock felt by a few people living in upper floors; 
Ill : Shock felt by some people indoors, vibration of windows and doors, and 
swaying of objects; 
IV : Shock felt by many people indoors , vibration of windows and doors, clinking 
of crockery, and creaking of wooden floors and walls; 
V: Shock felt by the whole population in a locality, many sleepers awakened, 
spi lling of liquids, and wide swinging of hanging objec ts. 
In the higher degrees of VI to X intensity, the MSK scale is more precise than other 
intensi ty sca les and takes account of the type of construction, the percen tage of 
buildings damaged and the nature of damage as described in the following paragraphs 
(UNDRO, 1978): 
a) Type of construction 
Type A: 
Type 8 : 
Type C: 
cobweb, adobe, rural and ordinary stone bui ldings; 
brick, concrete block, combined masonry and wood, bonded 
stonework; 
steel frame, reinforced concrete and strong wooded bu ildings. 
b) Perc:e11W~e of building dClnwge 
Q (few): 
N (many ): 
P (most): 
about 5%; 
about ]0%: 
75% or more. 
c) Nwure of dtlfllllJ.:C 
1: crack ing, falling of debris and plaster: 
11: cracking of wal ls. fallin g of roof tiles. cracki ng and falling of parts of 
chimneys: 
111 : deep and wide cracks in wa ll s. fall ing of complete chimneys: 
iv: breaches in walls. partial col lapse of bui ldings. destruction of in te rnal 
wa ll s: 
v: total col lapse of bu ildings. 
)I 
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Const:quently Tahlt.: 2.7 can IH:lp in tlt.:tennin ing the intensi ty of an can hquakc at a 
Cl: rtain locat ion to a rt:asonahk tlt:gree of accuracy. 
Tahle 2.7: Determination of earthquake intensit y 
MSK Intensit y Type 1\ Type B Type (' 
Q N p Q N p Q N p 
VI 2 I I 
VI I 4 3 2 I 
VIII ) 4 4 3 3 ') 
IX 5 5 4 4 3 
X 5 5 5 4 
Source: U DRO. llJ7X . 
l ~anhquake intensity al so influences the dfects of an earthqua ke on ground. For 
example at intensity VI sma ll ri ssurt:s appear if the ground is wet. /\t intensity VII and 
VI II the fl ow or springs changes. cracks develop in roads and water in reservoirs gets 
turbid due to stirring up or silt. /\t lntt:nsi ty IX water and mud ge t thrown out of lakes 
and ca nals. and roc kfal ls and landslides may occur at many places. In tensi ty X causes 
damage to even stronger structures such as bridges, dams, dykes and other 
emban kme nts, unde rground pipel ines, and rail way lines which may ge t twisted . 
Fi ssures as wide as I metre may appear in the ground. /\ t intensit y XI major destruction 
occurs and even strong bui ldings collapse or ge t severe ly da maged . Inte nsi ty X II 
complt:te ly changes the landscape in which valleys blocked by landslidt:s may fonn new 
l;tkcs and ex isting lakes may dry up due to the creat ion of large fissures. /\11 physical 
infrastrtJcturL' co llapses or ge ts seven:ly dama!:!cd. 
1\ com parison of th~o: two most widely used MM ( Jl))()) and M SI\. ( I CJX I revisio n) scaks 
IS g1ven in Tahk 2.X. 
lnt l·n~i ty 
I. 
I/. 
Il l. 
IV. 
V. 
VI. 
VII. 
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Tahle 2.X : Seismic intrns it y scalrs MM (1956) and MS K ( 19XI ) 
.\1\1 Srall' 
Not ft·l t 
Marg1nal and long-pc r1od l.' fkU.\ of 
largl.' e<tnhquakc\. 
Fdt h v p<'rsmts a t n ·st 
Fel t hy rx:rson:-. at n::-. t. on uppu 
floor \ or favourably plat.:nl. 
Fl'lt Indoors 
I\1SK Sra lr 
Not notin·a hlr 
Below the li m11 of sensibility. Tremor 1s 
de teued by sclsnH>graph only. 
Snt rn l y notina hll·lsligh t 
Vibration felt by J><.'oplc resting 111 houses. 
spct.:iall y upper lloors. 
Wrak 
l l;mg1ng ohjcrt ~ sw mg. Vibra tions are r:c lt mos tl y llld<x>rs. Vibrations arc we<tk . 
ltkc passing of 11gln tntrks. l langing ohjcus sw1ng . 
ll anging ohj l·r ts swi ng 
Vibrations are l1kc passing of heav y 
truck:-.. SwiHilng car:-. nx:k. 
Windows and doors rattk . 
Classwarc clinks. 
Fl' lt indoor 
Dircel1on estimated. Sil'q>crs 
awakened. Liquid d isturhn l/spill cd. 
Unstahk olljl'cL~ dtsplarcd. 
Pendulum clm·b upset and change 
rate:-.. Doors :utd w111dows open and 
shut h~ thl' ll l.\t' h"I.'S . 
Fl'lt hv a ll 
Many frightcll\'d and run outsHlc. 
Persons walk unsteadily. Windows. 
di shc:-. and g lasswarc brc:tk. Damage 
to wt·ck plaster. Cr;K·ks in plaster 
and D t)' Jlt' ma~onry . I k:tvy 
Furn i tun· OVt'rl tmtcd and d;una~cd. 
Small lx· li s rill)! . 
DiiTiru lt to s tand 
h ·lt h~ c tr dn,\·rs. l lang111g ohjcus 
qul\·t·r . Funllturt· hml..t·n. Damagc to 
D tYJX' masonr~ _ Wcal.. chimneys 
hml..cn :ll rool illlt' . Fall o l plastrr. 
hnck' :111d stollt'' · Sonll' rracks in (' 
l)' JX' m:1~onry. \\'a tn turhl!l. Conrrcte 
lrrl)!: llHlll ditdlt'' d:ll ll:l)!t'd . 
La rgt•ly ohSl'rnd 
f7c lt hy most rx:ople indcx>rs. V 1hrations 
arc moderate. D< x>rs and windows rallk . 
Wcxxkn rl cx>rs and walls creak . 
Strong 
Felt indoors by most; outside by many. 
Sleeping people awakened . Some run 
ouL-;idc. Animals disturbed. D<xlrs and 
windows OJX:Il and shut. Grade I damage 
to!\ type buildings. Soml.'timcs change 111 
the now or sprmgs. 
Slight damagr 
f7e lt indoors and outdoors. /\n 1111a ls run 
out of stalls. Dishes and g lassware brc.<tk . 
Grade I damage to some single !\ type 
and many 13 type buildings. Grade 2 
damage to !\ type buildin gs. Sometimes 
dwngt' in spring flows. Sma ll bell.~ ring. 
Da magl' to bu ildings 
Most lli.'Opk rrightt' lll'd and run quivn. 
Furn iturl' hrok l·n. D:unagc to outdoors . 
Largl' lx·lls ring. Man y lind it difficul t to 
stand . 1\lany C type buildings sul n gra<k 
I loss. 1\ lany bui lding of !\ rlass sufk r 
grade ' and soml' grade -1 losses. Cracks tn 
mad and stonl' walls. l.ands l11ks. Wa w s 
fonlll'd on water and watn turnl'd turh1d. 
\Vatl'r k vl'l:-. 111 wclls and spnng l low~ 
d t:utg,· . In sonh' ,· ;t st·~ dry ~pn ngs st:trt 
llowing :utd l11 l\\'1ng :-.p1 1np b,·vuml' dry. 
Som,· sandy h:u1b :-. l1p nff . 
VIII. 
IX. 
X. 
/\"11\ 1 Sralt• 
Car stttring afftrtt·d 
Darn<~ge to masonry C: part1al collapse. 
Some damage to masonry none to 
masonry A. Fall of stucco and some 
masonry wal ls. Tw1 sting and fall of 
chimneys, nHlnumenL~. towers and 
water t.ank s. Fram e house moved if 
not bolted to the ground. l .<x>~e panel 
wal l Lhrown out. Tree branches broken 
o iT. Changes in llow and tcmpcr;lturcs 
o f springs and well s. Cracks on wet 
ground and on :-.teq1 :- lopes. 
(;t·nnal panir 
tvb sonry D 1k st.royed: masonry C 
heav il y dam;1grd: 111;1 :--onry 1\ St'fiOIISiy 
danwged. D;u11agL· to foundations. 
Framt' strtlcturL'S shilted oil if not 
bolted down. 
Strur tun· foundations clt•s troyt•d 
Most masnnry and fr;lnlt'd structures 
tk stroyt·d w 11 h tilt' ir ft \lliHiat ions. 
Stllllt' ' trong wootkn :-- tn lt"!llres and 
hndgt' ' tkstroyt·tl. SellllllS damage to 
dams ;uHI t·mh;ull..lllt'nts. l .andslide:-.. 
\Vater tlu own lllll PI 11\"\'1 ;uHI Clll;tl 
h;lllk ' . S;uHI ;111d mud splashed on 
heac llt'' · Ratl ' hr 111 ' l1gll tl y. 
Chorm· r rwo 
/\"1 S 1\. Sea lt 
Dtstrurtion or huilclings 
General fright. Motor dri vers arc 
di sturbed . Some Lree branches broken. 
I !anging lamps damaged . Many C type 
buildings suffer grade 2 damage and few 
of grade 3. Man y 13 type build1ngs 
suffer grade 3 losses and few of grade 4. 
Man y buildings of A type suffer lo:-.scs 
of grade 4 and some of grade 5. Stone 
walls collapse. M emorials and 
monurncnL\ twisted. cracks in ground. 
Damage to roads. Watc.:r levels change 
in wells and reservoirs. Dome dry wells. 
springs and reservoirs recharge whi le 
some ex isting reservoirs become dry. 
(;t•nt•ral damage to hui lcl ings 
Ccncral pan ic. Considerable damage to 
fUflll!ure. /\nnllaJs fUll ;lr()Uild Ill 
confusion and cry. Many bui ld ing of 
type C suffer grade 3 <hun;1gc and few o f 
grade 4. Many bu ildings of type B suffer 
damage of grade 1 and few o f grade 4. 
Many build ings of type 1\ suffer grade 5 
losses. Monuments and columns fall. 
reservoirs may show heavy damage. In 
many cases railway l ines arc bent and 
roadways damaged. Ovcrllow ol turb1d 
wa tcr is seen. Cracks as b1g as 10 cm 
appear 111 slopes and ri ver banks. 
Landslides. earth l"l nws ;111d high wavc..:s 
in watc..:r arc common. 
Building genl'ral dt•strur tion 
Many C type build ings sui kr losses of 
grade 4 losses and sontt' tl f gratk .'i. 
Many 1\ type hu i ld 111gs :-.ufkr grade 5 
losses. Most ol tht· ,\ l)'Pt' ronstnlt' tH l ll 
ro llapst's. I );un. dykr:-. and otht•r 
elllb;lllklllelltS lll;l) sui"Jcr Sl'Vt'ft' Ill 
rritiral d:una)!e. Railway lnlt's arr 
sl 1ghtly bent. Road pa,·t·mr nts ;111d 
asphalt shnw waves of \V1dt' rrat·J.. , 111 
thr gmund. somr tllll t'S as lllllt·h a' I 
lllt'tre wide Broad fi ssurt's ;dtutg watr r 
courses. Loose rarth slldt'' 11 0111 ~ lt' t' Jl 
slopt'S. D ispl;lt"t' lllent nr s;utd ;uld llll ll l Ill 
coastal areas. Nt·w l;tkt•s llll"llll'd. 
XI. 
XII. 
Sources: 
MM Sralt 
Ra ils gn·atly htnt 
Ruils hen!. Underground 
pipclmcs completel y ou t of 
service. 
Total Damage 
Damage nearly total. Lmge 
rock masses displaced. Lines 
of sight and level distorted. 
ObjccL<; thrown into ai r. 
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MSK Scall' 
Catastrophl' 
Destruction o f most and colla pse of muny C 
type buildings. Even strongly bui lt bridges and 
dams muy he destroyed. Railway lines arc 
twisted and buckled. Highways become 
unusable. Underground pipe! ines destroyed. 
Ground fmcturcd by broad fissures and cracks. 
Numerous landslides and rock falls. 
Landsrape rhanges 
Practicall y all structures alxJVc or below ground 
arc heavily damaged or destroyed. Ground 
surface i s radically changed. Large ground 
cracks wi th ex tensive vertical and horizontal 
movcmcnL'> arc seen. f-all of rocks, creation of 
new lakes, .sl iding of ri ver banks dellection of 
ri vers and appearance of water falls arc the 
probable evenL<;. 
Notes (Type of bui ldings not l'arthquakl'-rl'sistant) 
Masonr y A : Good 
workmanship. mortar and 
design. use of rei nforcing steel 
to resist lateral forces. 
Masonr y 11: Goo d 
workmanship and mortar. 
Reinforced, but not designed to 
resist lateral forces. 
Masonr y C: Ordinary 
workmanship and mort.ar. No 
ex treme weaknesses such as 
lack of corner ties but no 
reinforcement nor designed to 
resist horizontal forl'l'S. 
Mason r y D: Weak ma terials 
such as adobe. )XX>r mortar, low 
workmansh ip standards and 
hori1.onwlly we<tk. 
T ypl' A : Undressed stones. rural structures. 
adobe or clay houses. 
T ype B: Ordinary brick buildings, large bkx.:k 
construction, partl y timbered construct ion wi th 
semi-dressed stoned. 
Typl' C: Precast concrete skeleton construction, 
pret:ast concrete skeleton consLruct ion. pret:<.L•;t 
large panel construction. well-bu i l t wooden 
structures. 
C lassification of damage: 
Grade 1: Slight damage: fine cracks in pla ter, 
falling o f plaster. 
(; radl' 2: Moderate damage: f ine cracks in 
walls. large pieces o f plaster fall ofT, pan of 
chimneys fall down. 
G radt• J : lle<tvy damage: large and deep cracks 
in walls. chimneys fall down. 
(;radt· 4 : Destruction: gaps in walls. collapse of 
pan of buildings, panition walls and fi lkd in 
wal ls 111 framL' structures collapse. 
(;null' 5: Tow l damage: tOLal col lapse of 
infrastructure. 
O tsuka. llJXO: Cohum and Spcncc. Jl)92 
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2.10. 16.2 Sinxle imensity scale: There are several intens ity scales to describe 
earthquakes and wh ich sometimes creates confusion. Medvedev, Sponheuer and Karnic 
who developed the famous MSK intensity scale also compiled a table for convening the 
intens ity recorded from one scale to another. Table 2.9 presents th is conversion table. 
Table 2.9: Conversion table for different seismic intensity scales 
MSK Russian McxJified Japanese Rossi- Mercalli-
se ismic Scale Mercalli scale Forrel Cancani -
scale scale (MM) scale Seiberg scale 
1964 1952 1931 1950 1873 1917 
I I I 0 I I 
2 2 2 I 2 2 
3 3 3 2 3 3 
4 4 4 2-3 4 4 
5 5 5 3 5-6 5 
6 6 6 4 7 6 
7 7 7 4-5 8 7 
8 8 8 5 9 8 
9 9 9 5-6 10 9 
10 10 10 6 10 10 
11 11 11 7 10 11 
12 12 12 7 10 12 
Source: UNDRO. 1978. 
2. 10. 16.3 Isoseismals: The intensity is strongest c lose to the epicentre. This is 
why deep ea rthquakes with high magni tude or those occurring in deserted areas cause 
less or no human suffering than the shallow earthquakes of even moderate magnitude 
particularly if thei r epicentres arc located close to populated areas. The maps showing 
intens ity of earthquakes are called isoseismal maps in which li nes of equal intensity are 
separately shown. These maps are pre pared by geologists after each sign ificant 
ea rt hquake (Coburn and Spencc. 1992). Isoseismal maps of the past even ts arc very 
important for predicting the timing. magni tude. intensity and location of the next 
ea rthquakes. 
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2. 11 Other hazards accompa nied by earthquakes 
Evt.:n in the short du ration in which an earthquake <x.:curs, other major hazards may bt.: 
triggered off dlH..: to the presence of certain geological material s or loose format ion of 
soil slopes in the l<x.:alities where the seismic sh<x.: ks are taking place (UN DRO, I 'J79). 
Study of the past earthquakes revea ls tha t death and damage tol l afte r an earthquake can 
rist: sharply as a result of follow-on disasters initiated by the earthquake and escalating 
tht.: cri sis further . The most important among these secondary disasters arc fires. 
tsunamis, land slidt.:s. liquefaction. ground subs idence and industria l failures . These 
hazards can h(; conlrolkd and lossc.;s much rcduct.:d if !he sc.;condary d isas!crs arc 
foreseen and nc.;ct:ssary precau tionary measures caken in advance (Cobu rn and Spence, 
I <)<J2) . 
2. 1 1.1 Landslides: Landslide in the context of a follow-on hazard to earthquake means 
downward and outward movement of the slope-forming materia ls such as natural rock, 
soil or artificial fill (UNDRO. I<J79). Earthquakes cause landslides in areas where the 
mountains have.: loose rocks and soi l on the slopes. The sha ke-up se ts tht.:sc materia ls 
fret.: resulting in land slides which cause heavy losses to life and property in the lower 
regions. There arc many examples around the world (Peru 1970, Guatemala 1976 and 
Yt.:mcn I <JX2) in which di sintegrating mountainsides sent down tons of debris on the 
populati ons rt.:siding at their bases and caused havoc. Individua l slope failures arc 
gent.:ra ll y not so signi ficant and cos tl y as some other natural ca tas trophes but they an: 
so widespread that the total human and prope rt y losses in landslides place them arnong 
major natural hazards . 
These hazards may not be easily preventable during emergencies due to the time. cos! 
and effort involved in he exercise. Long 1c.:rrn prcventacivt: rnc.:asun:s n:quire 
icknti fica ti on of the potential threa t. informing dissemination among the population at 
risk and assisting them in making land use pl;uming accordingly. and carrying ou t gco-
techn ical engineering work which may help stabili se the slopes as far as poss ihk . 
2. 11 .2 Tsunamis: Tsunami is a Japanese word which means bay waves. Thi s ts 
pt.:rhaps wh y these waves arc some times ca lled tidal waves. Japan took .,kad rn 
.')7 
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identifying and naming thi s hazard because the country has experienced tsunamis more 
frequen tly than others. A tsunami sometimes follows an earthquake and causes 
devastation in wide spread coastal areas (Cobum and Spence, 1992). Earthquakes of 
large magnitude, shallow depths and their epicentres located in mid-ocean usually cause 
the tsunamis. These waves are markedly different from the common wind-waves 
because of their long wavelength , ex tremely high speed and low attenuation. Their 
am plitude at the source is about one metre wi th a trave lling speed of about 1,000 km 
per hour depending upon the depth of the epicentre and the dep th of water at that point. 
These waves can travel thousand of miles from one end of the ocean to the other 
slowing down very graduall y. When they reach a coastal area the reducing depth of 
water causes increase in their amplitude by several metres. Their heigh t and abrupt 
reduction in speed causes them to hit the shores violentl y thus resulting in serious 
damage to the coastal life and installations. 
Tsunamis are known to have occurred in all oceans and the Mediterranean sea but a 
majority of them have been observed in the coastal areas of the Pacific Ocean 
(U DRO, 197R). They travel in all direc tions from their point of origin. 
Approx imately 200 tsunamis have been recorded in the current century. While most 
of them crea ted onl y local effects about 20 of them caused destruc tion throughout the 
Pacific Ocean. 
Protect ion from tsunamis can be achieved by construct ing sea wa lls and beach defences, 
planting shore-line trees and bui lding other physical obstructions in front of the coastal 
areas. Population movement from the hazardous areas is also an important prevention 
measure. 
2. 11 .3 fires: fire is also a serious secondary hazard in an earthquake di saster. Severe 
shaking causes overturning of stoves, heating equipme nt and elect rica l appliances and 
:1ther items which can produce fire . On the other hand seismic vibrations also damage 
fuel and gas lines and other inflammable material s causing leakage and spill of such 
materials . The resultant fi re becomes a serious threat if there is sufficient combustib le 
mataial in the vicinity such as wood, plastic, clothes or other similar material, which 
spread the lire rapidl y. f-ire can be even more devas tating if buildings in the affec ted 
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an.:a arc grouped together. The smoke and fumes released during a fi re en tirely 
consume the buildings on fire. Dry weather and winds further aggravate the situation. 
Some of the post carthljuake fires (J;1pan, I<J2l) arc known to have continued for 
several days after the earthquake covcring vas t areas in the proccss and blocking all 
escape routes. 
Protection aga inst connagration requires regulations against sprcad of fire such as the 
use of incombustiblc building material s, s pacing between build ing. keering of fire 
extingui shers. etc. Public awareness abou t precautionary measures against fires and 
wha t 10 tio in case of a fi re plays an important role in minimising losses in such even ts 
(Coburn and Spcnce. I <J<J2). 
2. 11.4 Dillcrcn tial eround settlemen t: Somctimcs a structure is located on two soils of 
difkrent compositions. Earthq uake shaking causes more settlement of one of these soils 
than the other which results in foundation se ttlement and development of cracks in th e 
st ructure. Th is rhenomcna frequen tly occurs where part of the site is prcpareti by 
cutt ing in the ex isting ground and the remaining by filling depressions wit h fresh soil. 
2. 11 j Liquc!'act ion : Some derosits in nat alluvial valleys have a very compressible 
structure which is disturbed by earthquake vibrati ons (U DRO. I<J7<J). These vibrations 
liquefy certain types of sandy soil s. 1\ soil in thi s condition has effectively zero shear 
strength and therefore the sediments above it arc free to move under grav ity forces in 
any direction. The whole material above the liquefied layer may then spread laterally 
and break up into smalle r units . The buildings founded upon such layers can no longer 
stand on liquified soi ls and subside. break up or fall on one side causing further damage 
to ot her rK arby buildings ((;en: and Shah. ll)X-l) . 
2. 1\ .() Clrnund suhsidt:rH.:c: (!round suhsitkm:c is among ma.1m natural hazards and 
frequently appears as the secondary hazard fo llowing an earthquake. Soi l compac tion 
on·urs during an earthquake whic h n:sults in thL· fill ing of voids and se!!lcment of 
gnHlltd. This :;ct tkrncnt c;tuscs nacks in the buildings. pipelines. roads. e tc. Ground 
subsidence is usually not given serious cunsidcratiort as compan.:d to o ther natural 
hazards such ;ts carthquakL'S. landslides. volcanors and i'loods. This is pcrh;qJs bt:cause 
,') l) 
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the.: effec t of grouml subsidence.: is not as dramatic as in the case of above.: hazards 
(Waltham, I ')X()). T he.: loss of life.: is rare.: in thi s case. Yet ground suh~itkncc.: is among 
rhc mosl widespread as compared to o1hcr .surface hazards. Ground subsidence presen ts 
se rious threats to the structure above and needs care ful assessment. 
2. 11 .7 Dam fa ilures: Severe shaking during earthquakes can result 1n dam fa il ures 
whic h can cause havoc in the downstream areas by nooding ami destroying li fe, 
agricultu re and other propert y. A rout ine procedure aft er an appreciable eart hquake 
should be 10 inspccl all dam srruclllrcs in rhe vic ini1y. Quick reduCi ion of wa1cr levels 
in the reservoi r should be undertaken if any damage is suspected. This should be 
followed by a repa ir of the affec ted areas. 
2. ll .X Industrial hazards: Earthquakes damage machinery, struc tun:s and indust rial 
unit s (Coburn and Spt:ncc, llJlJ2 ). Tht:rt: are usual ly many industrial facilitit:s in se ismic 
areas. Some of thc.:sc fac ili tit:s arc close to population ccnrn.:s and provide jobs for 
many. While the problems of industries using combust ible matt:rials and fuds arc 
discussed in para 2.9.3, tht:se ind ustries also provide employment and industrial 
produc ts and tht:ir fa ilure can create an additional hazard for the local population. 
Leakage of dangt:rous fumes and gases due to breach in pipt:lines or storage tanks 
during earthquakes can be ye t another hazard. The.: industries, particularly the ha1.ardous 
industries using or producing dangerous materials, should be locatt:d at safe.: diswnccs 
from popu lation centres. Their pipel ines anti storage systems shou ld also be buil t wi th 
sakty considaations in the even t or a disaster t:mergcncy. 
2.12 Ccnera l r esponses aft er an earthquake 
Tabk 2.2 shows that earthquakes of moderate or even mild ma~nitutk. in low-income 
or lowt:r middk-incomt: countrio, ha ve..: caused rcl ati vc.:ly n1mc damag.t: than severe 
eanhquakt:s 111 the de veloped coun tri es. The.: stud y or disas tn:- is in fac t the study or 
pove rt y since it is the poor count ric.:s where..: most or the disasters occur (Davis, llJ7X). 
Somt: recent Studies on t:arthq uakt: disastns sugges t that freq ue ncy or disasters has 
signi ficant ly increased during the last fifty years wi th no m;t_jor change in the J;co logy 
or c limate or earth . The rt:asons give n ror thi s incrt:aSL" ;trc attrihutL·d to over 
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population, rapid urbanisation due to lack of facilities and lack of job opportunities in 
rural areas, and make-shift shelters used by the poor with unsafe techniques and in 
dangerous locations, such as mouncain slopes and river beds, etc. The people living in 
such circumstances cannot afford any better abode and resign their fate to the will of 
God. When an inevitable disaster hits these people their faith in nature and the 
environments, in which they always felt safe, is suddenly shaken. Their attitudes, 
however, change after the first shock of the disaster is over. The victims regain 
initiative to rebuild their shelters and start a nonnal life. Reconstruction is started by 
the community with an intention and determination to remove all signs of the tragedy 
and to restore the system as it was before the catastrophe (Geipel, 1991 ). 
UNDRO (1991) is of the opinion that no disaster is entirely natural. Man 
unintentionally aggravates the effects of disaster by uncontrolled increase in population, 
urbanisation and other similar social problems commonly seen in low-income countries. 
The same agency observed in 1982, that human activity increases the risks of disasters 
by ignoring essential safety measures in the location and building of settlements. Still 
the primary response to disaster is provided by the affected community itself. 
Communities do not leave their future to chance. They try to participate in future 
planning, with increasing frequency, which provides guidelines for the disaster affected 
areas (Foster, 1980). The peoples of low-income councries are more self-reliam in che 
basic skills of rebuilding infrastructure than those in the middle or high income 
countries (Davis, 1978). This is more true in the rural areas where people are used to 
building their own houses. The financial and technical resources of these poor 
communities are however limited. Apart from some immediate but temporary 
measures, not much can be expected in terms of long term planning and infrastructural 
inputs. 
Leslie (1986) refers to the 1982 earthquake of Yemen, in which the survivors showed 
a remarkable ability to provide shelters for themselves by using corrugated iron sheets, 
wood and other materials recovered from the rubble of their old houses, as a good 
example of community work. Government announcements to reconstruct or repair 
42,000 houses to cover all earthquake victims discouraged many of them to start their 
own relief and rehabilitation works. 
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Home governments and local NGOs are the next to respond, after the affected 
communities , in assessing the problems and needs of the disaster area. The magnitude 
of the disaster, such as an eanhquake, and post disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction 
work, is usually vast and requires diversion of all avai lable resources to provide earliest 
relief to the victims. Appeals for external humanitarian assistance are made and 
substantial commitments are received. This assistance, from donor countries, however 
comes last mainly because of several formalities involved before its delivery, such as 
the assistance cannot be provided, no matter how urgent it is, without a formal request 
from the rec ipient country. Approval of the aid package and its mobilisation also takes 
time because of the distance and logistic problems in most of the developing countries. 
UNDRO (1 982) is of the opinion, in light of the agency's long experience of relief and 
reconstruction work in di saster affected areas all over the world, that relief provided by 
foreign agencies never exceeds 20% of the total work even in the most favourable 
circumstances. 
A good example of response is Guatemala where in 1976 an earthquake destroyed 
nearly 90% of the struc tures (Cuny, 1983). In this country some NGOs such as Oxfam, 
World Neighbours and Save the Children were already working on some development 
projects. When the disaster hit Guatemala, these NGOs immediately paid their attention 
to relief and reconstruction works. They assisted the government in mobilising 
resources at local and international level. The NGOs also participated in providing 
building materials and training in building techniques to the survivors. The community-
based effons of these NGOs saved the country from a possible economic crisis which 
seemed inevitable if the reconstruction work had not been carried out efficiently. 
Davis (1986) quotes another case study of the 1970 earthquake in Gediz in western 
Turkey (7.3 on Richter scale), which destroyed most of the infrastructure. The victims 
and the government responded well to carry out reconstruction work speedily. Aysan 
( 1986) however asserts that the government programmes concentrated more on technical 
solutions rather than socio-cultural and environmental conditions of the victims. Over 
the years, which followed since the earthquake in Gediz, people still continue to repair, 
rebuild or extend their homes according to their needs. It is very important in a 
development or reconstruction work that local socio-cultural and environmental needs 
must be respected. 
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development or reconstruction work that local socio-cultural and environmental needs 
must be respected. 
2.13 Different approaches in development and reconstruction 
Yemen was assisted by foreign donors after the earthquake but the ultimate results of 
the reconstruction programme were not very encouraging. It was observed during the 
field surveys of this study that although substantial technical and financial assistance 
was provided by foreign donors to the country, it was not utilised very effectively. The 
community did not have many resources and experience to cope with the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction work. The economic situation of the country itself was also better 
than what it is now. Lack of involvement of local communities in planning and most 
of the reconstruction programme was probably the main reason for the unsatisfactory 
resu lts. Institutional deficiencies seem to be an important cause for the lack of impact 
of the reconstruction programme. 
Different strategies were used in implementing reconstruction programmes by the 
concerned agencies. Some of the donors preferred to deliver turnkey projects. They 
built good looking structures through contractors with modern facilities. A lot of 
publicity was given to these projects. Field surveys revealed that the community did 
not have any say in such programmes. Even the location of houses was not discussed 
with the victims in most cases. A number of school buildings are short of staff or 
students. An appreciable number of primary health care units are without staff or 
supplies although there is an overwhelming demand for health facilities in the area. 
The local communities find the design and location of such infrastructure alien to their 
traditions and culture. 
On the other hand those donors who helped in building the infrastructure through 
community involvement, generally implemented their projects with more success 
although it usually took more time than actually envisaged. The workmanship of these 
buildings was not as good as those built by the contractors but the people were using 
these houses with some modifications according their individual needs. 
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2.14 Need for efficient designs in earthquake zones 
Earthquakes are among the o ldest enemies of the mankind but the awareness to protect 
ourselves against them is a relatively recent development (Cobum and Spence, 1992). 
The reconstruction programme implemented by the government of Yemen, after the 
1982 earthquake, has highlighted the view that if there is some preparedness against 
disasters among communities living in earthquake zones and their governments, and 
careful planning is made in the use of available human and financial resources, the 
relief efforts can be much more effic ient and effective as compared to those where the 
re lief and reconstruction programmes are undertaken haphazardly and wi thout proper 
planning. 
The Republic of Yemen lies in an earthquake zone and is experienc ing earthq uakes 
from times unk nown (SCREAA\ 19X6). Earthquake-resistant bui lding techniques are 
not new to the Yemen is. Lesl ie ( 19g6) points ou t that in the earli e r structu res wooden 
ring beams were provided at differen t levels to e nsure safety aga inst earthquakes. As 
time passed, and wood became scarce and expensive, people started usi ng it only for 
decoration purposes. There was more emphasis on ornamental beau ty of the houses 
rather than the ir eart hquake-resistance. The earthquake of 19g2 brought to light a ll 
defects in the present day traditional struc ture. The disaster provided an op portunity 
to the local engi neers and arch itec ts to introduce earthquake-res istant designs with full 
considera tion of the socio -cultura l and environmental needs of the people. It seems tha t 
while the re was emphasis on earthquake-resistant designs there was not enough concern 
about communit y participation in the relief and reconstruc tion prog ramme. The general 
lack of acceptability of !he reconstruction programme in Yemen , and what should be 
done to introduce effi c ient and effec ti ve conslruction and recons truction in earthquake 
zones m not o nl y Yemen, but also o f o ther poorer coun tries, forms the bas is of this 
study. 
SCREAA: Supreme Counc il for Reconstruction in Earthquake /\fkcted Areas, Republic of 
Yemen. 
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Th~ n~xt chapter discuss~s tll ~ country profile of Y~m~n. to give an idea of the socio-
economic and soc io-cultural life in tile country. Th is knowlcdg~ about th~ country and 
its people is considered necessary before discussing tile post-eanhquake reconstruction 
programme in detail which had an importance relevance to thei r everyday life. 
Summary: 
The earthquake hazard is serious not only because it is unpredictable, but also because 
it initiates a number of destructive secondary haza rds. Another major concern is th at 
many people, particularly those living in low-income and lower middle-income 
countries. be lieve that earthquakes arc 'acts of Cm!'. lt is therefore important. that 
there shou ld be a general awareness about the earthquake hazard. among tile people 
living in ea rthquake zones. Literature review shows that the initiative and responses 
oC the victims arc imponan t tools in rebuilding a di sast~r-a ffcct~d area. CJovernm~nts' 
and donors' assiswnce for 1he eanhquake vicrims is useful but ifs mobili sa1ion usual ly 
takes some time. The affected communi1y 's initia1ive can, therefore, be u1i liscd by the 
governments and NGOs to provide time ly and safe infraslructurc in 1hc disaster area. 
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THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN - COUNTRY PROFILE 
"Tradition was deeply rooted in their culture, and the products of this tradition were 
never alienated from their environment and cultural roots". 
(Jakayo Ocirci, 1993) 
3.1 Historical background 
Yemen is an old and historical country rich with ancient civilisation. It has always 
played an important political, economic and strategic role in the region of the Arabian 
Peninsula. The geographical location of Yemen, on the south-west of the Arabian 
peninsula, means that it stood both on the periphery of the ancient centres of civilization 
in the Fertile Crescent and at the entrance to the Red Sea, where the sea routes met 
between Egypt, the Red Sea ports, East Africa and South Asia (Yaranda, 1982). 
Throughout history Yemen has been influenced by and contributed to developments in 
the northern lands of the Middle East, but by virtue of its relative isolation has retained 
a distinctive individuality, particularly in the mountainous areas, known as the Central 
Highlands. 
One of the five principal kingdoms of southern Arabia (Yemen) was the kingdom of 
Saba (called Sheba in Bible), with its capital in Marib. It was the oldest, the most 
civi lised and the most powerful kingdom in the region (Daum, 1988). Other kingdoms 
were Ma'in on the slopes of Wadi Jawf, Qataban, Awsan and Hadramawt. In the first 
century these kingdoms began to decline and the centre of southern Arabian culture and 
power moved to the Highlands. 
The Ottomans ruled Yemen for about a hundred years, during 16th and 17th centuries, 
until a Yemeni religious leader, Imam AI-Qasim, regained power in 1639. Although 
the Ottomans never controlled the whole of Yemen, they made an important 
contribution towards the development of a centml government, the central 
administration system, a network of communications and a series of fonresses along the 
strategic points throughout the country. 
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The Briti sh occupied the southern part of Yemen in 1839 and decla red it as a British 
Protectorate. with headquarters in /\den . The northern tribes also united themselves 
under lmam Yahya ! !amid /\1 -Din, after withdrawal of the Ottomans at the end of 
World War One, and formed a government in the northern areas in l 9 1 X. 
In ll)62 a group of young anny officers overthrew the Imamate. This led to a long 
civil wttr which continued until I 96<J. The Yemen Arab Republic was established in 
1969-70. 
The British left in 1 <J67 and the /\den Protectorate emerged as an independent soc ialist 
state. to be known as the Peoples Democratic Repu blic of YenH.:n. By mid 1970. the 
conservati sm of northern Yemen's society had prevailed in spi te of all fore ign 
influences (Page, 1985). Although the Yemen Arab Republic (Y 1\R) sti ll exis ted, its 
potent ial as a radical force in the peninsula had diminished due to renewed tribal 
warfare and poor economic situa tion in the country. reuds continued between the two 
Ycrneni states till a peao; accord was signed. in May I ')~N. wh ich rcsullcd in 
unification of the country. The unified country , second largest on the peninsu la after 
Saudi Arabia. is now called the Republic of Yemen, with its capi tal in Sana'a. 
North Yemen remained inaccessible, until early seventies , dut: to the isolationis t pol icies 
of its previous rulers, the lmams (Mul ler, 199 1 ). Aden, on the other hand, flourished 
under Briti sh rule frmn 1839 to l %7. 
Al though one of the low-income coun tries. Yemen has undergone tremendous change 
and dt:vtlopment in the past 20 years (Les lie , l 98()) . Old traditions and backwardness 
still inhibit progrt:ss but tht:re is a deep desire, throughout the count ry. to cat ch up with 
rest of tht: world. Muller ( 1<)91) estimated that after peace and uni fi cat ion the nurnber 
of fort:ign tourists visiting tht: country was about 40.000 annuall y. 
3.2 Phys iography and climate 
Yt:nH.:n is loca tt:d among arid and semi -dt:st:rt countri es of tht: rq! Ion (/\1 -hisail t: t al. 
(<J<J ll . The landscapt: untlt:rgot:s r;Ip id changt:s as one movt:s from tilt: 2.000 km long 
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coastline of the Red Sea, and northward of the Gulf of Aden, to the great Arabian 
desert. The country can be divided into five natural regions on the basis of 
physiography (Figure 3.1 ). These regions are Tihama, the Midlands, the Highlands, the 
Eastern and Southern Plateaus and a portion of the Arabian Desert, called Al-Ruba'a 
Al-Khali (Varanda, 1982). 
The maritime semi desert coastal plain, Tihama or 'hot land', has a tropical climate 
(Table 3.1 ). Ir extends 440 km along the Red Sea and is between 25 to 40 km wide. 
The land in Tihama is quite fertile when irrigated and produces palm dates and cotton 
(UNCDF1, 1991). 
The Midlands have altitudes up to 1,000 metres split by deep gorges with streams 
running down to Tihama and to the Gulf of Aden. It is a fertile zone with a subtropical 
climate. 
The mountainous area from the north to the south constitute the Highlands, with 
altitudes ranging between 1,600 to 3,000 metres. The climate in this region is 
characterised by warm, temperate and rainy summers and cool and moderately dry 
winters with frequent fog. The highes t mountain in the peninsula, called Nabi Shuaib, 
is also located in this region. 
The Eastern Plateau is a semi desert area with mountains sloping towards the Arabian 
desert, Al-Ruba'a Al-Khali or 'Empty Quarter'. 
As much as 600- 1,200 mm rainfall annually has been recorded in the high altitudes of 
the interior such as Ibb and Ta'izz but the plateau area receives only about 400-500 mm 
per annum (Al-Fusail et al, 1991). Most of this rainfall occurs in the Midland and 
Highland regions during the two rainy seasons from March to May and from July to 
September. The rainfall pattern in Yemen is quite irregular and droughts are not 
uncommon. Scarcity of rain affects the water resources. Since agriculture is a major 
component of Yemen's economy, and most of the agriculture is rain fed, the dry years 
1 UNCDF: United Nations Capital Development Fund. 
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cause food shortages and further poverty, particularly m the rural areas whose 
livelihood mostly depends on agriculture. 
Table 3.1: Physiographic zones and climate of Yemen 
Physiographic zones 
Coastal area 'Tihama' 
Midlands 
Highlands 
Eastem/Southem Plateaus 
Eastem Desert 
Al-Ruba'a Al-Khali 
Approximate 
altitude (m) 
0-200 
200-1000 
1600-2400 
1000-1600 
200-400 
Climate 
Hot, tropical 
Semi-tropical 
Dry, moderate to cold 
Dry, warm to moderate 
Dry, hot to cold 
Source: UNCDF Project Agreement YEMJ90/C01,1991 
Average 
annual 
rainfall (mm) 
100-200 
400-800 
600-1200 
300-500 
0-100 
The five distinctly different types of physiographies, in the country, influence not only 
the climate but also the culture and custom in these areas. 
3.3 Geology 
The foundation for the geology of Yemen is the Arabia-Nubian shield which is 
composed of meta-volcanic and plutonic rocks (MEB2, 1991). Geologists believe that 
this shield was formed by a process of microplate or terrain build-up, during the 
Proterozoic era, about 660 to 900 million years ago. The various terrains lie side by 
side along linear zones representing edges of the microplates. The youngest and most 
prominent zone is called the Nabitah Structure which was probably formed by the 
collision of two crustal plates during the late Proterozoic era. The resultant mountain 
building ceased around 640 million years followed by wrench faulting which produced 
the Najd fault system. Between 640 and 540 million years, the whole Arabian-Nubian 
Shield underwent extensive magmatism resulting in acidic volcanism, caldera formation. 
and the emplacement of numerous granitic complexes. The geologic map of Yemen 
shows overall geography and stratigraphic relationships of the area (Figure 3.2). The ' 
2 Mineral Exploration Board, Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, Yemen. 
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Source: Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, 1992 
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oldest sedimentary rocks are the Cambro-Ordovician sandstone known as Waj id 
Sandstone which exists on ly in north-western Yemen. 
Large parts of Yemen are overlain by extrusive stratified rocks of Tertiary and 
Quaternary age which are collectively referred to as the 'Yemen volcanics' or the 'Trap 
series'. These rocks range in composition from basalt to rhyolite and often contain 
inter-bedded fresh water sediments. Volcanic activity in the region is believed to be 
on going from prehistoric times. This volcanism is considered to be related to uplift 
of the African-Arabian dome and subsequent rifting and separation of the Arabian, 
Nubian and Somali plates. It has formed most of the highland areas in the country. 
Continuing occurrence of severe earthquakes, hot springs and sulphurous waters in the 
area show that the region is not fully dormant. Recent sedimentary deposits include 
aeolian, beach sands , coral reef along the Red Sea coast, loess, sebkhas and alluvials. 
Geologists consider Yemen as structurally simple. The range of geologic formations 
in Yemen suggests high potential for mineral exploration. A lready many industries are 
commercially exploiting gypsum, salt and limestone deposits which play an important 
role in the country's economy. 
3.4 Natural resources 
Yemen is gifted with a variety of natural resources, such as minerals and fisheries but 
there is an overall shortage of water resources in the country. The following is the 
present situation with regards to various natural resources: 
3.4.1 Land: Yemen has a total estimated land area of 555,000 sq km excluding the 
Al-Ruba'a Al-Khali desert (MPD3, 1992). Nearly 70% of this area is covered by the 
mountainous highlands. Most of the land is used for agricultural purposes but fast 
rising population, economic difficulties of the recent years and shortage of water 
resources has adversely affected the use of land. Mineral resources, particularly oil, 
have some potential but to date no significant change has occurred to bring prosperity 
to the country. 
3 Ministry of Planning and Development, Yemen. 
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3.4.2 Oil: Major oil deposits, with an estimated output of 300,000 barrels per day, 
were found by an American oil exploration finn, in 1984 (Unwin, 1986). Most of the 
oil and gas have been discovered along the desert 'Al-Ruba'a Al-Khali'. A number of 
foreign firms are presently engaged in oil exploration in the country. While there are 
good prospects for funher increase in oil production, to date there is no significant 
upsurge in the national economy because of several factors to be discussed later. It can 
be argued that if oil had not been discovered, in exportable quantities, the county would 
have been facing even worse economic difficulties. 
3.4.3 Other minerals: Apart from oil, there are several other minerals deposits in the 
country, as described below: 
Rock salt: The rock salt quarry at As-Salif, on the coast to north of Hodeidah, 
is one of the major mineral projects in Yemen. At this quarry 140,000 tonnes of salt 
is produced annually of which 120,000 tonnes is exported (MEB, 1992). Salt from 
evaporation of sea water was also widely produced in the past, but now there is only 
one major factory left at Khonnaskar. This factory, located near Aden, produces about 
150,000 tonnes of salt per annum. 
Gypsum: Gypsum is extracted, from a quarry near the Al-Salif salt quarry, at 
the annual rate of 70,000 tonnes of which almost a quarter is used in cement 
manufacture while the remaining is exported. 
Industrial clays: Industrial clays, such as bentonite, are extracted in the eastern 
part of the country. Other minerals available in the country include silica, limestone, 
feldspar, barite, celestite, phosphate, graphite and volcanic sinter. 
3.4.4 Fisheries: Yemen is gifted with long coastal areas along Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden. There is a big potential for development of the fisheries industry. The 
average annual catch of marine fish, including prawns, lobsters and shrimps, is 
estimated at over 80,000 tones per annum which contributes about I, 700 million riyals 
to the national GDP. Efforts are under way to improve this prospective industry (MPD, 
1991). 
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3.4.5 Water resources: Although some of the Middle Eastern countries, particularly 
in the north such as Syria, Lebanon and Jordan are blessed with sufficient surface water 
in the fonn of perennial rivers on which dams and water reservoirs have been built, 
Yemen lacks this feature because of its location in the arid and semi desert zone. This 
leaves the country totally dependent on rainfall and ground water. 
Different studies carried out in Yemen reveal that there exists a water crisis of national 
consequence (YEM/88/00 14, 1992). There IS insufficient water to meet the 
continuously rising demand. About twenty years ago there was no such problem when 
rain and spring water was mostly used for irrigation which consumes about 90% of the 
total water (Durrant, 1991). With the introduction of boreholes in Yemen the use of 
ground water is increasing at a fast rate (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Past and present use of springs vs boreholes 
Year Springs Boreholes Total 
1975 73,000 ha 4 5,000 ha 118,000 ha 
1988 25,000 ha 1 05,000 ha 130,000 ha 
1991 NA NA 142,000 ha 
Source: Durrant, 1991 
It should be noted from the above table that the area of spring fed irrigation has 
considerably decreased in the past few years. 
The ground water situation of the basins, especially those nearer to the main cities, 
suggests that the rate of ground water utilisation exceeds annual recharge (2,600 mcm5 
abstraction against 1,300 mcm recharge), a phenomenon which is commonly known as 
water mining. The government has been pursuing a growth oriented strategy which 
requires larger quantities of water to support the overall development process. Although · 
• A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNCDF funded project 
agreement for Republic of Yemen. 
s MCM: Million Cubic Metres. 
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excessive ground water mining has been the main source of economic growth during 
the last two decades, it has also caused a dropping of the water table(s) at an alarming 
rate. It is becoming uneconomical to grow food locally due to high water pumping 
costs. This implies that the country will have to continue importing food in the years 
to come (Taqieddin, 1991 ). Lack of legislation and regulation on ground water 
extraction, and the use of traditional methods of irrigation, is causing enormous waste 
of water through seepage and evaporation. The government is considering measures to 
reduce the renewable imbalance by the protection of water resources, particularly 
ground water. 
In order to achieve a balance, between abstraction and recharge, a annual reduction of 
1,300 m cm would be indicated for irrigation use. Durrant (1991) points out that if by 
the year 2010 municipal and industrial use of water grows to the estimated annual 650 
mcm a balance of 650 mcm would be left for irrigation purpose viz only 30% of the 
total extraction. Table 3.3 shows water present (1990) and future (2010) demands of 
water in the country. 
Province 
Abyan 
Aden 
AI-Bcidah 
Al-Jawf 
Al-Mahwit 
Dhamar 
Hadrarnawt 
Haijah 
Hodeidah 
Ibb 
Lahej 
Mahran 
Marib 
Sa'adah 
Sana'a 
Shabwah 
Ta'izz 
Total: 
Table 3.3: Present and future water demands in Yemen 
(Quantities is million cubic metres) 
Present demand (1990) Future demand (2010) 
Urban Rural Other Total Urban Rural Other 
1.66 2.72 0.16 4.54 2.77 4.54 0.27 
8.48 0.37 0.14 8.99 14.17 0.62 0.23 
1.50 2.90 0.20 4.60 5.20 9.10 0.70 
0.10 0.70 0.00 0.80 0.20 1.60 0.10 
0.30 2.60 0.10 3.00 1.30 6.20 0.40 
2.60 6.00 0.40 9.00 11.80 12.70 1.20 
6.12 2.87 0.44 9.43 10.23 4.80 0.73 
0.80 8.00 0.40 9.20 4.40 29.90 1.70 
7.10 9.10 0.80 17.00 28.40 24.50 2.60 
6.70 10.80 0.90 18.40 27.00 24.40 2.60 
0.88 2.69 0.07 3.64 1.46 4.50 0.12 
0.73 0.23 0.13 1.10 1.22 0.39 0.22 
0.20 1.00 0.10 1.30 0.50 2.10 0.10 
0.90 2.50 0.20 3.60 4.10 4.20 0.40 
18.10 11.10 1.50 30.70 127.40 19.50 7.30 
0.96 1.33 0.12 2.40 1.60 2.22 0.20 
9.70 10.90 1.00 21.60 39.40 22.40 3.10 
66.82 75.82 6.76 149.40 281.15 173.67 22.07 
Source: Al-Fusail et al, 1991. 
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Total 
7.58 
15.02 
15.00 
1.90 
7.90 
25.70 
15.76 
36.00 
55.00 
54.00 
6.08 
1.84 
2.70 
8.70 
154.20 
4.02 
64.90 
476.89 
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In view of not very encouraging prospects for ground water, government efforts are 
under way to increase efficiency of the surface water sources. 
Some consolation could however be derived from the discovery that while the tectonic 
activity in Yemen, especially in the agricultural areas of the highlands and midlands, 
has caused natural hazards, such as earthquakes and landslides, it has fractured and 
faulted the southern escarpment and created dikes in some areas, thus forming a good 
media for surface water infiltration to enrich the ground water source (Al-Fusail et al, 
1989). Additionally, the sedimentary formations provide good aquifers. Natural and 
mineralised springs prevail along this region and agriculture is highly dependent on such 
water sources in the mountain regions. Such areas are however few and with erratic 
rains and persisting drought years, the concern for ground water resources remains a 
national priority. 
3.5 Population 
The Ministry of Planning and Development (199l)'s estimates show that Yemen is the 
highest populated Arab country with a present estimated population of over 13 million, 
spread over a total area of 555,000 square kilometres which gives a population density 
of 22 per square kilometre (Table 3.4). About 80% of this population lives in rural 
areas. Annual population growth rate is estimated to be 3.1 percent while the average 
household size is 6.7. Life expectancy is 46.3 years. The percentage of male and 
female population is almost equal. At this growth rate the population will double in the 
next 20 years (MPD, 1991). Capital Sana'a, Aden, Ta'izz and Hodeidah are the main 
town centres where most of the 20 percent urban population lives. 
High population growth, coupled with inadequate social and physical infrastructure, has 
its adverse effects on family health, particularly mother and child; general quality of 
life, such as social services, health and education (YEM/90/001 6, 1992). 
6 A UNCDF funded project for infrastructure development in Dhamar, Republic of 
Yemen. 
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A large number of Somali, Ethiopian and Sudani refugees, some of whom have 
acquired immigrant status, also live in these towns. The total number of refugees in 
Yemen is estimated at about 100,000 (UNHCR7, 1993). About 850,000 to one million 
Yemenis, representing over 10 percent of the country's work force, previously working 
in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States, returned after the Gulf War and most of them settled 
in various urban centres such as Sana'a, Ta'iz.z, Hodei dah and Aden (UNCDF, 1992). 
Year 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
* 
Sources: 
Table 3.4: Estimated population in Ye men (1989-1993) 
Estimated population in Republic of Yemen 
Total 
Urban Rural Refugees* 
2,329,800 9,919,200 NA 11,649,000 
2,437,200 9,748,800 5,000 12,191,000 
2,512,800 10,051,200 8,032 12,572,032 
2,590,700 10,362,800 52,146 13,005,646 
2,671,000 10,684,000 59,476 13,414,476 
Almost 95% of the refugees, since 1992, are of Somali origin. Others 
include Ethiopians, Eriterians, Sudanese, Iraqis, Syrians and Russians. 
Ministry of Planning and Development, 1991. 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1993. 
The influx of refugees and returning Yemenis has significantly increased the population 
in cities in recent years causing further pressure on the already overburdened urban 
infrastructure and creating serious problems for the government (Sulieman, 1991). Lack 
of adequate housing and job opportunities are beginning to show their effects through 
increased crime rates and intolerance. Unstable political and economic situation in the 
neighbouring countries may lead to an increased influx of migrant Yemenis and non-
Yemenis, potentially exacerbating these detrimental social effects. 
The Government of Yemen is seriously viewing the population growth and related 
problems for which a national strategy is in the making under the guidelines provided 
by the Bucharest (1974) and Amman (1988) Conferences on Population Planning (MPD, 
1991). 
7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
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3.6 Economy 
Yemen is the poorest country among its oil rich neighbours. The country has 
traditionally been able to support itself because of relatively high rainfall and fertile soil 
allowing subsistence agriculture in suitable areas. The departure of nearly one million 
of this labour force, to work in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States in the early eighties, 
adversely affected agriculture production. The country's efforts to develop its industry 
are also not very successful. Average per capita income, according to the World Bank 
estimates is about US$ 390 per annum (fhe World Bank, 1994). This figure is not 
truly representative because a major part of the country's wealth is in the hands of a 
small high-income minority. The percentage of low-income population is estimated at 
over 90%. Muller (1991) estimates the average per capita income in Yemen at US$ 
650 while the Central Statistical Organisation of the Ministry of Planning and 
Development (CSO!MPD) in Yemen claims per capita GNP to be YR 7,807 (MPD, 
1991). Per capita income in Yemen, calculated by most individuals and agencies on 
the basis of official currency exchange rate of 12 riyals to a US dollar, is misleading 
because the market exchange rate is now about 150 Yemeni RiyaJs to a US Dollar. The 
real exchange rate, wh1ch dictates the prices of consumer goods, places Yemen in the 
lower bracket of the low-income countries. 
The country was receiving an assistance of about US$ 600 million per annum from 
donors such as, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, USAID, ODA, Dutch Aid, 
the United Nations and others, for its development and construction programmes. After 
the Gulf War, much of the foreign aid was curtailed. The economic situation in Yemen 
is presently going through a transitional phase and this period can be termed as difficult 
because of the following main reasons (UNCDF, 1992): 
a) unification of two separate countries ie Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and 
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) with different political 
ideologies and socio-economic systems to form one integrated system, 
b) the Gulf War which resulted in mass exodus of nearly one million Yemenis, 
from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, whose return has not only deprived the 
country of over l ,300 million dollars revenue in home remittance but also 
created the problem of providing employment to these retumees; 
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c) continuous influx of refugees from the Horn of Africa and some Arab countries. 
The number of these refugees is estimated at 100,000 including the illegal 
refugees; 
d) cancellation or curtailment of economic cooperation by most of the donor 
countries; and 
e) the prevailing and prolonged world recession. 
MW&E/UNOTCD (1991) summari se the economic perfonnance of Yemen as fo llows: 
a) GDP increased from YR 22 billion in 1983 to YR 55 billion in 1988; 
b) agriculture remains the most important sector of economy by contributing 25%; 
c) merchandise exports increased to 4.6 billion in 1988 mainly due to export of 
crude o il which constitutes 84% of the total exports; 
d) merchandise increased twofold between 1983 and 1988 with food items 
accounting for 30%; 
e) private consumption accounts for nearly 86% of the total GDP; 
f) private investment is increasing gradually at an average rate of 15%; 
g) national savings have been continuously declining and from 1988 they are 
negative; 
h) total government accounts registered a deficit of YR 2 billion in 1989; 
i) the rate of unemployment is estimated to be over 30% which is further 
aggravated by Yemeni nationals returning after the Gulf War and the refugees 
from neighbouring coun tries; and 
j) the rate of inflation is soaring and the general cost of living index was over 20% 
during 199 1. 
Like most low-income countries, Yemen also has a substantial imbalance of trade, 
amounting to US$ 1,520 million. The total estimated imports in 1991 stood at US$ 
2,026 million as compared to the total exports amounting about US$ 506 million (MPD, 
1992). This ever increasing trade deficit is placing further pressure on an economy 
already over burdened by factors mentioned above. The amount of national debt is 
estimated at over US$ 5,000 million. 
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An imponant prospect is the country's potential oil resources which to-date has not 
brought any significant upsurge in the national economy mainly because of the several 
negative factors outlined above. 
Economic development plays a vital role in the development of other fields, including 
education which in turn helps improve awareness at the government and community 
levels. High trade deficits and low industrial development are among the main causes 
for low socio-economic development in the country. 
3. 7 Agriculture 
Yemen is predominantly an agrarian country. Most agriculture is based on subsistence 
farming using traditional methods. The country is gifted with some of the most fertile 
land in the Arabian peninsula, both in the highlands and the dry coastal plain of Tihama 
(SCREAA, 1986). The total cultivated area is estimated to be over 1.5 million hectares 
out of which only 15% is irrigated by perennial water supply. Agricultural growth in 
recent years has not been encouraging mainly due to the use of primitive methods and 
lack of pest control. The agriculture sector presently employs some 70% of the labour 
force and contributes about 36% to the GDP (MPD, 1991). 
U nwin ( 1986) estimates that before migration of a large Yemeni labour force to the oil 
rich Arab countries, in early 1980's, as much as 85% of the country's work force was 
engaged in agricultural activity. Their mass exodus badly affected local agriculture but 
this problem was ignored in view of the large sums of foreign earnings remitted by the 
migrant Yemenis. The local economy sustained itself reasonably well, because of the 
country's excellent relation with its neighbours, until the Gulf War of 1990. Loss of 
home remittance and return of migrant Yemenis, coupled with an influx of refugees, 
created serious problems for the country . The prolonged drought from 1990 to 1992, 
which had a serious impact on agricultural production, added more to the above 
problems resulting in increased food imports which caused a further setback to the 
national economy. The country is in need of some continuous good rainy seasons to 
harvest good crops to boost the economy. 
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Yemen is said to be the pioneer in coffee growing which is planted on the mountain 
slopes near Tihama. Export of coffee has been the biggest foreign exchange earner in 
the past. World wide recession in the demand for coffee encouraged the Yemenis to 
replace coffee growing with qat, a narcotic, which is a cash crop and far more 
profitable. Annual production of qat is estimated at over US$ 1,200 million. Detailed 
discussion on qat is given in Section 3.14. 
Yemen is known for producing a large variety of crops, predominantly cereals, from the 
advent of Islam in the region (Schmidt, 1988). Important cereals of Yemen are 
sorghum, millet, wheat, barley and maize. In 1981 the grain production was over 
800,000 tons and the country used to export grain to the neighbouring counuies. The 
production however started to decline after departure of a large number of agricultural 
labour force, to the neighbouring counuies, for better employment opportunities. The 
situation was worsened by continued droughts and other natural calamities. 
A number of fruits eg citrus fruits, apricots, peaches, grapes, pomegranates, mangoes 
and almost all types of vegetables are produced in the Highlands. The hot Tihama 
plains are known for producing dates, cotton and tobacco. FA08 estimates for 1992 
showed that cotton production was falling in recent years due to low prices maintained 
by the government. 
Yemen has received assistance m agriculture from a number of foreign counuies 
including Japan, the Netherlands, China and the oil rich Arab states but the overall poor 
economic activity in the country and the overwhelming influence of qat does not 
provide any incentive for the local farmer to increase production of his other crops. 
Table 3.5 and 3.6 show the trends of agriculture production and gradual increase in 
imports during the last few years. There is continuous decrease in the production of 
most of the salient crops while the population is increasing at an alarming rate of 3.1 %. 
As a consequence the import b:ll is also rapidly increasing adding to the economic 
difficulties of the country. 
8 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation. 
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Table 3.5: Agricultural produce in Yemen (1987-91) 
Yearly figures in thousands of tonnes 
Crop 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Wheat 112.527 142,452 162.571 153,346 99,913 
Maize 53,876 57,500 68,471 65,639 45,936 
Sorgum/Millet 508,780 594,109 574,409 491,294 272,886 
Barley 40.568 48,617 58.599 55,003 28,912 
Pulses 39,497 46,233 72,459 75,847 42,979 
Tomatoes 147,077 145,168 163,034 167,732 171.511 
Onions 4,612 45,522 77,473 70,270 58,777 
Potatoes 119,253 127.566 140,15 1 159,849 157,125 
Ot.her Vegetables 78,418 79,714 87,1 11 80,426 93,696 
Couon 6,622 7,810 13,036 7,839 7,291 
Tobacco 5,312 6,449 4,394 6,779 6,975 
Coffee 5,111 6,473 6,807 7,41 1 5,430 
Palm Dates 30,702 32,927 24,898 20,697 20,906 
Source: Ministry of Planning and Development, 1991 . 
3.8 Trade and industry 
The future of Yemen's induscry is largely dependent on the outcome of oil exploration 
which the government is actively pursuing in collaboration with some foreign finns. 
According to some estimates, the local industry accounted for about 16% of GDP and 
it employed about 5% of the country's labour force during the mid-eighties (Unwin, 
1986). Most of the industry is based on traditional skills, such as textiles, leather work, 
jewellery, glass making, food processing, utensils making and manufacturing of building 
materials. Industrialisation in Yemen did not make any substantial impact even when 
the country was receiving large foreign remittance, from immigrant Yemenis, before the 
Gulf War. Now the situation is even worse. 
Two cement factories, which fall short of meeting the domestic demand, are among the 
successful projects in the country. The combined capacity of the these factories is over 
1 million tonnes per year. 
High quality salt deposits in Yemen are estimated at a minimum of 25 million tonnes. 
Many local agencies and foreign firms are involved in this major mining industry in the 
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country much of which is exported to Russia, Bangladesh and North Korea. Other 
minerals known to be existing in the country are coal, iron, sulphur, silver, gold and 
uranium. 
Major oil deposits, with an estimated return of 300,000 barrels per day, were found in 
1984. Since then many foreign firms have engaged in oil exploration in the country. 
The industrial development in Yemen is in its preliminary stages. Most of the domestic 
demands are fulfilled through imports consisting of vehicles, machinery, electrical 
appliances, spare pans, food items, electrical goods, furniture, textile, toys, footwear, 
building materials such as cement, reinforcement steel, water pipes, sanitary fittings, 
timber and electrical goods , etc, etc. The small local industry is mainly involved in 
canning and packaging food and some domestic use items. Table 3.6 shows the ever 
rising deficit between imports and exports in the country. The increasing trade 
imbalance does not seem to be a matter of serious concern to the government. 
Table 3.6: Balance of trade in Yemen (thousands of Riyals) 
Year Imports Exports Trade balance 
1988 19,840,962 5,394,425 -14,446,537 
1989 19,332,894 7,45 1,441 - 11 ,88 1,453 
1990 18,867,090 8,315,504 - 10,551,586 
199 1 24,314,326 6,075,948 -18,238,378 
Source: Ministry of Planing and Development, 1991. 
3.9 Education 
The World Bank (1994) estimates place adult female literacy rate in Yemen at 26% 
while the figure for male literacy is estimated to be 38%. Ministry of Planning ( 1992)'s 
figures assumes female literacy rate to be about 22% and the male literacy rate as 62% 
with a national average of 45% (MPD, 1992). These figures however seem to be 
inflated because of inclusion of those who can read only the Qur'an as a re ligious 
obligation. Adult literacy rate in Yemen, particularly among women, is one of the 
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lowest in the world. Unwin (1986) believes that adult literacy in Yemen was only 
13.7% by 1985 (males 26.1 % and females 3.1%). 
Less than 60% of the school age children are enrolled in primary schools. The number 
of students seeking high school or university education is far less. The percentage of 
population knowing any other language, besides native Arabic, is reported to be about 
15%. 
Literacy rate in rural areas, representing over 80% of the national population, is far less 
than the national average. Knowledge of Arabic is therefore very important for any 
foreigner working in Yemen, particularly in the rural areas. Lack of education is also 
one of the major causes for low awareness of various socio-economic problems at the 
government level as well as at the community level. 
3.10 Religion 
Yemen has almost 100% Muslim population, with the exception of a small Jewish 
community, comprising about 5,000 members, which can be seen in northern areas 
(Klein-Franke, 1988). Islam is the state religion and judiciary and constitution are 
based on Islamic law (Muller, 1991 ). Islam came to the region in its early days in the 
sixth century. 
Christianity ceased to exist in Yemen even before the tenth century but there was a 
sizable population of Jews, who were known for their craftsmanship and settled in 
various parts of the country. The Jews started facing problems in selling their products 
after the opening of the Suez Canal by the British in 1849 and declaring Aden as a free 
port. The consequence was that demand for locally produced handicraft fell sharply in 
front of the better quality imported goods from Europe. The Jewish community, 
comprising some 100,000 members, faced many economic problems and most of them 
left Yemen in 1949 to settle in the newly created State of Israel (Varanda, 1982). 
There are cwo major Islamic seers in Yemen. The people living in the northern part of 
the country follow Zaidi'ism, one of the oldest form of Shia'ism in Islam. There are 
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no clear geographic boundaries between the two sects but those living south of Dhamar 
are mostly Sunni Muslims while the Zaidis are found north of Dhamar, including the 
capital Sana'a. There is a small population of about 2% Ismailis who are mostly settled 
in the Harraz mountains, east of Manakha. 
There is sectarian tolerance and liberalism among the Sunnis and the Zaidis and both 
worship in the same mosques. The Zaidis, known as fierce fighters, have preserved 
their culture and traditions well by challenging and fighting against all foreign powers 
intending to occupy the country. Tribal structure in the Sunnis is less strong. They are 
relatively more educated and are mostly involved in business. 
The strong religious influence in the day to day life, compounded by high illiteracy rate 
and the tribal system, is linked to awareness at all levels and affects development or 
reconstruction work in the country. 
3.11 Culture and traditions 
The Yemeni culture is conservative and all Yemenis are proud of their country and 
traditions. Yemeni society, like other Arab countries, is male dominated (Myntti, 1979). 
Males enjoy ultimate power and are fully responsible for the needs of the family. The 
near total dependence of the women on men, forms the basis of family laws including 
marriage, divorce and inheritance. 
From the time of introduction of Islam, men of religious positions were held in high 
esteem (Varanda, 1982). Formal religious rule started from 1919 when I m am Y ahya 
Hamid Al-Din established the Imamate regime. Military rule has been in existence 
since the sixties and has considerably reduced the status differences cultivated under the 
old regime. The long religious rule and agrarian based tribal culture has influenced the 
~ocal architecture and other infrastructure designs including houses, water supply and 
sanitation schemes and clinics in the country (UNICE~. 1985). 
9 UNICEF: United Nations Children Fund. 
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Early marriages are customary. Most of the couples get married between the ages of 
15 to 20 years . which has many negative effects on health, population growth, 
employment and education, etc. 
3.12 Woman's status in society 
A Yemeni woman is a very industrious person and plays imponant roles in production 
and reproduction (Myntti, 1979). Her responsibilities in rural areas include, besides 
child bearing and the normal household duties, fetching water for the family, working 
in the family agricultural farm, looking after livestock, arranging fuel wood, etc. 
Women 's tasks dominate in producing subsistence crops. Irrigating the farms is 
however man' s responsibility. 
The Yemeni society is divided between sexes. Males have the ultimate power and men 
have the responsibility to bear all expenses for the women and children. The Islamic 
practices and Yemeni traditions require all Yemeni women to be veiled and no one 
except the immediate family should see her face (Muller, 1991). Mixing, or sometimes 
even talking to a stranger, is considered sinful. When a woman works outside the 
boundaries of her home she covers herself well so that no stranger may have even a 
glimpse of her body. Woman's status is derived from Qur'an which demands veiling 
and seclusion from male strangers. The new Yemeni constitution is more liberal with 
regards to women in comparison of other Arab countries of the peninsula (Myntti, 
1979). In Tihama region, and particularly in Aden, women move and work more freely 
without veiling themselves and sometimes even without covering their heads. 
Education, even at primary level, is not considered important for girls in which time 
they help the family in domestic duties. Very few girls are allowed to continue 
education beyond primary level. At that age of thirteen or fourteen years, they are 
considered suitable for marriage. As receiving large sums of cash from the bridegroom 
is customary in Yemen, many parents wait for their daughters to grow up so that the 
family could improve the house, or install a water supply system or build a prestigious 
pour-flush latrine in the house, or establish an irrigation pump for the farm. 
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All projects in which involvement of local women is considered necessary, such as 
health education, . sanitation and primary education for girls, face difficulties in 
implementation in Yemen. There is relatively more freedom for women in the southern 
parts of Yemen because of the earlier British, and later socialist influences. 
3.13 Local skills 
The Jews of Yemen have remained an integral part of the history of the country (Klein-
Franke, 1988). Yemeni Jews took keen interest in the intellectual life and economic 
development of Yemen. They were famous for their craftsmanship and trading skills 
as silver smiths, smiths, tin cutters, tailors, weavers, potters and as makers of leather 
goods and gunpowder, etc. Their sudden and mass exodus to Israel, in 1949, created 
a vacuum in the country as far as local skills were concerned. After the departure of 
most of the Jews, the Muslims have tried to fill up the gap partly by learning some of 
the skills themselves and partly by employing expatriate labour. 
Yemeni architecture is centuries old and renowned all over the world. When Islamic 
buildings began to be erected, from the start of the Islamic era, Yemen provided the 
basic and essential ingredients which the experts believe gave birth to the Islamic art 
(Lewcock, 1988). 
Yemenis are considered to be the first to have introduced multi-storied buildings to the 
world. These historical structures can still be seen all over the country while some of 
the oldest are located in the capital San a' a and in the south-eastern town of Shibam 
(Figure 3.3). 
Yemenis are skilful agriculturists and even before the departure of Jews to Israel, 
agricultural farming remained with the Muslims. Their generations old agricultural 
terraces, in the Midlands and the Highlands, are well known for growing qat, 
vegetables, fruits and other crops. Although ground water is the main source of water 
supply to agricultural farms, hand-dug and usually stone-lined water ponds called 
'maj il ', which retain surface water for three or four months after the rain, are also used 
to irrigate farms in the dry season. 
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Figure 3.3: The centuries old Yemeni architecture 
Source: Ministry of Tourism, 1994 
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Yemenis' skill in architecture, stone masonry work, and community work exhibited 
while making agricultural terraces and building mosques, provides a good basis for 
improvement of safety of their buildings by encouraging them to use simple earthquake-
resistance techniques. 
3.14 Influence of qat 
Chewing or nibbling the green leaves of qat is an essential part of Yemeni culture 
(Muller, 1991). Everyday, after lunch, male relatives and friends gather at each other's 
place to join the chewing session. Everyone brings his own qat. Water pipe (hubble-
bubble) and soft drinks and/or bottled water is normally provided by the host but in 
informal gatherings cigarettes and drinks are also supplied individually. Guests are also 
welcome to these sessions and if they appear without their bag of qat, the host and 
other visitors willingly share their supply with him. The chewing session usually 
continues until Maghrib (sunset) prayers. 
Women also chew qat but to a much lesser degree. It is estimated that almost 90% of 
Yemeni male adults chew qat in qat growing regions. Although qat chewing is a daily 
feature, weekends, family ceremonies and national festivals are special occasions when 
the consumption increases even further. 
The qat plant 'Catha Edulis' is grown in many countries besides Yemen, such as 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Madagascar and Tanzania. Some forty kinds of qat is found 
in Yemen which is mainly cultivated in the mountain terraces and valleys of the 
Highlands. Qat has many psychological and physical effects on its consumers, such as 
anxiety, intestinal disorder and psychic behaviour (WH010 , 1983). 
Qat is expensive and an average person spends about 100 Riyals (about 2 US Dollars) 
dail y in buying qat. It is a cash crop and the Yemeni farmer gives it preference over 
all other crops. He irrigates hi s qat farms with expensive water supplied through 
tankers, if cheaper means are not available. The expansion of qat fields in Yemen, 
10 WHO: World Health Organisation, One of the UN agencies. 
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across the agricultural lands, along mountain slopes and river beds, is slowly replacing 
other crops. The southern pan of the country which did not have much qat farming is 
also catching up fast after unification (Al-Fusail et al, 1991 ). Qat grows all year round 
but prices fluctuate from season to season. Off season prices are relatively higher when 
water is scarce. 
Access to ground water through bore holes is another incentive for qat growers and 
random drilling will further endanger the already depleted ground water resources of 
the country. 
Qat is said to be a stimulant and almost all Yemenis, and an appreciable number of 
expatriates living in Yemen for some time, are addicted to it. Yemenis believe that qat 
is good for mental and physical health and that it improves virility. Medical research 
conducted out by experts however does not support this belief (WHO, 1983). On the 
contrary, since qat is not washed before consumption, it creates other health hazards as 
briefly mentioned above. 
Qat has significantly affected Yemeni culture and character. Monthly wages of a low-
income or lower-middle income Yemeni individual, is in the range of YR 3,000 to YR 
6,000. On the average, he spends about 30% to 50% of this amount on buying qat. 
The remaining balance is insufficient for his other personal and family needs such as 
food, clothing, children's education and health-care. The persisting and ever increasing 
gap between income and expenditure contributes towards lack of education, lethargy, 
corruption, receiving bribe money and avoiding hard work, on an individual level. The 
problems generated by qat at an individual level also has its consequences at the 
country level. 
There are also some positive effects of qat, such as providing employment to an 
appreciable number oi the labour force which otherwise would have faced serious 
problems after the Gulf War. Resource mobilisation and income generation can also 
be attributed to the cultivation of qat. On the national level, however. qat is creating 
a more negative than positive effect on the economy and development of this one of the 
poorest and least developed countries is seriously hampered by the influence of qat. 
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3.15 Dependence on foreign skills 
In spite of being a low-income country, Yemen's dependence on foreign skills is 
extensive. Expatriate professionals, such as medical doctors, engineers and teachers are 
mostly recruited from the neighbouring Arab and African countries. These countries 
include Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq and Sudan. The skilled and unskilled 
workers, such as mechanics, technicians and domestic servants come from Somalia, 
India and the Philippines. Low literacy rate and conservatism are some of the causes 
for high expatriate employment. The negative impact of this practice on the national 
economy is a constant drain on the foreign exchange resources of the country, inflation 
of Yemeni Riyal and large scale unemployment among Yemenis. 
3.16 Rural economy 
Eighty percent of the Yemeni population lives in rural areas, whose main source of 
earnings is rain-fed agriculture (MPD, 1991 ). This can be disappointing in drought 
years. 
Rural infrastructure to support the rural economy is inadequate. The only way to reach 
the majority of villages is by a four wheel drive vehicle. Some villages are not 
accessible in the rainy season even by a four wheel drive vehicle. 
The village head, called 'Sheikh ' or 'Aaqil' , is usually a wealthy person with large 
agricultural farms, private bore holes and more than one prestigious vehicle. He is also 
a member of the Local Council for Cooperation and Development (LCCD), a village 
based government agency, responsible for rural development. The influence of the local 
sheikhs and LCCD can be useful in rural development works but presently their roles 
are not much appreciated by the community because of the lack of commitment in these 
two important institutions and the community's lack of tru ~t in them. 
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3.17 Government's concerns 
The government's commitment to improve rural infrastructure does not seem to be 
enough and there seems to be over-dependence on foreign assistance for national 
development and reconstruction programmes. Agriculture has always played an 
important part in Yemeni economy. However, large remittances from immigrant 
Yemenis and substantial aid packages from rich Arab neighbours and other donors 
reduced the importance of local agriculture. Rural development was not considered a 
matter of priority. The foreign aid was also seriously curtailed partly because of 
Yemen's sympathies with Iraq and partly because of economic difficulties of the donor 
Arab countries. This abrupt and unexpected situation affected Yemen's economy 
adversely. Now although the need for agriculture development has revitalised and the 
government claims to provide better facilities to the local fanner, but, apart from a lack 
of resources, a lack of sufficient commitment seems to be the major stumbling block. 
LCCD, responsible for rural development, is not very effective due to lack of 
motivation, shortage of funds and lack of skilled manpower. Some village tracks are 
improved by LCCD in a few areas but in the absence of any technical considerations 
these roads survive only for one or two rainy seasons. 
3.18 Community's concerns 
The rural communities generally seem to be aware of their needs and problems with the 
exception of the safety needs against earthquakes. The main needs indicated by the 
rural communities during the field surveys were schools, health centres, water supply 
and farm-to-market roads. They were usually not aware of the solutions to their 
problems. LCCD is the government agency responsible for attending to these problems 
about which the people are aware, and some other problems about which the people are 
not well aware. The latter category of problems include the earthquake hazard, 
economic and health problems due to excessive qat chewing, and the depletion of water 
resources because of excessive ground water extraction. LCCD, under the chairmanship 
of the provincial governor, can be very instrumental in solving the communities' known 
and unknown problems, but instead it has become a tool of the government for 
mobilising political support in the rural areas. 
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At present most rural children have to walk several kilometres to attend schools. Many 
parents do not find it worthwhile because they can use their young sons on family 
agriculture farms or for shepherding the livestock. There is no possibility for the girls 
to go to distant schools in the conservative society. The girls from their childhood stan 
helping their mothers in collecting fuel wood or water for domestic use. If the schools 
are in the vicinity of one kilometre, a number of young boys and girls might start going 
to them. 
An acute shortage of rural health centres is another problem about which the rural 
people are very concerned. Even if a health centre exists nearby, in most cases it is 
without staff or supplies or both. There are no private clinics in the rural areas because 
the few qualified doctors prefer to work and practice in the urban areas. The nearest 
hospitals are located at two to three hours drive on rough mountainous roads and only 
the affluent farmers can afford to have a private vehicle. Under these circumstances 
getting medical care for even serious patients becomes a problem. 
The demand for farm-to-market roads is also high. Most of the hilly tracks suffer from 
lack of drainage and lack of maintenance problems. During rains these roads become 
impassable due to too much water or land slides and a number of villages remain 
isolated from the rest of the area for a number of weeks. This problem adversely 
affects the local economy because the farm produce cannot be transported to the market 
during most of the rainy season. The market prices also rapidly rise in this period due 
to the shortage in supplies. LCCD cannot cope with this large amount of work due to 
a lack of equipment coupled with a lack of financial and technical resources. The 
people doubt the competence of LCCD to undertake any major rural development work. 
Water supply and sanitation is also a major issue in a majority of the villages but the 
people do not consider it as important as the need for schools, roads and health services. 
Because of the difficJlty in getcing water from distant bore holes or mountain springs 
the people consume very little water in a day. Urban per capita water needs of a 
country reflect its economic, social and health development. WHO guidelines suggest 
an average daily per capita consumption for domestic use in the range of 120 to 150 
litres. The known Yemeni fi gure for urban areas is 64 litres per capita per day. 
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Similarly average daily per capita consumption of water in rural areas is about 21 litres 
against WHO guidelines of 60 to 80 litres per capita per day (Al~Fusail et al, 1991). 
Bathing may be once in several weeks and clothes are also not washed on a regular 
basis. A lack of knowledge about personal hygiene and the importance of clean water 
for health is another reason for the people's lack of concern for water supply and 
sanitation. 
There is little concept of building schools, roads, clinics, water schemes through 
community efforts in the northern parts of Yemen, although the same people build their 
houses, mosques and agricultural terraces through community work. The government 
is considered responsible for providing all the above facilities. The people in south 
Yemen are relatively more accustomed to community work to meet most of their needs. 
There are several reasons for the above attitudes, such as lack of education, poverty, 
lack of trust of the village leadership (sheikhs) and LCCD, and tribal rivalries. 
Summary 
The Republic of Yemen is a low~income country. The country has an old history and 
the people are generally conservative in all matters, including the design of their houses. 
The government and the people are aware and concerned about many of their problems. 
There are certain real problems about which sufficient awareness seems to be lacking. 
One such problem is the earthquake hazard. The country had better economic 
conditions in 1982 than now, when the last earthquake occurred. It may be a more 
serious problem than before, if an earthquake occurs in future. There is an urgent need 
for awareness of the persisting earthquake hazard and the necessary measures. 
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EARTHQUAKES IN YEMEN AND RECONSTRUCTION AFTER 
THE 1982 DISASTER 
"Housing has a long tradition in Yemen. Excavation work carried out by some French 
archaeologists suggests that houses of eight or nine stories were built even two 
thousand years ago". (Cor Dijkgraaj, 1989) 
4.1 Histori.cal overview 
Legendary evidence of earthquakes in Yemen dates back to the seventh century BC 
(Shu'lan, 1989). Most of the earthquakes are reported to have occurred along the 
coastal areas of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Systematic historical records of 
these events is not available. The famous Sabean Dam in Sa'adah-Marib is known to 
have been destroyed in the year 742 AD (SCREAA, 1986). Table 4.1 presents some 
historic earthquakes in Yemen. 
Year 
742 
872 
1072 
1154 
1259 
1265 
1349 
1359 
1387 
1394 
1427 
1463 
1502 
1613 
1644 
1647 
1667 
1675 
1788 
1789 
1859 
1873 
1878 
1895 
1909 
Source: 
Table 4.1: Historic earthquakes of Yemen 
Approximate location No of documented canhquakcs 
Marib I 
Districts of Aden and Sana'a I 
Sana'a, Zabid and Mukha I 
Between Sana'a and Aden I 
West of Sana'a 2 
Sana'a Sequence of shocks 
Zabid I 
Zabid, Sana' a and Aden I + many afLCr-shocks 
Hajar in Aden District I + many afLCr-shocks 
Mazwa Sequence of shocks 
Zabid 1 + many afLCr-shocks 
Zabid Many shocks for three days 
Zabid Sequence of shocks 
Aden 1 
East of Sa'adah 1 with landslides 
Sana'a 1 
Sana'a and rest of Yemen 1 
Dawran 30 shocks in sequence 
Hodcidah 1 + many afLCr-shocks 
Between Mukha and Abu Arish Sequence of shocks 
Aden and Mukha Sequence of shocks 
West of Sana'a 1 with landslides 
Dhamar and Y arim Shocks for three months 
Mukha and Ta'izz 3 
North of Ma'abar 1 
Supreme Council for Reconstruction of Earthquake Affected Areas, 
1986. 
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It can be seen from Table 4.1 that not only have earthquakes been occurring frequently 
in Yemen, but even in the Dhamar govemorate and other surrounding areas, which 
experienced a disastrous earthquake in 1982 have also suffered from earthquakes in the 
past (Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: Seismicity map of Yemen for the period 1900-1991 
Source: Al-Salim, 1993 
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More detailed records of earthquakes during the present century are available at the 
Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources which shows regular occurrence of earthquakes 
in the country (SOC1, 1992). Table 4.2 presents some of the recent earthquakes. 
1. Seismological Observatory Centre, Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, Republic of 
Yemen. 
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Year 
1930 
1941 
1950 
1958 
1961 
1973 
1975 
1982• 
1982• 
1982• 
1985 
1987 
1991 
Source: 
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Table 4.2: Some recent earthquakes in Yemen 
Location Richter Depth in Estimated losses 
Magnitude metres 
Near Aden 5.6 Shallow Minor losses@ 
Near S'adah 6.3 Shallow Minor losses 
Southern Coast 5.9 NA Minor losses 
Southern Coast 5.5 NA Minor losses 
Aden Coast 6.1 NA Minor losses 
Aden Coast 4.5 38 Minor losses 
Hodeidah Coast 5.2 41 Minor losses 
Dhamar 6.0 18 2800 dead, 40,000 homeless and 
Dhamar 6.3 NA miscellaneous infrastructure 
Dhamar 6.4 33 destroyed 
Southern Coast 5.2 3 Minor losses 
Near Hadramawt 3.8 33 Minor losses 
Al-Udeyn 4.6 Shallow 200,000 homeless 
1. 
2. 
Seismological Observation Centre, Dhamar, 1992. 
DHA-UNDRO News, 1993. 
Minor losses due to earthquakes occurring in the sea. 
All these earthquakes occurred on 13 December 1982. 
Most of the historical earthquakes seem to be undocumented due to the ir occurrence in 
the sparsely populated areas . Minor shocks in the recent past, before the 1982 
earthquake could not be recorded because of the absence of seismic stations in the 
country. Geologists mention about three moderate earthquakes having occurred in 
Ta'izz, Sa'adah and Ibb regions in the years 1955, 1959 and 1965 (Arya et al, 1985). 
In view of high earthquake risk in Yemen, and lessons learnt from the 1982 earthquake 
in Dhamar the government has now established twenty seismic stations in different parts 
of the country. These observatory centres will help in monitoring seismic movements 
and ground acceleration in differen t areas. The information can be helpful in 
microzoning these areas and initiating building controls (Shu'lan, 1989). The frequency 
and magnitude of earthquakes in Yemen explicitly requires the designs of infrastructure, 
particularly the buildings, to be earthquake-resistant. While a number of new buildings 
in towns and cities are now being designed on earthquake-resistant principles the rural 
buildings still continue to be built in the traditional way with no consideration for safety 
in the case of an earthquake. The engineers, architects and geologists in the country 
are concerned with the continued use of unsafe building technologies by the rural 
population. Their concern about the government's persistent lack of introduction of a 
building code is even greater. 
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4.2 The earthquake of 1982 
Almost the entire governorate of Dhamar was rocked by a moderate earthquake in 
December 1982 (Figure 4 .2). This earthquake was reported to be of magnitude 5.8 to 
6.0 on the Richter Scale (Arya et al, 1985). The shock was felt over a large area 
including Sana'a, the country's capital, 100 kilometres north of Dhamar town. 
Rumbling sounds of a fore-shock preceding the main shock were reported from a 
number of villages. About 5,000 sq km area around the epicentre was heavily damaged 
while the total damage affected area measured some 20,000 sq km. The earthquake 
claimed about 2,800 human lives and some 4,000 people received serious injuries (Gere 
and Shah, 1984). The loss of livestock and property was also extensive. It is estimated 
that some 70,000 dwellings built of stone-masonry laid in mud-mortar were completely 
destroyed or were damaged to various degrees thus rendering over 265,300 people 
homeless. The depth of the epicentre was determined at 10 kilometres (Jaghman, 
1989). In the following days a series of after-shocks were received and a number of 
buildings which had earlier developed cracks in the flrst main shock collapsed or 
severely damaged thus further increasing the losses above the initial estimates 
(SCREAA, 1986). 
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Figure 4.2: The 1982 earthquake-affected area in Yemen 
Source: Arya et a1, 1985 
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4.3 Description of the study area 
Dhamar govemorate is located in the middle of the Republic of Yemen and its 
headquarters Dhamar is about 100 kilometres south of the capital Sana'a. It is 
considered to be among the under served areas in the country (MPD, 1991 ). Most of 
the population lives in the fonn of scattered mountain communities with little social 
infrastructure. The governorate consists of nine districts or 'nahiyas' (DGHO, 1990). 
The govemorate suffered from an earthquake disaster in 1982. The government took 
up shon-tenn relief and long-tenn development measures to rebuild infrastructure in the 
devastated areas with the assistance of foreign donors. It seems relevant to briefly 
describe the salient socio-economic features of Dhamar governorate, before discussing 
the earthquake and the reconstruction programme. 
4.3.1 Economic features: As much as 70 percent of the economkally active 
population of Dhamar governorate is engaged in agriculture and affiliated activities 
(MPD, 1991) which accounts for about 60 to 70 percent of the regional gross domestic 
product (GDP). Most of the remaining work force comprises of skilled and unskilled 
workers. There is a high unemployment rate of over 15 percent. The per capita GNP 
in Dhamar governorate is reported to be YR 7,500 (MPD, 1991). This amounts to only 
US$ 90 per capita per annum according to the current exchange rate in the open market. 
Inflation is also high in Dhamar like most of the country. Economic progress of the 
governorate is hampered by the following major factors: 
a) isolation of villages and farms from markets due to extremely poor road 
conditions in the mountainous areas; 
b) absence of population centres with the basic social and economic infrastructure 
needed to retain skilled and educated people (UNCDF, 1991 ); and 
c) lack of secondary road system and other essential infrastructure, which happens 
to be a country wide problem but it is more serious in the Dhamar governorate. 
Consequently the scattered rural population has been unable to fully participate in 
development activities in the govemorate (Consulting Engineering Services, 1986). The 
government' s development plans attempt to address these problems on national level 
through provision of better roads and social infrastructure. The government is, 
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however, experiencing difficulties as an aftermath of the Gulf crisis which immensely 
reduced foreign remittances, the return of over one million migrant Yemenis, an influx 
of refugees from neighbouring African countries, long droughts and more recently the 
civil war in the country 
4.3.2 Population structure: Dhamar governorate is located in the Central Highlands. 
Dhamar's estimated population, based on the 1986 census, is over 900,000 (MPD, 
1991 ). The average household size is 7 persons. The governorate has a high rural 
population which is nearly 90% of the total. The ratio between male and female 
population is almost equal. The study of census reports suggests that while there is a 
high population growth of over 9% in Dhamar town, the growth rate in rural areas is 
less than 1%. This suggests a large scale migration of the rural population to Dhamar 
and other urban centres in the country (Consulting Engineering Services, 1986). These 
figures give the average annual growth rate in the governorate as 3.26 % which is 
above the national average of 3.1 %. This high growth rate is due to a crude birth rate 
of 55 per thousand against a crude death rate of 30 per thousand (Dhamar Governorate 
Health Office, 1988). Table 4.3 below, based on 1986 census, shows the population 
trends of Dhamar govemorate. 
Table 4.3: Projected population estimates of Dhamar governorate 
Location 
Dhamar Town 
Rural Areas 
1991 
71,482 
759,220 
Year 
1995 
101,087 
863,045 
Source: Dhamar Governorate Health Office (DGHO), 1990. 
2001 
169,068 
1,046,227 
4.3.3 Topography and climate: Dhamar covers an area of 7,885 sq km with a 
mountainous topography which rises abruptly from the flat Tihama coastal plain in the 
west to altitudes ranging between 1,200 to 2,700 metres. The area of Dhamar town is 
approximately 20 sq km (ACE et al, 1993). On the eastern side, towards Ruba 'a Al-
Khali desert the fall in altitude is gentle. The western highlands of Dhamar are carved 
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by deep gorges, valleys and plateaus (DGHO, 1990). These valleys and plateaus are 
gifted with good quality soil for agriculture (UNCDF, 1991). The climate is usually dry 
and temperate which becomes quite cold during winters with occasional frost and snow 
on the mountains. Rainfall is erratic and droughts are not uncommon. The average 
annual rainfall is 525 mm. The bulk of the rainfall occurs during the summer season 
between April to June. A shorter rainy season occurs from August to September. 
4.3.4 Literacy rate: Literacy in Dhamar is below the national level of about 18%. 
There is one graduate college in Dhamar which is affiliated with Sana'a University. 
Apart from this college, there are a limited number of secondary schools confined to 
towns and a few large villages. Primary schools are also inadequate, and a number of 
children do not attend schools simply because they are not available in the vicinity. 
Low literacy rate can also be attributed to the rural population' s attitude towards 
education who do not consider it very important. They prefer to utilise the services of 
their children for assisting them in the family farming, shepherding livestock, fetching 
water for domestic use, collecting fuel wood and miscellaneous other duties for the 
family . The average literacy rate in the rural areas is not more than 5%. More 
recently, however, the people of Dhamar are showing more interest in educating their 
children. 
4.3.5 Agriculture: Flat land is limited in the govemorate because of the mountainous 
topography. People usually have small land holdings mostly as a result of the centuries 
old tradition of making terraces between mountains introduced in the reign of the 
legendary queen Arwa (Edge, 1992). Agriculture is generally rain-fed and is the main 
occupation in the region. Agriculture is still labour intensive. The basic unit in 
agricultural production is the extended family household. Repeated and prolonged 
droughts have encouraged farmers to use ground water which is expensive but more 
reliable than the erratic rains. Dhamar is among the major food producing regions of 
the country. The principal crops in Dhamar govemorate are cereals such as wheat, 
maize, sorghum and miller which are for domestic consumption only. Other major 
crops are tomatoes, potatoes and melons which complement the traditional cash crops 
of coffee, qat and fruits. Various fruits such as citrus fruit, peaches, apples and apricots 
are also produced in appreciable quantities (MPD, 1992). As a consequence of high 
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pumping costs, less profitable crops are slowly going out of production, thus making 
more cultivated area available for the much more profitable cash crop, qar. Like the 
rest of the country, food production in Dhamar also tends to show a declining trend, 
thus making the regional economy more dependent on food imports. 
4.3.6 Industry; The local economic scene of Dhamar is not different from rest of the 
country and the average per capita income places Dhamarites in the low-income 
bracket, close to the national average. The Gulf War has had its effects on Dhamar's 
economy as well. There is no major industrial unit in Dhamar except for two small 
dairy plants, one at Ar-Rusabah and the other near Dhamar rown. Both of these planes 
belong to the government. There also exist some privately owned poultry farms which 
cater for poultry needs in the governorate. There is, however, good potential for the 
development of agriculture based industries in Dhamar for which land, cheap labour, 
Dhamar's central location in the country, with reliable telecommunication system and 
some other infrastructure, is an incentive. The capital Sana'a is almost reaching its 
limits and cannot continue to accommodate the ever-increasing population. The existing 
infrastructure in Sana'a is also inadequate and its water resources are depleting fast. 
Under these circumstances, Dhamar, because of its close vicinity to Sana'a and good 
climate, provides a genuine opportunity for future development. 
4.3.7 Social patterns: Dhamar, as is generally the case in northern Yemen, has a 
conservative society with a strong tribal system. Most villages are basically tribal 
settlements built on rocky outcrops for the reason of security against rival tribes (Leslie, 
1986). The traditional home in Dhamar, like most other areas in the highlands , is a 
defensive structure made of thick walls from stone masonry. The houses comprise 
several floors with different floors for different purposes, for example, the ground floor 
is usually used as a stable for domestic animals, the first floor is mainly at the disposal 
of women while the top floor is used by men to receive guests and chew qat. Higher 
location of the men's floor gives them an opportunity to keep a close eye on strangers 
and their enemies, considered necessary because of the continuing tribal feuds. These 
houses and their location proved to be highly vulnerable during the earthquake of 1982. 
In spite of suffering heavy death toll and property losses the people called it an ace of 
God and did not consider the type and location of their homes as a contributing factor 
to the scale of destruction. 
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4.4 Seisrno-tectonic set-up of the region 
The study of satellite imageries of Yemen indicates the presence of an active N20'W-
S20'E trending belt with recent faults and volcanism within several thousand years. 
This belt, extending from the Dharnar-Rada'a quaternary volcanic massif in the south 
continues towards Sa'adah in the north and is intercepted by a major northeast-
southwest trending active belt with recent faults extending from the Marib-Sirwah 
volcanic massif in the northeast and extending toward the southeast in the central 
mountainous region. The 1982 Dharnar earthquake occurred in the zone of intersection 
of these two belts. Ground fractures from NlO'W to N20'W were noted in the region. 
These fractures followed the recent faults along the Dhamar-Sa'adah belc and were 
noted to occur at some places along a length of 15 kilometres with the western side 
moving up a few millimetres with respect to the eastern side. This phenomena 
indicated the thrust fault mechanism in which the western region was probably over-
thrusting the eastern region. The openings caused by the fractures ranged from a few 
millimetres to 10 centimetres and extended over 50 to 100 metres distance. No strike-
slip movements or offsets were observed along the ground fractures. Figure 4.3 shows 
the seismo-tectonic map of Yemen. 
Figure 4.3: Seismo-tectonic map of Yemen 
Source: Arya et a!, 1985 
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Figure 4.4: Some of the buildings damaged during the 1982 earthquake 
Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
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4.5 Intensity of earthquake and ground motion 
The Dhamar earthquake caused panic among the local residents. Most of the random 
rubble and adobe construction in Dhamar and Ma 'abar areas suffered large and deep 
cracks in the walls, collapse of outer and inner surfaces of the masonry walls causing 
partial or complete collapse of buildings (Figure 4.4). Many single storey buildings 
made of dressed stones or concrete blocks, laid in gypsum or cement : mortar suffered 
moderate damage and showed cracks only along the mortar joints without endangering 
the safety of the buildings. This heavy damage corresponds to Modified Mercalli (MM) 
scale intensity VIII and is reported to have covered a 45 x 35 sq km area in the Dhamar 
governorate. Over 70% of houses located in this area suffered irreparable damage. 
Figure 4.5 shows the isoseismal map of the earthquake-affected area describing various 
damage zones ranging from MM intensity VI to VIII based on the degree of damage 
observed in these areas and the integrated effect of the main shock and the after-shocks. 
It was observed that ground motion intensity decreased faster in the areas of ground 
fractures than the hilly terrain which suffered heavy damage over a large area. 
Slumping of the dry-packed masonry retaining walls supporting agricultural farms in 
the intensity VIII zone was reported. Sliding and overturning of loose objects such as 
utensils and furniture was also reported in the region. The damage area under intensity 
VII was measured to be 65 km north-south and 75 km east-west of Dhamar. 
Figure 4.5: 
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Isoseismal map of the 1982 earthquake in Yemen 
Source: Arya et al, 1985 
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4.6 Traditional construction 
Most of the settlements in the highlands of Yemen take the form of scattered villages 
of stone masonry houses, built on rocky outcrops or slopes for reasons of defence 
(Leslie, 1986). The country is well known for its ancient mud and masonry 
architectural work, which is to date part of the Yemeni culture (Figure 4.6). In the past 
Yemeni architectural designs kept a good balance of beauty and stability which made 
the buildings strong enough to withstand the earthquakes. The ancient houses used 
traditional strengthening practices, such as timber ties and ring beams (SCREAA 1986). 
Excavations carried out by French archaeologists reveal that even 2,000 years ago, the 
Yemenis used to build as high as eight to nine storey buildings (Dijkgraaf, 1989). It 
was found that several earthquake resistant techniques were known in Yemen in past. 
These tested techniques for strengthening and stabilising buildings were ignored by the 
later day builders and emphasis remained only on beautification (Vulto, 1989). This 
happened to be the main cause for heavy losses in the 1982 earthquake in the country 
which proved the vulnerability of the traditional houses. 
The existing rural houses in northern Yemen are usually built from stone masonry while 
block masonry is more common in the south. In most of the traditional construction, 
the walls tend to separate vertically in the absence of a binding force. This type of 
construction was frequently destroyed in the earthquake of 1982. 
Most of the new traditional construction in the area consists of random rubble or half-
cut stone masonry or adobe (Figure 4. 7). The stone-masonry walls are usually 60 to 
90 cm thick. Heavy stones are provided on the outside and inside and the remaining 
gap in between is filled with scone scrap and mud. This practice does not allow any 
connection between the outer and inner sides of the walls. There is also no inter-
locking of the walls at the corners or between perpendicular walls (Arya et al, 1985). 
The traditional buildings are usually located on cliffs or steep hill sides directly resting 
on the exposed rocks. Where these buildings rest on soil, foundations are dug to 
shallow depths of about 50 centimetres which are packed with dry stones or stones and 
mud. The height of the building can go up to three to four storeys or 12 to 15 metres. 
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Figure 4.6: Typical mud architectural designs of traditional buildings in Yemen 
Source: Executive Office for Reconstruction, Yemen, 1985 
The door and window openings are usually few and small due to the extreme weather 
conditions. 
The roofs are almost always flat, made of roughly dressed round or half-round timber 
joists or tree branches, covering spans of 3 to 3.5 metres with about 50 cm centre-to-
centre spacing in between. This limits the width of the room but the length can be as. 
much as 12 to 15 metres . The timber joists are sometimes covered with wooden planks 
but in most cases bush or weed is used to fonn the deck for receiving clay topping. 
The clay topping in a new traditional house is about 20 to 25 thick but quite often a 10 
cm or so thick layer of clay is added just before the rainy season for protection against 
leakage which continues to add to the thickness and weight of the roof with the passage 
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Figure 4.7: Traditional stone-masonry work in Yemen 
Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
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of years. Sometimes an old roof can be as thick as 90 cm thus adding to the 
vulnerability of the building. When roof tops are used as floors, concrete screed with 
cement plaster is sometimes applied to get a smooth surface. Parapet walls on roofs 
are of low height, made from rubble stone covered with clay plaster mixed with straw. 
The few public buildings such as dispensaries and schools in the pre-earthquake era 
were built and maintained by the government. These buildings were usually single 
s toreyed built on proper foundations. The walls were made of half-cut stones with a 
proper bond between the walls and between the wall and roof. The roofs of these 
buildings were made from reinforced concrete. These public buildings suffered only 
minor to moderate damage during the earthquake. 
4.7 Community's response 
Estimated property losses in the 1982 earthquake run well over 2 billion US dollars. 
The local population was caught completely unaware by the disaster and most of them 
suffered heavy losses to life and property. The surviving community's response to the 
catastrophe, immediately after recovering from the shock, was that of self-help (Leslie, 
1986). They erected temporary shelters by tying bed sheets and blankets over wooden 
posts and whatever else was readily avajlable from the ruins of their collapsed houses. 
Those who could get hold of some corrugated iron sheets made better shelters. They 
helped each other in fixing the emergency shelters and by sharing food and other 
essential items. These shelters were later supplemented by tents provided by the · 
government. Fears about further tremors prevented most people from returning to their 
damaged homes. The government's repeated announcements through media regarding 
the supply of emergency shelter on an immediate basis, and the pennanent shelter in 
the nearest possible future to all survivors discouraged many of them from starting even 
the simplest type of reconstruction by exploiting their own resources such as the 
materials from their ruined homes. 
The Turnkey free housing built in the reconstruction programme was available to only 
a few, relatively influential, percentage of the earthquake victims (Figure 4.8). A 
majority of the people were not satisfied by the reconstruction programme for various 
reasons. Detailed discussion on this issue is given in Chapters 8 and 9. 
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The donor assisted self-help housing programme required the beneficiaries to contribute 
30% of the total cost by providing unskilled labour and local materials (Figure 4.9). 
The beneficiaries response to this programme was better than the turnkey housing 
programme. 
The government also assisted some of those people whose houses were not seriously 
damaged by repairing and strengthening their existing houses (Figure 4.1 0). The 
beneficiaries had to contribute a major part of the repair cost in thi s programme and 
most of them were not happy. 
There were still a large number of earthquake-affected people who could not benefit 
from the government's reconstruction programme. These people felt bitter because the 
government took away their initiative by promising them free housing and then did not 
produce. The construction cost also substantially rose in the meantime thus making 
house building even more problematic. Many of these people or non-beneficiaries went 
back to live in their damaged houses which could prove lethal in a future earthquake. 
4.8 Government's response 
The government announced re lief measures immediately after the disaster (SCREAA, 
1986). The relief programme included tents, food and medicines for the victims. The 
government appointed a high level body under the Prime Minister and named the 
Supreme Council for Reconstruction in Earthquake Affected Areas (SCREAA) to 
monitor the relief work at the national level and to coordinate international assistance 
(Wijenberg, 1989). SCREAA represented all those ministries who were involved in the 
relief and reconstruction work one way or the other. These ministries included the 
Ministry of Works, the Ministry of Municipalities and Housing, the Ministry of Water 
Supply and Electricity, the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, the Central Planning 
Organisation, and the General Union of the Local Councils and Cooperatives for 
Development. The government announced its plans to reconstruct 25,000 houses and 
to repair 17,000 through local resources and foreign assistance apart from the 
development of the infrastructure (SCREAA, 1986). 
110 
------------ ---- - - - - - -
Figure 4.8: 
A turnkey house 
Figure 4.l0: 
An aided repaired house 
Source : Field Surveys, 1994 
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Figure 4.9: 
An aided 
self-help 
house 
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At the local level, an Executive Office for Reconstruction in Dhamar (EOR) was 
es tabli shed, under SCREAA, with the responsibility to supervi se and implement the 
reconstruction and resettlement activities in the Dhamar Govemorate (DHV Consultants, 
1988). A world wide appeal to help combat this disaster was launched by the 
Government of Yemen. At the local level, teams of engineers and other experts from 
all provinces were despatched to the disaster area to participate in the relief efforts. 
Technical and statistical survey teams also toured the area to collect technical data for 
use in future planning. 
EOR divided the e ntire governorate into twenty zones in order to avoid duplication of 
efforts and to facilitate better coordination and monitoring (Kassem, 1989). Seventeen 
of these zones where a majority of the buildings had been destroyed were earmarked 
for the turnkey housing programme to be constructed through contractors (Figure 4.11). 
The remaining three zones covered those villages where repairable damage had occurred 
to most of the houses and only a few houses were destroyed in each village. These 
three zones were to be covered under the self-help programme. T hese zones were 
assigned to different donors in accordance with the aid package committed by them. 
Under the reconstruction programme, 10,300 turnkey housing units were actually built 
through open bidding while another 1,300 houses were completed under the Self-help 
programme. About the same number of houses, in repairable conditio n, were repaired. 
As such only about 50-55% of the original target was achieved. 
Many factors are said to be responsible for this shortfall, such as deficiencies in 
planning and mobilisation of resources. The government claims that some of the donors 
did not provide their committed assistance which was an important element in 
hampering the reconstruction programme, and left the government in a difficult 
situation. The one hundred-bed hospital in Ma'abar, the second larges t town in Dhamar 
governorate, is quoted as an example. This hospital is badly needed but the government 
has so far not been able to complete it. 
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Figure 4.11 : Map of Dhamar showing the govemorate distributed in 20 zones. 17 of 
these zones were rebuilt through a contractor, while the remaining 3 
were assisted by aided self-help projects. 
Source: Executive Office for Reconstrution , Dhamar, 1992 
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4.9 Donors' response 
Donors' response to the country's appeal for help in rebuilding the earthquake-affected 
areas was overwhelming. Several multilateral and bilateral agencies, such as Saudi 
Arab Fund, UAE Fund, Kuwait Fund, USAID, Dutch Aid, UNDP, UNCDF and 
UNICEF agreed to provide technical and financial assistance in the relief and 
reconstruction work (UNCDF, 1990). Apart from financial assistance in the 
reconstruction work, some donors such as ODA sponsored programmes for training the 
local artisans in simple earthquake-resistant techniques, and mostly by using local 
materials. 
Most of the reconstruction activities continued until 1989. It can be seen from Table 
4.3 that the reconstruction activity generally involved the building of housing units, 
primary schools (PS), hospitals, health centres (HC), primary health care units (PHCUs), 
mosques and water supply and sanitation schemes (WSS). The first project was to 
build some 74 kilometres of feeder roads in the North West Dawran region of the 
Dhamar govemorate, has just started after identifying the urgency of this project and 
in response to the demand from the local communities. The idea behind building feeder 
roads and to provide perennial access between agriculture farms and potential markets 
in the region is to help improve the socio-economic condition of the local population. 
Table 4.3 also provides brief details of the amount and type of assistance provided by 
various donors in rebuilding the physical infrastructure in the earthquake-affected areas 
of Dhamar govemorate. 
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Table 4.4: Post-earthquake donor assistance for reconstruction in Yemen 
Donor Nature of assistance for infrastructure Cost in 
millions of 
US$ 
Saudi Arabia 3413 low-cost houses, health centres and schools 68 
Kuwait 1514 low-cost houses and one 102 bed hospital 27 
Kuwait Fund Health faciliLics and miscellanoous rural infrastructure 33 
UAE 665 houses and other rural infrastruc ture 17 
Oman 326 houses 5 
Qatar Miscellaneous social services eg PHCUs, mosques, schools 5 
Dutch Aid 184 low-cost houses 5 
VSAlD 369 low-cost houses and medical facilities 10 
EEC 46 low-cost houses 1 
Germany Water supply systems 3 
UK Technical assistance for design and repair of infrastructure 
India Technical assistance for design and repair of infrastructure 
USSR Building materials for reconstruction work 3 
UNCDF 279 houses 3 
Japan Building materials for rural infrastructure 
North Korea Cement for reconstruction work 
fOB Schools 2 
USA Technical assistance lhrough Peace Corps Volunteers 
Sweden Social guidance community development 
UNICEF Health centres and PHCUs 2 
Source: UNCDF Project Agreement YEM/90/COl ; 1990 
4.10 Pre-earthquake infrastructure 
There was hardly any modern physical infrastructure in the nonhem parts of Yemen 
until the end of the Imamate regime in the middle of 1960s. Centuries old traditional 
water collection and irrigation systems still exist which are famous for land-use 
planning and economical use of run-off in a country where rainfall is low and erratic. 
Most of the modern development staned in the early 1970's. The infrastructure existing 
in the rural areas of Yemen before the 1982 earthquake is briefly discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
4.10.1 Housing: The traditional houses in north Yemen are defensive buildings 
sufficient for all the domestic activities within its compound (Leslie, 1986). The rural · 
houses in the highlands are multi-storeyed comprising of chree or four floors (Figure 
4.12). The ground floor is used as a stable for domestic animals and storing fodder and 
crop. The middle floors are for the use of women and children. The rooms in these 
floors are built around a central staircase. The top floor is meanc for men which 
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Figure 4.12: Layout plan for a traditional rural house in north Yemen 
Source: Leslie, 1986 
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includes one or more 'divans'. The divan is used for receiving guests, holding feasts 
and chewing qat for long hours. These buildings are not safe against earthquakes as 
experienced during the last earthquake in Dhamar (1982) and Al-Udeyn (1991) in which 
moderate earthquakes caused severe loss of life and property. Traditional roofs were 
also found to be vulnerable to damage because the timber joists often do not penetrate 
far into the walls and are easily separated from their support walls. The heavy mud 
roof proved to be yet another dangerous component of the structure during the 
earthquake of 1982. DHV Consultants ( 1989) detennined the following weak points 
in traditional Yemeni houses: 
a) the composition of a wall has two tiers (internal and external) without any 
functional connection in between; 
b) the conical shape of the inner side of the stone which allows very little bond in 
the masonry work; 
c) the excessive weight of thick roof with little connection to the walls; and 
d ) the lack of a tie beam connecting outer walls. 
These factors make the structure very weak and dangerous in the face of an earthquake. 
4.10.2 Water supply: Myntti (1979) observed that water supply was one of the most 
serious problems in Yemen. Surface water is rare while ground water is usually deep. 
There are very few water supply schemes in rural areas. Outside larger towns and cities 
piped water supply systems are virtually unknown (SCREAA, 1986). Water supply for 
domestic use is provided by women and children who fetch it by hand or on donkey-
backs (Figure 4.13). The entire water fetching operation may take several hours, in 
some cases, depending upon di stance of the water source and high location of the 
house. The pre-earthquake water collecting systems, which are still widely used in rural 
areas, are primitive and generally unsafe. In these systems water is collected from open 
ponds filled by rain water called 'majils', open streams, irrigation boreholes or 
mountain springs. 
Only boreholes , which were much fewer in the early eighties than now, and to some 
extent mountain springs, could be considered as a safe water source. It is not only the 
wa ter source but also the methods of transporting and carrying water which affect water 
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Figure 4.13: A small Yemeni girl fetching warer for the family 
Source : Field Surveys, 1994 
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quality. Majils and open streams are extremely unsafe for human consumption because 
of their exposed surface. Further, human beings and domestic animals take water from 
these sources, by directly entering inside the pond or stream, which makes them 
undisputed health hazards. 
4.10.3 Sanitation: Public sanitation and hygiene are poor in Yemen (Myntti, 1979). 
Most of the diseases in Yemen are caused by unsafe water supply and poor sanitation, 
for example diarrhoea, tuberculosis, malaria, dysentery, worms, intestinal diseases and 
bilharzia. Traditionally rural Yemenis use open fields for defecation. Dry or pour-flush 
latrines were rare in rural areas before the earthquake of 1982. 
4.10.4 Health services: Before the earthquake a few hospitals and clinics existed only 
in the main towns which usually suffered from lack of skilled staff and supplies. These 
hospitals and clinics were insufficient to meet even the local demand of towns. Health 
related infrastructure was almost non-existent in rural areas and even primary health-
care units were not seen in these areas because of isolationist and anti~development 
policies of the Imamate regimes (Muller, 1991 ). People mostly depended on traditional 
treatment. Only serious patients were brought to the hospitals. Local culture and 
conservatism, which discourages women's contact with strangers, also played a major 
role in non-availability of such facilities . Poor living conditions and an acute shortage 
of professional and paramedical facilities were other reasons for the lack of health-care 
in rural areas. 
4.10.5 Roads: Only a few primary roads, such as Sana'a-Ta'izz and Ta'izz-Aden 
existed as single lane asphalt roads before the earthquake. Most of the towns were 
approachable by gravel surfaced roads which suffered from a lack of maintenance. 
Secondary roads were also very few and connected only some main areas. The so 
called feeder or tertiary roads were no more than animal tracks on which only four-
wheel drive vehicles could traveL There were only a few people who could afford 
four-wheel drive vehicles. Donkeys were mostly used for shon journeys. A number 
of villages in the mountain regions used to become inaccessible during the rains due to 
erosion and land slides. Such villages remained isolated for several weeks from the rest 
of the country. 
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Lack of all-weather roads adversely affected local economy. Inability to transport 
agricultural produce to the markets, in the rainy seasons, added to the economic 
difficulties of the rural population. 
4.10.6 Telecommunication: Primitive telecommunication system existed only in urban 
areas. There was no such system in rural areas. Rural people had to travel long 
distances on foot or by occasional transport to reach the nearest telephone or post 
office, a facility which they rarely used. 
4.10.7 Electric supply: Public sector electric supply was restricted to cities and towns. 
Only a handful of privately-owned generators could be found in the rural areas . A very 
small number of affluent farmers or traders could afford this luxury for their fanns, 
houses and shops. 
4.10.8 Fuel energy: Oil or gas were not discovered in commercial quantities in Yemen 
before the earthquake of 1982. Most of the country ' s population depended on wood or 
charcoal for fuel. This became the main cause of the shortage of forest area over the 
years. Evidence from ancient buildings in Yemen shows that the use of wooden tie 
beams in the walls was common which made such buildings safer against earthquakes. 
However, the indiscriminate cutting of trees, for wood fuel use, depleted the forest 
resource. Use of wood in buildings became rare and only for ornamental purposes due 
to its rising cost. As a consequence the buildings became unsafe with the passage of 
time and when a moderate earthquake hit Dhamar in 1982 it caused serious damage to 
life and property . 
4.11 Post earthquake reconstruction programme 
Kassem (1989) says that the Government of Yemen after the earthquake of 1982, 
started a vast and comprehensive reconstruction programme in the disaster affected area, 
under donor assistance, at an estimated cost of 2.68 billion Yemeni Riyals. The 
purpose was to remove all physical signs of the catastrophe by providing shelter to the 
homeless and by compensating survivors for their losses. As a consequence the 
following construction programme was envisaged: 
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10,000 low-cost houses through a contractor; 
3,000 low-cost ·houses through self-help; 
95 primary and secondary schools; 
57 mosques; 
24 rural health centres; 
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one 200 bed hospital in Dhamar and one 102-bed hospital in Ma'abar; 
electrification of 80 villages; 
levelling of Dhamar-Dhabah road; and 
259 water supply schemes. 
4.11.1 Housing: The government financed, on its own, the repair of 17,000 houses 
which were not completely destroyed and could be used after some repairs. 10,000 
earthquake resistant housing units were built through contractors on a turnkey basis. 
The self-help reconstruction programme, under which nearly 3,000 houses were built 
in remote rural areas, was the first of its kind in the hiscory of Yemen (Wijenberg, 
1989). 
The primary aim of Dhamar Aided Self Help (DASH) Reconstruction Project was to 
introduce earthquake-resistant building techniques using local building materials and 
simple building techniques. The new houses were intended to be attractive and 
affordable to the average household, keeping in view the local culture and traditions. 
With all construction elements strongly connected to each other, the tight box like 
structure should be able to withstand shock waves from any direction (DHV Consultant, 
1989). The emphasis in the self-help programme was to maintain, as much as possible, 
local architecture and to improve on the available building knowledge in the area 
(Vulto, 1989). 
The DASH project was implemented with the following objectives 
(Sutmuller, 1989): 
a) short-term: to provide shelter to the homeless; and 
b) long-term: introduction and transfer of knowledge concerning earthquake 
resistant techniques. 
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The main emphasis was on the following points: 
a) to maximise the use of local building material s; 
b) to safeguard the Yemeni architecture; 
c) to bui ld on existing building techniques; 
d) to build a house affordable to most of the population; and 
e) to introduce a self-help concept with maximum participation of the beneficiaries. 
4.11 .2 Primary and secondary schools: 95 primary and secondary schools were built 
on turn-key basis in the entire govemorate (Figure 4.14). A group of five to ten 
villages or more with about a hundred students and no school in the vicinity of 3 to 4 
kilometres were provided with primary schools. Other larger vi llages with existing 
primary schools, but no facility for further education, were considered for secondary 
schools. 
4. 11.3 Mosques: 57 mosques of various sizes, depending upon local population, were 
built in different areas through contractors (Figure 4.15). The mosques are also used 
for imparting re ligious education to the local children. 
4.11 .4 Hospitals and rural health centres: Health facilities were poor in Dhamar and 
Ma'abar towns and almost non-existent in the rural areas. A 200 bed hospital was built 
in Dhamar under donor assistance. Another hospital at Ma 'abar has not been completed 
to date. 
24 rural health centres were built through contractor at different locations in the Dhamar 
Govemorate (Figure 4.16) . Building of primary health care units is still continuing. 
Most of the rural health centre or units, however, suffer from a lack of staff and 
supplies. 
4.11 .5 Rural electrification: 80 villages were electrified by installing diesel generators 
and by providing a limited distribution system. The beneficiaries in these villages 
receive electricity supply for four to five hours daily in the evening. Fuel supply is not 
a problem in Yemen, even in remote areas, but maintenance facilities for mechanical 
and e lec trical equipment is a problem. 
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Figure 4.14: 
A primary 
school in Al-Marwan 
Figure 4.16 : 
A health centre 
in Dawran 
Source: 
Figure 4.15: 
A mosque in Dhamru· 
Infrastructure built during the reconstruction programme 
Field Surveys, 1994 
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4.11.6 Roads: Road building programme, comprising of widening the Sana'a-Dhamar-
Ta'izz road and the building of the Dhamar-Albaidah road, was confined to urban areas 
only. This programme was, however, part of the national development plan and not 
specifically related to post earthquake reconstruction. Dhamar is well known for 
agriculture production and most of the existing approach roads in rural areas are nothing 
but animal tracks which are not accessible in the rainy season. The need to improve 
these tracks is well established but apart from the levelling and grading of the Dhamar-
Dhabah road no significant road work was carried out in the rural areas of Dhamar in 
the reconstruction programme. 
4.11.7 Water supply and san itation schemes: 259 water supply schemes were 
originally planned for the earthquake-affected areas, but less than 50% could actually 
be built. Only two urban water supply schemes for the only two towns of the 
governorate, Dhamar and Ma 'abar were built. The rural schemes are based on pumping 
ground water to a storage tank on an elevated point, and distribution by gravity (Figure 
4. 17). Because of conservatism and tribal rivalries community water supply is not 
popular in Yemen and people prefer domestic connections. For this purpose the 
beneficiaries, who could afford it, preferred to pay for private connections. 
The sanitation programme included building pour-flush latrines in the new houses, 
schools, hospitals, health centres and mosques. Local artisans were trained on building 
soak pits and related sewerage systems. 
The water supply, sanitation and hygiene programme still continues in the rural areas 
of Dhamar under Dutch assistance. 
4.12 Reconstruction programme details 
The entire work was divided into four categories as follows (SCREAA, 1986): 
a) repair of nearly 17,000 houses, in repairable condition, through government 
resources; 
b) reconstruction of vastly destructed areas by contractors through open bidding; 
c) reconstruction of partly damaged areas through self-help projects; and 
d) development and reconstruction of the infrastructure through contractors. 
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Figure 4.17: A water supp ly system at Ar-Rusabah 
Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
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The houses with minor damages were repaired through local contractors. The contracts 
were directly signed between the Executive Office for Reconstruction (EOR), Dhamar 
and the contractors after assessment of damage to each house and the amount of repair 
involved. Other houses requiring minor repairs were repaired through release of cash 
funds to the owners. The cash was issued in four instalments. The first instalment was 
paid immediately after signing an agreement between EOR and the victims. The next 
payments were released after certification by EOR Engineers regarding satisfactory 
completion of the previous phases. 
Major repair works included adding reinforced concrete tie-beams under roofs with deep 
anchorage in the support walls, replacement of delaminated wall s, filling of cracks, 
replacement of occasional broken wooden beams. In cases where more wooden beams 
of the same roof were found broken or cracked the entire roof was replaced with a 
reinforced concrete roof. 
In the Turnkey approach master and survey plans for location of houses and other 
infrastructure were prepared by the government engineers. The design of buildings was 
prepared by foreign experts and was based on earthquake resistant techniques . This 
design was standardised for all victims (EOR, 1989). Tenders for building these 
structures in each area were issued through advertisement and works awarded to 
successful bidders. A total of 10,30 I houses (Table 4.4) were completed under the 
reconstruction programme. Construction of 95 schools, 57 mosques, 24 health centres 
and over 250 water supply schemes and electrification of more than 80 villages was 
also part of the reconstruction and development programme. The victims were not 
consulted about the location, design or construction of any of these works. 
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Table 4.5: Reconstruction of houses through contractors 
Location Beneficiary No of Origin of Total Cost per Donor 
villages houses conLractor ConLract house 
Price (YR) (YR) 
Dhamar 10 679 Turkey 51 ,601,000 75,996 Saudi Arabia 
Dawran 12 774 India 59,365,800 76,700 Saudi Arabia 
Rusaban 13 1001 Yemen 76,261,185 76, 185 Saudi Arabia 
Manqadah 10 713 Yemen 56,396,161 79,097 Yemen 
B.Shajarah 23 1076 Yugoslavia 76,536,867 71,131 Yemen 
L.Asshawis 15 812 Yemen 46,539,1 72 57 ,314 Yemen 
Ma'abar 16 1006 Italy 62,720,076 62,346 Saudi Arabia 
Ashshamahi 16 388 China 34,434,224 88,748 Kuwaii/Oman 
Tinen 15 620 Yemen 48,464,160 78,168 UAE(ZWA* 
Wynan 38 443 Bangladesh 53,160,000 120.000 Yemen 
Sunaa 13 711 South korca 57,740,310 81,210 Kuwait PC** 
Khirb Afiq 11 394 Yemen 29,572,401 75,057 Yemen 
Marsabah 12 462 China 33,882,618 73,339 Kuwaii/Oman 
Jabal Ishaq 30 553 Bangladesh 58,065,000 105,000 Yemen 
Zurajah 33 39 1 China/Y emen 37,825 ,235 96,740 Yemen 
Dawran 35 195 China/Yemen 19,370,3 14 99,335 Yemen 
Ar-Rusabah 26 183 China/Y cmcn 8,244,800 45,054 Yemen 
United Arab Emirates and Zubiani Women's Association, a UAE NGO. 
Kuwait Peoples' Committee, A Kuwaiti NGO. 
Source: Executive Office for Reconstruction , Dhamar, Yemen. 
The average cost of a Turnkey house, built during the period 1983 through to 1987, 
comes out at about YR 80,084 or about US$ 14,000. 
Sparsely scattered remote villages, with a lesser number of damaged houses and 
approachable by narrow and dangerous mountainous roads, were regarded by the 
government as too expensive to be built by contractors. Some donor agencies, who 
offered to assist with self-help programmes, were invited to work in these areas. The 
cost of reconstructing houses under this approach was shared between government and 
the beneficiaries. The government provided all imported materials which were not 
available in rural areas together with skilled labour. Technical supervision and training 
of the local craftsmen in earthquake-resistam building techniques was also provided by 
the government. The beneficiaries contributed with land for the house, local materials, 
such as stones, gravel, sand, clay, water for construction and unskilled labour. 
Beneficiaries' contribution accounted for a maximum of 30% of the total cost and the 
house was built in four phases (Table 4.5) . Van Dijkhuizen (1989) reported that the 
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criterion for selection of beneficiaries was that the old (pre-earthquake) house must be 
tocally destroyed. 
Table 4.6: Self-help reconstruction project material check list 
Total material input 
Phase 
Description of material Quantity Description of material Quantity 
1 Sand 4m3 Cement 30 bags 
Gravel 2m3 Reinforcement steel 8 mm 74m 
Stones 30 cm height 400 pieces Wood planks 2xl0 cm I20m 
Soil 25m3 Nails 2.5 inch I kg 
Water for construction 2m3 - -
2 Sand 56 m3 Cement 80 bags 
Gravel 7m3 Wire mesh 75m 
Stones 30 cm height 1120 pieces Reinforcement steel 6 mm 23m 
Water 3 m3 Reinforcement steel 8 mm 148m 
- - Door fram es 6 pieces 
- - Window fmmes 9 pieces 
3 Sand 2m3 Cement 35 bags 
Gravel 4m3 Wire mesh 12m 
Stones 30 cm height 400 pieces Reinforcement steel 6 mm 23m 
Water 2m3 Reinforcement steel 8 mm 148m 
- - Galvanised wire 3 mm 50 m 
- - Timber joists 7xl2 cm 130m 
4 Sand I m3 Cement 35 bags 
Gravel 3m3 Plywood 12 mm 18 sheets 
Stones 30 cm height 225 pieces Nails 1.5 inch 1 kg 
Water 2m3 Nails 2.5 inch I kg 
Soil 6m3 Roof proteCtion foil 60m2 
Yemeni arches 10 pieces Doors 6 pieces 
- - Windows 9 pieces 
Source: Self-help Project Reconstruction Report, 1989. 
The procedure for building houses under the self-help programme required signing a 
contract between EOR anci the victim after which building materials for various stages 
of work, such as cement, reinforcing steel, wood, doors and windows were delivered 
at site. The beneficiary also contributed his part for the relevant stage of work. The 
next instalment of materia ls was issued only after the previous stage of work was 
completed. Different phases of work mentioned in Table 4.5 describe each phase of 
work in detail together with the contributions of the government and the beneficiaries. 
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The following rules were applied for reconstruction under the ~elf-help programme: 
a) design and sizes of houses were the same as those built through a contractor; 
b) beneficiary contribution was fixed and the same for everyone; 
c) planning to start the building was done centrally at EOR office in Dhamar. The 
beneficiaries could not decide on their own to start the construction activities; 
d) the building programme was directly supervised by EOR; and 
e) the time for completion of all activities at one site was four months. 
Table 4.7 shows details of the number of houses built under self-help approach, 
beneficiary areas and the sources of funds: 
Table 4.7: Reconstruction of houses under Self-help programme 
Location Number Source of foreign s ource of local funds 
of ho uses funds 
Maghrib Ans 600 Dutch Aid/EEC GO Y /Loan from US AID 
NW Dawran 280 UNDP/UNCDF Gov ernment of Yemen 
J abal Ashsharq 400 Dutch Aid GO Y /Loan from US AID 
Source: Executive Office for Reconstruction, Dhamar, Yemen. 
EOR ( 1986) reponed that this approach was found to be useful for those areas where 
reconstruction through a contractor was not economically feasible. A partial 
contribution of the cost by the victims reduced construction cos t for the government. 
The use of local labour he lped train them for future development works. The use of 
local materials not only saved cost but also helped the local econom y and created more 
local jobs. The programme helped the beneficiaries as they became house owners by 
contributing only a small amount (less than one third) of the total cost. The feeling of 
ownership from the very beginning of the reconstruction work encouraged owners to 
put their maximum efforts to fin ish the houses to a high standard. 
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4.13 General observations 
The Turnkey approach was favoured by some bilateral donors, especially the rich Arab 
countries. Housing units, hospitals, health centres, health centres, schools, water and 
power supply systems, mosques, and a few kilometres of roads were built under this 
approach in selected areas. Field surveys showed, that the houses delivered under the 
turnkey approach remained unoccupied for a long time, despite the fact they were 
provided free of cost. Even today an appreciable number of these houses can be seen 
unoccupied. The door, windows, electrical and sanitary fittings had been scavenged by 
the earthquake-affected people for use in their traditional houses. Some houses were 
seen to be used as stables for domestic animals, or barns to stock fodder. In some 
places the turnkey houses were found being rented out to expatriate teachers who taught 
at the local primary schools. The contractor built structures based on earthquake-
resistant design. The victims had mixed reactions about these structures. Most of them 
preferred to stay in their area and they repaired or rebuilt their damaged houses even 
though they were not earthquake-resistant. When they received contractor built houses 
they either used them as second houses for guests or invariably added more rooms to 
suit their needs, such as kitchens, toilets, stables for domestic animals, barns and stores. 
They did not like the location of the new houses whic h, although safer, were usually 
away from the old houses where the victims had their agricultural lands and other 
belongings. They also found these houses different in appearance from the traditional 
houses, in which stone masonry work was a dominant part of construction whereas the 
new houses were made from block masonry. A number of houses remained unoccupied 
for a long time after completion. 
Under the turnkey approach the victims appreciated the building of the other 
infrastructure , which came more as new development work, and was better than the 
housing programme. This infrastructure comprised of schools, mosques, water supply, 
electric suppl y and health centres. The victims were also not involved in their location, 
design or construction. Most of this infrastructure deteriorated over a short period of 
time due to lack of maintenance. 
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The self~help approach was introduced by some United Nations agencies, such as 
UNCDF, UNDP and UNICEF, and some western bilateral donors such as Dutch-Aid, 
USAID and ODA. The Self-help programme was a new experience in the country 
(Dijkgraaf, 1989). This approach was confined to construction of houses only. Under 
this approach the beneficiaries were responsible for providing the land for the house. 
According to the government sources, the beneficiaries had to contribute up to 30% of 
the total cost in the form of local materials, water and unskilled labour. Most of the 
beneficiaries, however, claimed that they had to provide food and qat also for labourers 
and government supervisors on a regular basis, in addition to their agreed contribution. 
They estimated their actual cost sharing in the aided Self-help programme at 50% of 
the total cost. Although the houses provided under this approach were occupied soon 
after completion, they were subjected to a number of alterations afterwards. 
The self-help programme faced some difficulties in the beginning as the victims were 
reluctant to pay their contribution. But once this programme overcame its initial 
problems the beneficiaries took more interest in this programme than the Turnkey 
programme. Earthquake-resistant designs of these houses were also alien to the victims 
but they were found to be more acceptable than the Turnkey houses, mainly because 
of some participation by the beneficiaries in this programme. Like the contractor built 
houses, the beneficiaries had to add additional rooms to these houses as well in order 
to meet their needs. 
The victims seemed to be somewhat satisfi ed with the repair programme. This 
programme involved restoration of those houses which had received repairable damage 
during the earthquake. This programme was originally intended for the entire 
earthquake-affected area but later the government limited it to Dhamar town only. 
There were no serious complaints about this programme, excep t that there was no 
proper criteria for fixing priority for the houses to be repaired first. Another complaint 
was that only a few houses were actually repaired out the figure originally announced 
by the government. One reason for the fewer complaints of thi s programme could be 
the relative smallness of the programme, where prolonged and excessive involvement 
of the government was not possible. 
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The self-help approach was introduced by some United Nations agencies, such as 
UNCDF, UNDP and UNICEF, and some western bilateral donors such as Dutch-Aid, 
USAID and ODA. The Self-help programme was a new experience in the country 
(Dijkgraaf, 1989). This approach was confined to construction of houses only. Under 
this approach the beneficiaries were responsible for providing the land for the house. 
Aceording to the government sources, the beneficiaries had to contribute up to 30% of 
the total cost in the form of local materials, water and unskilled labour. Most of the 
beneficiaries, however, claimed that they had to provide food and qat also for labourers 
and government supervisors on a regular basis, in addition to their agreed contribution. 
They estimated their actual cost sharing in the aided Self-help programme at 50% of 
the total cost. Ahhough the houses provided under this approach were occupied soon 
after completion, they were subjected to a number of alterations afterwards. 
The self-help programme faced some difficulties in the beginning as the victims were 
reluctant to pay their contribution. But once this programme overcame its initial 
problems the beneficiaries took more interest in this programme than the Turnkey 
programme. Earthquake-resistant designs of these houses were also alien to the victims 
but they were found to be more acceptable than the Turnkey houses, mainly because 
of some participation by the beneficiaries in this programme. Like the contractor built 
houses, the beneficiaries had to add additional rooms to these houses as well in order 
to meet their needs. 
The victims seemed to be somewhat satisfied with the repair programme. This 
programme involved restoration of those houses which had received repairable damage 
during the earthquake. This programme was originally intended for the entire 
earthquake-affected area but later the government limited it to Dhamar town only. 
There were no serious complaints about this programme, except that there was no 
proper criteria for fixin g priority for the houses to be repaired first. Another complaint 
was that only a few houses were actually repaired out the figure originally announced 
by the government. One reason for the fewer complaints of this programme could be 
the relative smallness of the programme, where prolonged and excessive involvement 
of the government was not possible. 
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A literature review shows that almost no effort was made by the government to inform 
the people about the earthquake risk in the area, and that the disaster could be repeated 
again within a few years. At the end, the earthquake-affected people had more 
complaints about the programme than appreciation. 
Summary 
The 1982 earthquake caused heavy losses in Dhamar governorate. The earthquake-
affected people showed their initiative in immediately making temporary shelter and 
food arrangements for themselves . The government made its arrangements but it took 
some time before the emergency relief reached the victims. They announced long-term 
arrangements consisting of: providing shelter to all victims together with some other 
infrastructure, such as roads, schools, health centres, water supply schemes and 
mosques. The government implemented reconstruction programme could not be 
completed as planned. The beneficiaries of the programme had several complaints and 
many of them preferred to live in their traditional houses. Most of the other 
infrastructure also did not last long and went into disuse because of the lack of 
maintenance. Apparently no steps were taken by the government in creating hazard 
awareness among the earthquake victims. 
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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SAFE DESIGNS 
"The value of any earthquake prediction programme will be greatly reduced if the 
collapse of structures and the resulting life hazard could be avoided through effective 
application of earthquake engineering knowledge". (Ray Clough, 1978) 
It is an interesting fact that most of the regions of low seismicity around the world are 
almost uninhabited such as Siberia, Greenland, Canada, most of Australia, the Amazon, 
the Sahara and Antarctica (Arnold and Reitherman, 1982). On the other hand most of 
the historic architectural designs emerged from seismic areas such as Greece, Egypt, 
India, Italy, China and Japan. It seems that ancient arch itects did not consider 
earthquakes as a natural hazard and concentrated their efforts on providing comfort 
against climatic problems. The reason given for this approach is that the climatic issue 
is an everyday problem whereas earthquakes occur once in several years and therefore 
do not remain fresh in the memories of the local people after some time. 
Another reason is that earthquakes did not receive any serious attention from scientists 
and engineers until beginning of the twentieth century when population growth and 
building congestion, particularly in the urban areas, led to some serious disasters and 
heavy casualties in different parts of the world located in seismic zones. It was after 
the San Francisco ( 1906) and Tokyo (1923) earthquakes that earthquake~resistance was 
first given any serious consideration in building designs. It is now well established that 
human suffering caused by earthquakes is almost entirely because of man-made 
structures (Smith, 1994). Life and property losses due to earthquakes have increased 
in the later part of this century as discussed in Chapter 2. In spite of modem research 
it is still not possible to predict or prevent earthquakes and as such scientists, engineers 
and architects are concentrating more on limiting the damage they cause (UNDRO, 
1978). In addition to the protection of housing, which is directly concerned with saving 
human life and shelter, attempts are also being made to protect other infrastructure such 
as industrial buildings, chemical factories, fuel storage tanks, thennal plants and nuclear 
power stations which can further aggravate a disaster through the leakage of chemical, 
inflammable materials and nuclear radiation. 
133 
- - - - - - - - - - - - ·-- -- - - ---
Chapter Five 
The design of buildings and other infrastructure ro protect them against earthquakes is 
a skilled job and requires a good understanding of the destructive nature of earthquakes 
and the mechanism under which they are triggered off (Cobum and Spence, 1992). 
Specialists in the fields of civil, structural and geotechnical engineering have very 
important roles in the design of earthquake resistant soucrures and the related protection 
measures. However in view of the increasing danger of earthquakes and international 
concern for mitigating earthquake losses, it is necessary that earthquake-resistant design 
should become an easy-to-understand and non-specialist skill within the guidelines 
provided by the specialists in order to have a safer environment. The application of 
these standards is becoming an essential practice in order ro guarantee the safety of 
urban and rural population centres. One of the major steps in widening the scope of 
earthquake-resistant design is to bring into fold other professionals directly involved in 
the planning and design of infrastructure such as architects, surveyors and interior 
designers, etc . 
The subject of earthquake-resistant design is so extensive and still immature that it is 
difficult to present any ready-made solutions for any particular project. (Dorwick, 1978). 
The general principles apply to the whole range of building construction and civil 
engineering, while the detailed design is more related to structural and architectural 
aspects. Earthquakes require engineers and architects to make a number of important 
considerations which are not necessary in the nonnal design process. A simplified flow 
chart indicating the design process requirements for earthquake-resistant strucwres is 
given in Figure 5.1. 
Earthquakes produce both horizontal and vertical forces . The horizontal forces are of 
far greater importance as they create vibrations over long distances, depending upon 
magnitude and depth of the earthquake. The effect of vertical forces is only significant 
close to the epicentre of an earthquake. Most of the earthquake-resistant structures are 
therefore braced to resist horizontal forces only (Smith, 1994). This concept is however 
under intense review after the Northridge and Kobe earthquakes of 1994 and 1995. 
Many experts are now of the opinion that the vertical forces should also be given due 
consideration in earthquake design (New Civil Engineer, 11/1995). 
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5.1 Objectives of earthquake-resistant design and construction 
It is not possible to make completely earthquake-proof structures which will not suffer 
damage in any destructive earthquake (Architectural Institute of Japan, 1970). The 
concept behind earthquake-resistant structures is that of 'acceptable risk' (Cobum and 
Spence, 1992). The objectives for earthquake-resistant design and construction of 
structures are as follows: 
a) to resist minor earthquakes without damage; 
b) to resist moderate earthquakes without significant structural damage, but with 
some non-structural damage; and 
c) to resist major or severe earthquake without major failure of the structural 
framework of the structure or its elements and equipment, and to maintain life 
safety; 
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Great earthquakes are rare. The criteria for earthquake-resistant designs do not cover 
great earthquakes because such designs will make the construction costs exorbitant and 
therefore uneconomical. 
A brief review of the considerations for earthquake~resistant design is given in the 
following paragraphs. 
5.2 Site selection 
The selection of site is a very important first step in the design of a structure in a 
seismic area (Coburn and Spence, 1992). The site selection process not only requires 
consideration of the earthquake hazard but also other secondary hazards which usually 
accompany earthquakes. An assessment of the earthquake hazard in tenns of duration 
and severity is very important in assessing the needs for site selection and the structure 
to be builr in a particular area. No site can be expected to be ideal in every respect. 
Selection of a safe site is therefore based on judgement about the risks and cost 
involved to avoid those risks. Some si tes are, however, so hazardous that they make 
the cost of a safe building prohibitive. A brief discussion on such sites is given below. 
Engineers try to avoid such sites as far as possible. Site assessment should provide 
enough information to determine loading and other inputs for structural design. This 
process becomes easier if zoning maps giving geotechnical details of the area and a 
building design code are available. The task, however, becomes difficult if seismic 
hazard assessment of the site is to be carried out first. 
The following are among the importam considerations for si te selection: 
a) what is the earthquake-pattern in the region in terms of size, nature of the event 
and recurrence period? 
b) whether an active fault can be identified which passes through or near the site 
and may create a potential risk to any structure in the area? 
c) what are other potential hazards at the site such as tsunamis, landslides, 
subsidence and liquefaction? and, 
d) what are the soil conditions in the area? 
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5.2.1 Local geology and soil conditions: The effect of an earthquake on a site greatly 
depends on the local geology and soil conditions (Dorwick, 1978). In this regard the 
topography and nature of the bed-rock and the nature and geometry of the deposited 
soils are of significant importance. Rocks provide less damping to shock waves than 
the softer compressible soils which aggravate earthquake damage on structures. 
Horizontal variation in soils at a site can also be a potential danger during an 
earthquake particularly if a building is founded on different types of adjoining soils. 
Different types of soils behave differently during an earthquake. In such a case their 
compressibility is also different and thus affect the safety of a building. In brief terms 
the geology and topography of a region can have the following influences in site 
selection (Smith, 1994): 
a) the amount of movement created in the underlying rocks and soils and damage 
caused by an earthquake; 
b) the amount of damping effects provided by the soils; and 
c) any possible refraction and reflection of the shock waves. 
5.2.1.1 Landslides and r ock[alls: Slopes made of sedimentary rocks fail during 
eanhquakes and slide downwards in the form of avalanches. Sedimentary rocks are 
formed by the action of water, wind or glacier (Singh, 1992). These huge heaps of mud 
and debris may bury alive the population and property at the foot of the slopes or cause 
serious damage through rockfalls (Figure 5.2). Similarly building on in-fill soils or 
partly on in-fill and partly on hard soils is also dangerous because of the different 
behaviours of the two types of soils (Figure 5.3). Building on sloping rock foundation 
is also not safe (Figure 5.4 ). There are solutions for such situations as well, and they 
are discussed later in this chapter. Such solutions are however expensive. 
5.2.1.2 Liquefaction: In some other cases such as where sandy pockets occur in mostly 
clay soils, slope failures may result in liquefaction which is another hazard for building 
foundations. Liquefaction can also occur in flat areas containing cohesionless soils. 
Site and soil investigations, such as drilling bore holes and soil analysis are very 
important for any physical infrastructure development or a construction project. The 
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Figure 5.2: Sites exposed to landslides or rockfall s are not suitable for locating 
buildings 
. .:: .. ;.. -:;..:c;: ,. 
iii) 
i) Building on infill soil is not good 
ii) Building very close to a retaining wall is not good 
·- . ~ . 
Building half on infill soil and half on hard soil is not good 
Figure 5.3: Some safe and unsafe building si tes 
Sources: Cobum and Spence, I 992 
Dhamar Aided Self-Help Project (DASH), Dhamar, 1988 
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Sloping rock is an unsafe building location. Never build on a sloping 
rock. Make horizontal and flat steps for foundation. 
scope of site investigation depends on the importance of the project and the amount of 
the budget available. It is also very important to know the depth of bedrock or strong 
rock-like material which is preferable for building foundations. 
5.2.2 Distance between houses: New buildings, no matter how safely designed have a 
potential danger of damage in an earthquake if they are located very close to old 
buildings (DHV, 1988). Old buildings are usually not designed to resist earthquakes. 
Previous seismic shocks weaken such buildings and make them more vulnerable even 
if they do not have any apparent sign of damage. The old bui ldings become a serious 
threat in any future earthquakes and their close vicinity to new buildings creates an 
additional safety hazard (Figure 5.5). 
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Close vicinity to an old vulnerable building is a hazard. 
Source: Dhamar Aided Self-Help Project, 1986 
5.3 Construction materials 
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The choice of construction materials is an important factor for earthquake-resistant 
structures (Dorwick, 1978). It is not always possible to get the desired materials. Their 
local availability, political and economic factors influence the selection criteria. 
The following qualities desired in earthquake-resistant structures are closely related to 
the choice of construction material s: 
5.3.1 Duc tility: This is the ability of a structure to repeatedly distort or deform 
without collapsing. Ductility is also defined as the ability of the structural elements of 
a building to undergo considerable amounts of plastic deformation before failing; 
5.3.2 Stiffness: It is the ability of a s tructure to resist any attempts by the earthquake 
forces to deform it. This quality is needed in a structure so that the displacements are 
within acceptable limits so that interac tion between the structural and non-structural 
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elements can be controlled. A very stiff building, however, tends to be brittle and may 
cause problems in avoiding resonance. Stiff structures are suitable for long period sites. 
Stiffness of a structure should therefore be related to the sub-soil properties of the site. 
Stiff structures (structures in which non-structural elements are integrated with the 
structural elements for unified resistance against earthquake forces) are mostly 
recommended to be built on long period sites because of their high response on such 
si tes. 
5.3.3 Flexibility: This property is related to the ductility of a structure. Fully flexible 
structures are those in which all non-structural elements such as doors, windows, in-fill 
panels, partitions, claddings, staircases and lift shafts are separated from the structural 
elements such as beams, columns and floors. The purpose of designing flexible 
structures is to make them as ductile as possible. Flexible structures are considered 
more suitable for short period sites where they have high response. 
Infrastructure built with materials consisting of the following properties has better 
chances of withstanding an earthquake (Smith, 1994): 
a) high ductility (ability of a material to defonn after its maximum strength has 
been achieved without loosing its ability to carry load); 
b) high streng th (mild steel is one of the most well known materials known for its 
qualities of ductility and strength and is considered suitable for construction in 
seismic areas); 
c) low weight (timber has the highest strength versus weight ratio); 
d) uniformity in composition and strength; 
e) similar mechanical qualities in all directions; 
f) orrhorropy (ability to resist earthquake forces in all directions) 
g) simple in application or use; and 
f) producing good bond when used with other materials. 
The importance of these properties is related to the size and importance of a structure 
(Dorwick, 1978). For larger structures and important buildings like hospitals, airports, 
offices and market centres the above described material properties are certainly of 
greater significance than some other structures of less importance. 
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The choice of materials for construction in seismic areas largely depends on their 
availability and cost (Cobum and Spence, 1992). Rubble, stone, rammed earth, adobe, 
bricks or cement concrete blocks are low strength, low ductility and high weight 
building materials. These materials do not perform well against earthquakes when used 
without reinforcing steel or wood (Chin, 1980). 
Table 5.1 shows the performance of various structural materials in different types of 
buildings. The order of suitability is only a guideline as the type of construction and 
the choice of material varies from area to area. 
Table 5.1: Performance of structural materials in buildings 
Structural materials Type of building 
in approximate order 
of suitability 
Best ( I ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Worst (8) 
where: 
Sources: 
High-rise Medium-rise Low-ri se 
steel steel tim ber 
in-situ reinforced in-situ reinforced in-situ reinforced 
Concrete concrete concrete 
good precast concrete steel 
prestressed concrete prestressed concrete 
good reinforced good reinforced 
masonry masonry 
precast concrete 
primiti ve reinforced 
masonry 
un-reinforced 
masonry (adobe, 
rammed earth, 
bri cks, stones or 
blocks) 
Low-ri se = 1 to 3 storeys; Medium-rise = 4 to 7 storeys; and High-ri se 
= 8 storeys or above. 
I. Dorwick, 1978. 
2. Loyidos, 1993. 
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5.4 Configuration 
The configuration of a building can be defined as the nature, size and location of the 
structural and non-structural elements which may affect the structural performance of 
a building (Smith, I 994). These elements consist of the following: 
a) walls, columns, floors, staircases and service cores; 
b) the number and type of internal partitions; and 
c) how the external walls are built to allow air and light in the building. 
It is now fully acknowledged that configuration, simplicity and directness of seismic 
resistance of a structure is as imponant as structural design for the lateral forces. Past 
experience has shown that structures with irregular configuration suffer more losses than 
those having regular configuration (Green, 1987). Plan irregularities are having L, H, 
U, Tor similar shapes. Vertical irregularities are created by set-backs, unplanned and 
unsymmetrical openings such as doors, windows, etc. Most desirable configurations are 
square, rectangular or circular shapes. 
Earthquake-resistant designs without emphasis on seismic detailing sharply increase the 
cost of a building because of the high content of steel reinforcement (in reinforced 
concrete designs) or steel members (in steel frame designs) required to achieve the 
desired level of strength (Arnold and Reitherman, 1982). 
5 .4.1 Safety requirements in a structure: As partly discussed before, a structure will 
have the maximum chances of survival in an earthquake, when: 
a) the load bearing membenare uniformly distributed; 
b) the columns and walls are without offsets; 
c) all beams are free from offsets; 
d) columns and beams are co-axial; 
e) reinforced concrete columns and beams are of the same width; 
f) the dimensions of principal members are not changed suddenly; 
g) the structure is as continuous (redundant) and monolithic as possible; 
h) there should be no soft storeys. Multi-storey buildings are usually provided with 
cross-wall s or frame-infilling in the upper storeys which are mostly used for 
143 
Chapter Five 
residential or office purposes. The ground floors are however composed of 
columns only to allow space for car parking or commercial letting. Such open 
storeys are called soft storeys and they become a serious weakness for the entire 
structure because of the discontinuity in the structural fonn of the building. 
i) there should be limitations in the plan-size and slenderness of a structure. The 
problems of plan-size and their possible solutions are discussed in Table 5.2. 
The slenderness (height-width ratio) of a building should not nonnally exceed 
3 or 4. Special design considerations are required for higher slenderness ratios. 
Figure 5.6 shows some of the desirable configurations. 
Shear Wall Moment-Resisting Frame Braced Frame 
• Few Openings • Large section columns and beams • Lateral forces carried by tension 
and compression in columns, 
beams and cross-bracing 
• Carries large lateral forces if 
openings are relatively small 
• lateral force taken in bending 
Figure 5.6: Some desirable building congfigurations 
Source: Coburn and Spence, 1992 
• Frame sections smaller 
5.4.2 Problematic configuration : Configuration, directness and simplicity are 
extremely important for the safety of a structure during earthquakes. It is, however, not 
always possible to have an ideal configuration for various reasons. The problems of 
configuration and their possible solutions are discussed in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Configuration problems and possible solutions 
Confi.,.ration A rchilcc:lural Struclllral Solution 
problc:mo ltalanmt problem 
ll.aLancnl 
F.:ltrnM dhnm1lonJ 
a ) Exll'amo hciaht~ ratio Plarnifta ot ~problem Hiah ovu-wmina r.,.,.,., Rcvilo dimcn~iOM or ~trucwrol 
larac drill ay11em 
b) Eattanc pi., area; larao area· Mootl y waro-llouom. ahoppina large diaph roam r"""'" Sub-divide building by aeiamie 
amoU height tcnltU, oiT~ea jointa 
c) E•t.remo clevatim; larao length· Mootly waro-howea, large lateral fon:a in Sub-divide building by aeiamie 
rmoll depth woruhopo and offica petimcut 10 biJ dilTercnoe jointa 
in rcailunec o f the two 
.... 
llo rhonbl layout 
a) Varia tion in perimeter llrtngth· Mootly in 11rucwrca where Tonion duo utrcme Add frunc:a; dioeonncct wolla or 
•tiffneu aomo walW eomen aRI blank variation in llrtngth and uac famca and liaht weight wolla 
and oomo with bia opcninp 1tiffncaa 
b) Falac aymmctry Mootly in officca &nd Torsion due 10 Diaconnect core or u&e f ramc 
commercial building in citica uns ymmctrical core with non·attuctural core wolla 
to we open rpaeca 
c) Re-entrant comen Moctly in old rcaidential , To rsion and otrcu Separate the joining walla or 
h011pitaiJ and officca in urban concct~tration at the corner provide a rchitoctur1l relief at the 
area& notche5 inner notch 
d) Mus cocc:ntricitiea Book aucka in libraries, Torsion and st..rc.s.S Add rcaiauncc: around mua 10 
equipment or elevated COOCC11ltation balance rcaiatance &nd mau 
swimming pooiJ 
Vertical layout 
•> Vertical and rcve nc act-bocka Moctly duo 10 programme or Strcaa concentration at the Specil.l attucturol ayatcm and 
l ite limitatiOM notch, diaorderly periods dyniJTlic anolyaia 
b) Sofl 1to rey frames Moctly for ground-floor car Abrupt change of atiffneu Add bracing o r columns or both 
parl<ing or lhopping or fashion at point of diaeontinuity u per requirement 
c) Variations in column stiffness Due to need for variety in Abrupt change in stiffness, Re-design attucture to balance 
within a storey spaces or for falhion higher foreca in atiffer sy>tem 
colwnn 
d) Discontinuous shear waU PlaMing rcatricu use of shear Discontinuity in load path; No oolution except nedeaigning 
waU on c.ntn nce floor or for stress concCI'Itration for the whole structure 
fashion heavily loaded elements 
e) W ea! oolumn·atrong beam Common where larae window· Columns fail before bums No aolution except add full walla 
area ex.ists like 1chools. to reduce apode 
hocpita ls and offices 
f) Modifications in primary Major/minor change5 in Serious when modifications Remove in· fu I p anels or use 
slruccu~ strucwre ro .tccommod.tte make cnangc:3 in-fill panel light weight mateti&l for in-flU 
addi tional needs arrangement columns 
~tencv 
Duilding separation StNcture with set-backs Pounding m ay occur Ensu"' adequate separation 
depending on building considering opposite building 
period. drift height and vibn~tions 
disu nce 
Shear walls 
a) Coupled Moctly in building corridon Dc!onnation between walla Linu should be nedesignod 10 
for architoctu ral purpose5 only and links not u me en1ure compatible deformation 
with walla 
b) Random openings Windows, doors, ducts and Transfer o f earthquake All openings should be pn>-
other openings occording to r orce..~ is rc.s1 ricted conceived in de5 igr> an d duly 
actual needa reinforced for non-linear 
beha viour 
Continued ... 
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Table 5.2: Configuration problems and possible solutions 
C<ll\liJUration A rchileCtllral StNctural Solution 
problcrna IUtanc:nl problem 
ILILcrncnl 
Oiaph111gm 
a) Openings For vertical circulation of air Serious! y re<luu. di.aph ragm Should be pre-conccived during 
or light arn.ngcmc:nu n:aio!.lnce eopacity dcaign & reinforcc<l for nm-
linear behaviour 
b) Shape M011tly for circulation ol air Seriously rcdueea diaphragm Should be pre-conccived during 
and light capacity at critical pocition duign & reinfon:ed for non-
linear bc:h o~viour 
c) Tower A set-baclt, mOt!tly for Diaphragm at set-b.clt must Dea ign should pro-concci ve thia 
architectural deco111tion be able to transfer full tower problem and reinforce diaphragm 
loads accordingly 
Source: Amold and Reithennan, 1982. 
It will be seen from Table 5.2 that it is extremely important to design the configuration 
of a structure before embarking on structural design. Irrational configuration can 
seriously handicap the capacities of diaphragms and shear walls in resisting earthquake 
forces, no matter how well the structural design is prepared. While some of these 
problems can be solved through modifications the others cannot be rectified after a 
structure is built. Such buildings always remain at far more risk than those which are 
designed with the consideration of configuration_ 
5.5 Earthquake-resistant design considerations 
The occurrence and behaviour of earthquakes is mostly unpredictable. The only reliable 
knowledge about seismic loads is that they are predominantly horizontal and dynamic 
in character (Loyidos, 1993)_ Vertical dynamic loads can be of significance only near 
the epicentre. No clear knowledge about the amount of energy released, the direction 
of movement, and the frequency and duration of an earthquake is available. The 
response of a structure to seismic forces depends on a number of factors, such as the 
period of vibration, damping, ductility, and the type of soil on which the structure is 
built. A combination of these factors and some more, make earthquake-resistant design 
a difficult task. 
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5.5.1 Basic principles in earthquake-resistant designs: Earthquake-resistant designs 
are based on the following essential features (Dorwick, 1978): 
a) In framed structures columns should be designed stiffer than the beams so that 
the beams will absorb the earthquake energy and fail before the columns. In 
this way damage to the structure and the resultant losses is much reduced; 
b) failure should be in flexure instead of shear; 
c) premature failure of joints between the structural elements should be prevented 
as early failure of joints will mean early collapse of the structure, no matter how 
well the elements are designed; and 
d) ductile rather than brittle failure should be obtained as ductile structures are 
better absorbants of earthquake energy. Should a failure occur, ductile structures 
are likely to suffer less damage than brittle structures. 
Earthquake motion has both vertical and horizontal components. Normally only the 
dominant horizontal motion is considered for design purposes. For earthquake-resistant 
design of large structures however, vertical motions should also be taken into 
consideration (Architectural Institute of Japan, 1970). 
5.5.2 What the seismic design codes say about structural design: The present design 
codes used in most countries of the world can be summarised as follows: 
a) seismic forces acting on a structure shall be determined as equivalent static 
loads using the stati stically evaluated seismic coefficient or the shear force 
coefficients. Sectional dimensions of the elements shall be determined from the 
stresses and strains caused by these equivalent loads; 
b) seismic forces acting on a structure shall be determined from the response 
spectrum considering various factors such as the ground characteristics, natural 
periods and damping coefficients of buildings (Figure 5.7) . Deflection and the 
storey shear force can then be calculated and stresses and sections of each 
element determined; and 
c) considering subsoil conditions, earthquake motions shall be selected from past 
strong earthquake records and by means of structural response analysis from 
them, the sections shall be revi sed after considering the amount of deflection 
and stresses. 
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Figure 5.7: Typical diagram showing response spec tra of earthquake ground motion 
Certain problems such as energy dissipation between the ground and foundation, 
implication factor of the ground, and the relationship between previously recorded 
ground motions and those statistically expected in future are still unresolved. These 
problems make the determination of the earthquake motions, which act at the bottom 
of buildings, difficult (Figure 5.8). 
5.5.3 Structural and non-structural elements: It is important to know the functions and 
importance of structural and non-structural elements of a building to understand their 
roles in resisting seismic forces. The following is a brief description of these elements. 
5.5.3.1 Structural elements: The structural elements considered to be of great 
significance in the safety of a structure, are described below: 
a) Diaphragms: The elements of a structure which offer horizontal resistance 
(floors and roofs) to lateral forces and transfer them to the vertical members are 
called diaphragms. A diaphragm acts c.s the web of a beam and its edges as the 
flanges. Diaphragms are interrupted by several other members such as 
staircases, elevators, skylights, ducts, etc. Detailing of all these members is 
necessary for safe design of buildings. 
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b) Shear walls: Vertical cantilever walls designed to receive lateral forces from 
diaphragms and transmit them to the ground are known as shear walls. The 
forces in these walls are predominantly shear forces. Slender shear walls may 
also be subjected co bending apart from shear forces. The safety of a structure 
requires that its shear walls should be able to resist torsional forces which try 
to rotate the structure during an earthquake. The size and location of shear 
walls is crucial for the safety of buildings. 
c) Braced frames: The function of braced frames is similar to that of shear walls. 
In braced frames, the bracing members rransmit the horizontal forces in tension 
and compression. Such frames can be very stiff. They are considered useful 
only for the external walls of a structure. Braced frames usually provide less 
resistance than shear walls . Braces are generally made from steel rolled 
sections, circular bars or pipes. Earthquake forces cause the bracings in a 
structure to expand or to contract. When resistance in the braces is not enough 
co check the earthquake forces the expansion or contraction in the braces is so 
much that they loose their effectiveness. This failure results in deformation or 
collapse of the vertical struc ture. 
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d) Moment-resisting frames: In this type of frame the horizontal forces are 
transmitted by bending moments in their columns and framing beams. A 
moment-resisting frame can be designed by using reinforced concrete to be as 
strong as required. Moment-resisting frame structures tend to be more flexible 
than braced or shear walled structures. 
5.5.3.2 Non-structural elements: An appreciable amount of damage caused to structures 
during earthquakes is due to its non-structural members (Dorwick, 1978). 
An understanding of non-stmcrural elements and their performance in earthquakes is 
necessary because a great deal of a building's inherent resistance to lateral forces is 
determined by its layout. It is important to note that some non-structural elements 
become very responsive to the lateral forces during earthquakes. This means that any 
member or element of a structure which resists the forces generated by an earthquake 
deserves full consideration in its design and placement. Non-structural elements, such 
as in-fill and partitions walls are insignificant in their seismic performance if they are 
made of flexible materials. But if these elements are made of rigid materials, such as 
brick masonry or concrete, they may have a significant effect on the performance and 
safety of a structure during an earthquake. The effects which the non-structural 
elements create during earthquakes can be summarised as follows: 
a) influence on the natural vibration period of the structure by changing seismic 
energy and seismic stresses for which the structu re is originally designed; 
b) change in lateral stiffness of the structure and stress di stribution; 
c) premature failure of the structure by pounding; and 
d) serious damage to the non-structural elements themselves from pounding causing 
life and property losses within the building. 
The following principles are usually applied in the seismic detailing of non-structural 
elements: 
a) Infill panels and partitions: Earthquakes produce differential movements in 
every floor which is in relation to the adjacent floors of a multi-storey stmcture. 
This phenomena is called storey drift. Vertical deformations in the he ight of 
each storey , between floors and beams occur in this period. Infill panels are 
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designed to counter these movements and their overall response on structural 
frames is as follows: 
i) to increase stiffness and hence the base shear response during earthquakes; 
ii) to increase the overall energy absorption capacity of the structure; and 
iii) to alter shear distribution in the entire structure. 
There are two approaches as follows: 
i) Integrating infill panels with the structure: The influence of non-structural 
members increases with the flexibility of lhe main structure. Negative influence 
of non-structural elements in stiff structures can be controlled by including them 
in the structural design. In this way the non-structural members no longer 
remain non-s tructural and perform together with the structural members during 
an earthquake. 
ii) Separating infill panels from the structure: This method of restraining the 
influence of shear stiffness of non-structural members is applicable to flexible 
structures. In this method gaps are left between non-structural and the structural 
members above them and the two are linked together using dowels (hooks made 
of reinforcing steel, partly embedded in the non-structural member and partly 
in the structural member immediately above). The remaining gaps are filled 
with flexible materials such as putty. In this way the non-structural elements 
are allowed minimal influence on the seismic performance of the structure. 
The above solutions are more effective when applied together with the considerations 
for seismic detailing or configuration. 
c) Cladding, curtain walls, doors and windows: Like infill panels, cladding or 
any other non-structural item such curtain walls, doors and windows should also 
be installed with the same principles of either integrating them with or 
separating them from the structure. 
5.5.4 Design considerations: Most building codes require that a structure should be 
designed to be safe against dead loads (self-load of the building together with the load 
of any other immovable item such as equipment), live load (human beings and animals, 
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if any), snow load, soil pressure, water pressure and seismic load (Architectural Institute 
of Japan, 1970). 
5.5.4.1 Orthogonal effects: Earthquake forces act in both principal directions of a 
structure but do not attain their maximum value at the same time (Green, 1987). This 
phenomenon is called orthogonal effects. The American based Applied Technology 
Council (ATC) code 3-06 on earthquakes suggests that structural elements should be 
designed for 100% of the effects of the seismic forces in one principal direction and 
30% in the other principal direction . 
5.5.4.2 General requirements (or static analysis: There are certain essential 
requirement for an earthquake-resistant structure. These requirements make it necessary 
to have adequate vertical bracing elements, in the form of ei ther frames or shear walls 
which provide stability to the structure by transmitting all earthquake forces to the 
ground (Green, 1987). There must also be the diaphragms to tie the structure together 
and transfer all lateral forces to the vertical bracing elements. A continuous path is 
necessary for transmitting each lateral force from its origin to the ground. The point 
of origin of a seismic force is the centre of gravi ty of the mass which is being 
accelerated. The vertical bracing elements must be supported on a foundation capable 
of resisting all downward loads, possible uplifts and horizontal shear forces. The 
footings should be tied together to prevent any relative horizontal movements. 
a) Distribution of earthquake forces without torsion : Structures wi th reinforced 
concrete floors and roofs are usually considered to be diaphragms which are 
rigid under the action of the distributing forces acting in the same plane as the 
diaphragm . It is assumed that deformation of a diaphragm within its plane is 
insignificant to alter the load distribution. This means that there is no horizontal 
rotation of the diaphragm due to torsion. If the bracing elements in a structure 
are all of the same type, either shear walls or frames, the total lateral load will 
be distributed to these elements in proportion of their rigidities or stiffness 
factors (the sti ffness factor of a structural element is the force required to 
produce a unit denection). lf a bracing system includes both shear walls and 
frames a different method of load di stribution shall be used. 
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b) Beam and column frames: A commonly known vertical bracing system is the 
frame with moment resisting beam to column connections sometimes known as 
the rigid frame (for more detail refer to sub-section 5.5.3). 
If there is no torsion and there are no shear walls the earthquake load may be 
distributed to the frames in proportion to their stiffness factors. The stiffness 
faccor is equal to the triangular load which produces a unit deflection at the top 
of the frame. The triangular load varies from maximum at the top to zero at the 
ground. This load is used as the equivalent static force for the seismic design 
method. 
c) Shear walls without openings: Shear walls (also see sub-section 5.5.3) are 
built either alone or together with frames to give more stiffness to a building. 
A shear wall acts as a vertical cantilever beam which goes through a lateral 
deflection due to bending and shear. If the walls have no openings or the 
openings are small the bending deflection will predominate. If the relatively 
small shear deflection is ignored the s tiffness factor of the shear wall is 
proportional to the moment of inertia of a horizontal section of the wall. 
The walls of elevator shafts, stairwells and central cores are frequently designed 
as shear walls and they seldom have any openings. The walls between adjacent 
properties are also usually without openings. If shear wall s are to be used as 
bracings, it is important that they do not have openings. Shear walls with 
openings create serious problems in structural design. 
Deflection of a wall is primarily due to bending but may be influenced by 
rotation of a foundation which on compressible soils. This effect can be 
countered by using foundations under the shear walls which will reduce the 
rotation to a minimum. A combined footing with a large moment of inertia is 
mostly preferred for compressible soils (Green, 1987). 
d) Combination of shear walls and frames: If a bracing system without torsion 
consists of both shear walls and frames, the load cannot be distributed 
proportionately to their stiffness faccors because their modes of defl ection are 
!53 
Chapter Five 
not the same. Shear walls prominently deflect in bending and this deflection is 
more in the case of a frame. For a combined system the beams connecting 
shear walls to frames in the same plane should have hinged type connections. 
The interaction between the two types of structures is thus reduced to a system 
of horizontal forces. 
e) Distribution of forces with torsion: Horizontal torsion exists at any floor of 
a building if the direction of the total resultant seismic force above the floor 
does not intersect the venical line through the centre of rigidity of the venical 
bracing elements at that floor. An earthquake-resistant design usually considers 
the resuham seismic force acting in the direction of each major axis and either 
or both forces may produce torsion. 
d) Dynamic analysis: Static analysis methods are not considered very accurate for 
large structures and quite often dynamic analysis becomes a necessity (Dorwick, 
1978). Dynamic analysis for the design of earthquake~resistant structures is 
done by using an accelerogram. Various complex methods have been developed 
for dynamic analysis of structures. The solution of the equations of motion and 
the usual statistical relationships of equilibrium and stiffness are common in 
them. Computer analyses is done by the matrix methods for structures with 
more than three degrees of freedom. 
Three main techniques used in dynamic analysis are named as follows: 
direct integration of the equation of motions through step-by~step procedures; 
normal mode analysis; and 
response spectrum techniques . 
It is difficu lt to provide clear advice on the use of a certain method for seismic analysis 
and design of structures as there may be several limitations in practice, such as the 
shortage of technical staff, lack of finance and statutory regulations. In general, 
however, it can be said that the sophistication of dynamic analysis required increases 
with the size and complexity of a structure. Table 5.3 is a simple guideline for the 
applicability of analytical methods for preparing earthquake-resistant designs. 
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Table 5.3: Guidelines for analysing different structural designs 
Type of structure 
Small simple structures 
Method of analysis 
(1) Equivalent static fo rces 
(use appropriate code) 
(2) Response spectra 
(use appropriate spectra) 
Moderately large and demanding structures (3) Modal analysis 
(use appropriate dynamic input) 
(4) Non-linear plane frame 
(use appropriate dynamic input) 
Large complex structures (5) Non-linear 3-D frame 
(use appropriate dynamic input) 
Source: Dorwick, 1978. 
5.6 Construction controls 
A strong physical infrastructure is probably the best protection against earthquakes 
(Coburn and Spence, 1992). The quality of construction of structures is of immense 
importance for resistance against earthquakes. Minimum design and construction 
standards approved through legislation can be regarded as the first step in minimising 
future eanhquake risks. These codes should remain under constant review for inclusion 
of any new techniques for earthquake-resistant structures. These codes should be made 
part of the sy llabi at the polytechnics, and universities teaching civil engineering. 
Apart from academic application of building codes, the supervision and monitoring of 
construction works, to ensure the desired levels of quan tity and quality of materials and 
workmanship at site are equally important. 
Summary 
It is ironical that the first serious considerations to the earthquake hazard were given 
after the 1906 and 1923 earthquakes in the USA and Japan, and once again the 
earthquake experts are busy in reviewing the established theories after the 1994 and 
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1995 earthquakes in the same countries. It is difficult to prescribe any exact guidelines 
for the safety of buildings, because of the unpredictable (or still unknown) behaviour 
of the earthquake forces. There are, however, some imponant considerations which can 
be helpful in the safety of a building. These considerations are location, construction 
materials, configuration, structural design and construction controls of a building. What 
is more important for the people living in earthquake zones, is to have an awareness 
about the eanhquake hazard and to apply the safety measures while constructing their 
houses and other buildings. 
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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT IN 
SEISMIC DESIGNS 
"It is widely accepted that sufficient resources are never available 10 remove every 
possible risk no mauer how trivial it is. Depending upon availability of resources, we 
have to set our priorities as 10 which risk should be removed first". 
(Trevor Kletz, 1988) 
The rising number of earthquake disasters around the world has made the study of 
earthquake-resistant design a major concern for planners, engineers and architects. 
Seismic designing i£ becoming more sophisticated and thought provoking as further 
research continues in this field. This positive change has revised the concept of 
professional liability and responsibility (Amold and Reitherman, 1982). According to 
this new concept seismic designs should not only be earthquake-resistant but should also 
be acceptable and affordable for their users. 
Earthquakes occurring in urban areas of high-income or higher middle-income countries 
are excessively costly (The Economist, 1995). The Northridge earthquake of 1994 with 
57 human casualties and over US$ 20 billion losses is considered to be the costliest 
earthquake in American history. Financial losses suffered in the recent (January 1995) 
earthquake in Kobe are initially estimated at US$ 110 billion and may go further up in 
the range of US$ 150 to 200 billion which is about 4% of Japan 's annual gross 
domestic product (GDP). The number of dead in th is earthquake is 5,470 while the 
number of homeless is 310,000. Similar disasters in low-income or lower middle 
income countries however cause even more severe blows to their economies, and form 
a larger part their GDP and usually cancel out any real economic growth. The effects 
of earthquakes must therefore be viewed, not only in humanitarian terms, but also in 
social and economic terms (UNDRO, 1978). 
The people living in high-income or higher middle-income countries may be able to 
financially afford, and may be will ing to pay for the high cost _of earthquake-resistant 
steel framed or reinforced concrete structures because of their awareness of earthquake 
risk. The ir awareness is probably due to the high literacy in such countries. But most 
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of the people in low-income or lower middle-income countries are poor. They represent 
about 80% of the world's population (The World Bank, 1995). Most of them cannot 
afford the high cost of earthquake-resistant houses capable of withstanding severe 
earthquakes. 
Field surveys in Yemen and study of other low-income countries, having suffered from 
earthquakes in recent years, suggest that even those who may afford such high costs are 
not willing to pay due to their conservatism, and lack of awareness of the usefulness 
of earthquake-resistant designs. What is needed in a situation like this is to introduce 
designs which are safer against earthquakes and not too alien from the traditional 
designs. The degree to which an engineer or an architect should go in preparing 
earthquake-resistant as well as affordable and socially acceptable structural designs, 
requires understanding of some essential terms given in the following section . 
6.1 Definitions 
UNDRO (1980) has classified various concepts and terms related to the earthquake 
hazard as follows (Figure 6.1 ): 
6.1 .1 Hazard: The probability of occurrence of an earthquake of a certain 
severity, within a specific period of time, in a given area is known as earthquake 
hazard. An earthquake may be specified in terms of its source charac teristics such as 
magnitude or its effects observed in a particular area such as intensity, peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) or similar characteristics based on ground motion. 
6.1.2 Risk: The expected number of elements at ri sk such as lives lost, 
persons injured, property damaged, social and economic activities disrupted in a 
specified future time is termed as earthquake risk. Jones-Lee (1989) defines risk more 
or less in the same way by saying that, it is the extent of an individual' s exposure 10 
the possibility of death or injury in a specified time. 
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Figure 6.1: Risk, hazard and vulnerability 
Source: Cobum and Spence, 1992 
6.1.3 Vulnerability: The degree of loss to a given element at risk or a set of 
such elements resulting from the occurrence of a hazard, such as occurrence of an 
earthquake of a given severity is called vulnerability. Vulnerability of an element can 
also be defined as the ratio between expected loss and maximum possible loss. 
6.1.4 Probability: It is a number between zero and one, indicated in percentage 
which represents a judgement about the perceived likelihood of the occurrence of an 
event such as an earthquake. Zero implies that the event is impossible, while the figure 
one indicates that the event is certain. Probability can therefore be defined as the 
degree of possibili ty of an event between the extreme limits between impossibility and 
certainty. 
Mathematically risk can be expressed by the following formula: 
R.. =H . X v .. IJ J 1) 
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in which R ;j is the risk to an element, such as building i due to the earthquake ground 
motion of severity j. Hj is the hazard or probability of experiencing earthquake ground 
motion. Y ;j is the vulnerability or the level of loss which will .be caused to the element 
at ri sk i, as a result of experiencing ground motion severity . .J 
~ 
6.1.5 Safety: Safety can be defined as the degree of protection, from 
attenuation of physical risk (Jones-Lee, 1991). While ta1king about safety, it usually 
means the safety of human life. 
6.2 Vulnerability assessment 
It can be seen from the above form ula that risk to any structure, or the occupants of that 
structure is a direct function of vulnerability. This means that greater the vu lnerabil ity 
of a structure, higher the risk for the structure and its occupants in the case of an 
earthquake. 
Two well known methods of assessing vulnerability are predicted vulnerability and 
observed vulnerability (Cobum and Spence, 1992). 
Predicted vulnerability deal s with expected performance of building's design 
specifications and judgement of the assessor. This method is preferred in case of 
e ngineered structures build with proper designs and engineering calculations. 
Observed vu lnerability is based on statistical data available from the damage caused by 
past earthquakes. This method is more suitable for determining the vulnerability of 
non-engineered structures, made of low-strength material such as adobe, unreinforced 
masonry, timber whose earthquake-resistance is difficult to find out. 
Apart from design there are other equall y importan t factors which influence the 
performance of a structure during earthquakes. Knowledge of these secondary factors 
is also very im portant in assessing vulnerabi lity of a struc ture. Table 6. 1 shows the 
secondary vulnerabi lity factors. 
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Table 6.1: Secondary vulnerability factors of structures 
No Secondary factors 
Structunal fonn 
I Non-symmetrical or irregular plans. 
2 Differences in architectural plans and stiffness of various storeys particularly in the case of framed 
3 structures. Number of storeys and stiffness of structure and its effect on natural period and 
dynamic cha18cteristics of structure. 
4 Single directions of strength such as all load bearing walls in one direction and building orientation 
with respect to direction of the seismic forces. 
5 Ex:ccssive wall openings leaving insufficient wall area to resist shear. This is more common in 
masonry structures. 
6 Heavy roofs and disposition of loads with height 
7 Depth, adequacy and frost protection of the f01.mdations. 
8 Design faults . Good practices such as alignment of vertical load bearing members not followed. 
Site planning 
I Stiffening effects of adjacent buildings. 
2 Pounding effects due to collision o f adjoining buildings. 
3 Subsoil quality causing liquefactjon. 
4 Slope effects causing subsidence and weakening buildings. 
5 Local ground failures causing landslides or rockfalls further exacerbated during earthquakes. 
Construction quality 
I 
2 Use o f low quality building materials not conforming with specifications in emergencies. 
3 Poor worlcmanship. Ignorance of good practice and details. 
4 Deliberate neglect of specifications due to corruption. 
Mixing building materials of different seismic performance. 
I 
2 Decay and weakening of materials such as wood and steel due to old age. 
3 Structures weakened by previous earthquakes or other shocks. 
4 Quality of repair, maintenance and strengthening measures. 
Modifications, additions and alterations affecting building configuration and overall behaviour of the 
structure during earthquakes. 
Source: Cobum and Spcnce, 1992 
6.3 Seismic risk domain tree 
The seismic risk to different structures depends upon a number of factors, such as site 
conditions, building conditions, whether the buildings are engineered or non-engineered 
structures, whether the configuration is aseismic or not, what is the quality of 
construction, etc. All these considerations are extremely important in the design of 
earthquake-resistant structures. The degree to which all or any of these factors are 
considered also indicate the degree of risk to which a structure is vulnerable in the case 
of an earthquake. The factors responsible for seismic risk to struc ture are shown in the 
seismic risk domain tree given in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Seismic risk domain tree 
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6.4 Damage evaluation . 
Assessment of structural damage to a building is not an easy task because of their 
different mechanisms and different materials. The construction materials can range 
from adobe, stones or bricks to wood, rei nforced concrete and steel frames. Structural 
damages such as the cracking of the masonry, sapping or joints deterioration in wood, 
and the failure of reinforced concrete or steel frames present damage of different 
natures which can be hard to compare. 
6.4.1 Repair cost ratio method: One way of assessing struc tural damage is in financial 
terms and the method is known as the repair vs cost ratio. According to thi s method 
structural damage is quan tified by comparing the cost of the structure with respect to 
the cost of repair. This method is however not considered very satisfactory because of 
the following problems: 
a) dependence on prevailing economic situation; 
b) arti ficially high or low prices of certain materials due to short or excess supply 
of those materials at a given time; 
c) variation of material costs from place to place; 
d) variation of labour costs from place to place; 
e) different ways of repairing and strengthening; 
f) price vari ations from one period to another; and 
g) nature of repair being different for different type of structures. 
The other method is based on direct assessment of structural damage. 
6.4.2 Structural damage assessment method: This method categorises different states 
of structural damage for different types of materials which can be used for working 
costs at any ti me, and at any place. O ther factors contributing to econom ic losses such 
human life casualties, homelessness, unemployment etc . can also be linked up by this 
method. T able 6.2 briefl y shows damage descriptions. 
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Table 6.2: Description of structural damage 
Category (C) and damage Nature of damage 10 different structures 
degree (D) 
c D Load-bearing masonry RC framed structures 
0 Undamaged No obvious damage No obvious damage 
I Slight damage Hairline cracks Infill panel damaged 
2 Moderate damage Cracks 5 10 20 mm Cracks < 10 mm in structure 
3 Heavy damage Cracks > 20 m m or wall Heavy damage to structw-al 
material removed members, falling of concrete 
4 Partial destruction Total collapse of individual Total collapse of individual 
walls or a support below roof structural member of major 
dencction of frame 
5 Collapse More than one wall or more Failure of structural 
than half or roof collapsed members causing fall of 
complete roof or slab 
Source: Coburn and Spence, 1992. 
6.5 Damage d istribution 
In most of the moderate to severe earthquakes, the structures suffer a variety of damage. 
Table 6.3 shows probable damage distribution in structures. Besides giving the 
probability of damage in different earthquake intensity, the table provides a relatively 
simple method for estimating cost of damage to the structure. In this method, the total 
estimated cost of structure is multiplied by the central damage factor (CDF), expressed 
in percentage of the total cost to arrive at the probable repair or reconstruction cost. 
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Table 6.3: General form of damage probability matrix 
Damage Central Probability of damage {%) by intensity 
state damage 
factor(%) VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
1 0 95 49 30 14 3 1 0.4 
2 0.5 3 38 40 30 10 3 0.6 
3 5 1.5 8 16 24 30 10 1 
4 20 0.4 2 8 16 26 30 3 
5 45 0.1 1.5 3 10 18 30 18 
6 80 -- 1 2 4 10 18 39 
7 100 -- 0.5 I 2 3 8 38 
Key to the extent of damage: 
1: None: 
2: Slight: 
3: Light: 
4: Moderate: 
5: Heavy: 
6: Major: 
7: Collapse: 
Limited damage not necessary to be repaired; 
Appreciable locali sed damage but usually not senous 
enough to warrant repair; 
Significant localised damage requiring repair; 
Extensive damage requiring major repairs; 
Widespread serious damage requmng complete 
rehabilitation; and 
Total destruction of most the structure necessitating 
reconstruction. 
Source: Cobum and Spence, 1992. 
Other methods of assessing damage distribution are through expert opinion survey and 
by using PSI scales of intensity. 
6.5.1 Expert opinion survey method: This method is based on asking a 
number of experts about the extent of damage to a structure considering different class 
of buildings and different levels of earthquake intensities. The consensus of the 
opinions of these experts is taken as the probable damage. 
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6.5.2 Parameterless scale of intensity (PSI) method: The PSI method 
involves aggregating damage data relevant to the structures under consideration at the 
given levels of earthquake intensity. The probabilistic application of these data can then 
be applied to predict future damage to similar buildings, having the same age and 
similar ground conditions, for a recurrence of that intensity. Such detailed data for all 
types of buildings are however scarce. Most of the information collected in this regard 
is an aggregate of data gathered from different countries and from a number of 
earthquakes. This method is considered to be reasonably reliable because all seismic 
intensity scales assume that the performance of similar type of buildings under similar 
conditions of foundation soil, configuration, etc., is similar irrespective of their location. 
There can however be differences in recording observations and classifying intensities 
by different survey teams visiting different earthquake affected areas at different times. 
This difficulty can be overcome by using a large number of damage surveys and 
eliminating any unreliable data. Damage distribution diagrams for various type of 
construction are prepared from these data to assess the damage distribution . 
6.6 Human casualty estimates in economic terms 
The foremost purpose of earthquake protection is saving human life, although huge 
infrastructure losses accompanying large earthquakes cannot be ignored (Yalery, 1995). 
Casualty estimation is more difficult than property loss estimation, because of extreme 
variations from one disaster eo another. Death rolls in earthquakes of same intensities, 
in low-income countries are usually far more than high-income countries, mainly 
because of non-engineered structures built in unsafe locations and on poor foundation 
soils. Casualties can be due to building collapse, automobile and other machinery 
accidents, hean attacks, and secondary disasters such landslides, liquefaction, 
subsidence, rockfall and fires. Earthquake records show that building collapse alone 
accounts for 75 to 90% of the total human casualty (Coburn and Spence, 1992). 
The following equation is derived to express casuahies in a given earthquake disaster: 
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in which K. is the number of persons dead due to structural damage, K ' represents the 
deaths caused by non-structural damage and K2 represents the figure for secondary 
disasters. In severe earthquakes K. is the dominant factor in the overall value of K but 
in moderate earthquakes the other components K' and K2 are quite variable. 
6.7 Lethality ratio 
Lethality ratio is defined as the number of people killed with respect to the number of 
buildings collapsed. If thi s relationship is reasonably established, it is easy to determine 
the number of people killed in an earthquake by counting the number of buildings 
collapsed. Ks can therefore be further elaborated by the following formula: 
where D5 is the total number of collapsed structures in a damage of level 5. The value 
of Ks will be different for different types of structures. This formula should therefore 
be used for a set of similar types of structures. 
M1 to M5 represent different modifiers to a potential mortality rate. These modifiers 
vary from country to country and from urban areas to rural areas. 
The factor M1 represents population size of the building and is dependent on household 
size in the particular area under consideration. 
The factor M2 depends on the time of the day when the disaster has taken place. The 
number of life losses vary at different times of the day. Fatalities during night time, 
when people are in bed are usually far more than the day time when most people are 
outside at work. 
M3 depicts the people trapped inside buildings at the time of the earthquake. The 
number of survivors in single storey buildings are usually more than those in multi-
storey buildings because of the former's better chances of rescuing themselves. 
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The factor M4 is related to injuries caused during earthquakes some of which can be 
fatal, while the rest can be moderate to light injuries requiring little or no treatment. 
Ms is related to the efficiency of the rescue operations which can affect the number of 
casualties among the victims trapped in a col1apsed structure. 
6.8 Other losses 
Other losses in earthquakes are caused by destruction of the fini shing works, material, 
furniture, machinery during collapse of a structure, secondary hazards, unemployment, 
etc. 
6.9 Prevailing concepts of risk management 
It is obvious from the brief discussion in the above paragraphs, that overall earthquake 
losses are getting more and more unbearable in modern times. Construction of larger 
and more complex commercial and public buildings, increased use of elevated roads and 
motor ways, sprawling housing systems, fas t developing utility services, such as water 
supply, sewerage, telephone system, electric supply, and multiplying industries have 
raised the cost of disasters. It is estimated that even a modest earthquake striking an 
urban area in a high-income or higher middle-income country will cost in the vicinity 
of US$ 30 to 50 billions or about 1% of the GDP of a rich country such as Japan (The 
Economist, April 1995). An equivalent of the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco will 
today cost around US$ 115 billion. Similarly if the 1923 earthquake in Tokyo is 
repeated, it will cost in the range of US$ 900 million to 1.4 trillion. Even the richest 
countries cannot afford such huge deficits. 
Dea th tolls in the high-income and higher-m iddle income countries are much reduced 
mainly because of the application of building codes which have made structures far 
safer. Moreover the economic costs of earthquake are not limited to repairing and 
reconstructing buildings alone. The interruption in business and unemployment adds 
up to the financ ial problems (Yalery 1995). Earthquake engineers' primary concern is 
to save people and not structures, but the sky rocketing financial losses caused by 
earthquakes and secondary disasters al so cannot be ignored. 
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The low-income and lower middle-income earthquake-prone countries are in a worse 
dilemma. A number of them, such as Yemen do not have any building codes (Field 
surveys, 1994). Even those who have such a code, do not follow it strictly, such as 
Pakistan where a building code was introduced after the 1935 earthquake. Tables 1.1 
and 1.2 show that lack of any serious attempt to save life and infrastructure in the low-
income and lower middle-income countries, has resulted in a high death toll and large 
financial losses in recent years. Their economies which are suffering with the chronic 
problems of inadequate financial resources, high population, illiteracy, lack of adequate 
infrastructure, etc. cannot afford the tremendous losses caused by earthquakes. They 
seek help from the high-income and higher middle-income countries and other donors 
such as the United Nations whose financial constraints are also increasing. This 
persisting problem has increased the world's interest in saving structures alonfwith 
human life. The idea emerging from this situation is a new philosophy called the risk 
management. 
Earthquakes remain as unpredictable as ever but many people around the world continue 
to insist that seismology should be able to correctly predict earthquakes (The 
Economist, April 1995). This trend is dangerous as it creates a tendency of lack of 
preparedness leading to unnecessary life and property losses. Even if reliable 
predictions are possible, only human lives can be saved and not the infrastructure and 
facilities (Gere and Shah, 1984). Evacuation of cities and villages, and providing 
shelter to the homeless populations will be another major problem. The best protection 
against earthquakes is therefore to prepare for them. 
Earthquake-resistant design considerations necessary for earthquake protection are 
discussed in Chapter 5. There are other important measures, both at macro and micro 
level which form part of the strategies for risk management against earthquakes. These 
measures are discussed in following sections. 
6.10 Macroseismic studies 
The earthquakes which can be felt by human beings are called macroseismic 
earthquakes (UNDRO, 1978). The method of s tudying earthquake effects without the 
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use of any instruments involves making observations on the ground, on buildings and 
on the people affected. Earthquakes occurring before the twentieth century are called 
historic earthquakes because description of these earthquakes is the only source of 
infonnation to estimate the magnitudes and the depth of these earthquakes. Various 
intensity scales to describe earthquake effects are discussed in chapter 2. Keeping a 
record of historical earthquakes is a useful measure for earthquake protection. 
6.11 Isoseismal maps 
In the preparation of isoseismal maps, seismic intensities observed in different parts of 
an earthquake-affected area are marked on a map and locations with similar 
observations are joined by lines. These lines are called isoseismal lines which indicate 
the areas in which similar intensities have been observed. The epicentre is located in 
the isoseismal of the highest intensity. The shape of isoseismal also gives information 
about the subsoil conditions and depth of the focus. 
6.12 Microzoning 
Microzoning is an importa nt and promising technique in earthquake protection (Coburn 
and Spence, 1992). The purpose of this record is to identify and record on a map the 
variations in earthquake hazard in a limited area such as a town or a city. Microzoning 
maps are very helpful in land-use planning particularly when development and 
reconstruction is to be undertaken in an area. Important information for earthquake 
protection includes the following: 
a) soil conditions and topographic variations which can amplify ground 
motion; 
b) 
c) 
susceptibility of the area to landslides, rockfall, ground subsidence and 
other forms of ground failure; and 
low-lying coastal areas subject to Tsunamis. 
Earthquake protection measures at micro level , in an earthquake-affected area, deal with 
the following aspects: 
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repair and maintenance of the repairable structures which can be 
rehabilitated to sufficient degree of earthquake-resistance without 
raising the repair cost beyond affordability limits of the beneficiaries; 
strengthening and retrofitting existing structures, which have 
experienced one or more earthquakes but apparently look in-tact; 
reconstruction of new structures in place of collapsed structures or 
additional to meet local needs. 
As this research mainly focuses on issues related to masonry structures, a common type 
of construction in low-income and lower middle-income countries, including Yemen 
where the case study was undertaken, the discussion in the following sections has its 
emphasis on strengthening and construction of masonry works. 
6.13 Causes of damage and collapse of masonry structures 
The main· causes of damage and collapse of masonry structures, observed in Yemen and 
other earthquake affected areas, and reported by engineers and consultants, such as 
Davis (1978), Jolyon (1984), DHV (1989), Arya (1991 ), Coburn and Spence (1992) and 
Abid (1993) are as follows: 
a) high rigidity causing high response to earthquake ground motion. The 
amplification of earthquake acceleration could be as much as three or 
four times. Large masses of walls and thick heavy roofs create large 
inertia forces; 
b) 
c) 
tensile and shear strengths in the common masonry works are small , 
almost zero in rubble stone masonry laid in mud mortar, thus incapable 
of resisting such stresses imposed during earthquakes; 
lack of bond due to no through stones which are necessary to connect 
the outer and inner wythes of the walls. In Yemen the wythes were 
quickly separated or delaminated from each other as the shaking started 
(Figure 6.3), because not only there was no bond between the outer 
and inner wythes due to absence of through stones, but also between 
masonry courses due to the use of mud mortar. The pyramid-shaped 
facing stones became loose in the shaking and the vertical load forced 
the outer wythe to bulge outside and the inner wythe to bulge inside; 
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poor bond between perpendicular walls allows them to separate at the 
junctions causing loss of box-like action and leaving each wall to resist 
inertia forces on its own mass. This problem can be physically seen 
from the almost vertical cracks which appear at the junction of the 
perpendicular walls. These cracks are widest at the top. The roof acts 
as a separate bending wall perpendicular to the supporting walls 
unaided by their shear-wall action; 
the roofs have no diaphragm action to be able to transfer inertia forces 
to all four walls or two wall acting as shear walls; and 
random cracks at the corners of the openings indicate the seismic 
derailing problems which restrict free movement of the earthquake 
forces . 
HAMMER DRESSED _ H UO r iLL 
STONES 
T ~~{ ~~~ 
S[PAR AIIOII 
OELAMINAT ION 
BUL GI NG 
DAMA GED YE ~lE: NI HOME 
t a l WY I H ( f ALL ( H 
• (HJP 5 
·- ·- PtHIUOr" 
RVOAl [ 
C b l WALL BVLCt O 
Figure 6.3: Section of a typical Yemeni house and the various defects observed 
after the 1982 earthquake 
So urce: Arya, 199 I 
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6.14 Low-cost repair of damaged masonry structures 
Improving the resistance of existing masonry structures in earthquake zones is an 
important task. Some recent earthquakes have clearly shown the weakness and 
vulnerability of the old stock particularly where rubble stone masonry work or adobe 
is the dominant construction material (Cobum and Spence, 1992). Better construction 
methods and technologies are necessary to minimise future disasters but such methods 
can be implemented only if they are affordable for the people having low incomes. The 
new and improved methods should also be easy for adaptation by the local artisans and 
should be culturally acceptable to the users. 
Many reconstruction programmes, involving new construction and improvement of the 
existing structures in earthquake-affected countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Turkey have proved to be not very successful because the above 
limitations were ignored (Davis, 1978). The survivors or intended beneficiaries in such 
cases, unimpressed by the improvements went back to their traditional abodes. 
The risk management concept requires a realistic approach of low-cost upgrading of the 
traditional structures, affordable and culturally acceptable to the people. The main 
objective of this approach is to keep the damage minimal from a moderate earthquake, 
expected in a 10 year (or more) cycle and to give their occupants a good chance to 
escape in the case of a rare severe earthquake. Many of the common defects in 
traditional structures observed in Yemen and reported from other countries can be 
removed at a nominal cost by using simple technologies easily adaptable by the local 
builder (Arya, 1991 ). 
It should be noted that restoration of a traditional building means that the repaired 
structure should be able to regain at least its original strength. The process involves 
close examination of the entire structure to identify even the smallest cracks and other 
weak spots in the masonry works. In the case of Yemen the restoration process also 
necessitated strengthening, because the traditional structures were found incapable of 
withstanding even a moderate earthquake of MSK intensity not higher than Vlll in any 
place. One of the safety measures suggested by Arya (199 1) for Yemen, was to get rid 
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of all storeys above the second storey. Arya claim · that this measure is applicable to 
all earthquake-prone countries with similar type of construction. Low to moderate 
strength structures stand better chances of remaining in~tact if they are low rise. 
6.14.1 Grouting in cracks: Finer cracks should be filled with I : 1 cement-
water or gypsum-water grout while wider cracks should be repaired with 1:1 or 1:2 
cement-sand mortar. This method becomes too expensive if used in dry maso nry hence 
not advisable. Imported materials with high tensile strength, such as epoxies are very 
expensive and not affordable for the low-income people. Also the availabilicy of such 
materials is not always guaranteed. 
. 6.14.2 Stitching of stone-wythes: Installation of bonding ele ments which 
connect the outer and inner wythes of masonry walls, is essential in all load-bearing 
walls (Figure 6.4). If some portions of the wall has fall en, it will have to rebuilt by 
using cement-sand mortar and by placing steel reinforcement to join it with the existing 
wall. 
Providing R.C . 'thro ugh' e le ments fo r 's titching' st o ne wythes 
Figure 6.4: 
ii) 
Make ho les gently 
iii) 
Placing bar and 
fi ll ing concrete 
4 
Stones removed to make 
through holes 
2. Holes 
3. Hooked Bar 
4. Chute for pouri11g 
concrete 
5. Filled concrete 
6. Internal Wythe 
7. Internal Wyt hc 
Strengthening wall s of the existing buildings by stitching walls 
Source: Arya, 1994 
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6.14.3 Treating bulged walls: Mild bulging indicates hollowness between the 
inner and outer wythes of walls. This problem can be treated by filling cement-sand 
mortar in the gap after stitching the wall, otherwise hydrostatic pressures develop inside 
which may cause bursting of the wall. This treatment is not applicable to seriously 
bulging walls. Such walls need to be dismantled and rebuilt in cement-sand mortar 
with proper bonding with the remaining portions of the existing walls. Such repair 
works need extreme c~e as sometimes soaring of the adjoining walls or roof may be 
required. 
6.14.4 Wooden ring beams: Some of the old buildings have wood beams 
horizontally usually placed at the lintel levels. These beams are usually weak at the 
joints. They held the masonry walls intact as far as possible, but cracks started to 
appear in the walls wherever the joints separated. These wood beams can be fortified 
by nailing steel strips at the joints, in order to restore their tensile strength and 
resistance to earthquake forces. 
6.15 Low-cost strengthening of existing masonry structures 
The study of traditional masonry strucrures and bui lding practices in some of the low-
income earthquake-prone countries shows that a number of building practices were 
being followed without any consideration of their effect on earthquake-resistance of the 
structure. These practices can be reviewed and low-cost measures can be applied to 
improve earthquake resistance of the existing structures. 
According to the nature of weakness noticed in a structure, strengthening may require 
any or all of the fo llowing measures (Cobum and Spence, 1992): 
a) modifying the plan to reduce asymmetry; 
b) improving connections between perpendicular walls; 
c) strengthening or replacing floors and roofs and improving their bond 
with the load bearing walls; 
d) 
e) 
f) 
strengthening the walls; 
strengthening the foundations; and 
improving drainage at the roofs and ground levels. 
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Some the measures for strengthening existing structures are discussed below (Arya, 
1991): 
6.15.1 Installing reinforced concrete bands: This reinforced band (Figure 6.5) 
is also known as the bond beam, parameter beam or chaining. The band can be 
installed inremally or _externally at various levels of the structure such as plinth level, 
lintel level and 
Figure 6.5: 
Bands and Cross ties 
Just below roof level 
D Door 
W Window 
I . Existing Stone Wall 
2. Steel Welded Wire Mesh 2SX2S 
mm gauge 
3. Overlap in mesh, 600+600 mm 
1. 12 mm dia TOR tie 
5. Micro concrete I: 1.5:3 or 
Cement Plaster I :3. about 30 mm 
thick 
Strethening existing buildings by installing ruinforced concrete bands 
Source: Arya, 1994 
below roof level. This strengthening method is applicable to both new and old 
structures. In old buildings the most suitable location is just below the roof level of 
each storey, where it will have to be installed over the existing wall. The band has two 
important functions as follows: 
a) to bind all walls together and prevent their separation at the corners. 
Tying perpendicular walls at the corners is necessary to prevent 
kinematic instability of walls which means their overturning out of 
plane after separation at the corners. 
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to act as horizontal bending beam to resist the horizontal inertia force 
of floor or roof together with that of the mass of the external walls. 
This action is of particular significance as the traditional floors do not 
act as diaphragms. 
Strapping: Extensive strapping of the walls, roofs and floors by using 
both vertical and horizontal steel ties improves bond between these members. 
6.15.3 Reducing earth-load from roof: Most traditional houses in low-income 
and lower middle-income countries have large layers of earth on roof of thickness 
ranging from 60 cm to 90 cm. The purpose of this earth is to provide climatic comfort 
but it also becomes deadly during earthquakes, because the earthquake forces are 
directly proportional to mass of the structure. If this layer is reduced to 20 cm the 
climatic effect on the building remains more or less the same but it drasticall y reduces 
the weight of the roof with a better chance for survival of the structure (Figure 6.6). 
A polythene layer can also be placed horizontally at the middle of this layer for water 
sealing of the roof. 
Figure 6.6: 
Polythylene sheet place ment - waterproof mud plaster 
6 
I Stone wall 
2 Wood po~t 
3 Wood joi~t 
4 Wood plank 
S Seismic belt 
6 Cro~s tic 
4 
7 Soil Foil ( Base layer ) 
8 Black polythene 
9 Soil Fill (Top layer ) 
I 0 Water Prool Mud Plaster 
I I G alvanoscd chicken-wore mesh woth cement 
plaster I :6 or Water proof mud plaster 
Roof treatment to reduce weight of soil and to provide protection 
against water penetration 
Source: Arya, 1994 
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Sometimes complete coverage of the external walls of structures with nominal steel and 
covering it with rich cement plaster, is also recommended but it considerably raises the 
cost of strengthening. This method is used when damaged walls need extensive repairs. 
6.15.4 Retrofitting wooden frames: If the structure has wooden columns to 
support large roofs, the use of knee braces (Figure 6.7) helps in strengthening the 
columns and improved, distribution of the roof load. 
Traditional houses 
· before retrofitting 
I Wooden Column 
2 Stone Ptd t su l 
) H>to Wood Su m 
~ Wood c>ptt> l 
S Longitudtnol V\bod Bt>m 1 
6 St cood>ry Wood Joist • 
7 Wood Pl>nks 
8 E>rth Topptng ~ SO to 900mm 
Figure IB 
Retrofitting Timber 
Post and Beam System 
In traditional houses 
I Wooden Column 
2 Stone Ptdu ul 
) H>in Wood Bt•m 
~ Wood c>ptt>l 
S Loogttud•n>l V\bod Be>m 
6 S~ond>ry Wood Joist 
7 Wood Pl•nks 
8 E>rth Topp•ng r educed to 200mm 
9 Knee Br>c. 
I 0 Sl>ek Polyt hene Sheet 
/ 
Figure IC 
De taol o f Knee Brace 
l···-
. 
. I 
11 MS An&le )0x)0x)mm or 
Bl;ack iron p•pt 20mm d• ll 
12 10<-m lonl wut n:uh 
Figure 6.7: Retrofitting of traditional buildings supported on wooden frames 
Source: Arya, 1994 
6. 15.5 Stiffening of wooden floors and roofs: Such floors and roo fs can be 
strengthened by covering 'them with a thin layer of reinforced concrete . 
6.15.6 Water penetration: One of the most common defects in low-strength 
traditional buildings is th at allows water penetration into the walls. This causes ends 
of the timber roof joists to rot, or steel joists to rust and the mud mortar to soften 
resulting in deformation and instability of the walls. Such structures become further 
susceptible to earthquake damage. Installation of improved drainage system, with 
overhanging eaves at the roof level and improved surface water run off are inexpensive 
measures to restore such structures. 
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6.16 Strengthening of reinforced concrete structures 
The main problems of weakness in reinforced concrete structures are the following: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
g) 
6.16.1 
insufficient lateral load resistance because of design fault; 
inadequate ductility because of insufficient longitudinal reinforcement 
at beam-column or slab-column junctions; 
concentration of local stresses due to complex and irregular geometry 
of the structure in plan and elevation; 
interaction between structural and non-structural elements due to 
eccentricity causing unintended torsion and stress concentration; 
weak ground floor (soft storeys) due to lack of shear walls; 
high flexibility combined with insufficient spacing between buildings 
resulting in pounding by neighbouring buildings during earthquakes; 
and 
unrepaired damage from prev10us earthquakes also makes such 
structures more vulnerable during the next earthquakes. 
Ge neral measures: The following general measures are taken for 
strengthening of re inforced structures: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
6.16.2 
to increase lateral load resistance and to increase ductility of the 
structure where such deficiencies are noted; 
to remove or redesign non-structural walls in order to improve shear 
strength. This measure is taken where fle xible infill walls have caused 
or are feared to caused pounding inside the structure; and 
I 
stiffening of tall structures located on softer soils is also sometimes 
carried out to reduce natural period of the struc ture below that of the 
subsoil. Strengthening of foundations may also be required in such cases. 
Specific measures: Specific measures for strengthening reinforced 
concrete struc tures are described below: 
a) shear walls: adding more shear walls in a reinforced concrete frame 
structure is a common method for increasing its shear resistance. 
These additional walls are also usually made of reinforced concrete. 
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The walls are designed and built to have a good bond and composite 
action with the existing structure. Addition of shear walls changes the 
load distribution pattern of the structure and may also require 
strengthening of the foundations. 
jacketing: another method of increasing dimensions and strength of the 
existing principal frame members is to encase them with new 
reinforced concrete covers. This method, commonly known as 
jacketing, also improves ductility of the building. Any concrete 
damaged in a previous earthquake can also be replaced by this method. 
This work also requires careful handling in order to achieve the desired 
bond between the existing structure and the new work. 
After going through the above methods of restoring and strengthening the existing 
infrastructure in earthquake areas, it seems appropriate to review some reconstruction 
works undertaken in different parts of the world. 
6.17 Study of reconstruction programmes in some earthquake-affected 
Areas 
Reconstruction in earthquake affected areas is one of the most challenging tasks (Davis, 
1978). Construction costs of hundreds or thousands of new houses and other 
infrastructure such as hospitals, health centres, water supply systems and roads reach 
' 
several million dollars which the low-income or lower middle-income countries can ill 
afford from their own resources. Most of the reconstruction work is carried out with 
foreign assistance. 
The main objectives of the recons truction programmes are usua lly the fol lowing (DHV, 
1989): 
a) 
b) 
to introduce low-cost earthquake-resistant building techniques usmg 
local materials and local building methods; and 
to introduce houses which are affordable and culturally acceptable to 
the intended beneficiaries in particular and common people in general. 
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In spite of seemingly good intentions of the concerned government agencies, responsible 
for programme implementation, most of the post-earthquake reconstruction programmes 
in low-income and lower middle-income countries has failed to meet the desired level 
of success and impact on affected people. Some of these reconstruction programmes 
are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
6.17.1 Reconstruction of Quetta City: Quetta city of Pakistan was hit, by a 
severe earthquake measuring 7.6 magnitude, in 1935, which destroyed almost every 
building in the city and surrounding villages (Cobum and Spence, 1992). The 
earthquake claimed 25,000 lives. It was not possible to relocate the city to another 
place. Earth scientists declared the city safe from another similar earthquake for a long 
period. The government ordered all new construction to be built by using earthquake-
resistant techniques. This prompted drawing up of a building code which is considered 
to be the pioneer of all modem codes of practice. 
General regulations were issued specifying shape, size and spacing of the buildings and 
the construction methods were also reviewed. The code required all residential masonry 
buildings to have reinforced beams and vertical reinforcement at all corners and at the 
junctions of perpendicular walls. This practice came to be known as Quetta bond. For 
important buildings...such as hospitals, airports and government offices, a system of steel 
frames with brick infill panels was introduced. 
The Quetta bond remained in practice for some years, when the building controls were 
strictly monitored by the government. As the city population grew in the following 
years with the influx of refugees from Afghanistan and India, it became impossible to 
keep a tight control in building construction. 
Another problem was that the building code did not offer any cheaper alternatives. In 
recent years the use of prescribed quantities of steel reinforcement and wood was found 
to be beyond the reach of a common person. Today most of the low-income population 
of Quetta (total estimated population 800,000) lives in unauthorised masonry structures 
of low strength. 
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The Queua bond provided a good solution for building earthquake-resistant structures. 
The proposed buildings were culturally acceptable for which local materials and 
workmanship were available. What the code however lacked was the economic aspect 
and only a small percentage of the local population could afford to build such houses 
from their own resources. If an earthquake similar to the one of 1935 were to be 
repeated today, the life and property losses will be far greater. 
6.17.2 Reconstruction in Skopje: This Yugoslavian town suffered a moderate 
earthquake of 6.0 magnitude in 1963. Many buildings collapsed or were seriously 
damaged causing over 1,000 deaths and leaving tens of thousands homeless. Massive 
funds were received through international assistance and local resources. The 
government embarked on a large reconstruction and repair programme designed mainly 
for rehabilitation of the earthquake victims. Reconstruction and strengthening of the 
public buildings and other facilities was also part of the programme (Davis, 1978). 
This programme dragged on for over fifteen years, despite availability of sufficient 
finances and no technical problems. The government was finally forced to leave the 
programme incomplete and shelve it mainly because of legal interven tion, political 
interference and financial corruption problems. 
The incomplete recbnstruction programme failed to create any positive impact on the 
intended benefi ciaries. Most of them did not receive any housing and the majority of 
them went back to li ve in their damage-prone houses to show their mistrust and 
disapproval of the government' s reconstruction programme. 
6.17.3 Reconstruction in Gediz: A major earthquake of 7.3 Richter magnitude 
hit Gediz area in western Turkey in 1970. Over 1, I 00 people were killed in this 
earthquake and a large number of structures collapsed causing extensive economic 
losses (Gere and Shah, J 984). 
The main objective of the Turkish government in the following reconstruction 
programme was to reduce vulnerability of the people and stn1c tures. A large number 
of the earthquake survivors benefitted from the programme. In the long run however, 
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the reconstruction programme achieved very little success in its goaJ . This happened 
mainly because the technical and scientific techniques employed in improving the safety 
of local housing system were indifferent to the socio-cultural, economic and 
environmental conditions of the local communities (Aysan, 1986). Over the passing 
years the affected communities have continued to modify, extend or even rebuild their 
government provided post-disaster houses according to their needs by using traditional 
construction techniques. Consequently the vulnerability of the present housing stock 
is even more than before, because of increase in population and extensive building 
activity going on without any consideration for safe location or safe construction. 
The reconstruction programme in Gediz is one of the many to highlight that such 
programmes should not only pay attention to the technical issues, but should also 
consider the socio-cultural values and economic conditions of the affected communities. 
These considerations are vital to increase the acceptability of such programmes. 
6.17 .4 Reconstruction in Managua: Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, 
experienced a deadly earthquake in 1972 recording 6.2 magnitude on Richter scale. 
5,000 people perished in this disaster while extensive building damage left tens of 
thousand homeless (Gere and Shah, 1984). The economic losses ran into millions of 
dollars . 
The government assured the earthquake victims about its intentions to provide houses 
to everyone whose house had been destroyed by the earthquake. The government also 
promised to repair and strengthen all those houses which were only partly damaged. 
The government appealed for international help. The neighbouring countries were quick 
to respond. Columbia provided 100 houses and 12 class-rooms. On completion, the 
entire lot of lOO houses was distributed among the President's family members and 
friends and some high-ranking military officers (Davis, 1978). Most of the earthquake 
victims could not benefit from the reconstruction programme. The programme failed 
to create any positive impact. The government's instructions for building safe houses 
were ignored and the earthquake victims preferred to build new houses or repair their 
existing houses through own resources and using the old vulnerable building techniques. 
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6.17.5 Reconstruction in Guatemala: A severe earthquake measuring 7.5 
magnitude on Richter scale 7.6 hit Guatemala in 1976, killing 23,000 people and 
causing extensive damage to adobe construction. Numerous landslides, occurring as 
secondary disasrer caused further damage leaving one-fifth of the country's population 
homeless. 
It is interesting to note that historically the Guatemalans were accustomed to safe 
building technologies and used to live in simple timber frame houses, covered with corn 
stalk walling. When the Spanish invaders came they brought with them the lethal 
technology of adobe walls and heavily tiled roofs. This is perhaps one of the few 
examples in the world where the new technology rendered the traditional technology 
unsafe (Davis, 1978). 
As happens in most cases, the reconstruction programme following the 1976 earthquake 
failed to consider the basic issues of affordability and acceptability of the local 
communities. The programme managed to provide shelter to only a small percentage 
of the earthquake victims. The remaining poverty-stricken people had themselves to 
cater for their shelter needs. In the process, many of them reverted to even more 
vulnerable shelters . A future severe earthquake in the same area, which can be repeated 
once in 25 years, is liable to cause real havoc. 
6.17 .6 Reconstruction of Mexico City: Mexico city has suffered three 
earthquakes of damaging effects since 1957 of magnitude ranging from 7.6 to 8.0 (DHA 
News, 4/1993). The second severe earthquake occurred in 1978, while the last one 
occurred in 1985 thus taking the total death toll to about 7 ,000. Huge property losses 
accompanied these repeated disasters and several hundred thousand people were 
rendered homeless. The high level of damage was due to rapid expansion of the city 
and the types of structures built during the 1960s and 1970s. This adverse situation was 
compounded by high intensity of the last earthquake which is said to be the highest in 
Mexico city in the current century. The local subsoil conditions are also unfavourable 
as the city is built on the bed of an ancient dried lake, making it more vulnerable to 
strong ground motions more than most other places elsewhere. The saturated soil s 
resonate even from moderate earthquakes occurring 400 km away. The return period 
of 15 years for moderate to severe earthquakes in Mexico city is relatively high. 
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The Mexican government has adopted several measures to avoid future disasters as 
follows: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
large-scale strengthening of important structures such as schools, 
hospitals, government offices, airports, nuclear facilities, power houses, 
water works and historical buildings; 
a major reconstruction programme to rehabilitate the disaster victims; 
and 
revision of the urban master plan including microzoning of the city; and 
revision of the existing building codes. 
This programme is successful to the extent of strengthening of government built 
important structure and houses. The slum areas, where majority of the city population 
lives still generally continue to live in shelters devoid of any safety consider ations. 
6.17 .7 Reconstruction in Maharashtra: Marathawada area of Maharashtra, 
India received an earthquake of 6.5 magnitude in 1993 in which 50 villages were wiped 
out. The death toll is estimated to be over 20,000 while the number of homeless is in 
the vicinity of 150,000 (DHA News, 1993). 
Most of the houses in Marathawada area are made of stone rubble masonry with poor 
bond between_perpendicular walls, and between walls and roofs. The roofs are heavy 
with 60 to 90 cm depth of earth to provide climatic comfort. The heavy roofs and the 
lack of bond between walls and roofs became the main cause of heavy destruction in 
Marathawada. The government of India took up the repair and reconstruction of 
Marathawada mainly through its own resources. The government made unreali stic 
promises to the victims that they will be provided new shelters before the next rainy 
season. But except for a handful of different looking new houses, most of the people 
are still li ving in temporary shelters (Sharma, 1995). The process is slow and may take 
several years in completion because the Indian government is finding difficulties in 
mobilising resources for the enormous job of providing safe shelters and other 
infrastructure to a very large number of the homeless people in the earthquake affected 
area. The lack of a well-formulated rehabilitation policy has led to confusion. If they 
are hit by another earthquake while they are still living in their vulnerable make-shift 
shelters, it cou ld be a greater misfortune for the Marathawada people, than the last one. 
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As the traditional construction in Marathawada is similar to that in Yemen, discussed 
in detail in chapter 4, the technology recommended for repair and strengthening of 
existing houses in Marathawada is also the same as in Yemen (Arya, 1994 ). 
6.17.8 Reconstruction in Northridge: The Northridge earthquake which caused 
serious damage to infrastructure in Los Angles and other nearby areas, was of 6.7 
Richter magnitude. The death toll was only 54 mainly because the earthquake occurred 
in the middle of night of a public holiday when most of the local residents had travelled 
out. The earthquake smashed overhead freeway bridges and multi-storey car parks to 
the ground, mainly because of the soft-storey factor. A few high-rise structures also 
toppled probably because of torsional forces created by eccentric loading. The 
economic losses caused by this earthquake are estimated at US$ 30 billion making it 
the costliest earthquake in the history of the American Continent (The Economist, 
1994). 
A building code covering earthquake-resistance of all buildings is strictly followed in 
California state and other seismic areas of the United States. The low-rise, mostly 
residentia l structures are made of timber. The medium-rise and high-rise buildings are 
made of reinforced concrete and steel frame. Experts believe that the Northridge 
earthquake losses would have been far more if the above protection measures were not 
applied. 
The USA is a high-income country with ample technical and financial resources. Small 
wonder that the repair and reconstruction work, entirely funded by the government, has 
been completed two months ahead of schedule. 
This is in con trast to the low-income or lower middle-income countries, where post-
earthquake recons truction works drag on for years as discussed in the case of 
Marathawada and some other cases. Earthquakes not only cause heavy losses to life 
and infrastructure only, but also sometimes they completely change the socio-economic 
patterns of the affected communities. Many households suddenly find themselves 
shelterless and jobless after the disaster. A number of such households become 
destitutes as the concerned governments continue to follow indifferent relief and 
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reconstruction programmes. The promised assistance to the affected people either never 
comes or comes only partly and so late that most of the effect is lost. 
Yemen's case, where this research was conducted is no different. The reconstruction 
programme is still incomplete after thirteen years of the disaster. A large amount of 
the financial assistance has been spent and wasted to a great extent as nearly half of the 
affected people have not benefitted from the programme. Even the beneficiaries are not 
satisfied with the houses built for them. A majority of the government engineers and 
other officials involved in the reconstruction programme believe that the programme 
could have been implemented in a better way (refer to chapter 6 for details). 
6.17 .9 The Kobe disaster: Kobe is one of the major industriali sed cities of 
Japan. It is ironical that only a few year ago the government of Japan had placed this 
city on the li st of low-risk seismic areas (The Economist, 4/1995). Earthquake hazard 
awareness and technological advancement in Japan is one of the highest in the world. 
The country is also among the richest. In spite of all these positive factors, the 
earthquake of January 1995 (Richter Magnitude 6.9) caused extensive damage to the 
housing and other infrastruc ture. In the wake of the disaster 5,470 people lost their 
lives and some 33,000 became homeless . The economic loss is es timated to be about 
200 billion US dollars. The main cause of the heavy losses is that the pre-conceived 
low seismicity of the area, and non-occurrence of an earthquake in or around Kobe, for 
hundreds of years had led the seismologists to believe that the chances of severe 
earthquake in the area were almos t nil. The heavy roofed buildings and insufficient 
bond be tween roofs and wall is said to be responsible for the colossal damage. 
The Northridge and the Kobe earthquakes have exhibited that the established knowledge 
about the hazard is still incomplete (El-Nas hai , 1995). The increasing incidence of the 
earthquakes to occur almost anywhere, has led the European scientists to develop a 
Eurocode for earthquake-resistant considerations in all construction works. 
Like USA, Japan is a high-income country. The government is working fas t to rebuild 
Kobe with safer construction techniques. 
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6.18 Acceptable risk, affordability and acceptability 
The tenns acceptable risk, affordability and acceptability are crucial in earthquake-
resistant design of structures. It is worthwhile to establish simple definitions of these 
tenns in this context. 
6.18.1 Acceptable risk : Earthquake intensity level XTI on Modified Mercalli 
and MSK scales means total collapse. As such no infrastructure can be expected to 
escape destruction in great earthquakes of Richter magnitude 8.0 and above, 
corresponding to intensity levels XI and XII. It is therefore not possible to have 
earthquake-proof structures. This is why structures designed to resist earthquakes are 
called earthquake-resistant and not earthquake-proof struc tures. The level of acceptable 
risk for different type of buildings also varies because an increase in safety measures 
also increases the cost. The main categories of buildings are classified as (i) 
occupancy; (ii) importance; and (iii) hazard. 
Acceptable risk in the case of an occupancy building, such as a house or an apartment 
means that it should suffer no damage in minor earthquakes and resist structural damage 
in moderate earthquakes. In severe earthquakes such buildings may suffer major 
damage but not collapse and the occupants should be able to escape safely. 
The level of acceptable risk for important buildings such as offices, hospitals, airports, 
railway stations and schools is higher than the occupancy buildings. Acceptable risk 
for an important building requires that the building should suffer no or only superficial 
damage in a moderate earthquake and no structural failure in severe earthquakes. 
Acceptable risk for hazard buildings such as nuclear plants, fuel dumps and dams 
requires that they should be able to withstand even severe earthquakes without any 
structural failure damage. Serious damage to such structures can trigger off serious 
secondary disasters causing further fatalities and other losses and di sruption in rescue 
and relief operations. 
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The above definitions could be called as the technical definitions. But while dealing 
with shelters the people's perception of risk is very important. Risk has been defined 
earlier in this chapter. Further discussion is given in Chapter 11. 
6.18.2 Affordability: In development and reconstruction programmes the 
question of affordability and acceptability is more related to housing. In house building 
the people have to mainly depend on their own financial resources. Considerations of 
their individual , cultural and climatic needs are of paramount imponance to make the 
housing designs acceptable to the community. 
Affordability is a relative phenomenon which varies from place to place dependjng upon 
socio-economic condition of the concerned people. 
The people in Yemen are generally poor but a strong joint-family system exists among 
them, under which all earning members of a household pool their resources to meet 
their needs jointly. Wealthy relatives, not pan of the same household also sometimes 
assist if an important financial undertaking is beyond the means of their kin. House 
building and marriages are considered among important undertakings . However 
affordability levels for house building in Yemen should be based on the economic 
means of the concerned households only. Affordability of the earthquake-affected 
people in Yemen is further 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
6.18.3 Acceptability: Housing systems designed for the disaster victims 
should be critically examined by them as to how similar it is to their traditional housing 
and whether its location, design and size can take care of their essential needs. Any 
housing system not considering these basic requirements should be rejected by the 
beneficiaries. 
It was observed in Yemen that even in the case of beneficiaries of the post-earthquake 
reconstruction programme, who had to pay nothing or only a part of the total cost, the 
issue of acceptability played a vital role in the fate of the programme. 
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Yemeni people are conservative muslims and attach great value to their old Islamic 
traditions including Yemeni architecture. Detailed discussion on the socio-economic 
profile of Yemen and traditional housing exists in chapters 3 and 7. Salient features 
of traditional Yemeni housing in the context of acceptability are given below. 
Traditional housing in Yemen is based on their cultural and climatic needs. The 
traditional houses have large rooms and are three to four storey high. There are several 
rooms in the house because of joint-family system in practice in which each family has 
a large number of children. The walls and roofs are thick to provide climatic comfort. 
The women's quarters are kept separate for religious reasons. The men's retiring rooms 
are on the top floor for vigilance in case of an enemy attack. Livestock keeping for 
dairy purposes and for use in agriculture farms is an integral part of Yemeni culture. 
Stables for the livestock are therefore also considered necessary in rural houses. Large 
kitchens because of joint-family system is yet another essential need. Any housing 
design which does not correspond to these basic needs of the Yemeni people is not 
acceptable to them. 
Acceptability of the reconstruction programme in Yemen is further discussed in detail, 
in Chapter 9. 
6.19 Acceptable risk for earthquake-resistant designs in Yemen 
According to the seismic studies of Yemen, the probability of an earthquake of 
magnitude 6 is about 4 to 5 times in 25 years. The probability of an earthquake of 
magnitude 7 is once in 25 years,while the probability of an earthquake of magnitude 
8 is less than once even in 100 years (Al-Salim, 1993). Table 6.4 shows the probable 
return period of earthquakes of different magnitudes in Yemen. 
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Table 6.4: Probable return period of earthquakes in Yemen 
Magnitude M 1 year 10 years 20 years 25 years 75 years 100 years 200 years 
(Richter 
scale) 
3.0 33.9 338.6 677.2 846.5 1692.9 3385.8 6771.7 
4.0 6.3 63.2 126.4 158.0 3 15.9 631.8 1263.7 
5.0 1.7 11.8 23.6 29.5 59.0 117.9 235.8 
6 .0 0.2 2.2 4.4 5.5 11.0 22.0 44.0 
7.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.0 2.1 4.1 8.2 
8.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.5 
9 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Source: Al-Salim, 1993. 
The record available from the Seismic Observatory Centre of the Ministry of Oil and 
Mineralogy in Yemen does not show any earthquake of magnitude 7 or above having 
occurred in the country. As such it seems reasonable to assume that acceptable risk in 
Yemen will allow a building to be considered as safe if it does not collapse in an 
earthquake of magnitude 7 wi th an intensity of about 8 to 9. 
Technical measures for ri sk management by engineers, based on literature review, are 
described in the following section. 
6.20 Measures for engineers 
Engineers visiting the earthquake affected areas in Yemen and elsewhere with masonry 
structures, find the existing buildings in the following four conditions (Arya, 199 1): 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
collapsed buildings beyond economic repairs, requiring reconstruction; 
damaged buildings requiring major or minor repairs; 
buildings showing little or no apparent damage but weakened by the 
last earthquake and thus in need of strengthening to resist future 
earthquakes; and 
buildings with only superficial or no damage, not requiring any repair 
or strengthening measures. 
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The buildings planned, designed and supervised by engineers are known as engineered 
buildings and they usually fall in the last category. Such buildings may also however 
suffer repairable damage in a severe earthquake, if they are not based on earthquake-
resistant design principles. Almost all public builctings are engineered buildings and 
usually suffer only moderate damage even in severe earthquakes. Expert engineers 
recommend that repair of such damage should be carried out as soon as possible, after 
the earthquake in order to keep them functioning with full efficiency at a time when 
they are most needed. 
Serious problems are however encountered in the non-engineered buildings, usually 
built by local artisans in consultation with the house-owners whose main considerations 
are social and cultural needs, climatic comfort and cost saving. An engineer will have 
to examine all buildings in the earthquake-affected area systematically to determine the 
nature and extent of damage to each structure. 
Most of the low-income communities around the world live in non-engineered 
buildings. Experts agree that the engineers should provide such earthquake-resistant 
guidelines to the people which are affordable and acceptable to them. The most 
common and well known problems in such building, and their possible solutions are 
summarised in the self-explanatory Tables 6.5 and 6.6. 
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Table 6.5: Common design problems in non-engineered buildings and possible technical solutions. 
Building Type of construction Type of dm~age Is afT oniability u acceptability 
com~ent Type of problem I 2 3 4 Possible low-GOSt solution an issue? an issue? 
Roof T)'ree trunks 01' branches placed on opposite Sc:parate vibration in u ch direction causing . • • RooC collapse can be IC1h&l. YeJ r-;o 
waUs with insufficient bearing providing lack of diaphragm action with four walls in Olllngin g week rafters or those with 
lillle bond with waUs and heavy load of clay resisting late ral loads. Old roofs are more small wall bearings will be oceded. 
(30 cm o r mOI'e) on top vulnerable due to insect action 01' rotting Typing with walh will be done by 
thw further reducing bond with walls steel straps 
Roof As above As above 
. . Reduce depth of urth on roof to 20 !'o t'o 
cm which will ~ovide the ume 
climatic cOI'nfort but make the roof 
safer 
Roof Large roofs built as a'oove but given extra As a'oove . . Retrofi t columns with roof by wing Yu No 
support by wooden columns lcnee-braces. 
Roofs and Roof and flOOI'S made of timber Aexibility may cause pounding and major . • Wooden floon and rooh can be Yu Ye.s 
floors damage to the whole sl1\IC1~ stiffened by covering them with a 
thin layer of RC 
Roofs As above and several O!her types of roofs Water penetration from roofs to wall$ due 10 • . . . Improved roof drainage and placin& Yu No 
poor drainage poor sealing of roofs causes eaves at ro<X level is a low-rost 
damage to timber or steel joists. softening of musure to =tore safety of the 
mud mortar and weakening of walls swcrure 
Masonry walls Rubble stone masonry with outer and inner Cracks in the walls without major swcrural . Minor cracks to be rc:paired with 1:1 No No 
wythes la id in mud or week cement-sand damage cement or gypwm g!OOL Wider 
mooar. In between hearting filled with stone cr-acks to be repaired wilh I: 1 or 1:2 
chipp ing and mud mOI'lar cement sand mortar 
Masonry walls As a'oove No bond between outer and inner wythes of • . Fallen portiocu can be rebuilt by No No 
walls causing faUing of some portions of the using cement sand moru.r. Repaired 
waU portion can be joined with the 
erilt ing wall by placing Steel ban in 
between 
M.asonry walls As above As a'oove . Further strength can be provided by Yes No 
placing through bondin& elancnts in 
the wall. This is called stitching 
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Building 
component Type of consLruction Type of problem 
Masonry As above As above 
Masonry walls As above Bulging of walls indicates 
hollowness which creates 
hydrostatic pressure in the mortar 
and bursting or wall 
Masonry walls As above Lack of bond or poor bond between 
walls and roofs 
Masonry wall s As above Lack of bond between walls and 
noor 
Key 
I : none Of superficial damage; 
2: damage requiring repair and restoration; 
3: no apparent damage but weakened structure requiring strengthening; 
4: major damage or collapse requiring reconstruction. 
Source: 
1: Arya et al. 1985; 
2: Arya., 1991; 
Type of damage 
I 2 3 
. 
. 
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Is 
Possible low~t solution afford.ability 
4 an issue? 
. Steel straps at joints and all corners Yes 
will be needed. Wooden ring beams 
at lintel, cill and roof levels will 
provide further strength 
This work is done after stitching the No 
wall by filling the bulged portions 
with cement-sand mortar. Seriously 
bulged walls need dismantling and 
rebuilding 
. Reinforced concrete (RC) bands can Yes 
be installed in new works at the 
plinth , lintel and just below roof and 
noor levels within wall thickness. In 
old work RC bands can be pia=:! 
below roof and noor levels outside 
the wall 
. !!cavy strapping by using steel bars Yes 
between walls and noon improves 
bond and gives more rigidity to the 
structure 
ll 
acceptability 
an issue? 
No 
No 
1\o 
So 
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Table 6.6: Secondary factors for improving earthquake-resistance of buildings 
Problem Possible solution Is Is 
community's community's 
affordability acceptability 
an issue? an issue? 
Site conditions 
Existing site may have a geological Change of site may be Yes Yes 
fault increasing the probability of a required. 
future earthquake or t.he subsoil 
conditions may cause liquefaction, 
subsidence, landslides or rockfall 
Distance between houses 
Closeness of old and unrepaired Examine the repair and Yes Yes 
houses may make new construction strengthening measures for the 
vulnerable adjoining buildings as well and 
made suggestions if so 
required. New houses should be 
located at safe distances from 
old houses. 
Construction materials 
People prefer to use familiar Emphasis should remain on the Yes Yes 
materials easily avai lable in the use of local materials but 
market unsafe methods of their use 
should be changed 
Configuration 
Extreme dimensions, problematic Revision of dimensions or Yes Yes 
horizontal and vertical layouts, structural design 
excessive openings in shear walls 
and diaphragms, and adjacency of 
another building with configuration 
problems 
Structural design 
Difference in stiffness of various Revision of structural design to Yes Yes 
storeys and their effe.ct on the ensure safety 
natural period and dynamic 
characteristic of the structures, 
insufficient wall area to resist shear, 
heavy roofs and design faults 
Construction gua lity 
Use of low quality building Review of design to strengthen Yes Yes 
materials, poor workmanship. the existing works 
mixing materials of di ffcrenr 
seismic performance and 
History 
Decay and rotting of materials due Strengthening measures may be Yes Yes 
to age, weakening effcc L~ by required 
previous shocks, low quality of 
repair and maintenance, 
modifications affecting seismic 
behaviour of the structure 
~ource: Cobum and::> pc nee, 1 YYl.; 
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Summary 
The rising number of earthquake disasters is now a matter of major concern for the 
governments and engineers all over the world. The recent earthquakes in USA and 
Japan have shaken the established concepts of safety. The problem however is not so 
serious for the high-income or higher middle~income. The real problem is for the 
poorer people who form over 70% of the world population. Most of these people live 
in non-engineered houses. Post-earthquake reconstruction programmes in low-income 
and lower middle-income countries have generally fai led to satisfy the needs of the 
victims, because of indifferent approaches of those responsible for implementation of 
such programmes. Risk management requires that the reconstruction programmes 
should not only provide safe infrastructure, but that it should also be affordable and 
acceptable to the people, and they should use the same techniques in the future 
construction as well. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
"In the early twentieth century, anthropologists developed a method of investigation 
called 'field work', which was one of observation of the culture in its natural habitat. 
This involved learning the language of the people, observing the rituals and everyday 
life of the people, and talking at length to a variety of informants in a natural 
conversation. This was a major step towards organised social research". 
(The Open University, 1979) 
7.1 Research Methods 
Most research scientists agree that scientific research follows a sequential methodology, 
in which the follo wing steps act as gears to the assurance of quality research (Buckley, 
1976): 
a) gathering information from observations, whic h take place throu gh a definable 
searching process; 
b) defining the research problem, thereby explaining why the research is being 
conduc ted, and what is intended to be achieved at the end; 
c) formulating a research plan by selecting the appropriate strategies, domains and 
techniques for the research; 
d) initiating inquiry according to the plan, in the light of the need to obtain relevant 
and sufficient evidence; 
e) stating the outcome of the inquiry in explicit terms, which may result in support 
or refutation of an ex isting hypothesis; and 
f) documenting the conclusions with sufficient support and clarity, so that these 
conclusions establish what was done, what was found and what significance the 
findings may have. 
The methodology followed in this research is based on the above prescribed steps. 
Accordingly, the research problems were identified through preliminary literature review 
and field observations which led to describing the study objectives. The objective are 
presented in Section 7 .2. 
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7.2 Specific objectives of the study 
Different approaches used for the implementation of the reconstruction programme in 
Dhamar has provided the basis for studying and investigating these approaches in detail 
in order to derive policy implications for efficient and effective implementation of 
future reconstruction programmes, not only in Yemen, but also in other countries facing 
similar problems. Major objectives of the research are presented below: 
Objective 1: to examme initial responses of the government and the earthquake-
affected communities, and the extent of their willingness to undertake the 
post-disaster relief work; 
Objective 2: to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the government's planning 
process, and to examine the compatibility of the reconstruction 
programme with respect to the severity of the situation faced by the 
victims; 
Objective 3: to analyse to what extent the objectives of the reconstruction programme 
were realised, and to identify the issues and constraints which inhibited 
or contributed to the efficient and effective implementation of the 
programme; 
Objective 4 : to ascertain the role of the earthquake-affected community in different 
phases of the reconstruction programme, with the intention to elaborate 
how community management can enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of such programmes; and 
Objective 5 : to propose recommendations to serve as guidelines for the development 
and implementation of future reconstruction programmes for Yemen in 
particular, and other countries facing similar problems in general. 
7.3 Common research strategies 
The purpose of choosing a research strategy, is to find a way for generating and testing 
a theory which could help in achieving the research objectives (J awahar, 1995). Four 
common strategies described by experts, such as Buckley (1976), are given in the 
following paragraphs. 
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7.3.1 Opinion research: When a researcher seeks the views, judgement and appraisals 
of other persons with regards to the research problem, he/she engages himself/herself 
in an opinion research. This approach is one of the most well known methods to study 
people's behaviour and responses about a certain problem. This approach requires 
learning the concerned people's views and observations through questionnaires and 
personal interviews (Fink and Kosekoff, 1985). 
7.3.2 Empirical research: This strategy requires that the researcher should observe 
and/or experience the things for himself, rather than mediation through others. Case-
studies, field observations and laboratory testing come under thi s category. 
A case-study can be defined as the in-depth study of a particular case under 
consideration, which will ultimately help in making assessments and drawing 
conclusions for other similar cases (Hamel et al, 1993). Intensive methods of field 
research, based on case-study, are of great value and importance in making certain 
conclusions. A case-study requires personal involvement of the researcher in finding 
out the real information from reliable sources and the n presenting them in the light of 
his research. The data collected by the case-study method is considered to be superior 
than the information gathered through bureaucratic and administrative sources (Blumer 
and Warwick, 1983). Many experts, such as Yin (1 993), are convinced that case-study 
research is an essential form of soc ial investigation. 
7 .3.3 Archival research: This approach involves examination of the recorded facts, 
such as original documents, files and recorded facts investigated and publi shed by some 
other researchers; 
7 .3.4 Analytical research: This research methodology relies on the use of internal 
logic on the part of the researcher. In this approach, the researcher has all the resources 
required for solving the problem at hi s/her disposal. No explicit reference or external 
data is necessary in this method. This strategy is not very commonly used because not 
many researchers can find all the resources needed for their research within themselves. 
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The present study has used two of the above described techniques, i.e. the opinion 
research and the empirical research techniques. 
The opinion strategy was used because the responses of the people, for whom the 
reconstruction programme was implemented, and on which the research focused, was 
vital for the study . The opinion of those who implemented the programme, was also 
of significant importance . 
The empirical technique was used as an additional tool of research, because the 
researcher stayed and worked on a United Nations project in the disaster-affected area, 
for three years ( 1992-1995). His long presence in the study area gave him an 
opportunity to conduct the field studies and laboratory tests in support of the research. 
7.4 Methodological framework 
The methodological framework provides a clear idea about what information is to be 
collected, how it will be analysed, and in what way it will be interpreted. Formulation 
of OYis becomes the step-by-step guideline for the individual research work. The 
clearer the OYis are the more comprehensive the research work is. The research study 
reported in this dissertation is based on insights into the issues under consideration, 
which are further examined through statistical analysis. 
The study objectives are already described in Section 7.2. The methodological 
framework to achieve these objectives comprises the following steps: 
a) formulating objective verifiable indicators (OYis); 
b) iden tifying data needs and sources; 
c) reviewing relevant literature; 
d) determining survey methodology and collec ting field data; 
e) processing field data and analysing it; 
f) interpreting results from analysis with reference to OYis; and 
g) drawing conclusions and making recommendations. 
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7.5 Objective verifiable indicators (OVIs) 
OVIs are very important to clearly identify the problem under investigation, why it is 
being investigated, how it will be investigated, and what will be achieved as a result of 
the investigation. 
7.5.1 OVIs for objective 1: The 1982 earthquake came suddenly. Literature review, 
and later field studies indicated that neither the government nor the people had much 
idea about hazard. After the earthquake, both the government and the victims reacted 
on their own. The responses are studied under the following OVIs: 
a) nature of the government's temporary arrangements (emergency help) ; 
b) time taken in providing the. emergency help; 
c) coverage of victims by the emergency help; 
d) impact of the emergency help on victims; 
e) earthquake-affected community's immediate response; 
f) time taken in victims' immediate response; and 
g) coverage of victims by their immediate response. 
7.5.2 OVIs for objective 2: The review of efficiency and effectiveness of the 
reconstruction programme required evaluation and analysis of the following OVIs: 
a) cost of the infrastructure built during the reconstruction programme; 
b) delivery time of the infrastructure; 
c) affordability of housing for the victims; 
d) earthquake-resistance of the infrastructure; 
e) extent of utilisation of the infrastructure; 
f) acceptability of the infrastructure; and 
g) exte nt of coverage of the victims by the reconstruction programme. 
7 .5 .3 OYis for objective 3 The main objectives of the reconstruction programme, as 
seen during literat ure review and discussed with the Yemeni colleague engineers, were 
to provide earthquake-resistant housing and other infrastructure to cover the entire 
earthquake-affected population. It was intended that the reconstructed infrastructure 
should be available to the people in the shortest possible time, it should be fully 
accep table and affordable for future construction and that it should be fu ll y utilised. 
201 
Chapter Seven 
In order to confirm how far these objectives were achieved, it was considered necessary 
to conduct a social, as well as a technical evaluation of the reconstruction programme. 
The OVIs for the two types of investigation are given below under separate titles: 
7 .5.3.1 Social evaluation: 
a) coverage of the earthquake victims; 
b) full utilisation of the infrastructure built in the reconstruction programme; 
c) satisfaction with the reconstruction programme; 
d) constraint in implementing the programme; 
e) institutional deficiencies; 
f) working conditions for the field staff; 
g) political interference; 
h) donor preferences; 
i) local contractors, lack of experience; and 
f) lack of the community's appreciation of the reconstruction programme. 
7.5.3.2 Technical evaluation: 
a) dimensions of various rooms in the house; 
b) location of different rooms; 
c) general condition of the house; 
d) materials used in construction; 
e) ground (safety) conditions against earthquakes; 
f) load bearing capacity; 
g) materials used in foundation; 
h) location of tie beams; 
i) materials used in super structure; 
j) materials used in roof structure; 
k) protection measures against roof leakages; 
I) protection measures for foundation; and 
m) laboratory test results. 
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7.5.4 OVIs for objective 4: In order to review the earthquake-affected community's 
role in the short-term measures (immediate relief) and long-term measures 
(reconstruction programme), it was considered necessary to test the following OVIs: 
a) initial responses of the government ; 
b) initial responses of the community; 
c) level of community involvement in location of the infrastructure; 
d) level of community involvement in design of the infrastructure; and 
e) level of community involvement in construction. 
Figure 9.1 presents the study objectives and the OVIs in a diagrammatic form. 
7.5.5 Basis for conclusions and recommendations: The inferences derived from the 
evaluation and analysis under rhe above OVIs, led to draw cerrain conclusions. The 
recommendations based on these conclusions are presented in Chapter 11. 
7.6 Identification of data needs and sources 
The study of development and reconstruction problems, in earthquake zones, 
emphasised the need for gathering information from various sources. The required data 
included information about earthquakes, recorded events of significant importance in 
various parts of the world, their probability and preparatory measures considered against 
them. This information was gathered through the following sources. 
7 .6. 1 Literature review: The following sources were used for the literature review: 
a) study of relevant technical books through personal purchase or on loan from the 
Pilkington Library and WEDC Resource Centre, both at the Loughborough 
University of Technology. Some essential material, not available at these 
sources, was arranged by them from other libraries in the UK; 
b) visit to well known sources of information, such as the Oxford Centre for 
Disaster Studies (OCDS), the Martin Centre for Architecture and Urban Studies 
(MCAUS), the Imperial College, University of London, the Overseas 
Development Institute, London (IDA), the Development Planning Unit, London 
(DPU), and different United Nations offices and the World Bank office in 
Yemen. These visits were made in order to hold discussions with experts on 
various topics covered in this research and to collect study material; 
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c) study of various technical conference papers, journals and periodicals on the 
subject available at the above sources, Sana 'a University, UN and the World 
Bank offices in Yemen and Pakistan, and the Geological Survey of Pakistan ; 
d) study of news bulletins published by various specialised agencies, such as 
UN/DHA; WHO, UNICEF, UN/HABITAT-OHS, UN/AEC, UNICEF, UNIDO, 
etc; 
e) review of the record avai lable at the governme nt mini stries and other offices in 
Yeme n, such as the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Urban Planning, 
the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Planning and 
Development, the Executive Office of SCREAA Dhamar, and the Seismological 
Observatory Centre Dhamar; 
f) study of the literature published by various international and bilateral agencies 
and NGOs, who were involved in the reconstruction programme, such as UNDP, 
UNCDF, UNICEF and Dutch-Aid, and NGOs such as OXFAM; 
g) carrying out computer searches via the Pilkington Library at Loughborough 
University, OCDS, MCAUS, IDA, DPU, and the Imperial College, London to 
locate any relevant material for the research; and 
h) undertaking discuss ions or correspondence with different experts in the re lated 
fields. The names of some of these experts and their fields of expertise are 
given below: 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
Disaster management 
Earthquakes and seismic studies 
Geology 
Reconstruction 
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Or Ian Davis (OCDS), Or Andrew 
Coburn (MCAUS), Mr Robin 
Spence (MCAUS), and Or Anand 
Arya of the Building Material and 
Technology Promotion Council 
(BMTPC), India; 
Mr Mazin Salim (UNDP) and Mr 
Jamal Shu 'lan of the Seismological 
Observatory Centre (SOC), Yemen; 
Mr Osman Thabit (SOC) and Mr 
Najeeb Husain (SOC); 
Or Ian Davis (OCDS), Or Anand 
Arya (BMTPC), Or Andrew 
v) Statistics 
vi) Architecture 
vii) Structural engineering 
viii) Low-cost housing 
ix) Sociology 
x) Economics 
xi) Demography 
xi i) Community management 
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Cobum (MCAUS), and Mr Robin 
Spence (MCAUS); 
Mr L Jawahar Nesan of the 
Wolverhampton University (WT) 
and Dr J R Cal vert of the 
Loughborough University of 
Technology (LUT); 
Dr Ian Davis (OCDS), Dr Anand 
Arya (BMTPC), Dr Andrew 
Coburn (MCAUS), Mr Robin 
Spence (MCAUS), and Mr Kamal 
Turki of the Ministry of 
Construction (MOC), Yemen; 
Mr Mike Smith (LUT), Dr Simon 
Austin (LUT) and Dr John Dickens 
(LUT); 
Mr Richard Neale (LUT), and Mr 
Paul Sutmuller and Mr Cor 
Dijkgraaf (DHV Consultants, 
Amersfoort, Holland); 
Dr Jo Beall of the Imperial 
College, London (ICL), Dr 
Muhammad Aslam (UNDP) and 
Ms Maliha Husain (EDC 
Consul tants, Islamabad, Pakistan); 
Dr Tariq Husain (EDC) and Or M 
A Farooqi (UNHCR); 
Mr Mohammad Afzal of the 
Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics (PIDE) and Dr 
Mohammad Rafiq (UNDTCD); 
Dr Richard Franceys (LUT), Dr 
Andrew Cotton (LUT), Ms Joy 
~---------------------------------------------- --- ---
xii\) Low-cost infrastructure 
xi\1) Social and technical surveys 
x v) Earrhquake-resisrant designs 
xvi) Soil mechanics 
xvii) Computer software 
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Morgan (WEOC consultant) and Or 
Jo Beall (ICL); 
Dr Richard Franceys (LUT), Dr 
Andrew C'Jtton (LUT) and Dr 
Andrew Coburn (MCAUS); 
Dr Richard Franceys (LUT), Or 
Muhammad Aslam (UNOP), Mr 
Mohammed Omar (MOC) and Mr 
Max Hunt (LUT); 
Mr Robin Spence (MCAUS), Mr 
Khalid Hazza'a (MOC) and Mr 
Abdul Ghafoor (MOC); 
Mr Abdulhabib Alwan (MOC) and 
Mr Geza Yastagh (UN/FAO); and 
Mr L Jawahar Nesan (WU), Mr 
Max Hunt (LUn and Mr Yahaya 
Al-Ansi (SOC). 
7.6.2 Social surveys: Much of the data and information required to satisfy the 
research objectives are qualitative in nature as they are required to determine the 
behaviourial responses of the affected communities as well as of the government 
functionaries towards the reconstruction programme. To this effect, a detailed social 
survey was carried out in the disaster affected areas to collect information through 
personal interviews with the following sources: 
a) different sections of the earthquake-affected community; the survey covered all 
categories of the survivors since many of them benefitted from the emergency 
relief works and the reconstruction programme but quite an appreciable number 
did not benefit from either programme; and 
b) government engineers and other supervisory staff who worked with SCREAA 
and participated in the reconstruction programme. 
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7 .6.3 Technical evaluation: Another source of information, regarding safety of the 
buildings, was to make tec hnical measurements of various houses and other 
infrastructure in the disaster affected area. This was done on selected samples 
representing all categories of houses and other infrastructure available in the project 
area. 
7 .6.4 Personal observations: Personal observations of the researcher, who lived among 
the affected communities in the disaster-affected area for three years, and the 
respondents' observations helped in screening and verifying the data collected through 
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the above sources. This approach required the researcher to learn the Arabic language, 
because this is the only language spoken and understood in rural Yemen. 
7.6.5 Survey methodology and data collection: As discussed earlier, the Dhamar 
governorate has a very conservative society with a low literacy rate. In the rural areas 
of the governorate only a few men can read and write. The female literacy rate is less 
than 5%. Collection of unbiased data was not easy under these circumstances. It was 
therefore not possible to collect most of the information in numbers, which could have 
been used for quantitative research. As a consequence of this limitation, the survey 
questionnaires had to be s imple enough so the respondents could answer easily and with 
little risk of providing any incorrect information. As most of the data was to be based 
on the participan t observation and unstructured in-depth interviews, emphasis was laid 
on such in formation which could later be used for qualitative research. 
7.6.5.1 Preliminaries: Qualitative research is mainly identified wi th participant 
observation whic h entails sustained and in-depth study by the researcher of the subject 
communities, organisations or whatever. Qualitative research can also be defined as an 
approach to the study of social world which seeks to describe and analyse the culture 
and behaviour of human beings individually or collectively from the point of view of 
those being studied (Bryman, 1988). Participant observation, however , is not the only 
method of data collection in this approach. Unstruc tured interviews , in which the 
interviewer gives minimal guidance to the respondents, is a more popular technique. 
Qualitative research refers to peoples ' behaviour, their beliefs, social attitudes and 
organisational functions, etc (S trauss and Corbin , 1990). 
Social surveys are an impon anr means ro collect information from people about their 
ideas, fee lings, beliefs, social, cultural, financial and educational background (Fink and 
Kosecoff, 1985). These surveys, however, require different sampling techniques 
according to different c ircumstances and needs for which the surveys are being 
conducted suc h as: 
a) how wide a coverage is req uired? 
b) what type of responden ts will be available? and 
c) will the selected group of respondents be representative of the community? 
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The answers to such questions provide a clue to the researcher to decide about a 
sampling design (Twumasi, 1986). 
There are two types of sampling techniques as follows : 
a) probability sampling; and 
b) non-probability sampling. 
In probability sampling each and every unit within the population to be surveyed is 
given an equal chance to be selected. The area under study is marked and a map is 
prepared. The number of houses in this mapped area are counted which is followed by 
detennining the selection criteri a for sampling. The larger the sample the better the 
chances for accuracy of infonnation, but important factors, such as time, energy, 
number of surveyors available and cost help determine the sample size. Some 
commonly used probability sampl ing techniques are as mentioned below: 
a) simple random sampling; 
b) stratified sampling; 
c) systematic sampling; and 
d) cluster sampling (Fink and Kosecoff, 1985). 
In non-probability sampling the researcher has a freer hand and he decides to take what 
he considers as the representative unit of the population. There are three major types 
of non-probability sampling techniques as follows (Twumasi, 1986): 
a) accidental sampling; 
b) purposive sampling; and 
c) quota sampling. 
Surveys can be in the fonn of questionnaires to be directly filled in by the respondents. 
This method is applicable in societies having a high literacy rate. rn contrast, Yemen 
has a low literacy rate (18% ), thus suggesting the need for personal interviews using 
a simple questionnaire. Lack of time and resources, problems in finding technically 
qualified and experienced surveyors, remoteness of the project area, and difficult 
working conditions forced the researcher to adopt a purposive sampling technique. 
However an effort was made to represent rhe broader characteristics of the respondents 
by selecting them from all walks of life and sexes. 
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In view of the fact that local language is Arabic and only about 1% of the population 
understood English, questions were kept simple and straight-forward in order to ensure 
legitimacy of respondents' answers. 
7.6.5.2 Sample selection: Respondents of the social and technical surveys represented 
the four categories. A total of seven questionnaires were designed eo cover all 
categories of respondents (Annex I). The general categories of these respondents are 
described below: 
a) the earthquake victims, some of whom benefitted from the government 
implemented reconstruction programme; 
b) the sheikhs (tribal leaders) representing the affected communities; 
c) government officials who participated in the reconstruction programme; and 
d) observations of surveyors who conducted the surveys. 
a) The earthquake victims: The victims of the 1982 earthquake in Dhamar can 
be classified into the following four major groups: 
i) those whose houses were fully damaged and they were the beneficiaries of the 
turnkey housing programme. For convenience, these respondents are referred 
to as the Turnkey category in the following chapters; 
ii) those whose houses were fully damaged and they were the beneficiaries of the 
self-help housing programme. These respondents are referred to as the Self-help 
category in the next chapters; 
iii) those whose houses were partly damaged and they benefitted from the repair 
programme. The repair programme was implemented for the traditional houses 
which were originally located, designed and constructed by their owners. 
Besides asking their views about the repair programme, these respondents were 
also interviewed in detail about their traditional houses . For convenience this 
category of respondents is referred to as the Traditional category in the 
following chapters; and 
iv) Those whose houses suffered collapse, or repairable damage, bur they did nor 
benefit from any of the above programmes and had to rely on themselves for 
shelter. 
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All these four categories had different experiences and views about the reconstruction 
programme. Their problems were also different. Therefore, separate questionnaires 
were designed for each category to determine their response to the reconstruction 
programme. Complete questionndres for each group of the respondents are placed in 
Annex 1 of this thesis and marked 1-A, 1-B, 1-C and 1-D. Personal views of the 
respondents about preparatory measures for protection against earthquakes, immediate 
relief measures after the earthquake, the reconstruction programme, their confidence in 
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the safety of the new or repaired infrastructure, their trust in traditional leadership and 
government agencies, etc. were important elements of the inte rviews and social survey. 
Special provisions were made in the questionnaires to cross-check participants' 
observations. 
For categories (i) and (ii), ten well-dispersed settlements each were selected. From each 
village, four respondents representing different walks of life and different sexes were 
selected for detailed interviews. In total , 160 respondents were interviewed with equal 
distribution among all categories. An effort was made to select sample units well -
dispersed in the Dhamar governorate to give a reasonable representation of the entire 
governorate. Since the repair programme was confined to only Dhamar town, all 
respondents under this category were selected from different parts of the town. The 
respondents from the non-beneficiary category were selected from the different areas 
representing the above three categories of respondents. A map showing the villages, 
where the surveys were conducted, is placed at Annex 2. 
b) Sheikhs of the affected communities: Village heads, known as sheikhs, are the 
traditional leaders of villages. The sheikhs have traditional, and in some cases official 
responsibilities, to take up local problems and demands with the government. They are 
well informed about the problems in their respective areas and about their solutions, 
because they serve as an impon ant link between the people and the government. It is 
also considered unconventional and unethical to collect information from the people in 
a village, without the knowledge of the sheikh. A surveyor may be regarded with as 
an intruder, if he or she tries to conduct social surveys and interviews without the 
knowledge and blessings of the sheikh. The sheikhs of the affected communities were 
interviewed to obtain an overview of the disaster effects and reconstruction programme 
in their respective villages. This was acheived by using a separate questionnaire. In 
total , 20 sheikhs were interviewed. This questionnaire is marked 2 (Annex 1 ). The list 
of the interviewed community sheikhs is given in Annex 3. 
c) Government officials: Government engineers and other officials who 
participated in the reconstruction programme had their own views about the 
implementation of the reconstruction programme. These views were considered very 
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important to know the institutional problems linked with the reconstruction programme. 
Their impressions about the reconstruction programme were recorded using a detailed 
questionnaire, marked 3 (Annex 1). About 50 Engineers and some other technical staff, 
such as geologists, architects and various technicians, worked under the SCREAA office 
in Dhamar during the reconstruction programme. SCREAA was dissolved in 1992 and 
the engineers and other staff were transferred to different government ministries. 
Fortunately most of the engineers who held responsible positions during the 
reconstruction phase, particularly those involved in the implementation of the Turnkey, 
Self-help and Repair programmes were still present and available for interviews. The 
results reponed in thi s study are based on interviews with 20 offic ials comprising of 12 
engineers, 3 geologists, 2 architects and 3 technical supervisors (Annex 4). 
The social survey data compiled as a result of these interviews, (the victims, sheikhs 
and governme nt officials) is given in Annex 5. 
d) Surveyors' observations: The researcher, who lived in the study area for three 
years and his three surveyors, who had lived and worked in the disas ter affected area 
since 1982, and all of them participated in the reconstruction programme, also made 
their own observations. These observations were considered important. A separate 
questionnaire was prepared for the surveyors to record their views of the infrastructure 
they visited. This questionnaire is marked 4 and also part of Annex 1. The surveyors' 
technical observations were based on field measurements carried out at 40 different sites 
selected for the study, including the town of Dhamar. This information is presented in 
Annex 6. 
7.6.5.3 Interview procedure: Before starting the actual data collection effort, all 
ques tionnaires were extensively pretested in the field, and necessary adjustments were 
made to enhance the clarity of the questionnaires. Actual field surveys were started in 
April 1994, but were interrupted by the civil war in Yemen from May to July. The 
researcher and his surveyors continued to work at the beginning of the war, but a stage 
came in the month of April 1994 when there was risk to life and the researcher was 
evacuated from the country by his employer, the United Nations. The researcher 
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returned to Yemen in July 1994. It took three months' extensive field work to complete 
the remaining field work. 
Figure 7.1: The researcher and the field surveyors wi th some of the respondents 
Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
The researcher selected and trained three surveyors to carry out the social and technical 
surveys. All these surveyors were Yemenis and of rural origin with technical 
background and some past experience in social surveys. Their simple life style and 
homogeneity with the local population was very convenient in gaining the confidence 
of the respondents. These surveyors were trained together and each questionnaire was 
discussed in detail during the traini ng essions. The surveyors were specially trained 
to remain objective during the interview sessions, in order to allow the respondents to 
express their opinions without bias. 
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The roads in the study area are very rough. Most of the target villages were found to 
be almost inaccessible without a four-wheel drive vehicle. Driving in these areas 
became more hazardous after sunset. The researcher accompanied the surveyors in 
most of their field visits and closely supervised and monitored the interviews (Figure 
7.1 ). The researcher's personal knowledge of the Arabic language, with the local accent 
proved to be very useful in the interviewing sessions. This helped him in not only 
conducting a number of interviews of the victims by himself, but also in monitoring 
other interviews conducted by the surveyors, to ensure that unbiased information was 
being recorded. 
The government engineers and other concerned officials were entirely interviewed by 
the researcher himself. 
7.6.5.4 Timing of inrerviews: The best time to hold individual interviews is 
morning, that is , before midday when the people are in their farms or shops or doing 
some other business. After midday, the afternoon prayer is immediately followed by 
luncheon. A long qat chewing session stans soon after luncheon and lasts until sunset 
or sometimes even later. Ir is almost impossible to speak to someone individually 
during the qat chewing period. During the qat session, most Yemenis, particularly those 
in the rural areas, are in a very light mood and do not give full attention to questions. 
They also try to exaggerate the answers. Afternoon time for field surveys is also not 
the best for surveyors if they are Yemenis. In view of the above limitations, all 
interviews were conducted in the morning hours. 
7.6.5.5 GeneraL considerations: Yemeni society, particularly in the northern part of 
the country, is very con ervative. The rural population is even more tradition oriented. 
For this reason special care was taken nor to ask any question which could have 
slightest conflic t with their local customs, traditions or religious beliefs. 
The questionnaires were prepared keeping in mind all members of the society and 
representing different walks of life and sexes. 
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Yemeni people are generally good natured but at the same time very curious. All male 
members of the village including small children, present at the time of the visits of the 
surveyors, always tried to answer the questions unanimously. Selecting the respondents 
and interviewing them separately was therefore was another challenge. 
7.6.5.6 Interviews of women respondents: Interviewing women, who are seldom 
exposed to any other environment besides their homes and family farms, was yet 
another challenge. It was most difficult to keep the male members from feeding 
answers to the female respondents. The researcher and his surveyors found some 
elderly women, some working women and some girl students from the beneficiary 
villages to participate in the interviews wi th the consent of their male relatives. This 
was possible only because of the confidence and good social contact established with 
the local community. 
7.6.6 Difficulties in data collec tion: Poverty , frequen t droughts , high unemployment, 
low literacy and the prolonged tussle between the northern and southern parts of Yemen 
had badly affected the socio-economic structure of the Yemeni society during the time 
of this study. The law and order situation was going from bad to worse. Highway 
robberies, car snatching and abduction of foreigners at gun-point for ransom had 
become common features. Many people in Yemen believed that the military were 
behind such crimes. The researcher also faced some of these problems in the p ursuit 
of his research and lost a new 4x4 vehicle at gun-point. T he vehicle could never be 
recovered. The civil war of 1994 proved to be another deterrent which has already 
been discussed earlier in thi s chapter. 
7.6.7 Data processmg and analysis: There is no standard analytical procedure to 
formulate and evaluate options for the development and reconstruction work in low-
income countrie s. The procedure has to be adjusted according to local conditions, 
depending upon the nature of the prob lem to be addressed and the type of data 
available. Analysing data from the surveys involves tallying and averaging responses, 
looking at their relationships and comparing them (Fink and Kosecoff, 1985). 
Data analysis was performed by comparmg the information collected through 
interviews, participant observation, inspection of records and field testing. In this 
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context, the first step, the data collected through field surveys was examined for its 
consistency and validity. This involved a thorough checking and editing of all 
questionnaires. The next step involved tabulating the collected information in order to 
separate the research data into its constituent parts. Finally, OVIs were derived and 
analysed in terms of percentages and absolute numbers. The results obtained were 
compared with the existing avail able information. These results are discussed in detail 
in the next two chapters. 
Summary 
Research design is key to a researc h study. Experts have described different and useful 
guidelines for the collection of information. But it is the researcher who prepares the 
research design to suit his study. Care is taken that while no relevant information is 
left out, at the same time, no irrelevant information is included. The choice of 
qualitative or quantitative researc h de pends on the type of research rather than the 
researcher 's preference. The hypothesis, objectives and OVIs need to be constantl y 
cons idered while preparing the questionnaires. The quality of questionnaires influe nces 
the a nalysis of data. Social and tec hnical surveys in low- income countries offer several 
difficulties and challenges. Personal involvement, dedication and foresight of the 
researcher are imporran t tools in collecting the information which ultimate ly provides 
the basis for testing the hypothes is, drawing conclusions and making recommendations. 
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PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE FIELD DATA 
"/ nteractual communication is fairly easy when it is cognitive or based on what we 
know, but experimental communication is nearly impossible because it is based on what 
we feel .. . " (Porter Samoven, 1976) 
The 1982 earthquake disaster in Yemen and the following short-term and long-term 
measures to rehabilitate the surviving communities after the disaster, presented an 
interesting case for derailed study. The objectives and the methodological framework 
of the study have already been described in derail in Chapter 7. These objectives called 
for comprehensive field surveys in the disaster-affected areas and evaluation and 
analysis of the data collected. 
In pursuance of the need for field data for the study objectives, sufficient information 
from different categories of respondents was collected through interviews, by using 
derailed questionnaires. The discussions in this chapter are no more than preliminary 
evaluation of the field data, in the order of the field survey questionnaires and do not 
necessarily follow the sequential orde r of the study objectives. Data processing, 
statistical analy is and discussions with res pect eo the OVIs, is presented in Chapter 9 
in the order of the objectives given in Chapter 7. 
8.1 Socio-economic features of the earthquake victims 
All respondents from the earthquake victims were those who had themselves 
experienced the 1982 earthquake disaster, and the following shon-term relief and long-
term reconstruction programmes. These respondents represented different age groups, 
sexes, professions, education levels and financial status. Their socio-economic features 
are provided in Table 8. 1. 
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Table 8.1: Socio-economic features of the respondents 
Typo of Total Av& LiJ<:ncy level ('l'o) <kalpoOOn ('l'o) Averqe .,...~ ;,.,.,.,. (Ycmctli Riya.lo) Hih 
bcncfi· no of .,~in •iz<: 
ciarics 
'""""' 
yrs 0 1 2 3 4 GS PS HW A.._ ""'~ no. per 
blbold Hl Ml Ll 
TK 40 46 38 30 ll 10 0 ll 75 3 !17,875 17% 40'l', 43% 9 
su 40 42 29 24 26 19 2 38 55 7 97,643 7% :2.8% 6S'l'o 8 
RP 40 41 24 24 TT l7 8 41 56 3 111.000 IO'l'o 29% 61% 6 
NB 40 40 .. 15 21 15 5 24 71 5 99.634 7% 3~ 61% 8 
160 42 l4 23 24 15 4 31 64 s !06,538 !OS ns SS'l'o 8 
Source: Field surveys, 1994. 
Respondents' categories: 
Education levels: 
Occupation: 
Income groups: 
Note: 
TK: Turnkey; SH: Self-he lp; RP: Repair programme; 
NB: Non-beneficiaries 
0: Illiterate; I: Primary; 2: Middle; 3: Secondary; and 
4: Above secondary. 
GS: Government sector; PS : Private sector (mostly 
farming); and HW: Housewife. 
LI: Low income (up to YR 100,000 per annum) 
MI: Middle income (YR 100,001 -200,000 per annum) 
HI: High income (YR 200,001 and above per annum) 
The above income levels are based on the prevalent market rates m 1994, and the 
individuals ' capacities to meet their basic needs. 
According to the information available from field and presented in the Table 8. 1, the 
average age of the respondents was estimated to be about 42 years. There was not 
much variation in the age groups of the respondents from different categories. The field 
survey results are quite consistent with those of the last census, in which the average 
age in Dhamar Governorate was reported to be about 46 years (MPD, 1991). 
Literacy among the respondents was found to be higher than the overall literacy level 
in the govemorare, probably due to the fact that 25% of the respondents were from 
Dhamar town where the literacy rate is more than in the villages. Secondly, many 
respondents, who could only read and recite the Mus lim holy book the Qur'an, claimed 
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to have attended pnmary school. Thirdly, the low literacy among women which 
drastically affects overall literacy figures in the governorate, were not many among the 
respondents for reasons of conservatism. Fourthly, most of the socio-economic data in 
the existing literature available from the government was projected from the 1986 
census figures, but development in certain sectors, such as education, is generally 
believed to be more than the projections. The survey figures showed that 57% of the 
respondents were illiterate or had little education. Another 39% of the respondents had 
an education level of middle to secondary school. The remaining 4% had studied 
further beyond secondary school. The literacy rate was paniculary low for the 
respondents representing the turnkey and the non-beneficiary categories. The general 
tendency observed in the governorate was that most people preferred to use their 
children in he lping the family in farming, fetching water for domestic use, collecting 
fuel wood or shepherding domestic animals, instead of sending them to schools. 
The survey data indicated that about 64% of the respondents were working for the 
private sector (mainly agriculture farming), followed by 31 % in the government sector 
and 5% as housewives. Some women respondents were also found in the government 
and private sectors, and a few were students. The government sta tistics indicated that 
about 70 % of the people of Dhamar were engaged in agricu ltural farming or affiliated 
activities. The main reason for the low survey figures was perhaps that the surveys of 
beneficiaries of the traditional housing repair programme were conducted within the 
Dhamar municipal limits, the only place where this programme was implemented. 
Dhamar town has a higher number of people working in the public sector. This was 
probably the reason why a slightly higher number of the respondents turned out to be 
government servants. It was not easy ro interview women in a conservative Yemeni 
society and to get their independent views. Male relatives stayed around and tended 
to feed information to the women. The percentage of female respondents might have 
been more if at least one of the surveyors was also a woman. 
The average annual income of the respondents was estimated to range between a 
minimum of YR 99,634 per household (or YR 12,454 per capita) for the respondents 
from the Non-beneficiary category , to a maximum of YR 117,875 per household (or YR 
13,097 per capica) for the respondents representing the turnkey category. These figures 
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were slightly above the government statistics quoted in the literature review, probably 
due to the reason that income figures had lately shown an upward trend in the recent 
past and particularly after the civil war of 1994. The average annual income for the 
entire sample was YR 106,538. This is slightly higher than the GNP and was possibly 
due to the high inflation in the country and did not necessarily mean a better economic 
situation . In actual fact the purchasing capacity of a common consumer was much 
reduced. Given the current economic conditions and continuously rising price levels, 
the following classification could tentatively be used to represent different income 
groups among the victims: 
a) low-income < YR 100,000; 
b) middle-income YR 100,001 to YR 200.000; and 
c) high-income > YR 200,001 . 
Based on this classification, 58% of the respondents represented the low-income 
category, 32% the middle-income category, and I 0% high-income category. Several 
fac tors, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, had driven the people to below the poverty 
line. The people in low-income bracket were found to be suffering more, since 30% 
to 50 % of their income was consumed by chewing qat and smoking. The 1994 civil 
war in the country had caused a further blow to the country's economy causing 
spiralling inflation and unemployment. 
The average household s ize in the study area was found to be 8 persons, which was 
close to the official figure of 7 persons. There was no systematic trend or pattern 
showing relationship between household size and income level. 
8.2 Initial responses 
The initial responses of the government and the earthquake victims, and the materials 
used in providing temporary shelter, ere are summarised in Tables 8.2 a nd 8.3. 
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Table 8.2: Extent of damage to existing houses and survivors's response 
House condition after Survivors' initial responses 
Survivors earthquake 
category 
Helped by Awaited Spent Used 
Total Part self/ government money labour 
damage damage community help 
Turnkey 90% 10% 98% 2% - -
Self-help 98% 2% 95% 5% - -
Repair 7% 93% 95% 5% - -
Non- 80% 20% 100% 0% - -
beneficiary 
Source: Field surveys, 1994. 
8.2.1 Earthquake victims' response: About 80% of the total respondents i n the study 
area reported that their houses were tOtally damaged as a result of the earthquake. 
Almost all of them moved out of their houses after the first shock, to save their lives 
and a few items of value. Even in cases where the houses were not totally damaged, 
they moved to open fields and made temporary shelters in the wake of the government 's 
emergency help. 
8.2.2 Materials used for tem porary shelters: The survivors mostly used blankets, 
wooden poles and materials recovered from the debris of their damaged houses in 
making the ir temporary shelters. The government 's emergertcy help consisted of tents 
and blankets. The earthquake-affected people did not hire any ski lled or unskilled 
labour in making the temporary shelters. 
8.2.3 Source and nature of emergency help: About 97.5% of the victim s had alread y 
made their temporary shelter arrangements of some kind, before the arrivaJ of the 
government 's emergency help. Only a small percentage, 2.5%, waited for the 
government 's he lp after the disaster. Relatives and friends of the victims living outside 
the disaster area, also temporarily sheltered some of the victims, or helped them in 
making their temporary shelters. 
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The emergency help from the government invariably consisted of tents and blankets. 
These items were initially supplied by the armed forces, but later many neighbouring 
countries also sent in their help. The food comprised of dry milk, cereals, cooking oil 
and sugar. The government also supplied first-aid facilities to a few villages. Water 
was supplied by water tankers provided the local UN offices. No arrangements were 
made for sanitation. Food and medicines were also provided by donors. 
Table 8.3: Initial responses 
Objectives Victim • s responses 
verifiable 
indicators TK Sl l RP (\fB Sheikhs Govt 
a) Nature o f Shelter, S hcher. Shelter, Shelter, Liaison Shelter, 
temporary food food food food community/ food, first-
arrangement government aid 
b) Materials usC<l Blankets/ Blankets, [31ankets , Blankets, Used own Tents, 
fo r temporary debris debris debris debri s, means to blankets 
arrangements wood, 7jnc wood, 7.inc disseminate 
information 
c) Source and Self/ Self/ Self/ Self/ Government/ Mostly 
nature of community community community community community donors 
emergency 
assistance 
d) Time taken in [m mediate fmmcdiate Immediate Immediate lmmediate 7 to 30 
providing days or 
emergency help more 
c) Coverage of 98% 95% 95% 100% 65% 
re lief operations 
f) Criterion for I ) 70% 1) 85% I) 80% -
- -
providing relief 2} 20% 2) 15% 2) 20% 
operations 3) 10% 3) 0% 3) 20% 
Source: F ield surveys, t994. 
l . Nature of damage to the infrastructure; 
2. Social and political infl uence; and 
3. Donors' preference. 
8.2.4 Time taken in providing emergency help: The response from aU the victims' 
categories agreed that the government 's emergency help started reaching some of them 
after a week. The emergency help took more time in the case of re mote areas, which 
was 4 weeks o r more in some cases. Emergency help to the victims located in remote 
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villages was also inadequate in many cases, because by the time the government teams 
reached there, the available relief materials were nearly finished because of 
mismanagement. 
The sheikhs provided liaison between their victims and the government and helped the 
surveyors in preparing lists of the victims and the extent of damage in their respective 
areas. The government respondents however considered these lists and the damage 
estimates to be inaccurate and said it was one of the main reasons for the low coverage 
of the victims with the emergency help and the long-tenn reconstruction programme. 
8.2.5 Coverage of emergencv help: The victims ' coverage by the government in 
providing relief measures, including temporary shelters was 65%. The remaining 35% 
did not receive any assistance from the government or any other source. They had to 
rely on their own temporary arrangements. Quite a large number of such victims, who 
could neirher benefit from rhe emergency help nor the reconstruction programme, can 
still be seen living in their vulnerable make-shift shelters in some of the villages. 
8.2.6 Criterion for providing emergency help: The criterion for providing emergency 
help in most cases (60% to 85%) was based on the extent of damage caused to houses. 
There was, however, one problem with this cri terion which was more seriously felt 
during the reconsrruction phase. As discussed before, traditional Yemeni buildings are 
multi-storeyed in which many families live together under the extended family system. 
These fami lies usually consist of the older parents, their children and the grand children. 
ln the emergency help however only one small tent was considered enough for all 
people living in the entire bu ilding. This crea ted difficulties and while only a few 
members of the family could benefit from the emergency shelters, the rest had to cater 
for their shelter needs on their ow n. 
According to the vicrims, political and social influences also played their parr to an 
appreciable extent ( 15% to 20%) in the provision of the emergency help . The villages 
with stronger political connections had a better say in obtaining emergency relief for 
their people. In contrast, the survivors having less political influence received 
inadequate and belated emergency help. Some donors, mostly oil-rich Arab neighbours, 
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were said to have dictated their tenns in choosing the areas for emergency help. They 
preferred the areas alongside the main roads, which were easily accessible and where 
the visitors and passers by could admire the assistance provided by such concerned 
countries. The percentage of such cases is between 10% and 20%. 
In general, the survivors of the earthquake disaster in Yemen responded faster, better 
and much more economically to meet their emergency shelter needs. The government 
also mobilised available resources to provide the emergency assistance but it was late 
and inadequate. The socio-political factors played an important role in prioritising 
assistance to favourable segments of the surviving community. 
8.3 Preparedness 
Discussions with the government respondenrs and field observations revealed that there 
was none or little preparedness against the hazard, at the government's level or the 
community' s level, before or after the eanhquake. The Table 8.4 and the following 
paragraphs take a look at this aspect. 
Table 8.4: Preparedness against a future disaster 
Existence Safety codes Resources Resources available in future 
Preparedness of in bylaws to allocated for disaster 
earthquake minimise relief 
warning losses operations Government Average 
system household 
Before 1982 No No No None Small 
earthquake 
After 1982 0 No No None Small 
earthquake 
Source: Field surveys, 1994. 
8.3.1 Existence of earthquake warning system: All government respondems confirmed 
that there was no hazard monitoring system in the country prior to the earthquake of 
!982. Although some seismic observatories had been established after the earthquake, 
but there were no building controls in ex istence. A small percentage (5%) of these 
221 
--------- - - ---- · 
Chapter Eight 
respondent revealed that concerns about the vulnerability of traditional buildings were 
expressed by some engineers before the earthquake, but no serious attention was paid 
by the relevant authorities. 
There was no code of safety in the country's building by-laws for resistance against 
earthquakes prior to the 1982 disaster. There was still no building code, after the 
earthquake, although the Sana 'a University has raised its voice on the matter. 
About 35% of government engineers believed that the Yemeni people were conservative 
and tradition-oriented, and they would probably not give up their traditional style of 
building construction even if a safety code was introduced. A large number of 
respondents (40%) were of the opinion that the frequency of even moderate earthquakes 
was low in Yemen and the need for earthquake designs was not serious. About 25% 
of the respondents were of the opinion that the introduction of earthquake resistant 
designs would raise the construction cost signi ficantly, implying serious concerns about 
the economic affordability of this technology. 
8.3.2 General steps taken ro minimise losses during earthquakes: Most of the 
government respondents agreed that the government had not made any arrangements to 
minimise suffering and losses in the case of a future disaster. Should such a 
catastrophe occur, the country will have to rely heavily on fore ign assistance. The 
community itself was also nor prepared. The majority of the people in the study area 
were poor. Their meagre resources hardly allowed them to prepare for an earthquake 
emergency in advance. More seriously, they did not believe in preparedness against the 
earthquakes. A number of earthq uake victims, when questioned about the safety of 
their houses, said that earthquakes come under Allah's will and only the next 
earthquake could determine whether their houses were safe or vu lnerable. 
8.3.3 Resources allocated for emergency rel ief operations: Nearly all government 
respondents said that the governme nr had nor eannarked or allocated any special 
resources in the current development plan ro meet emergency assistance needs arising 
from a future disaster. This was partly due to the fact that the country was facing 
formidable economic constraints from several of the reasons described in Chapter 3. 
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A lack of awareness at the government, as well as the community level, was probably 
the majn factor for the lack of preparedness. If the surviving communities had any 
concern about the hazard, they might have insisted on the government for resource 
allocation for this purpose. The attitude of Allah's will prevails not only at the people 's 
level but also at the government level. 
8.4 Reconstruction programme 
The reconstruction programme had two main components. These components were, the 
housing programme and the other infrastructure programme. The housing programme 
constituted a large part of the programme. The other infrastructure comprised of 
schools, mosques, water supply, roads, health centres, etc. These two components are 
discussed below. 
8.4.1 The housing programme: The survey results describing the responses of the 
beneficiaries to the housing reconstruction programme are summarised in Tables 8.5 
through 8.8. 
Table 8.5: Coverage in the housing programme 
Survivors 
Objectives veri fiable indicators 
Turnkey Self-help Repair Non-beneficiary 
a) Extent of coverage 52% 50% 13% 0% 
provided to disaster 
affected communities 
Source: Executive Office for Reconstruction , Dhamar, 1989. 
8.4.1.1 Extent of housing coverage provided to affected community: The literature 
review shows that the government, after assessing the losses, announced its commitment 
I 't . ... -
to rebuilding or repairing all 42,000 houses damaged by the earthquake. ,_25,000 of 
these houses were seriously damaged and had to be rebuilt, while the remai ning 17,000 
were to be repaired. In reality, only I 0,931 houses were built under the t urnkey 
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programme out of a target of 25,000. Another 3,000 houses were built under the Self-
help programme from a target of 5,000. Thus the coverage was 48 and 40% short of 
the planned targets under turnkey and self-help reconstruction programmes, respectively. 
The government officials attributed this shonfall mainly to the initial estimates of the 
damages which were said to be highly inflated. The government engineers indicated 
that resource availability was not a serious constraint at the time when the 
reconstruction programme was planned. Yemen was economically much better off and 
was having good relations with its rich neighbours and other donors at the time of the 
disaster. 
The performance in the repair programme (traditional category) was even less than the 
turnkey or self-help programmes, in which only 13% (2,200 houses) of the planned 
target (17 ,000 houses) was realised. The major reason for the shortfall was reported to 
be a lack of understanding between the government and the affected communities. For 
instance, according to the government respondents, the government's plan was to 
provide reinforced tie-beams in the load bearing sections of the buildings which the 
victims did not consider to be necessary. Instead, they insisted on a complete 
renovation of the buildings including repainting them. In contrast, the survivors claim 
that the government had allocated only YR 20,000 per house, which was not sufficient 
for most of the houses. They also questioned the universal application of the figure YR 
20,000 to all houses which were damaged w different extents and therefore needed 
different repairs. This programme was intended to be implemented in all disaster-
affected areas of the Dhamar governorate but difficulties were faced from the very start 
and the government had to abandon it after o nly panially finishing the works in Dhamar 
town. 
A large number of survivors in the disaster affected area did nor benefit at all from the 
reconstruction programme. The survivors attributed incorrect estimates and the wrong 
distribution criterion as the major reasons for insufficient coverage. As discussed 
earlier, the traditional house usually accommodate several families living together under 
the joint family system. While counting the damaged houses the government surveyors 
counted one large building, which provided shelter for three or four families, as one 
house which was replaced by one small house built under the reconstruction 
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programme. Consequently, only one out of three or four families could be 
accommodated while the remaining families had to cater for their shelter needs by 
themselves. Poverty in the study area has forced a large number of the rural population 
to continue living in the ir temporary shelters to date (Figure 8.1 ). 
Table 8.6: Criterion for location, design and construction 
Beneficiaries' Community participation Reason* 
category Location Design Size Construction Not Sheikh 
invited represented 
Turnkey 0% 0% 0% 0% 76% 24% 
Self-help 100% 0% 0% 100% 93% 7% 
Repair 100% 0% 0% 100% 100% 0% 
(repair) 
Source: Executive Office for Reconstruction , Dhamar, 1989. 
* Reason for Jack of participation in various stages of work. 
8.4.1.2 Criterion for site selection. design and size of houses: The surveys 
revealed that none of the respondents in the Turnkey category were individually 
consulted about location, design, size or construction of these houses (Table 8.6). The 
reason given by 76% of the respondents was that they were not asked to give their 
opinion while the remaining 24% claimed that they were represented by their sheikh in 
the decision making process. 
In the self-help category all respondents were consulted about the location of the house 
mainly because . according to the agreement, between the government and the 
beneficiaries, the latter were responsible to provide land for the houses. All of these 
beneficiaries reported that they were not consulted about the design or size of their 
houses. About 93% of respondents under this category reported that they were not 
invited to give their views on the des ign and size of houses while the remaining 7% 
indicated that they were represented by the ir sheikhs. The survey results suggest that 
all beneficiaries of the self-help scheme invariably participated in the construction 
programme and contributed with unskilled labour, water, local materials, and food for 
the labourers. The beneficiaries indicated their contribution was about 50% of the total 
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Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
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Figure 8.2: Box-like earthquake resistant houses are different from the traditional 
houses in most respects 
Source: Field urveys, I 994 
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cost, while the government estimates showed that the beneficiaries' contribution was 
only 30%. 
The beneficiaries of the repair programme revealed that they were not consulted about 
the repair of their houses. According to them the government chalked out a fixed 
programme which was indicated to all concerned beneficiaries. The programme was 
reported to be very rigid in nature since no deviations or adjustments were possible. 
Many beneficiaries of this scheme had to use their own financial resources, often by 
taking loans or by selling valuables such as personal jewellery, to make the necessary 
adjustments to suit the ir family needs. 
8.4.1.3 Accepcabilitv problems in the new houses: Table 8.7 shows the problems in 
acceptability of the houses bu ilt during the reconstruction programme. 
Table 8.7: Survivors ' acceptability problems in the new houses 
Cate· Problems on Aco:pub~ity ('l'o) 
gory 
Rooms Kitchen Lalm L•clt of Olhcr A«>cpub~ity f-uiUrcS 
s. So Ln l.n s. Ln St. St Bn Sb Se Fn Go c Wk Fv 
Turn· 80 90 37 95 100 62.5 60 95 87.5 85 70 85 20 35 IS 10 
key 
Self· 62.5 82.5 17 85 93 65 51 85 67.5 77.5 65 69 33 15 3 2 
help 
Source: Fie ld Surveys, 1994. 
Sz: size: No: number; 
Ln: location: St: storage; 
Bn: barn; Sb: s table; 
Se: separate entrance for women; Cl: climatic suitability; 
Fn: insufficiency for family needs; Ga: general appearance; 
Wk: work (distance from): Bw: boundary wall ; and 
Fv: fami ly village (distance from). 
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The new houses were completely different from the traditional houses (Figure 8.2). As 
discussed earlier, the design and size of these houses were not discussed with the 
beneficiaries, which became the main source of discontent among the beneficiaries . The 
survey results suggest that 62.5% to 80% of beneficiaries did not like the small size of 
the rooms. About 90% of the turnkey respondents considered the number of rooms to 
be too few for their needs. These problems were confirmed by 85% of respondents 
from the government officials category who agree. About 37% of them were not 
satisfied with the location of the rooms, while only 17% of the respondents from the 
self-help category expressed similar concerns. 
The majority of the respondents (93 to 100%) from the turnkey and self-help schemes 
expressed their di ssatisfaction about the size of the kitchen , while 85 to 95% disliked 
its location inside the house. The kitchen in a traditional house is about the size of a 
room (4.0 x 3.5 m2) to accommodate an earthen oven and accessories and is usually 
built on top of the roof to avoid the smoke from the fuel-wood e ntering the house. The 
new kitchen is not only small (1 .8 x 1.8 m2) but is also located inside the house with 
smoke filling the house as soon as the oven is lighted. A large proportion of the 
government engineers sample (80%) also considered this as a serious problem. 
About 60 to 74% of the respondents expressed serious reservations about the location 
of the latrine inside the house and next to the kitchen, while 62.5 to 75% did not 
approve of its size. Yemenis are used to large sized latrines (4.0 x 3.5 m2 or so) where 
half the portion is reserved for wash ing clothes. Although traditional latrines are also 
located inside the house they are usually away from the kitchen and other main rooms. 
Most people in rural Dhamar are farmers. They keep livestock for their dairy needs and 
for farming practices. It is very important for these farmers to have storage for keeping 
grain and stables and barns ro take care of the livestock. About 85 to 95% of the 
respondents showed their di ssatisfaction of the new houses because they did not have 
adequate facilities for storage and livestock. 
The new houses had only one entrance. This was not acceptable to a majority of the 
beneficiaries who felt a Jack of privacy for women when a male g uest visited them. 
A majority of the sampled respondents expressed their reservations on this issue. 
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A large number of the respondents (69 to 85%) considered the houses to be small or 
insufficient for their family needs. Although the average household size in Dhamar 
govemorate is 7 to 8 persons, the number of people living in a house is usually quite 
large because of the extended family system. The new houses were insufficient for 
such large families. 
The earthquake survivors received the new houses because they were living in 
temporary shelters and the new houses were either being clistributed free of cost 
(turnkey programme) or with only pan contribution (self-help programme). Field 
surveys showed that some beneficiaries never occupied the Turnkey houses for their 
own habitation. They built (or repaired their damaged houses) from their own 
resources, and started using the houses transferred to them under the reconstruction 
programme for other purposes, such as stable, storage, barn or as guest houses. In 
certain other cases, electrical and sanitary fittings, doors and windows, etc . were 
removed from the government built houses, and subsequently installed in self built 
houses. Tribal rivalries and anned encounters in the northern Yemen, including the 
Dhamar governorate , are quite common. According to the government respondents, the 
beneficiaries sometimes used ro test the strength and safety of the walls by shooting at 
them. If the bullets penetrated through the walls the houses were considered as unsafe. 
As such the clay bricks, which were mostly used in the turnkey houses, did not resist 
bullets and proved to be another reason of dissatisfaction among the beneficiaries. The 
self-help housing programme did not face such problems. 
8.4. 1.4 Type of changes made in the new houses: In spite of the problems mentioned 
in the preceding section , a majority of the houses built under the turnkey programme, 
and almost all houses built under the self- help programme were now occupied. The 
beneficiaries relucranrly reconciled with the situation because they were generally poor 
and had no orher al ternative. However, they did make a number of changes in these 
houses to suit their needs and affordability (Figure 8.3). Table 8.8 shows the 
percentage of beneficiaries who made alterations and amendments in their turnkey and 
self-help houses. 
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to an aided 
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A boundary wall 
added to a turnkey 
house 
Figure 8.3: Alterations made by the benefi ciaries to the houses built during the 
reconstruction programme 
Source: Field S urveys, 1994 
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Table 8.8: Types of changes made in the new houses 
Type Changes made (% age) 
of 
Rooms New addition outside the house Second Boun-
House Entrance dary 
Size No Kitchen laun Store Barn Stable Wall 
-
Turn- 0 18 60 30 38 28 33 4 4 
key 
Self- 0 21 64 33 36 24 29 12 12 
help 
Source: Field surveys, 1994. 
Although the respondents complained about the size of the rooms, none of the 
respondents made any alteration in the size. It was a difficult proposition, both 
technically and financially. About 18 to 21 % of the respondents, who were rich and 
could afford, added some rooms outside the house. Most of these people added a divan 
(living room) and a kitchen outside the house. The percentage of beneficiaries who 
built new latrines, stores, barns and stables outside their houses r anged between 24 to 
38% . Those who built a second entrance or a boundary wall were relatively small in 
number (4 to 12% and 4 to 10%, respectively). Those who were not able to make 
much needed alterations in their new houses attributed it to lack of resources. 
8 .4.2 Other infrastructure: Construction and rehabilitation of other infrastructure, such 
as schools, mosques, health centres, hospitals, electrification schemes, roads and water 
supply schemes) were also pan of the government's commitment to carry out 
development in the disaster-affected areas. 
8.4.2.1 Extent o{ coverage: A li st of the committed infrastructure, other then housing, 
included: 
a) 95 primary and secondary schools; 
b) 57 mosques; 
c) 24 rural health centres; 
d) one 200-bed hospital in Dhamar and one I 02-bed hospi tal rn Ma 'abar; 
e) e lectrification of 80 village s; 
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f) rehabilitation of Dhamar-Dhabah road; 
g) 100 km of new feeder secondary and tertiary roads; and 
h) 259 water supply schemes. 
Like the housing schemes, this part of the reconstruction programme also fell short of 
the planned targets. The government respondents attribute this shortfall also to wrong 
estimates of the disaster. However informal discussions with some contractors, who 
participated in the reconstruction programme, such as the Bangladesh Construction 
Company, Arabian Construction Company and the China Construction Company 
revealed that ever-increasing demands for commission and kickbacks by the government 
Supervisory staff and repeated stoppage of work by the militant beneficiary tribes in 
Haddah and Ans disrricts, were the main causes of this shortfall. T he m ilitant tribes in 
the earthquake area also freq uently interfered wi th the work and caused delays and 
increas ing losses. Many of these conrractors were forced to abandon their contracts 
uncompleted. 
Table 8.9 shows percentage completion of the infrastructure. 
Table 8.9: Other infrastructure committed by government 
Survivors Percentage completion of the committed infraso-ucture Comm-
Category unity 
School Mosque Clinics Hospi tal E/Supp Roads W/supp panic-
ipation 
T urnkey 65 63 13 50 13 20 40 6 
Self-help 24 12 29 0 0 20 21 0 
Repair 15 15 0 0 2 2 2 0 
Source: Fie ld surveys, 1994. 
In areas where the turnkey housing programme was impleme nted, construction and 
rehabilitation of other infrasrructure was also part of the overall conrract. Therefore, 
relatively better results were achieved in realising the planned targets. More 
specif ically, targets realised were: 65% for schools, 63% for mosques, 13% for c linics 
232 
Chapter Eight 
or rural health centres, 50% for hospitals (one of the two hospitals was built in Dhamar 
town while the Ma 'abar hospital is still pending) , 13% for electrification schemes, 20% 
for roads and 40% for water supply schemes. 
The self-help houses and repair programme (traditional houses) agreements were 
executed between the EOR on behalf of the government, and the beneficiaries 
individually. However, construction of other infrastructure in these areas was the 
responsibility of the government. The survey results for areas where self-help schemes 
were implemented suggest that very little progress was made to achieve the planned 
targets. The follo wing is the progress achieved in building other infrastructure, in the 
self- help housing area: 
a) 24% schools; 
b) 12% mosques; 
c) 29% healrh centres; 
d) 20% roads; and 
e) 2 1% water supply schemes. 
In areas where the repair programme (traditional housing) was implemented, the 
progress was even lower as a very small frac tion of the committed infrastructure was 
built. The targets realised were: 
a) 15% schools; 
b) 15% for mosques; 
c) 2% for electrification schemes; 
d) 2% for roads; and 
e) 2% for water supply schemes. 
8.4.2.2 Community parcicipation in site selection, design and size: All 
respondents (beneficiaries, sheikhs and the government engineers) confirmed the fact 
thar the benefkiaries of the reconstruction programme were not involved in the site 
selection, design or construction of any of this infrastructure. 
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8.4.2.3 Acceptabilitv problems in the new infrastructure: The victims did not have 
any major problems in accepting this infrastructure since it was always considered to 
be the government ' s property. During the field surveys most of this infrastructure was 
found to be in poor condition because of the lack of maintenance. The schools and 
mosques were in relatively better shape. 
The mosques are traditionally looked after by the community usmg them. As the 
mosques built during the reconstruction programme were also maintained by the 
earthquake victims they were in a reasonable condition of maintenance at the time of 
field visits. 
The people 's increasing interest in education was helping to maintain the school 
buildings as well. Teachers for the schools were provided by the government, under 
the national service scheme, which required every secondary school graduate to teach 
in a primary school for at least two years, before applying for under-graduation at the 
university. 
Lack of health services was a national problem due to an acute shortage of staff, 
medical equipment and drugs. Even major cities like Sana'a, Aden, Ta 'izz and 
Hodeidah do not have sufficient medical fac ilities. The situation in rural areas is worse. 
Most of the health centres visited during the field surveys were found to be deserted 
due to a lack of staff, supplies, or both. 
The fate of the water supply and electric schemes was also not different. Most of them 
were not functioning due to a breakdown of equipment and no maintenance. 
The roads serving rhe villages, were in poor shape due to continuous erosion and no 
maintenance. These roads were frequently breached during rainy seasons and 
consequently many vi llages were occasionally cut off for several days from markets and 
other important areas until the government repaired the damaged roads. These repairs 
were usuall y of a temporary nature and the same situation was repeated after almost 
every major rainfall. 
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The local communities did not consider themselves responsible for maintaining the 
roads or most of the above infrastructure. Instead they frequently excavated drains 
across the new roads, to divert upstream stonn water, or water pumped from boreholes, 
to their agriculture farms. This activity further reduced the life of the earth roads. 
There was no concern at the government 's level to educate the beneficiaries to maintain 
the infrastructure for their own benefit. 
8.5 Evaluation of the reconstruction programme 
The survey results with respect to the degree of social acceptability of the 
reconstruction programme among the beneficiaries are shown in Table 8.1 0. 
8.6 Social evaluation 
Table 8.10: Social evaluation of the housing programme 
Beneficiaries acceptability (%) 
o vrs Turnkey Self-help Tradi tional (Repair) 
A MA A A MA NA A MA NA 
Timely de livery 15 2.5 82.5 32.5 17.5 50 51 37 12 
Climatic suitability 30 55 15 27 70 2 97.5 2.5 0 
Suitability for family need 3 32 65 5 24 71 100 0 0 
Socio-cultural 42.5 55 2.5 32.5 62.5 5 lOO 0 0 
acceptabili ty 
General appearance 50 40 10 17.5 72.5 10 100 0 0 
Affordability 50 40 10 17.5 72.5 10 lOO 0 0 
Acceptability o f location 55 35 10 90 5 5 100 0 0 
Acceptabilily of size () 30 70 7 48 45 100 0 0 
Safety against earthquakes 20 42.5 37.5 15 52.5 32.5 0 10 0 
Quality or work 42.5 55 2.5 32.5 62.5 5 51 44 5 
Source: Field surveys, 1994. 
Kev 
A: Acceptable: 
MA: Marginally acceptab le; and 
NA: Not acceptable 
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8.6.1 Delivery schedule: The beneficiaries of the Turnkey houses were very sceptical 
about the delay in the delivery of the houses which was sometimes as late as 3 to 4 
years. During all this period the beneficiaries had to stay in temporary shelters or with 
relatives and friends. Only 15% of the respondents considered the delivery as timely 
and acceptable. Most of these beneficiaries were those who were socially influential 
enough to receive their houses without much delay. The majority of the beneficiaries 
(82.5%) felt that the delay was unacceptable. Only 2.5% of the respondents considered 
the delivery schedule as marginally acceptable. 
Delivery of the houses constructed under the Self-help programme was also late. The 
government respondents attributed the delays to political interference and institutional 
deficiencies. The remoteness and lack of vehicle access to some villages was given as 
another important cause of delay, and sometimes even the abandoning of the proposed 
house by the govemmenc. The construction work also got delayed frequently because 
a number of beneficiaries could not find sufficient resources to make their contribution. 
Construction for some of these houses was prolonged until 1993. However, the 
beneficiaries of this programme were relatively less dissatisfied as compared to the 
beneficiaries of the turnkey programme. In terms of figures , 32.5% of the respondents 
considered the delay as acceptable, 17.5% as marginally acceptable, while 50% thought 
it unacceptable. 
The programme covering repair of traditional houses was short in nature and completed 
relatively earlier because of the small nature of the repair work involved, easier 
communication, availability of building materials, and close vicinity of the SCREAA 
office. No major complainrs regarding timely delivery of the repair programme were 
reponed by the beneficiaries. More than half of the sample respondents (51 %) 
considered the repair programme as acceptable. 37% as marginally acceptable and 12% 
as unacceptable. 
8.6.2 Climatic suitability: The traditional houses, although vulnerable to earthquakes, 
are extremely suitable for the local temperate climate which can go to e ither extremes 
between day and night. Even in a normal day the temperature difference between early 
morning and noon hours can be as much as 20°C. The chick walls and roofs of 
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traditional houses made with stones and clay make them very comfortable in all 
seasons. The multi-storey construction makes them even more temperature resistant. 
In contrast, the walls and roofs of the new single-storeyed earthquake resistant houses 
are comparati vely much thinner. These house were reported to be nor temperature 
resistant. 
The Turnkey houses were built with clay bricks which provided thin walls ( I 0 cm), thus 
making them very cold in the winters and unbearably hot during summers specially 
during the noon hours. This turned out to be a major complaint of the respondents. 
Only 30% of the beneficiaries considered their house as acceptable for the local climate. 
About 55% of the respondents viewed climatic suitability of these houses as marginal ly 
acceptable, while the remaining 15% ranked these houses as unacceptable. 
Although the se lf-help houses had thicker walls made of 20 cm thick concrete blocks, 
which were more temperature-resistant as compared to the brick walls but the roofs of 
self-help houses were made of plywood resting on wooden beams. The plywood was 
covered with a thin layer of soil. As roofs are more vulnerable to the transmitting heat 
of the sun inside a building, the se lf-help houses were also not very temperature-
resistant. Only 27% of the recipients of the self-help houses found their houses 
acceptable for the local cl imate. A large proportion of the respondents (70%) 
considered their new houses as marginally acceptable for local climatic conditions, 
while the remaining 2% viewed them to be unacceptable for local climate. 
8.6.3 Suitab il ity for family needs: The turnkey and self-help houses have almost the 
same covered areas (48 m\ The beneficiaries of both categories considered the new 
houses as too small for their fami ly needs. Social surveys revealed that 65% to 71 o/o 
of the respondents indicated their non-acceptability for the new houses from the point 
of view of their family needs. About 24% to 32% of the respondents found the new 
houses as marginally acceptable, while only 3% to 5% of the beneficiaries were 
satisfied with the size of the new houses. As di scussed earlier, a majority of the 
respondents made additional changes in the houses to suit their fam ily needs which 
essentially confirmed the fact that beneficiaries were dissatisfied with the size of the 
new houses. 
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8.6.4 Socio-cultural acceptabil ity: Only 32.5% to 42.5% of total beneficiaries 
indicated their acceptance for new houses from socio-cultural perspective. About 55% 
to 62.5% of the respondents considered the new houses as only marginally acceptable 
for their socio-cultural needs, whereas 2.5% to 5% of the respondents under both 
categories found them unacceptable.6 
8.6.5 General appearance: The turnkey houses, built by foreign contractors, have 
relatively better finishing. The houses under the self-help programme were built by 
local arti sans with block masonry and no plaster or paint on walls which gives them a 
modest look. In the turnkey category 50% of the beneficiaries reponed that the new 
houses had an acceptab le appearance, while the remaining 50% considered it marginally 
acceptable or not acceptable. fn the self-he lp category only 17.5% accepted the 
appearance, while the rest, 82.5%, thought it was marginally acceptable or not 
acceptable. 
8.6.6 Affordabilitv: The turnkey houses were distributed free of cost whereas the 
beneficiaries of Self-help houses had to contribute 30% to 50% of the construction 
costs. The average construction cost was about YR 80,000 for a Turnkey house and 
abo ut YR 70,000 for a house built under the self help programme. Both types of 
beneficiaries, however, reported that they would have built better and bigger houses, 
according to their respective needs. if they had more say in the design and construction 
of their houses. 
About 50% of the respondents from the turnkey category found their new houses 
affordable; 40% indicated that new houses were marginally afford able; and the 
remaining 10% felt that these houses were unaffordable. On the other ha nd, no one in 
the self-help category thought that thei r houses were affordable for an average 
beneficiary. Only 17.5% of them considered their house was affordable. The remaining 
72.5% of respondenrs indicated that they could only marginally afford these houses, 
while 10% of respondents reported that these houses were unaffordable . 
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8.6.7 Acceptability of location: The beneficiaries of turnkey houses were not 
consulted about location of their houses. The traditional houses were usually built on 
hill tops or steep slopes w ith no technical consideration for resistance against 
earthquakes. When the reconstruction programme was undertaken the emphasis was on 
both these issues. 
The government did not consult the recipients of the houses built under the turnkey 
programme about the location of houses in most cases. Consequently, despite the fact 
that the new houses are designed to be earthquake resistant, 10% of the beneficiaries 
did not find the location acceptable, 55% indicated their satisfaction with the location 
of new houses, while 35% considered the location of their houses as marginally 
acceptable. The reason for relatively better acceptab ility of location of the Turnkey 
houses is that most of these houses were built not too far from the traditional villages 
of the owners. There were some complaints of inconvenience in some cases, but they 
were not too many. 
Since land for houses built under the self-he lp category was provided by the 
beneficiaries themselves, they were far more satisfied about the location of their houses 
than the beneficiaries of the turnkey houses. About 90% of the benefic iaries indicated 
that they were fu lly satisfied with the location of their houses. Only 10% considered 
the location as marginally accep table or not acceptab le. 
8.6.8 Design acceptability: The architecrural design of the new houses, although 
complete ly different from the design of a typ ical traditional house, was acceptable to 
30% to 40% of the beneficiaries. About 40% to 45% of the respondents did not 
appreciate the box like design but marginally accepted it in the absence of an alternative 
design. The des ign of the new houses was unacceptab le to 20% to 25% of the 
beneficiaries. 
8.6.9 Acceptability of size: None of the turnkey beneficiaries were happy about the 
size of the new houses. A large majority , 70% of respondents reported that the small 
size was unacceptable, while 30% considered the size as margi nall y acceptable for 
them. 
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In the self-he lp category only 7% among the beneficiaries were of the opinion that the 
size of their houses was acceptable . About 48 % considered the size as marginally 
acceptable, and it was unacceptable to the remaining 45% of the respondents. 
8.6.10 Safety against earthquakes: The government respondents revealed that the new 
houses were designed to resist an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter Scale. 
During the field survey , most of the beneficiaries were found not to have much 
knowledge about the safety aspects because of the lack of awareness about the 
earthquake hazard. They repeatedly said that only Allah knew whether the new houses 
were safe or not, and that only another earthquake could prove the safety of these 
houses. 
Only 20% of the respondents under the turnkey category agreed that earthquake-
resistance was an important fac tor in their accepting new houses. The remaining 80% 
considered the safety factor as marginally acceptable or not acceptab le. 
Safety considerations were acceptable for only 15% of the respondents in the self-help 
category, while 32.5% of the respondents found the safety considerations as 
unacceptable. The rest 52.5% respondents indicated that the safety factor played a 
marginal role in convincing them to accept the new houses. 
Only 10% of respondents in the repatr programme (traditional houses) category 
indicated their marginal acceptability of the repair programme because of a 
consideration of the safety against earthquakes. About 90% of these respondents 
believed that safety against earthquakes could not be guaranteed by anyone except Allah 
and therefore they were nor convinced of accepting the new houses based on the safety 
aspect 
8.6.11 Quality of Work: The quality of work was acceptable to 42.5% of the 
respondents from the rum key category , 32.5% of the respondents from the self-help 
category, and 51 % of the respondents from the repair programme (traditional housing) 
ca tegory. 
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About 55% of the people, both under the turnkey and the self-help categories, and 
62.5% of rhe respondents from the repair programme category considered the quality 
of work as marginally acceptable. The quality of work was reponed to be unacceptable 
by 2.5%, 5% and 5% of the respondents under the turnkey, self-help and repair 
categories, respectively. 
8.7 Technical evaluation of the housing programme 
A total of 40 houses of different categories, built by private owners and the 
governments, and other infrastructure were visited by the technical surveyors. With the 
exception of traditional houses and a few mosques, all other infrastructure, was built by 
the government during the post earthquake reconstruction programme. All this 
infrastructure was built with earthquake resistant techniques and no community 
participation. 
Different categories of houses were vis ited by the surveyors in different areas all over 
the governorate. The ratio various categories of house visited was as follows: 
a) Turnkey houses 34%; 
b) Self-help houses 19%; 
c) 
d) 
Repaired (traditional) houses 
Unrepaired traditional houses 
13%: and 
34%. 
The ratio of government built and owner-bu ilt houses, inspected during field surveys, 
was 53% and 47% res pecti vely. 
The survey results with respect to the salient technical features of the traditional houses 
and different categories of houses built under the reconstruction programme are given 
in Table 8.11. 
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Table 8.11: Technical evaluation of the housing programme 
Type of ho use 
OVIs 
Turnkey Self-help Repaired Unrepaircd 
(Traditional) (Traditional) 
Usual l Divan 3.9)(3.0 4.1)(2.7 6.0)(3.0 6.0)(3.0 
dimensions of ' Bedroom 3.0)(2.8 2.9)(2.6 4.0)(3.0 4.0)(3.0 
rooms (in Kitchen 1.8d.8 1.7xl.7 4.0x3.0 4.0x3.0 
square metres) Latrine 1.8x 1.8 1.7x 1.5 4.0x3.0 4.0x3.0 
boundary wall Store - - 2.Sx l .S 2.Sxl .S 
(in linear Barn - - 2.0x i .S 2.0xl.5 
metres) Stable - 4.0x3.0 4.0x3.0 
Boundary wal l - 10.0 20.0 
Usual location Divan G/floor G/floor Floor 3 Floor 3 
of rooms Ucdroom G/Ooor GJnoor noor 3 Floor 3 
Kitchen G/Ooor GJnoor Roof top Roof top 
Latrine G/Ooor GJnoor Floor I Floor I 
Store - Floor I Floor I Floor I 
11am Outside Outside Outside 
Stable - GJnoor G/Ooor G/floor 
Number of 3 3 or more 6 or more 6 or more 
mam rooms 
Number of I I 3 to 4 3 to 4 
storeys 
General Fair, good Fair to good Fair to good Fair to good 
condition of 
house 
Construction Foundation RCC material RCC PCC Stone, clay Stone, clay 
materials Superstructure Clay, bricks blocks wood, Stone, clay Stone, clay 
Roof RCC material clay wood, clay wood. clay 
Location of Safe Safe Safe uruafe 
house 
Soil bearing 2.5 - 3.0 2.7 - 3.3 2.2 to 2.8 2.5 to 3.5 
capacity 
(kq/cm2 
Location of Roof, lintel Lintel level Lintel level None 
tic beams and foundation 
level 
Roof leakage Slope I in 30 Slope I in 30 Slope I in 40 Slope I in 50 
protection 
Foundation Foundation above natural drainage 
protection 
Laboratory satisfactory satisfactory satisfactory satisfactory 
test results 
Source: Field surveys, 1994. 
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8.7 .1 Dimensions, location and size of rooms: Technical surveys showed that there was 
a vast difference in the number, location and size of rooms in the houses built during 
the reconstruction programme and the privately built traditional house . The overall 
sizes of the two types were also different. The turnkey and self-help houses were more 
or less of the same size and internal design. 
The dimensions of the divan (living room), mainly used for receiving male guests and 
chewing qat are merely 3.90 x 3.05 m2 in the turnkey houses and 4.1 x 2.7 m2 in the 
self help houses whereas the dimensions of the same room in a traditional house ranged 
from 7.0 x 3.5 m2 to 5.0 x 3.0 rn 2. Sometimes even two divans were seen in the 
traditional houses. 
T he dimensions of the other main rooms such as bedrooms were recorded as 3.05 x 2.8 
m2 in the turnkey house and 2.9 x 2.6 m2 in the self-house. There were only two such 
rooms in each of these categories. The dimensions of these main rooms in a traditional 
house ranged from 4.0 x 3.0 m2 to 2.5 x 1.5 m2 and there number was six or above. 
The sizes of kitchen and latrine in the turnkey houses were measured to be the same 
i.e. 1.8 x 1.8 m2. In the Self-help houses, the kitchen dimensions were noted as 1.7 x 
1.7 m2, whereas the latrine dimensions were noted as 1.7 x 1.5 m2 . The sizes of kitchen 
and latrine in the traditional houses were also found to be almost equal but they were 
much larger than the government built houses. The traditional kitchen and latrine sizes 
were measured to be in the range of 4.0 x 3.0 m2. 
The beneficiaries had to add a num ber of rooms in the houses built under the 
reconsuuction programme in order to meet their requirements. On the other hand the 
traditional houses had a number of accessory rooms such as stores, barns and stables 
for domestic animals. The stores and barns were of a relatively small size, such as 2.5 
x 1.5 m2 but the ground floors in most of the traditional houses were found to be used 
as stables for the safety of the animals during the night time. Family members were 
observed to be living between the second and fourth floors . 
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8.7.2 Number of storeys: The government built houses, both turnkey and self-help, 
were only single storeyed whereas the traditional houses had several storeys with the 
external walls slightly tapering inwards as the height increased. Consequently the 
ground floor had the largest covered area in the entire house, followed by the first floor 
and then second floor and so on. 
8.7.3 General condition of the houses: The general condition of the privately owned 
traditional houses was seen to be ranging from fair to good, in spite of their relatively 
longer life, simpler construction and little finishing work than the houses built under the 
reconstruction programme. In the government built self-help houses were observed to 
be in generally better condition with respect to the turnkey houses. Most of the self-
help houses were found to be occupied by the owners, whereas a number of the turnkey 
houses were seen being used as stables or stores by their wealthier owners, who lived 
next door in their self built houses. 
8.7 .4 Construction materials: Construction materials used in traditional houses were 
usually wood, clay and stone. Field surveys showed that cemenr, sand, stone aggregate 
and reinforcing steel had predommantly been used in the government built houses. 
In foundations and up to the plinth level, the local black basal t stone had been used in 
the traditional houses. In the government bui lt houses reinforced concrete had been 
used in foundations. 
The material used in the superstructure of the turnkey houses was mostly clay bricks 
laid in cement monar. ln a very fe w cases concrete blocks were also used. 
Superstructure work in the self-help houses was all in block masonry. 
Technical surveyors observed that the traditional houses used dressed conical stones laid 
in clay monar on the external faces of the thick superstructure walls while the internal 
faces were built from irregular undressed stones. Stone scrap and mud was used to fill 
in between the wall faces. This made the house climatically suitable, but at the same 
time vulnerable to the earthquakes. This was one of the main reasons for the collapsing 
of the traditional houses in the las t earthquake. 
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The available evidence suggests that the traditional houses used tree branches and clay 
to build their houses roofs. These branches were usually not straight so the distribution 
of roof load on these branches (or beams) and walls was not uniform. It was noticed 
that there was very little bond between the wooden beams and walls as the beam ends 
did not full y cover the width of the walls. This problem was probably the main cause 
for roof collapse during the last earthquake. The turnkey houses used reinforced 
concrete in roof structures. The self-help houses used several wooden beams, 
galvanised steel wire mesh covered with plywood and clay in the roofs. 
8.7.5 Location of the house: The survey data suggests that most traditional houses 
were built on top of hills, steep mountain slopes or close to other tall buildings. This 
is a traditional practice because of triba l riva lries and is done so that the enemies could 
be seen from a long distance. This practice also rendered the traditional houses more 
vulnerable to earthquakes. On the other hand safe location was an important 
consideration in the government built houses. According to the surveys only 40% of 
the ex isting traditional houses were located on safe ground whereas 100% of the 
government built houses are on safe locations. 
8.7.6 Sub-soil conditions: The Dhamar governorate is located in the Central 
Highlands where ground conditions for bui lding foundations are generally good. The 
data on soil bearing capacity shows it ranging from 2.5 to 3.5 kg/cm2. Tt was noted that 
all buildings, i.e. the government built houses and other infrastructure, and the 
traditional houses were built on safe ground conditions. 
8.7.7 Location of tie-beams: It was observed that reinforced concrete tie beams were 
provided at the foundation, lintel and roof levels in all government built houses and 
other infrastructure. A large num ber of traditional houses were destroyed by the 
earthquake perhaps due to a Jack of tie beams. 74% of the houses inspected during the 
technical surveys had wooden tie beams only at the lintel level. The remaining 26% 
had no tie beams. 
8. 7.8 Protection agai nst roof leakage: Roof leakage protection in the traditional as 
well as government built houses was observed to be achieved by providing roof slopes 
ranging from l in 30 to I in 50. 
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8.7.9 Foundation protection: Foundation protection in all government houses and most 
traditional houses was observed to be carried out by building the houses above natural 
drainage level. Only a few traditional houses' ground floors were found below the 
natural drainage level in which cases side drains had been built by their owners around 
the house to divert any drainage water. 
8.7.10 Laboratory tests: Laboratory tests in respect of a number of houses and other 
infrastructure inspected during the technical surveys in Dhamar governorate were carried 
out as shown in Table 8.12. 
Table 8.12: Laboratory tests performed during surveys 
Category of Site visited Laboratory tests 
infrasl.I1Jcture 
umber % RCCIPCC Block Water Test Sieve 
strength strength on Stones L 'Analysis 
Turnkey house l l 41 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self-help house 6 22 Yes Yes Yes 
Repaired house 5 19 Yes Yes 
Mosques 2 7 Yes Yes Yes 
Schools 2 7 Yes Yes 
Health centres I 4 Yes 
Total: '27 lOO 
Source: Field surveys, 1994. 
The rests were performed on concrere cubes and concrete blocks, measuring 15x 15x 15 
cm3 and 20x I Ox I 0 cm3 respectively, to determine their crushing strength in kg/cm2 on 
the samples available at the SCREAA (now MOC) laboratory . Tests were also 
performed on the ava ilable srone samples for water penetration which is described in 
terms of percentage of water retained by weight of the sample. Soil samples were 
collected, where possible , from the reconstruction sites. Sieve analysis tests were 
performed on these samples at the MOC laboratory. All these test results are attached 
wirh rhe technical surveys. 
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Table 8.13 presents salient features of various test results in more deta:il. 
Table 8.13: Salient features of laboratory test results 
lnfras trucrure Concrete cubes for RCC and PCC works Concrete blocks 20x l0xl0 cu cm for 
location and Type 15x1 5x15 cu cm masonry walls 
Manqadah 
Turnkey 
i\1-Marwan 
Turnkey 
Mosque 
School 
Turnkey 
Beihan 
Self-he lp 
Self-he lp 
Self-he lp 
i\1-Jami'a 
Repaired 
Repaired 
Jarf At-Ta hir 
Self-help 
Self-help 
Bir Khabud 
Repaired 
Repaired 
Bab i\1-Fa1ak 
Turnkey 
Turnkey 
i\1-Sa1a h 
Repaired 
Ar-Rusabah 
Mosque 
Turnkey 
Al-Ko1a 
Turnkey 
Turnkey 
Turnkey 
M/Ash-Sharq 
Self-house 
Hammam Ali 
Turnkey 
Dawran 
Turnkey 
Health Centre 
School 
Note: 
Source: 
Crushing Crushing Remarks Crushing 
load kg slress kg/sq load kg 
cm 
450-480 204-218 Good 240-370 
500-550 227-229 Good 3 10-370 
450-470 213-220 Okay 
300-320 136-145 NA 
580-680 263-308 Y/good 345-352 
400-550 181-249 Okay 350-350 
1050-112 476-544 Y/good 429-546 
800-900 302-408 V/good 
300-300 136-136 NA 
640-680 290-308 Good 
450-480 2 13-218 Good 
300-460 136-209 Okay 
590-700 267-317 Good 
470-650 213-295 Good 310-3 10 
900-1000 408-453 V/good 
340-360 154-162 Okay 
460-450 162-227 Okay 
750-880 340-399 Y/good 2 10-210 
650-780 295-354 V/good 
460-490 209-222 Good 
600-720 272-326 Y/good 429-507 
690-870 313-394 Y/good 
680-730 308-331 V/good 
520-540 236-245 V/good 35 1-356 
700-700 3 17-317 Y/good 430-509 
560-600 254-272 Good 
640-800 290-363 Y/good 
Okay: Acceptable result; NA: Not acceptable resul t. 
Field surveys, 1994. 
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Crushing Remarks 
strength 
kg/sq cm 
53 Okay 
57 Good 
61 Good 
60 Good 
63 Good 
53 Okay 
36 NA 
60 Good 
65 Good 
60 Good 
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Table 8.13 shows that out of 27 concrete cube samples collected from various sites of 
the reconstruction programme, 93% were of the quality ranging from acceptable to very 
good. Only 7% samples showed the quality of concrete work as of unacceptable 
quality. These results confirm response of the beneficiaries regarding quali ty of work 
of the new and repaired infras tructure which they appreciated in general. 
Out of 10 samples of the concrete blocks 90% results showed that the quality of blocks 
prepared and used in masonry works of the reconstruction programme were of 
acceptable to good quality. Only 10% results showed the quality as unacceptable . 
Apan from the concrete and block tests, water penetration tests on stones used in 
masonry work in the reconstruction programme, and sieve analysis tests on soils at 
various sites were also performed. These results showed that the quality of stones used 
in the reconstruction programme was of strong enough for safe ty purpose. 
The sub-soil conditions in the Highlands of Yemen are claimed to be good. Sieve 
analysis of the soil samples collected from differen t housing areas confirmed that the 
soil was composed of well graded materials . The results showed that 68% to 83% of 
the soils ware retained between sieves number 150 to 600. The quanti ty of coarser 
materials, retained between sieves 10 to 1.18 mm , ranged from 10 to 30%. The finer 
materials left in the pan were from 2% to 7%. Although the quality of soils in the 
reconstruction programme area slightly varied from site to site but in general, it could 
be described as well graded sandy clay mixed with some gravel. 
8.8 Earthquake-victims' role in implementation of reconstruction programme 
The post-eanhquake reconstruction programme was imple men ted for the earthquake 
victims and their appreciation of the governments's programme was of immense 
significance. The following Table 8.14 shows the extent of community participation 
in the programme. 
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Table 8.14: Role of local communities in programme implementation 
Reconslruction programme category 
OVIs 
Turnkey houses Self-help Repair Ol.her 
houses programme infrastructure 
Planning and Government Government Government Government 
decision making 
Programme Government Government Government Government 
implementation 
Level of Community not Involved in Involved in Community not 
community involved location and repair only involved 
involvement construction 
Acceptance of Low Low Moderate Moderate 
programme by 
community 
Source: Social surveys, 1994. 
8.8.1 Criteria for planning and decision making: According to the government 
respondents, one of the government 's priorities was to reconstruct the infrastructure in 
the disas ter-affected areas of Dhamar as quickly as possible with minimal involvement 
of the community. The initial surveys to assess the damage caused by the earthquake, 
which were to form the basis of the entire reconstruction programme, were also 
unilaterally conducted by the governmenr. Although some of the village sheikhs 
participated in preparing these, but for most of them, being illiterate, their participation 
was of ceremonial nature. Even in the later stages prior to implementation of the 
reconstruction programme, the community had no role to play in planning and deciding 
about the number. type. size and design of the houses and other infrastructure to be 
built in the disaster-affected areas. The survivors clearly mentioned during interviews 
that no one invited them to di scuss these important issues. The sheikhs on the other 
hand complained that when they raised their concerns with the government about these 
problems, there was no positive response. Surveys carried out in the government 
organisa tions confirmed that the beneficiaries were not consulted in planning and design 
of the infrastructure for various reasons, because: 
a) the programme was implemented on emergency basis and there was no time to 
consult the beneficiaries; 
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b) most of the beneficiaries were illiterate and they would not have understood the 
details of planning and decision making; and 
c) tribal rivalries were common in the disaster affected area and it would have 
been extremely difficult to bring all beneficiaries to agreement. 
8.8.2 Programme implementation: Surveys of the beneficiaries and government 
engineers indicated that implementation of the reconstruction programme was entirely 
carried out by the government. Most of the government respondents complained during 
interviews that the Executive Office of SCREAA had a very centralised administrative 
policy. All instructions regarding programme implementation came from the top 
hierarchy which they had to abide by as the final orders. In these circumstances there 
was little opportunity for the community to have any say in the programme 
implementation. This is perhaps the reason that over 90% of the respondents expressed 
their dissatisfaction of the Turnkey programme. 
8.8.3 Level of community involveme nt in the reconstruction programme: In the 
Turnkey programme there was no community involvement because the entire house, 
including the land, was provided to the beneficiaries completely free . Most of the 
beneficiaries did not like these houses. Their reaction and reservations to this free offer 
is discussed in detail in the foregoing paragraphs. 
In the Self-help programme the beneficiaries were in ·o lved in location and construction 
of the houses only because the beneficiaries had to provide land and participate in the 
construction cost. They were nor consulted about design, size and general appearance 
of their houses. Only 14% of the respondents expressed their satisfaction of this 
programme. 
The beneficiaries ' involvement in the repair programme was limited to the construction 
part only because they were required to contribute a major part of the total cost of the 
repair works (ofte n more rhan 50%). Field surveys showed that the beneficiaries were 
not much satisfied with this programme. Serious disputes arose between the 
government and the beneficiaries from the very beginning about the programme about 
the extent and nature of the repair work. This led to abandonment of the programme 
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after repairing houses in Dhamar town only. Originally the repair programme was 
supposed to cover all disaster affected areas. According to surveys 51 % of the 
respondents were satisfied with the timely delivery of the repair programme while the 
same percentage was found satisfied with the quality of work. 
8.8.4 Acceptability of the reconstruction programme among the beneficiaries: The 
field survey data revealed that on ly 1.5% of the beneficiaries were consulted about 
implementation of other infrastructure building programme. Again this involvement 
was only about location of the infrastructure in those places where the land had to be 
taken from the community. The community was not consulted about the type, design, 
size and general appearance of the infrastructure. A survey of the government 
organisations confirmed that commu nity participation in public use infrastructure was 
almost 0%. The approval rating of the infrastructure is however moderate (50%) 
because there was almost no such infrastructure in Dhamar, prior to earthquake. 
Although the respondents were aware and weary of the fac t that they were not consulted 
at any stage of this programme but 50% of them felt satisfied because there existed at 
least a few fac ilities existed for health. education, water supply and electricity, e re 
which were non-existent in rhe past 
8.9 Why some of the earthquake affected people could not receive assistance 
under any category of the housing programme 
8.9.1 Socio-economic factors: It was diffic ult to assess the exact number of those 
earthquake survi vors who did not benefit from the housing programme but it was felt 
during field surveys that the percentage was significant. The beneficiaries in each 
village tended to inflate the number of non-beneficiaries who were either related to 
them or f rom the same tribes. On the other hand the respondents from government 
organisations tended to deflate the percentage of the non-beneficiaries. They could not 
give any fixed number or percentage of the non-beneficiaries but just said that the 
benefits were available to mos t of the survivors. No records were available to confirm 
the f igure. The main reasons seemed to be the fo llowing: 
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a) the initial estimates, on the basis of which the government announced its 
reconstruction programme and appealed for foreign assistance, were that 25,000 
houses were completely destroyed while another 17,000 were partly damaged. 
The government committed itself to rebuild and repair the same number of 
houses. In actual practice however only 13,351 houses were built and 2,200 
houses were repaired. Thus the total number of houses built or repaired was 
only 37% of the original commitment No definite reason was given in the 
available literature, nor it could it be confirmed from survey of the government 
officials that why the above figure of 13,351 was chosen for building new 
houses against an estimated demand of 25,000 new houses. Financial resources 
did not a seem to be a serious problem for the government. The country was 
at that time enjoying excellent relations with its rich neighbours and the western 
donors. Technical and financial assistance was readily available. The main 
reason given for abandoning the repair programme, after repairing only 2,200 
houses in Dhamar town against an overall demand of 17,000 houses for the 
enrire governorare, was that the beneficiaries were more concerned about the 
government to renovating their houses rather than strengthening them is not 
convincing. These figures indicate, even if the initial estimates of losses were 
not l 00% correct, that the number of non-beneficiaries was large; 
b) one of the major complaints of the earthquake victims was that their family 
houses before the earthquake were multi-storeyed traditional buildings in which 
four to five fa milies were staying. When the earthquake demolished their 
homes, only one smal l house for each large building was alloned to them as 
rep lacement which could hardly suffice for the needs of only one small family. 
So only one of the four or five families, previously living in the traditional 
houses could use the new houses. The remaining members of the family were 
not given any consideration. This pol icy left a large number of victims without 
any ·helter: 
c) some of the sites for self-help houses were extremely remote in the mountain 
areas with almost no road conditions. Carrying building materials to these sites 
was almost impossible. The government was supposed to improve accessibility 
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of these villages before starting the houses. The roads to such villages were 
never built due to the institutional deficiencies and similar problems ar the 
Executive Office of SCREAA, as such the housing programme could not be 
extended to these villages; 
d) although foreign assistance for the reconstruction programme was m hard 
currency, the agreements between the government and the contractors were 
partly in hard currency and panly in local currency. The Yemeni Riyal, which 
was strong in early eighties and its marke t price was about 1 US$: YR 3.5 
sharply fell in the later years. In 1988 the exchange rate reached 1 US$: YR 11 
or more. As the reconstruction programme lingered on for different reasons, 
such as, institutional deficiencies, political interference, etc, the contractors 
found themselves faci ng losses due to inflation of the local currency. The works 
were stopped by many contractors and prolonged disputes sraned with the 
government. Some of the foreign contractors got so frustrated that they 
abandoned their projects and le ft the country for good ro avoid furrher losses. 
Institutional deficiencies were among the major causes for the government not 
reviewing the payment procedure in an attempt to save the contractors from 
suffering losses. Discussions with some contractors involved in the 
reconstruction programme revealed that the government engineers and other 
supervisory staff, always expected favours for any services provided to the 
contractors no matter how genuine they were. All this caused cunailment of the 
programme which deprived a number of beneficiaries from receiving shelter; and 
e) as briefly mentioned above lack of organisation among the be neficiary rribes and 
their mutual rivalries was also an imponant cause of delay and abandonment of 
the reconstruction programme in cenain areas (government surveys, 1994). 
Quite frequently they used ro stop the contractors ' works by force to change 
location of the works or for some other reasons. The government did not have 
any firm policy to deal wirh such s ituations and d id nor intervene quickly to 
solve sire problems with the resu lt that in most cases the contractors suffered 
losses due to prolonged stoppage of works. Many of them could not afford to 
work in these conditions and left the country. 
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It was observed during surveys that the non-beneficiaries were those poor people who 
were deprived in every respect. They were not related to the sheikhs or other important 
people in the village and therefore did not have any social or political influence to press 
their demands. The sheikhs' surveys estimated the non-beneficiaries to be 43% which 
seemed reasonable according to the actual situation observed by the surveyors. 
8 .9.2 Nature and source of alternate arrangements for the non-beneficiaries: A survey 
of the non-beneficiaries showed, that the survivors who could not benefit from any 
category of the reconstruction programme had to depend on themselves . Some of them 
stayed with their relatives for some time , or moved to centuries-old mountain caves 
where their ancestors used to live, or moved to the government provided temporary 
shelters (tents) immediately after the disaster. 
A small percentage of wealthy non-beneficiary survivors built new houses for 
themselves but most of the non-beneficiaries were poor and the disaster had further 
aggravated their financial diffic ulties. Some of them moved back to their disaster 
affected and earlier abandoned houses. Some made ex tremel y vulnerable shelters by 
using debris from their old damaged houses. Such shelters were made by piling stones 
one above another in irregu lar shape of walls, without using any mortar, and then 
covering them by corrugated iron sheers or rree branches. A very few non-beneficiaries 
purchased corrugated iron sheets and wood at subsidised prices from the government 
and made shelters themselves. T hese ' metal houses' become extremely cold in the 
night time and extremely ho r in the day rime. 
Summary 
A preliminary look at the social and technical survey data gives a reasonably good 
concept of the research problem and the results to be drawn. Evaluation and detailed 
d iscussions on rhis dara before statistical analysis, gives funher legitimacy to the 
process of sta ti stical te sting and drawing of in ferences. The combined exercise of 
preliminary data evaluation and detailed statistical analysis help in drawing truly 
objec tive conc lusions, which ultimarel y form the basis of recommending guidelines for 
the future. The prel iminary evaluation in thi s chapter gives an idea that the earthquake-
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affected community responded quickly and adequately to provide immediate shelter and 
needs to the vicrims. The government' s emergency help was neither timely nor 
sufficient for all victims. This evaluation also indicates that, the delivery the 
reconstruction programme was also late and could not cover all victims. Even the 
beneficiaries found many problems with the new houses and most of them did not find 
it acceptable. There was very little community participation in the reconstruction 
programme. 
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
"Statistical methodology allows the effective collection, analysis and presentation of 
numerical information, on the basis of which optimal decisions can be made". 
(Paul Marscon, 1982) 
The science concerned with collec ting facts and analysing them is given the name of 
statistics (Walker et al, 1993). Walpole (1983) describes that in statistical studies we 
are mainly concerned with the presentation and interpretation of the chance outcomes 
which occur during an investigation. In common use the renn statistics is frequently 
used in a quantitative way such as a person 's body dimensions, or a government's 
budget, etc. Chase ( 1967) explains that these numbers or figures however only become 
useful when a certain order is given to the masses of numbers collected in scientific and 
social data collecting exercises. The ordering of information is done by using certain 
statistical methods. Some of these methods which describe the characteri stics of a group 
are called descriptive methods. Other techniques in which inferences are drawn about 
a large group of individuals, when only a small group or sample of them can be 
observed, are known as inferential procedures. As this research also examined only 
some samples of individuals. from different categories of the earthquake-affected people 
in Yemen, inferential procedures have been used in the statistical analysis. 
Research in the social sc iences differs from the physical sciences or the so-called 
natural sciences in what is being studied and not in terms of the methods (Weiss, 1968). 
As such this research, based on borh social and technical evaluation of the post-
earthquake reconstruction programme in Yemen, has not deployed any special methods 
for rhe analyrical work. 
A variable in statistical terminology means a quantity which assumes different values 
which may be measured in some appropriate unit (Chambers, 1948). Height, weight, 
age, education level, ere are the examples of variables. The number of times a particular 
value of a vm·iable occurs in a set of observations is called f requency. The table 
showing the frequency of occurrence of all values of a variable in a set of observations 
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is named as a frequency of distribucion table. The distribution of total population is 
expressed in a mathematical form by using a small number of constants or parameters. 
One of the purposes of using statistical analysis is to test a theory, an assumption or a 
hypothesis (Noerher, 1990). 
9.1 Hypothesis testing techniques 
There are two methods or techniques for res ting a hypothesis. These are known as the 
parametric and the nonparametric techniques. The analytical rests related to parametric 
techniques are applicable when the following conditions exist (S iege! , 1956): 
a) the observations are independent ie the score of one sample does nor influence 
or bias the score of the other: 
b) the observations are drawn from a normally distributed population; 
c) the scores are real numerical numbers and nor jusr representations: 
d) the populations under study have the same variance; 
e) the variables involved are measured in at least an interval scale ro fac ilitate the 
arithmetical calculations involving addition, division and finding means of the 
data under analysis; and 
0 The sample size is large (nor less rhan 30). 
These condi tions are not usually mer when behaviourial responses of individuals are 
being srudied, particularly when the dara is in a ranking order. The nonparametric 
techniques are uniquely suited in such cases. Some of their advantages are listed 
below: 
a) the nonparametric rests do nor place any precondition that how the population 
under study hould is distributed. This is why these techniques are sometimes 
referred to as the discribucion free tests: 
b) many nonparametric rests can be app lied when the scores are nor numerical but 
simply ranks. Because of th is quality such tes ts are often called as the ranking 
tes ts; 
c) the nonparametric tests are comparatively simpler than the parametric tests. 
d) the nonparametric rests can be applied to even small sample sizes such as 6. 
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As most of the data collected during field surveys are of ranking order and in an ordinal 
scale, the nonparametric technique was considered to be most appropriate for statistical 
analysis in this study. 
Further, since the responses of the three types of house owners were considered to be 
of significant importance, the analysis was carried out by using relevant tests available 
for k independent samples (Jawahar, 1995). 
9.2 Steps to be followed in hypothesis testing 
The hypothesis testing procedure involves the following six steps (Siege!, 1956): 
a) state the null hypothesis (H0); 
b) choo e an appropriate tatistical test suitable for testing Ho; 
c) specify the significance level (usually 0.05 in studies such as this) and a sample 
size N (40 for each category of respondents in this case); 
d) find the sampling distribution of the statistical test under H0; 
e) define the region of rejection on the basis of steps (b) to (d); and 
f) compute the value of the statistical test by using the information collected from 
the samples. If the value of the result is in the region of rejection, the decision 
will be to reject H0 and accept the alternate hypothesis (H1). If the level of 
significance is such (less than 0.05 in this case) the decision will be to retain Ho 
and reject H1• 
9.3 Frequency analysis and mean score 
The responses analysed through the frequency test are presented in the form of graphs 
for easier comparison between the three groups of respondents (Annex 7). The answers 
regarding acceptability of the reconstruction programme are in the ranking of i) 
acceptable: ii) marginally acceptable: and iii) not acceptable. In a society where literacy 
level is very low. further ranking was not possible with the ri sk of affecting the quality 
of data. The frequency was calculated in percentage and tabulated. In order to 
determine the tendency of rating of the programme acceptabil ity, mean score for each 
variable was calculated by using SPSS-X (Release 3.0) software. 
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9.4 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) test 
Kuruskal-Wallis one-way analysis by ranks is considered to be extremely useful for 
determine the independent samples when the data is in skewed form (Siege!, 1956). 
The test examines the null hypothesis by determining whether the k samples come from 
the same or different populations with respect to the averages. The purpose of using 
this test was to confirm whether the three types of samples represented the same or 
identical groups of populations of the earthquake-affected people. This test is crucial 
to justify if the research findin gs will apply to all population sections under study. 
9.5 Kendalls ' rank correlation coefficient 
This test is suitable as a measure of correlation between two or more sets of data. The 
sampling distribution of the coefficient is known and it is tested for significance (Siege! , 
1956). It is a measure of association or correlation requiring both variables to be 
measured in ac lease an ordinal scale so chat the individuals under study may be ranked 
in two orders. The tes t's power efficiency is up to 91 %. Spearman's correlation test 
is also equally efficient. However, according to Or J.R. Calven of the Business School 
ar Loughborough Uni versity the Spearman' test is considered to be more suitable for 
two samples. 
9.6 Rationale for the statistica l tests used in this analysis 
Before rationalising the tests used in this analysis it seems appropriate to mention some 
of the basic insights involved in selec ting different statistical tests to examine the data 
from different aspects. 
In statistics the operations and relations used in obtaining the cores, define and limit 
the manipulation and operations which are permissible in handling scores. In general 
there are four types of scales in which scores can be collected to conduct any type of 
research (S iege!, 1956). These scales are known as nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. 
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The nominal scale is simply a classificatory scale in which numbers are used o nly to 
classify objects. This type of data measure is considered to be the of the weakest type 
of information. 
In ordinal scale the objects of one category of are not j ust different from the other 
categories but have some kind of relationship between them such as 'acceptable', 
'marginally acceptable' and 'not acceptable'. The ordinal scale differs from the 
nominal scale in the sense that it not only records the relation of equivalence (=) but 
also the re lation of greater than (>) or smaller than ( <). 
The interval scale has all the characteristics of an ordinal scale and in addition the 
distances between two numbers on the scale are also known. This quality makes the 
measurements strong for which usually parametric tests are applied. Such data is 
however difficult to find when peoples attitudes and preferences are being studied. 
When a scale has all the qualities of an interval scale and in addition has a true zero 
point as its origin it is known as the ratio scale. Information of this type is rarely 
available. 
The scale used in the field surveys of this research was ordinal for which only non-
parametric techniques are applicable. 
The frequency analysis was used to examine the percentage of ratings on different 
categories of agreement among the three samples. Based on the maximum percentage 
of rating in a particular category, the hypothetical conclusions were drawn. For cross-
check ing, whether the results obtained from the frequency anal ysis represent the whole 
sample, a re st of goodness-of-fi t type was required. O ne such test is the one-sample chi 
square rest which requires at least five expected freque ncies for each category. T his test 
was therefore considered unsuitable for this analysis. This study made use of the 
Kuruskal-Wallis one-way ANOYA rest, known for its usefulness to examine if the 
samples from different categories of house owners under study signified any genuine 
population differences. All these three rests, including the Kendall 's Correlation of 
Coefficient test, were performed by using SPSS-X (Re lease 3.0) software package. The 
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graphical charts were prepared through another software package, Excell (5.0) available 
at Loughborough University of Technology. 
The following sections briefly describe the statistical analysis undertaken and the 
inferences drawn in each case with reference to the objectives of the thesis (Figure 9.1). 
For the sake of clarity and not to be repetitive, all the tests carried out for one objective 
are discussed within the same section. All graphical charts resulting from the 
Frequency tests and the Kendall's Correlation of Coefficients test are presented in 
Annex 7. The tables for the Kuruskal-Wall is ANOV A and Kendall 's tests are included 
in the main text. 
9.7 Objective 1: initial responses of the government and the earthquake-victims 
and the extent of their willingness to undertake the post-disaster relief work 
The main response to provide relief to the earthquake-victims, after the earthquakes, 
came from the government and the people themselves. The respondents categories, used 
in this chapter, are described in Section 7 .6. The responses received from the various 
respondents are discussed below in the light of the statistical analysis. 
9 . 7 . l Government's response: The literature rev1ew and the evaluation of the 
reconstruction programme have shown us that the government's response immediately 
after the earthquake mainly consisted of the following steps: 
a) declaring a state of emergency throughout the country; 
b) creating a special and high powered body, called the Supreme Council for 
Reconstruction of Earthquake Affected Areas (SCREAA). The SCREAA was 
headed by the prime minister himself and had representatives from the key 
ministries whose cooperation was considered necessary to deal with the 
emergency. This body had a direct liaison with the aid giving agencies; 
c) appealing to the international community for assistance; and 
d) making arrangements for emergency relief for the survivors. 
The literature review and the evaluation of the field data shows us that the 
government's emergency help mainly comprising tents and blankets started reaching the 
disaster area after a week by which time the people had already gone through the phase 
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of immedjate response. The relevant variables to statistically rest the government's 
response are discussed below: 
9. 7 .1.1 Emergency help: The Frequency test (Annex 7 , Chart l) shows that 100% 
of the respondents are of the opinion that the emergency help came from the 
government. 
It can be inferred from the above analysis that the government provided the emergency 
help to the earthquake victims. 
9.7.1.2 Delivery time: The Frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 2) shows that the 
responEiems from the government officials differed in their in their opinion about the 
timing of the emergency help. Ten percent of them thought that the government's help 
was available to the earthquake victims within one week of the djsas ter. A larger group 
of 40% respondents felr that it took up to 15 days before the emergency help reached 
all victims. Only 5% held the view that the emergency help was provided in about 
three weeks time. Another 40% were of the opinion that it took as much as one month 
to despatch the emergency help to all people in the earthquake affected area. A small 
group of 5% thought that 1he help reached all victims in about rwo months' time. It 
is obvious from the above response~ thar the government's help was not immediate. 
It can be inferred from the above analysis. that the government' s emergency help was 
not delivered to the earthquake victims ar the proper rime. 
9.7.1.3 Availabilicy: The Frequency test (Annex 7, Chan 3) ro determine whether 
the government's emergency help covered all victims $hows, that none of the 
government respondents were of the opinion that the emergency help was available eo 
all victims. The test results show rhat 85% of the respondents thought that the help was 
available to most victims. The resr 15% felt that the emergency help was available to 
only ome victims. o one says that rhe help was nor available to any of the victims. 
On the baSi$ of the above analys is, it can be inferred thar the government' s emergency 
help was available to most of the victims. 
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9.7.1.4 Impact: The Frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 4) to detennine what impact 
did the emergency help created on the victims suggest's that 100% government 
respondents agreed that the victims were nor satisfied with the emergency help. 
It can be inferred from the above analysis that the earthquake victims were not satisfied 
with the government's emergency help which created negative, rather than positive 
impact on the people. 
9.7.2 Community 's response: Literature review shows that the 1982 earthquake 
disaster in Dhamar governorate, killed several thousand people and caused extensive 
damage to the property. As a result, several hundred thousand people were left 
homeless in the disaster-stricken area. In order to meet the challenge, the earthquake-
affected community responded to meet its immediate needs of shelter and food. The 
data collected in this respect. from the fie ld surveys, was also statis tically analysed. 
9.7.2. 1 Immediate responses: The Frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 5) shows us that 
only 2.5% people Uust one person) in the Turnkey category wai ted for the government 's 
emergency he lp while rhe remaining 97.5% helped themselves. In case of the o ther two 
categories, 100% of the immediate response came from the earthquake-affected people. 
The response was in terms of temporary shelter, food, first-aid and medical care. 
The Kuruskal-Wallis A OY A test, applied to all th ree categories of house owners, gave 
the significance level as 0.3679 (Table 9 .I). This result shows that the probability 
assoc iated with the occurrence of a val ue under null hypothesis (H0), as large as the H 
value (Kuruskal-Wall is Coefficienr), is greater than 0.05 (previously ser value of 
significance) which enables us to accept the null hypothesis that the three categories of 
house owners represented the same population. 
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Table 9.1: Analysis of Variance of immediate responses of the three categories 
of house owners 
Variable 
(Similarity by group) 
Immediate response 
Significance 
Alpha= 0.05 
0.3679 
Inference 
There is no significant difference 
between the three samples of 
population with respect to their 
responses after the earthquake 
The inference to be drawn from the above analysis is that the earthquake-affected 
community also responded to meet its immediate needs after the disaster, such as 
temporary shelter, food and first-aid. 
9.7 .1.2 Delivery time: The literature review shows us that the earthquake-victims 
responded immediately to their shelter and food needs. Some of them took care of their 
needs by themselves, while the rest were helped by family and friends . The community 
provided itself with very simple temporary shelter and other needs from the very first 
day after the disaster. 
9.7 .1.3 Coverage: The literature review also shows us that the people living in the 
earthquake-affected area provided temporary shelter, food and first-aid to all victims. 
9.7 .3 Summary of inferences: The inferences drawn in this section can be summarised 
as follows that : 
a) the government's initial responses to the earthquake-disaster included emergency 
(but not immediate) help of the victims; 
b) the government's emergency help was not delivered at the time expected by the 
earthquake victims; 
c) the emergency help was made available to most of the victims but not to all of 
them; 
d) the inadequate emergency help (not covering all victims) and its belated delivery 
created a negative impact on the victims; 
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e) the earthquake-affected community 's also responded to meet ics basic needs after 
the disaster; 
f) the community's response was immediate; and 
g) the community's response covered all victims. 
9.8 Objective 2: to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the government's 
planning process in order to examine the compatibility of the reconstruction 
programme with respect to severity of the situation faced by the victims 
This aspect was studied mainly in the context of the government's planning to provide 
an efficient and effective reconstruction programme. 
9.8.1 Efficiency: An efficiem infrastructure has been defined in chapter 1, as the one 
which is least costing, is affordable and is delivered on time eo the people. 
9.8. l. l: Cost: A comparison of the estimated costs and some other salient features 
of the different types of housing in the study area is shown in Table 9.2. This 
comparison shows that the government built houses were not least-cost. 
Table 9.2: Comparison of government built houses with the traditional houses 
llo"'in& T)l>C Main buildin& Eapcelcd danuac W. ., Aprwo:litnl le E•dm"cd coo< or • houoc: 
c.a~&oty m•~cria1, ..,thqualt< uNrCOJ~ USS 
USS!m' 
Modern: S<V<n: Small Medium Lat~t 
$6.33 rrl' 11.12 rrl' 14$.60 m' 
Go~nWllC~ Tumiu:y Bloclu, otm<lll, 0 I 2JO 14,082 20,.280 36,400 
aur<vre. 
rcin!Ofc.in& -.ed 
S<lf·help Bloc.k_t, otmcnl, I 2 U1l 11,76$ 16.~1 30,409 
•&&fC&IIC , wood, 
r~infotc,n& -'Oc:l 
Private Trlld.itional S t.ont , d •y,tt«: 4 s 120 6,760 9 ,734 3,494 
bf&.nchc:• (eG<JnOmi<:) 
2A l,lS2 l.l'-17 2A,732 
( rcnancW) 
Notes: 0 : undamaged; l : slight; 2: moderate; 3: heavy; 4: partial destruction; 5: 
total collapse 
Economic cost: the cost based on market rates 
Financial cost: the cost actually paid by individual 
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In order to test the efficiency of the reconstruction programme, statistical tests were 
applied to the other two main variables i.e. delivery and affordability. 
9.8.1 .2 Delivery rime: It was noted during the li terature review and the evaluation of 
the reconstruction programme that the government built houses were not delivered at 
the promised time. The Frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 6) conducted on the house 
owners shows that in the Turnkey category only 15% people considered the delivery 
time of houses as acceptable to them, 2.5% fe lt that it was only marginally acceptable 
to them while the remaining 82.5% considered the delay as unacceptable. In the Self-
help category 32.5% people thought that the delivery time, in spite of delay, was 
acceptable to them, 17.5% consider the delay as marginally acceptable and for the 50% 
people the delay was unacceptable. I 00% of the third category of respondents, i.e. the 
traditional house owners, who finance and build their houses by themselves , considered 
the delivery time of their houses was acceptable to them. 
The low acceptability of the time taken in delivering the houses to the beneficiaries is 
reflected in the Frequency te t (Annex 7, Chart 7) conducted on the data collected from 
the government" s surveys. Only I 0% of these respondents felt that the houses were 
del ivered in reasonable rime while 90% were of the opinion rhar governmenr built 
houses were delivered late. 
The ANOYA test to examine the people's views about the time taken in the delivery 
of their houses shows a significance level of 0.0000 (Table 9.3). This result indicates 
that the three categories of house owners had different views about the delivery time 
of their houses. It is apparent that majority of the beneficiaries of the government 
houses found the delay in the handing over of their houses only as marginally 
acceptable. On the other hand the Traditional category considered the delivery time, 
managed by themselves. as fully acceptable. This result shows that these three 
categories had the same perceptions about the time of delivery of their respective 
houses and differed only when some of them did not receive their houses on the 
promised time. 
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Table 9.3: Analysis of Variance of the time of delivery of houses to the three 
categories of house owners 
Variable Significance Infere nce 
(S imilarity by group) Alpha= 0 .05 
Delivery time 0.0000 There three sample of population 
significantly differ in their 
acceptability of the time of delivery 
of their respective houses 
The Kendall's Correlation test (Table 9.4) applied on the Turnkey category shows that 
these people' s satisfaction has a significant (0.0010) correlation with the time of 
delivery. Only 2 of the 40 respondents were the satisfied people and both of them 
considered the delivery time as acceptable (Annex 7, Chart 8) . The o ther 38 respondent 
were generally unsatisfied with the programme (A nnex 7, Chart 9). Four of them found 
the delivery as acceptable, 1 considered it as marginally acceptable while the remaining 
33 respondents thought the delivery time as unacceptable. In the Self-help and the 
T raditional categories, no significan~ correlation could be found between the people 's 
satisfaction and delivery which shows that delivery was not a significant issue for these 
respondents. The analysis shows that satisfaction of all the people living in the study 
area was linked with the time of delivery of their houses and it become a significant 
issue when the delivery was later than expected. 
Table 9.4: Correlation of the people's satisfaction (Turnkey category) with time 
of delivery of houses 
Variable I Variable 2 Significance 
Satisfaction Delivery 0.001 
It can be inferred that the delivery time of the government built houses was acceptable 
to only some of the beneficiaries. The majority of them considered it as marginally 
acceptable or not acceptable. In contrast, the traditional houses owners were found to 
be fully satisfied with the deli very time of their houses. 
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9.8.1.3 Affordability: Although the turnkey houses were provided free of cost to their 
beneficiaries, the respondents were asked to what extent they could afford if they were 
to build these houses by using their own funds. 
The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 1 0) shows that in the turnkey ca tegory 50% people 
found these houses as affordable, 40% as marginally affordable and the remaining 10% 
as unaffordable. Among the Self-help people 17.5% fi nd their houses as affordable, 
72.5% as marginally affordable and 10% as unaffordable. In the traditional category, 
100% of the house owners considered their houses as affordable. The reason for a 
higher degree of perception of affordability among the recipients of Turnkey houses, 
with respect to their counterpartS in the self- help category, seems to be due to the fact 
that they received their houses without spending any money and their views on 
affordabili ty were based only on assumptions. On the other hand the literature review 
shows us , that the se lf-help people had to contribute about 30% to 50% of the total cos t 
of their houses. This contribution was paid at a rime when these people had gone 
through a major disaster which nor only claimed many lives, but also economically 
crippled them and these people were left wi th hardly any resources. This hardship was 
probably the cause of their stronger views on affordability although their houses were 
re latively cheaper than the turnkey houses. Also the literature review shows that most 
of the self-house owners were bitter about the fact that while some of them were lucky 
enough to receive the turnkey houses completely free of cost, they had to pay an 
appreciable percentage of the cost for their house. The traditional houses were truly 
inexpensive houses as seen in Figure 9.2 and the views of their owners reflect the same. 
The ANOY A rest conducted on all three ca tegories of respondents shows the 
significance level as 0.0000 (Table 9.5). This result shows that the three categories of 
house owners had different opinions about affordabiliry of the houses in which they are 
living. This result shows that all three categories of respondents had very clear ideas 
about affordabi lity. They considered those houses as unaffordable which they found to 
be beyond the limits of their affordability, and reckoned those houses as affordable 
which they could afford to build from their own resources. 
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Analysis of variance of affordability of houses to the three categories 
of house owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Affordability 0.0000 The three samples of population 
significant! y differ in their 
opinions about the affordability of 
their respective houses 
1r can be inferred that a smaller percentage of the recipients of government houses 
(turnkey and self-help) considered there houses as affordable. The majority of the 
beneficiaries however considered them as unaffordable. 
9.8.2 Effectiveness: According to the definitions given in chapter 1 of this thesis, 
an effecrive infrastructure is the one which is risk minimising ,fuLLy wilised, acceptable 
and provides f ull coverage to the vic tims. The extent and the way in which the 
government built houses were utilised, is discussed in the previous chapters on literature 
review and evaluation. For resting the efficiency of the housing programme, statistical 
tests were applied to three main variables i.e. safety (earthquake-resistance), 
acceptability and coverage. The acceptability of the reconstruction programme found 
to be closely linked with the people 's satisfaction with respect to their houses. In order 
to examine the people' s acceptability of the reconsrrucrion programme, all related 
variables were statistically analysed. The detail of these rests is described in the 
fo llowing paragraphs. 
9.8.2.1 Safety : The afety of infrastructure in an earthquake zone means its 
earthquake-resistance. Figure 9.2 shows the estimated earthquake-resistance of different 
category of houses on the basis of literature review. 
The frequency test (Annex 7. Chart I I ) applied with respect to the safety indicated that 
tn the turnkey category 20% of the respondents found their house acceptable for safety 
considerations. Another 42.5% found the safety considerations as only marginally 
acceptable. The rest 37.5 ·said that only rhe next earthquake could tell whether their 
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houses were safe enough, and that they did not find any safety considerations of their 
houses as acceptable because no one except Allah could give such a guarantee. In the 
Self-help category, 15% of the respondents fi nd the houses acceptable because they 
were safer. The majority, 52.5% thought the house only marginally acceptable for the 
reason of safety. The remaining 32.5% said the any ass urances of safety were not 
acceptable to them. In the traditional houses no one thought that safety considerations 
were acceptab le. Only 10% of these people said that safety considerations were 
marginally acceptable to them. The remaining 90% thought that safety considerations 
were not acceptable to them because on ly Allah knew when and how severe earthquake 
wi ll take place. 
The ANOV A rest shows the significance leve l as 0.0000 (Table 9.6) which indicates 
that the three categories of house owners did not agree about the concept of safety 
against earthquakes probably because of the lack of awareness and the lack of a clear 
concept about the earthq uake hazard in their area. 
Table 9.6: Analysis of va riance of safety of houses to the three categories of 
house owners 
Variable Significance Infere nce 
l;) imilarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Safety 0.0000 The three samples of population 
(Earthquake-resistance) significantly differ in their 
opinions about safety probably 
because of their lack of awareness 
of the earthquake hazard 
The Kendall 's Correlation tes t (Table 9. 7) separately applied on all three categories 
gives a ·ignificance of 0.033 bel\veen the peoples ' satisfaction and safety. There were 
2 sati sfied (Annex 7, Chart 8) and 38 unsati fied respondents (A nnex 7, C hart 9) in this 
sample. Both of these overall satisfied respondents were satisfied with the earthquake-
resistance of their house. Six of the 38 unsatisfied respondenrs were satisfied with the 
safety considerations in their houses. Seventeen of them considered this aspect as 
marginally acceptable and 15 respondents considered the concept of safety as 
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unacceptable. There was no significant correlation between the people's satisfaction 
with respect to safety in the other two categories. 
Table 9.7: Correlation of the people's satisfaction (turnkey category) with safety 
of houses 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Significance 
Satisfaction Safety 0.033 
(Earthquake-resistance) 
It can be inferred that although the government built houses were based on earthquake-
resistant techniques, but the victims could not appreciate this because of their lack of 
awareness of the hazard. 
9 .8.2.2 Acceptability: The houses built during the reconstruction programme were 
quite different from the traditional houses in almost every respect which became a 
crucial reason with regards to their beneficiaries' acceptability, although these houses 
were stronger and more modern than the traditional houses. The government distributed 
the turnkey houses free of cost and contributed up to 50% to 70% of the cost in the 
aided self-help house programmes. 
Frequency tests were applied to all variables related to the acceptability the people. 
These variables were delivery, climatic suitability, location of house, availability, 
location and sizes of various rooms, safety (earthquake-resistance), cultural needs, 
general appearance, quality of work and affordability. Delivery, safety and affordability 
are already discussed above. The other variables will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
Climatic suitability: The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 12) applied to know 
the people's views on climatic suitability shows that in the turnkey category 30% people 
found their houses as acceptable, 55% as marginally acceptable and 15% as 
unacceptable. In the self-help category 27% people felt the climatic suitability of their 
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houses as acceptable, 70% as marginally acceptable and 3% as not acceptable. In the 
traditional category, 97.5% people considered the climatic suitability of their houses as 
acceptable and 2.5% as marginally acceptable. 
The ANOV A test (Table 9.8) found the significance level as 0.0000 which shows 
different opinions of the people about their different type of houses. Their opinions 
would probably would probably have been alike if asked about the same type of houses. 
Table 9.8: Analysis of variance of climatic acceptability of houses for the three 
categories of house owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Climatic suitability 0.0000 The three samples of population 
significantly differ in their opinions 
about climatic suitability of their 
different type of houses 
It can be inferred that majority of the respondents from the government built turnkey 
and self-help categories considered their houses as only marginally acceptable or not 
acceptable whereas almost all respondents from the traditional category considered their 
houses as acceptable for climatic suitability. 
Location of the house: Literature review shows that the people of Yemen are 
very sensitive about the location of their houses for the reasons of culture, supervision 
of agricultural farms and tribal rivalries. 
Frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 13) applied to learn their views about the location of 
their respective houses revealed that 55% from the turnkey category found the location 
as acceptable, 35% thought it as marginally unacceptable, and 10% as unacceptable. 
In the self-help category 90% found the location of the houses as acceptable, 5% as 
marginally acceptable, and 5% as not acceptable. Among the traditional house owners 
100% said that the location their houses was fully acceptable to them. 
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The ANOV A test found the significance as 0.0000 (Table 9.9). This shows that the 
people of the three categories differed in their opinions on location about the different 
houses they were occupying. They would probably have given the same opinion if 
asked about the same type of houses. 
Table 9.9: Analysis of Variance of acceptability of the location of houses for the 
three categories of house owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Location 0.0000 The three samples of 
population significantly 
differ in their opinions 
about location of their 
different type of houses 
The inference to be drawn is that the people of the earthquake-affected areas attached 
significant importance to the location of their houses. Majority of the people living in 
the government houses (turnkey and self-help) considered the location of their houses 
as marginally acceptable or not acceptable. In contrast, all respondents from the 
traditional category found the location of their houses as acceptable to them. 
Culture: Literature review shows us that the Yemeni people are conservative 
in almost every respect and they have high regards for their cultural values. Because 
of the extended family system prevalent in the society, they prefer to have large houses 
with a number of rooms and facilities. Qat chewing is also a very salient feature of the 
culture which has influenced the design of traditional houses. All these cultural aspects 
are related the people's satisfaction and are discussed in detail in the next section 9.9. 
In this paragraph the discussion will be confined to the overall cultural acceptability of 
the reconstruction programme. In order to examine their views on acceptability of 
different categories of houses with respect to culture statistical analysis was carried out. 
The Frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 14) revealed that 42.5% of the turnkey houses 
owners considered their new houses as culturally acceptable, 55% as marginally 
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acceptable and 2.5% as not acceptable. In the self-help category 32.5% respondents 
think that the new houses are culturally acceptable, 62.5% as marginally acceptable and 
5% as not acceptable. In the traditional category 100% people think that their houses 
are culturally acceptable. 
The ANOVA test showed recorded the significance as 0.0000. This result indicates that 
the samples understudy differed in their opinions about the cultural acceptability of the 
government built houses and the turnkey houses. Their views would probably be the 
same if asked about the same houses. 
Table 9.10: Analysis of variance of acceptability of the cultural acceptability of 
houses for the three categories of house owners 
Variable 
(Similarity by group) 
Culture 
Significance 
Alpha= 0.05 
0.0000 
Inference 
The three samples of 
population significantly 
differ in their opinions 
about cultural 
acceptability of their 
different type of houses 
The correlation test shows the people's satisfaction and acceptability has a significance 
of 0.011 in relation to culture. In turnkey category both of the 2 satisfied people found 
their houses as suitable in all related factors (Annex 7, Chan 8). Out of the 38 people 
unsatisfied with the reconstruction programme (Annex 7, Chan 9), 4 thought that the 
houses were acceptable to them for cultural considerations. A large majority of 27 
people felt that their cultural acceptability the houses was only marginal. The 
remaining 7 said that the turnkey houses were culturally unacceptable. 
Table 9.ll: Correlation of the people's satisfaction (turnkey category) with 
culture acceptability of houses 
Variable I Variable 2 Significance 
Satisfaction Culture 0.011 
No significance could be found in the other two categories. 
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It can be inferred that majority of the respondents from the government built houses 
(turnkey and self-help) considered cultural acceptability of their houses as marginally 
acceptable or not acceptable. All respondents from the traditional category considered 
their houses as culturally acceptable. 
General appearance: The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 15) to examine 
general appearance showed that 50% people in the turnkey category found the general 
appearance of their houses as acceptable, 40% as marginally acceptable and 10% as 
unacceptable. In the self-help category 17.5% ofrespondents found the appearance of 
their houses as acceptable, 72.5% as marginally acceptable and 10% as unacceptable. 
In the traditional category, 100% respondents found the appearance of their houses as 
acceptable. 
The ANOVA test (Table 9.12) gives a significance of 0.0000. The result 
understandably showed that different samples, selected from the same population, gave 
different comments on general appearance of different categories of houses. 
Table 9.12: Analysis of variance of acceptability of the general appearance of 
houses for the three categories of house owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
General appearance 0.0000 The three samples of 
population significantly 
differ in their opinions 
about physical 
appearance of their 
different type of houses 
The inference to be drawn is that the majority of people living in the turnkey and self-
help houses considered the general appearance of their houses as only marginally 
acceptable or not acceptable. All people from the traditional houses considered the 
physical appearance of their houses as acceptable. 
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Quality of work: The Frequency test was applied (Annex 7, Chart 16) to 
examine the people's views about the acceptability of the quality of work in their house. 
The results indicated that 42.5% of the turnkey house owners found the quality of work 
in their houses of acceptable nature, 55% as marginally acceptable and 2.5% as not 
acceptable. In the self-help category 32.5% found it as acceptable, 62.5% as marginally 
acceptable and 5% as not acceptable. In the traditional housing category 75% of the 
respondents felt the quality their houses as acceptable, 20% as marginally acceptable, 
while 5% thought they were unacceptable. 
The ANOVA test gives a significance of 0.0011 (Table 9.13). This result shows that 
different samples selected from the same population differed when asked to give their 
views about different types of houses. Their views probably would have been the same 
if asked about the same houses. This indicates that three categories of respondents 
actually represent the same population. 
Table 9.13: Analysis of variance of acceptability of the quality of work of houses 
for the three categories of house owners 
Variable 
(Similarity by group) 
Quality of work 
Significance 
Alpha= 0.05 
Inference 
------r-------------~ 
0.0000 The three samples of 
population significantly 
differ in their opinions 
about the quality of 
work in their different 
type of houses 
An inference can be drawn that the people in the earthquake-affected area had different 
opinions about the quality of work in their respective houses. The majority of 
respondents from the turnkey and self-help categories considered the quality of work 
of their houses as marginally acceptable or not acceptable. The traditional category 
respondents generally approved the quality of work in their houses. 
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9.8.2.3 Coverage: The literature review and evaluation of the reconstruction 
programme show that only about 50% to 55% of the earthquake victims could be 
covered. This is indicated in the survey of the government officials. 
The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 17) results also confirm that 100% respondents of 
the government respondents agreed that the reconstruction programme failed to provide 
benefits to all victims. 
9.8.3 Summary of inferences: The inferences drawn from the analysis in this section, 
can be concluded as follows: 
a) the government built houses were not least-cost; 
b) most of these houses were not delivered on time; and 
c) the new houses were not affordable or only marginally affordable to majority 
of the people living in the earthquake-affected area; 
) 
It can therefore be concluded that the that the government implemented reconstruction 
programme, comprising mostly reconstruction of houses for the earthquake victims, was 
not efficient. 
d) although the new houses were earthquake-resistant, but most of the people in the 
earthquake area did not consider any guarantee of safety acceptable to them. 
They thought that only the next earthquake would confirm how safe the new 
houses were. The people in the study area generally did not have a clear 
concept about the earthquake hazard and the need for safety against this hazard. 
One of the probable reasons could be that the government did not make any 
serious attempts to create this awareness during the reconstruction programme 
although it was a good opportunity; 
e) majority of the people regarded these government built houses as unacceptable 
for different reasons discussed above and in the evaluation; 
f) the government built Turnkey and Self-help houses were not fully utilised as 
discussed in evaluation; and 
g) they did not provide full coverage to the earthquake victims as discussed above 
and in the last chapter. 
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It can be concluded from the inferences that the reconstruction programme was not very 
effective. 
9.9 Objective 3: to analyse as to what extent the objectives of the 
reconstruction programme were realised and to identify tile issues and 
constraints which inhibited the efficient and effective implementation of the 
programme 
This section will discuss the main objectives of the reconstruction programme and what 
major constraints were faced in its efficient and effective implementation. The 
programme objectives are presented in the sub-section 9.9.1 while the constraints are 
discussed in the next sub-section 9.9.2. The inferences are presented at the end under 
sub-section 9.9.3. 
9.9.1 Prolrramme objectives: The government's objectives of the reconstruction 
programme are listed in the literature review. The following paragraphs will discuss 
these objectives together with the statistical analysis and inferences drawn from the 
analysis: 
9.9.1.1 Coverage: One of the major objectives of the reconstruction programme was 
to cover all earthquake victims according to their respective shelter needs and the 
available resources. The literature review shows us that at the time of the earthquake 
the government of Yemen was enjoying excellent relations with its oil-rich neighbours 
and the international donors, who responded with huge amounts of assistance soon after 
the government's appeal. The government also had its own resources mainly because 
of the large amount of about US$ 1.5 billion annually remitted to its coffers by migrant 
Yemenis in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. As such resources were not a major 
problem at the time of the disaster. In spite of these favourable circumstances, the 
evaluation of the programme shows us that only about 50% to 55% of the earthquake 
victims were covered by the reconstruction programme. The survey of the government 
officials (section 9.8) also confirms that all victims could not be covered by the 
programme (Annex 7, Chart I 7). As such the reconstruction programme failed to meet 
one of its major objectives i.e., to provide coverage to all victims. The statistical tests 
conducted to examine coverage of the victims are discussed in Section 9.8. 
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The inference is therefore that the reconstruction programme failed in meeting one of 
its objectives to provide coverage to all earthquake victims. 
9.9.1.2 Utilisation: Another important objective of the reconstruction programme 
was, that the new houses allotted to the beneficiaries should be fully utilised. It has 
been discussed during in the earlier chapters on literature review and evaluation, and 
in Section 9.8 that the reconstructed houses, particularly the turnkey houses were not 
fully utilised. This result shows that the government's objective of getting full 
utilisation of the reconstruction programme could not be achieved. 
The inference to be drawn from the above discussion is, that the infrastructure built 
during the reconstruction programme was not fully utilised. 
9.9.1.3 Satisfaction: It has been discussed in Section 9.8 that the earthquake-affected 
people's satisfaction and acceptability of the reconstruction programme was closely 
linked with a number of factors. Apart from expressing their views on overall 
satisfaction with the reconstruction programme, they gave their comments about these 
factors as well. The statistical tests applied to the overall satisfaction of the people and 
various other factors are discussed in the following paragraphs: 
Overall satisfaction: The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 18) conducted to 
examine the people's satisfaction with the programme revealed that only 5% people 
were satisfied with the turnkey programme. The remaining 95% people were 
unsatisfied. In the self-help category, 40% people expressed their overall satisfaction 
with the programme, while the rest 60% considered the programme as unsatisfactory. 
In the traditional housing category 100% respondent said they were satisfied with their 
self-built houses. The above analysis gives an idea of the people's degree of 
satisfaction with the different types of housing systems under study. 
The ANOVA test (Table 9.14) applied to the three samples, to examme their 
satisfaction with their respective housing systems, gave a significance level of 0.0000. 
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Table 9.14: Analysis of variance of satisfaction for the three categories of house 
owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Satisfaction 0.0000 The three samples of 
population significantly 
differ in their opinions 
about their satisfaction 
with their different type 
of houses 
This result confirms that the three categories of house owners had different opinions 
concerning their overall satisfaction with their different type of houses. This shows that 
the three categories of respondents differ in their level of satisfaction with respective 
houses. However it can be seen from the frequency analysis that 100 respondents from 
the traditional category, who managed the location, design, construction and funding of 
their houses, were satisfied with their houses. On the other, majority of the 
beneficiaries of the government implemented turnkey and self-help programmes were 
unsatisfied with their houses. This shows that their was some similarity between these 
two categories of respondents and they represented the same population with respect to 
the variable 'satisfaction'. 
The correlation test (Table 9.15) (Annex 7, Charts 8 and 9) shows us that the turnkey 
category's satisfaction with the reconstruction programme, was correlated to a number 
of critical factors, such as culture (significance 0.11), barn (significance 0.000), delivery 
(significance 0.001), entrance (significance 0.029), kitchen (significance 0.000), latrine 
(significance 0.020), number of rooms (significance 0.000), size of rooms (significance 
0.004), safety (significance 0.033), stable (significance 0.001) and store (significance 
0.000). No correlation of satisfaction with these variables was found in the other two 
categories of house owners (self-help and traditional). The above results show that the 
above mentioned factors (variables) have some influence on the satisfaction of the 
turnkey category beneficiaries. 
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Table 9.15: Correlation of the people's satisfaction (turnkey category) with other 
critical factors for acceptability of the houses 
Variable I Variable 2 Significance 
Satisfaction Culture 0.011 
Availability of barn 0.000 
Delivery time 0.001 
Women's entrance 0.029 
Location/size of kitchen 0.000 
Location/size of latrine 0.020 
Number of rooms 0.000 
Size of rooms 0.004 
Safety 0.033 
Availability of stable 0.00! 
Availability of store 0.000 
The Kuruskal-Wallis test (Table 9 .16) performed on the above variables also confirmed 
the same results, that the three samples of population significantly differ in their 
opinions on satisfaction with their respective and different type of houses. 
Table 9.16: Analysis of variance of satisfaction for the three categories of house 
owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Satisfaction 0.0000 The three samples of 
Culture 0.0000 population 
Availability of barn 0.0000 significantly differ 
Delivery time 0.0000 in their opinions 
Women's entrance 0.0000 about their 
Location/size of kitchen 0.0000 satisfaction and the 
Location/size of latrine 0.0000 related factors in 
Number of rooms 0.0000 their different type 
Size of rooms 0.0000 of houses 
Safety 0.0000 
Stable 0.0000 
Store 0.0000 
Out of 40 people in this category, only two were the satisfied people. Both of them 
were satisfied with all the above mentioned critical factors (Annex 7, Chart 8). In the 
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unsatisfied group (Annex 7, Chart 9), comprising 38 people, expressed their marginal 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction over most of the correlated factors. To elaborate further, 
25 of the 38 unsatisfied people only marginally accepted their dissatisfaction some of 
the correlate factors, such as culture, barn, entrance, kitchen, latrine, number of rooms, 
size of rooms, stable and store. However some other correlated factors, such delivery 
and safety indicated a high proportion of unsatisfied people among these beneficiaries. 
Culture: It has already been discussed at length in the literature review and 
evaluation of the reconstruction programme that Yemen is a conservative country with 
centuries old culture. The researcher observed in his long stay in Yemen, that the 
Yemeni people are generally proud of their being one of the first countries to have 
accepted Islam as the state religion. They greatly value their ancient culture, religion 
and traditions. These attitudes are reflected in their everyday life, particularly their 
homes. The traditional houses present a complete picture of their culture, traditions, 
religion and techniques to minimise climatic discomfort in a temperate climate. It was 
no chance that the nearly I 00% people from the traditional category were found to be 
satisfied with their houses in every respect. On the other hand, the hand the 
government built turnkey and self-help are almost a contrast to the traditional houses. 
This is probably why the earthquake-affected people's dissatisfaction, with regards to 
culture is expressed not only in the literature review and evaluation of reconstruction 
programme earlier discussed in this study, but also in the statistical analysis presented 
in Section 9 .8. 
The inference, as presented in Section 9.8, is that most of the beneficiaries in both 
turnkey and self-help categories either marginally accepted the cultural aspects of their 
houses or did not accept it at all. All respondents from the traditional category found 
their houses as culturally acceptable. 
Delivery: The delay in delivery of first the emergency relief after the earthquake 
disaster, and later the reconstruction programme was another major cause of the 
earthquake affected people's dissatisfaction. Literature review shows that most of the 
disaster-affected waited for months to receive their promised houses. Many of them did 
not get them even after a long and patient wait as discussed under coverage. For those 
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who were lucky enough to receive the houses at long last, did not find them sufficient 
for their needs as discussed in the following paragraphs. The reasons of delay, 
uncertainty in receiving shelter, and later insufficiency of the house added up to the 
recipients dissatisfaction of the time taken by the government in delivering the houses. 
Statistical analysis discussed in Section 9.8 shows that majority of the dissatisfied 
beneficiaries found the delivery of the reconstruction programme unacceptable. 
The inference is that most of the beneficiaries of the government built houses found the 
delivery time as unacceptable. The traditional category people considered the delivery 
of their houses as acceptable. 
Size of rooms: The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 19) carried out examine the 
people's satisfaction with the size of rooms, showed that in the turnkey category 20% 
people were satisfied and the remaining 80% were not satisfied. In the self-help 
category 37.5% people were satisfied with the size of their rooms but 62.5% were 
unsatisfied. Among the traditional house owners 100% people were satisfied with the 
size of rooms in their houses. 
The inference to be drawn is, that size of rooms in the government built houses were 
not acceptable to majority of the beneficiaries. The traditional house owners felt that 
the size of rooms in their houses were fully acceptable to them. 
Number of rooms: The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 20) applied on the three 
samples showed that 10% people in the turnkey category were satisfied with number 
of rooms in their houses. The remaining 90% were unsatisfied with the number of 
rooms. In the self-help category 17.5% of the respondents were satisfied with the 
number of rooms in their houses while 82.5% were not satisfied. In the traditional 
category 100% were satisfied with the number of rooms in their houses. 
The inference is that most of the beneficiaries of the reconstruction programme did not 
think the few number of rooms in their houses as acceptable. The traditional house 
owners considered the number of rooms in their houses as acceptable. 
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Location and size of kitchen: The literature review presented earlier in this study 
shows us that the location and size of kitchen in a house is very important for the 
people of Yemen. The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 21) conducted to examine this 
aspect indicated that 5% of the turnkey category of respondents were satisfied with the 
location and size of the kitchens in their houses while 95% were unsatisfied. In the 
Self-help category 15% were satisfied with the location and size of kitchen and 85% 
were unsatisfied. In the traditional category all 100% respondents expressed their 
satisfaction with the location and size of kitchen in their houses. 
The inference to be drawn from the above analysis is that majority of the beneficiaries 
of the reconstruction programme considered the location and size of kitchens in their 
houses as not acceptable. On the other hand the traditional house owners thought the 
location and size of kitchens in their houses as fully acceptable. 
Location and size of latrine: The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 22) undertaken 
to determine the satisfaction of the three samples of population regarding their views 
about the location and size of latrine showed that 27.5% of the turnkey category people 
were satisfied while 62.5% were unsatisfied. Among the self-help respondents 35% 
recorded their views as satisfied 65% were the unsatisfied people. In the traditional 
category all 100% respondents expressed their satisfaction with the location and size of 
latrines in their houses. 
The inference to be drawn from the above analysis is, that the location and size of 
latrine was only marginally or not acceptable to most of the beneficiaries of the 
reconstruction programme. On the other hand the traditional house owners thought the 
location and size of latrines in their houses as fully acceptable to them. 
Availability of a store: The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 23) conducted to 
examine the satisfaction of the three categories of respondents with respect to 
availability of a store in the house indicated that only 5% of the turnkey people were 
satisfied while 95% were not satisfied. In the self-help category 15% of the 
respondents said that they were satisfied. The remaining 85% said that they were not 
satisfied with the house because of non-availability of the a store. In the traditional 
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category all 100% respondents expressed their satisfaction with their houses because of 
the availability of store. 
The inference is that the lack of a store in the government built houses was a major 
source of only marginal acceptability or non-acceptability for most of the beneficiaries 
of the reconstruction programme. On the other hand availability of a store in the 
traditional was one of the important causes for acceptability by their owners. 
Availability of barn: The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 24) carried out to find 
out the satisfaction of the three samples of the earthquake-affected community regarding 
the availability of a barn in the house showed that 12.5% of respondents from the 
turnkey category were satisfied while 87.5% were not satisfied for this reason. Among 
the self-help people 32.5% respondents said that they were satisfied in spite of the 
absence of a barn in their houses. The remaining 67.5% said that they were not 
satisfied in the absence of a barn. In the -traditional category 100% respondents 
expressed their satisfaction with their houses because all of them had barns in their 
houses. 
The inference is that the lack of barn in the government built houses was a major 
source of only marginal acceptability or non-acceptability for most of the beneficiaries 
of the reconstruction programme. On the other hand availability of a barn in the 
traditional was one of the important causes for acceptability by their owners. 
Availability of stable: Literature review shows that almost all rural Yemenis 
keep livestock and other domestic animals to have as much self-sufficiency in their 
agricultural and domestic activities as possible. 
The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 25) conducted to determine the satisfaction of the 
three samples of the earthquake-affected community regarding the availability of a 
stable in the house showed that 15% of respondents from the turnkey category were 
satisfied while 85% were not satisfied. In the self-help category 22.5% people 
responded that they were satisfied although there was no stable in their houses. The 
remaining 77.5% said that they were not satisfied in the absence of a stable. In the 
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traditional category 97.5% respondents expressed their satisfaction with their houses 
because all of them had stables in their houses. Only 2.5% mentioned about 
dissatisfaction on this account. 
The inference is that the non-availability of a stable in the government built houses was 
a major source of only marginal acceptability or non-acceptability for most of the 
beneficiaries of the reconstruction programme. The availability of a stable in the 
traditional house was one of the important causes for acceptability by their owners. 
Availability of a separate entrance for women: It is discussed in detail in the 
literature review that Yemen has a very conservative Islamic culture. The rural people 
forming almost 80% of the population are even more conservative. For them 
segregation of sexes is very important. All women are kept away from strangers or 
visitors from other tribes. The rooms and entrances to receive outsiders are therefore 
separate from rest of the family house. 
The Frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 26) conducted to determine the satisfaction of the 
three categories of respondents regarding the availability of a separate entrance for 
women in the house indicated that 30% of respondents from the turnkey category were 
satisfied while 70% were not satisfied. In the self-help category 35% people responded 
that they were satisfied although there was no separate for privacy of the women in 
their houses. The remaining 65% said that they were not satisfied in the absence of a 
separate entrance. In the traditional category 100% respondents expressed their 
satisfaction with their houses because their houses had separate entrances for women. 
The inference is that the absence of a separate entrance for women in the government 
built houses was a major source of only marginal acceptability or non-acceptability for 
most of the beneficiaries of the reconstruction programme. The availability of a 
separate entrance for women in the traditional house was one of the important causes 
for acceptability by their owners. 
Safety: The aspect of safety or earthquake-resistance of the houses in the study 
area has also been discussed in Section 9.8. Although the houses built during the 
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reconstruction programme are designed under earthquake-resistant techniques but the 
people had no clear concept about safety or vulnerability of their houses. Only small 
percentages of respondents from the turnkey and self-help categories acknowledged their 
satisfaction and acceptability of the houses because of safety consideration. Most of 
the respondents from all categories thought safety considerations of only marginally 
acceptable to them because no could say definitely how their houses will perform in the 
next earthquakes. It confirms that all three samples of respondents represent the same 
population because of their similar views about safety. 
The inference is, that the people of the earthquake-affected area in Yemen have low 
perception of the earthquake hazard and the vulnerability of traditional houses. It is 
because of this lack of awareness that they did not appreciate the earthquake-resistance 
of the government built houses. 
\ 
Changes: We have seen in the literature review that the beneficiaries of both 
turnkey and self-help houses carried out major changes in their houses to suit their 
needs. The few people who did not make any modifications or alterations were mostly 
those who could not afford them. 
The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 27) to examine the changes carried out in the 
different categories of houses was also one way to determine the people's satisfaction 
with reconstruction programme. The results indicated that 62.5% people in the turnkey 
category carried out major changes in their houses. In the self-help category 52.5% of 
the people carried out changes, while no one in the traditional category undertook any 
changes. 
The inference which can be drawn from then above analysis that the earthquake-affected 
people's low acceptability of the reconstruction programme is evident from the amount 
of changes carried out in their houses on a large scale. The traditional house owners 
did not undertake any changes in their houses which confirms their acceptability of their 
houses. 
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9.9.2 Constraints: It has been discussed in section 9.8 that the post-earthquake 
reconstruction programme was neither efficient nor effective. The government officials, 
when asked in their interviews about the reconstruction programme and to give their 
candid opinion, gave different perceptions. These respondents mentioned several 
constraints in programme implementation such as centralisation in decision taking, 
political interference, difficult working conditions, etc. The information based on these 
interviews was statistically analysed and is presented in this section. 
In response to the question, whether they were satisfied with the implementation of the 
reconstruction programme, the frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 28) showed that 20% of 
the government officials were satisfied with the implementation of the programme while 
80% were not satisfied. 
The correlation test (Table 9.16) indicated that there was a significant correlation of 
0.001 between constraints and programme implementation. The test determined that 
there were 4 satisfied (Annex 7 Chart 29) and 16 unsatisfied respondents (Annex 7, 
Chart 30). None of the 4 satisfied respondents thought that there were any constraints 
in programme implementation. Among the unsatisfied respondents, 14 thought that 
several constraints hampered the programme implementation in meeting its objectives. 
Table 9.17: Correlation of the programme implementation with other critical 
factors (government respondents) 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Significance 
Implementation Centralisation 0.008 
Constraints 0.001 
Working conditions 0.003 
The inference is that majority of the government respondents were not satisfied with the 
implementation of the post-disaster reconstruction programme in Yemen. It is also 
inferred that there were several constraints which influenced the programme in not 
meeting its objectives. These constraints, as pointed out by the respondents, are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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9.9.2.1 Centralisation in the government's decision taking: A Frequency test (Annex 
7, Chart 31) was conducted to examine what percentage of the government officials 
considered centralisation as a constraint. The test determined that 60% of the 
respondents agreed that centralisation in decision taking was one of the causes of the 
reconstruction programme not meeting its objectives. The rest 40% did not think that 
centralisation hampered the reconstruction programme. 
The Correlation test (Table 9 .17) showed that there was a significant correlation 
between centralisation and programme implementation. Only 1 of the 4 satisfied 
respondents (Annex 7, Chart 29) did not agree that centralisation caused any problems 
in programme implementation, but the other 3 satisfied respondents said that 
centralisation was a major constraint. In the unsatisfied group (Annex 7, Chart 30) of 
the government respondents 13 agreed that centralisation was a constraint in programme 
implementation. The rest 3 thought that it was not a constraint. 
The inference is that centralisation in decision taking did have its implications in the 
implementation of the reconstruction programme according to its objectives. 
9.9.2.2 Difficult working conditions: The government respondents mentioned in their 
interviews about the difficult working conditions with which they had to cope during 
implementation of the reconstruction programme. These difficulties included long 
working hours without adequate compensation, poor camping arrangements for the site 
staff, inadequate transport facilities and difficult accessibility of most of the villages in 
the mountainous terrain of the earthquake-affected area. 
The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 32) conducted to examine the government 
respondents' views about difficult working conditions showed that 65% of them agreed 
that the working conditions for the engineers and other field staff was a constraint in 
the implementation of the reconstruction programme. The other 35% respondents did 
not think that the working conditions hampered the programme in any way. 
The correlation test (Table 9.17) showed that there was a significant correlation of 0.003 
between working conditions and implementation. None of the 4 satisfied respondents 
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(Annex 7, Chart 29) thought that working conditions influenced the in programme 
implementation. In the unsatisfied group (Annex 7, Chart 30) of the government 
respondents 12 agreed that centralisation was a constraint in programme 
implementation, while the remaining 4 said working conditions were not a constraint 
to the programme. 
The inference is that an appreciable majority of the government respondents believe that 
· working conditions was a constraint for the reconstruction to meet its objectives. 
9.9.2.3 Political interference: Another constraint in implementation of the 
programme, which came to surface during interviews of the government respondents, 
was the political interference of senior government functionaries, members of the 
parliament and tribal sheikhs. 
The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 33) conducted to examine the government 
respondents' views about political interference revealed that 60% of them thought it was 
a constraint in the implementation of the reconstruction programme. The other 40% 
respondents did not think that there was any political interference in the implementation 
of the programme. 
The correlation test (Table 9.18) showed that political inteiference was a significant 
constraint (significance level 0.003) in programme implementation. The test found 8 
satisfied respondents (Annex 7, Chart 34) and 12 unsatisfied respondents (Annex 7, 
Chart 34). Among the satisfied respondents 4 thought political interference as a 
constraint in programme implementation. The other 4 thought that political interference 
was not a constraint. In the unsatisfied group of 12 officials, 10 considered political 
interference as a constraint in implementation of the reconstruction programme. The 
remaining 2 thought that there was no political interference. 
Table 9.18: Correlation of constraints with political interference (government 
respondents) 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Significance 
Constraints Political interference 0.012 
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The inference is that political interference was a significant constraint in deterring the 
implementation of the reconstruction according to its objectives. 
9.9.2.4 Donor's preferences: Literature review and interviews of the government 
officials identified another constraint, which some of the respondents considered to have 
influenced the reconstruction programme. This constraint was the preferences of certain 
donor's for certain type of projects and there implementation in a certain way. 
According to the government respondents, sometimes these preferences were contrary 
to the government's implementation plans but the government had no choice because 
the foreign assistance was usually conditional. 
The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 36) conducted to examine the impact of donors' 
preferences on the implementation of the programme revealed that 20% of the 
government respondents thought it was a constraint. The rest 80% respondents did not 
think that donors' preference was a major constraint. 
The inference is that the donors' preference was not a significant constraint in deterring 
the implementation of the reconstruction according to its objectives. 
9.9.2.5 Lack of experience of local contractors: Some of the government officials also 
mentioned in their interviews, the lack of experience of local contractors as a constraint 
in programme implementation. 
The frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 37) conducted to examine the impact of lack of 
experience of the local contractors as a constraint, indicated that 45% of the government 
respondents thought it was a constraint. The remaining 55% respondents did not think 
that local contractors' lack of experience in handling major reconstruction jobs was a 
constraint. 
The inference is that the lack of experience of the local contractors was not a significant 
constraint. 
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9.9.2.6 Lack of the communities appreciation of the programme: Some of the 
government respondents talked about the affected community's lack of appreciation and 
the consequent lack of cooperation, being a constraint in the implementation of the 
reconstruction programme. 
A frequency test (Annex 7, Chart 38) conducted to examine whether the earthquake-
affected community's lack of appreciation of the reconstruction programme was a 
constraint in programme implementation. The result indicated that 50% of the 
government respondents thought it was a constraint while the remaining 50% 
respondents did not think there was such a constraint. 
The inference is that the government respondents are equally divided in their views 
about the community's lack of appreciation of the reconstruction programme as a 
significant constraint. 
9.9.3 Summary of inferences: The post-earthquake reconstruction programme in 
Yemen failed to meet its objectives as confirmed by the analysis and discussions 
contained in this section. The reasons, based on the inferences drawn in the foregoing 
paragraphs in this section, can be summarised as follows: 
a) the reconstruction programme failed in providing coverage to all earthquake 
victims; 
b) the housing system, which formed major part of the reconstruction programme, 
was not fully utilised; 
c) the programme failed to create a positive impact on the earthquake victims 
because of inadequate coverage of the victims, belated delivery and several other 
factors; 
d) majority of the recipients of the government built houses (Turnkey and Self-
help) were not satisfied with the new houses. The low acceptability of these 
houses was mainly because they did not meet many of the needs of the local 
community. The main causes of dissatisfaction of the beneficiaries were in 
respect of the size and number of rooms, location and size of kitchen and 
latrine. The other complaints were about the non-availability of store, barn, 
stable and separate entrance for women. 
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d) most people in the earthquake area under study have low perception about the 
eanhquake hazard in their area and the vulnerability of traditional houses. The 
reconstruction programme also failed in creating the hazard awareness in the 
local people. The government built new houses, because of the beneficiaries' 
general dissatisfaction and lack of acceptability, created a negative impact. As 
a consequence quite a few of the recipients of government houses preferred to 
live in the traditional houses; and 
e) implementation of the reconstruction programme was impeded by several 
constraints such as centralisation in decision taking, political interference and 
difficult working conditions for the staff. These problems could probably be 
avoided if the government had not involved itself so heavily in programme 
implementation. 
9.10 Objective 4: to ascertain the role of the earthquake-victims in different 
phases of the reconstruction programme with the intention to elaborate how 
community management can enhance efficiency and effectiveness of such 
programmes 
This section will examine the role of the earthquake-victims in the reconstruction 
programme and how a community can contribute in the efficient and effective 
implementation of a development/reconstruction programme in their area. There were 
two phases of activities after the 1982 earthquake i.e. the short-term measures (initial 
responses) and the long-term measures (reconstruction programme). The earthquake-
affected community's role in the short-term measures is discussed in sub-section 9.10.1 
and its role in the long-term measures is discussed in section 9.10.2. The subsequent 
inferences are presented in Section 9.10.3 
9.10.1 Short-term measures: The short-term measures after the earthquake were the 
initial responses of the government and the earthquake-affected community. These 
responses have been discussed in section 9. 7 and are only summarised in the following 
paragraphs. 
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9.10.1.1 Initial responses of the earthquake-victims: The earthquake victims quickly 
responded to the post-disaster situation by meeting their immediate needs of temporary 
shelter and food. In Addition, as discussed in detail in Section 9.7, the community's 
response covered all victims. 
The inference is that the analysis of the earthquake-affected community's response after 
the disaster shows that the community were well aware of not only their immediate 
needs but also their responsibilities. This shows the earthquake-affected community's 
management skills in dealing with its problems. 
9.10.1.2 Initial responses of the government: The government~ response was late to 
reach the victims by which time the phase of immediate relief was nearly over. Besides, 
the government's emergency help could not cover all victims therefore created 
resentment and bitterness among the victims as discussed in the literature review and 
in Sections 9.8 and 9.9. 
The inference to be drawn is that the government was not well prepared to address the 
post-disaster situation despite the fact that the country is well known for earthquakes. 
It could not adequately meet one of its objectives of providing immediate relief to the 
earthquake victims. The government's inadequate response immediately after the 
earthquake, created a negative rather than a positive impact among the victims. 
9.10.2 Long-term measures: The long-term measures consist of the implementation 
of the reconstruction programme in which residential houses and some other 
infrastructure such as schools, health centres, water supply schemes, etc. were built for 
the earthquake victims. Literature review shows that the government had promised to 
rebuild 25,000 houses and to repair 17,000 house. In actual practice the government 
could provide only about 13,000 new houses and 3,000 repaired houses. · The low 
coverage of the victims and their low acceptability of the reconstruction programme is 
already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. 
The inference to be drawn from the above discussion is that the government could not 
sufficiently fulfil its objective of providing shelter to all earthquake victims. 
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9.10.3 Community's role in the reconstruction programme: The literature review and 
evaluation of the reconstruction programme have shown that the earthquake-affected 
community had very limited role in its implementation. This community's involvement 
in the reconstruction programme was also reviewed by collecting relevant field data and 
then statistically analysing it. The process of this analysis and the inferences drawn are 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
9.10.3.1 Location: The frequency analysis (Annex 7, Chart 13) shows that 100% 
respondents from the turnkey category agreed that the location of their houses was 
entirely decided by the government for which they consulted their sheikhs in a few 
cases. In the self-help category all 40 respondents agreed that the location of their 
houses was jointly decided by the government and the beneficiaries, mainly because the 
latter had to contribute the land for house building although sometimes they were 
represented by their sheikhs. In the traditional category all 40 respondents replied that 
the government was not involved in the location of their houses, and they themselves 
decided about it. 
The Kuruskal-Wallis test (Table 9.19) conducted to examine the people's views about 
the variable 'location', gave a significance level of 0.0000 which showed the difference 
between the three samples. This difference is probably due to the different ways the 
site selection is done in each case. 
Table 9.19: Analysis of variance of location of house for the three categories of 
house owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Location 0.0000 The three samples of population 
significantly differ in their 
opinions about the procedure for 
location of the site for their houses 
The inference is that in the turnkey houses, which form the bulk of the reconstruction 
programme, there was absolutely no community involvement. In the self-help category 
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the beneficiaries were involved because they had to contribute the land for their houses. 
This type of involvement cannot be considered as community management. The 
location of traditional houses was fully managed by the community and the government 
had abmlutely no role them. 
9.!0.3.2 Design: The frequency analysis (Annex 7, Chan 39) shows that 100% 
respondents from the turnkey and the self-help categories agreed that the designs of 
their houses were decided by the government and they were absolutely not consulted 
about it. Ill' the traditional category all 40 respondents replied that the government was 
absolutely not involved the design of their houses, and that these designs were entirely 
managed by the individual houses owners. 
The Kuruskal-Wallis test (Table 9.20) conducted to examine the people's views on the 
variable 'design', gave a significance level of 0.0000 which showed the difference 
between the three samples. This difference is probably due to the different ways of the 
management of design in each case. 
Table 9.20: Analysis of variance of design of house for the three categories of 
house owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Design 0.0000 The three samples of population 
significantly differ in their 
opinions about the procedure for 
design of their houses 
The inference is that both in the turnkey and self-help houses, there was absolutely no 
community involvement. The location of traditional houses was fully managed by the 
community and the government had absolutely no role in them. 
9.!0.3.3 Construction: The frequency analysis (Annex 7, Chan 40) shows that 100% 
respondents from the turnkey category agreed that the construction of their houses 
entirely carried by the government through contractors in which they were not involved. 
In the self-help category 100% respondents agreed that they had participated in the 
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construction of their houses. The literature review shows us that this involvement 
consisted of providing unskilled labour and local materials by the house owner. The 
supervision was however completely carried out by the government which suggests a 
relatively weaker role for the house owner in this category. In the Traditional category 
all 40 respondents replied that the construction of their houses was fully managed by 
them. 
The Kuruskal-Wallis test (fable 9.21) conducted to examine the people's views on the 
variable 'construction', gave a significance level of 0.0000 which shows the difference 
between the three samples. This difference is probably due to the different ways in of 
the management of construction in each case. 
Table 9.21: Analysis of variance of construction of house for the three categories 
of house owners 
Variable Significance Inference 
(Similarity by group) Alpha= 0.05 
Design 0.0000 The three samples of population 
significantly differ in their 
opinions about the procedure for 
design of their houses 
The inference to be drawn in this case that is the community had either no role or a 
weak role in the construction of the government implemented reconstruction 
programme. On the other hand the traditional house construction was fully managed 
by the community. 
9.10.4 Summary of inferences: The overall inference drawn at the conclusion of this 
section can be summarised follows: 
a) as discussed before in Section 9.7, the earthquake-affected community showed 
its management skills in its initial responses after the earthquake by providing 
itself with its temporary shelter, food and first-aid needs; 
b) the communities post-disaster response was not only immediate but it also 
provided coverage to the entire earthquake victims; 
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c) the government's emergency help, fully managed by the government was late 
and could not reach the victims immediately when they needed it most; 
d) the government managed emergency help did not cover all victims; 
e) All decision taking in most of the reconstruction programme, including 
infrastructure other than housing, such as schools, mosques, health centre, water 
supply and roads, was done by the government. 
f) There was no community participation in the turnkey programme, which was the 
major activity of the reconstruction programme. Community participation in the 
self-help houses was followed under a very didactic approach in which the 
beneficiaries were just told what they were supposed to do. 
g) All phases of implementation of the traditional houses, such as site selection, 
design and construction was fully managed by the community. 
9.11 Objective 5: to propose recommendations to serve as guidelines for the 
development and implementation of future reconstruction programmes for 
Yemen in particular and other countries facing similar problems in general 
This chapter was devoted to statistically analysing the field data and presenting the 
inferences in an objective manner. Chapter 10 discusses the results based on the 
evaluation of the reconstruction programme carried out in Chapter 8 and the inferences 
drawn from the analysis in this chapter. The last Chapter 11, presents the conclusions 
and recommendations in an objective way, for Yemen in particular, and other countries 
facing similar problems in particular. 
Summarv 
The government's emergency help immediately after the earthquake did not reach the 
victims on time and it did not cover all victims. The earthquake-affected community 
acted immediately to provide for the needs of the victims and covered all victims. The 
government implemented reconstruction programme was neither efficient nor effective; 
The reconstruction programme also failed to create earthquake hazard awareness among 
the victims. The earthquake victims had no involvement in the management of the 
government's emergency help, and very little involvement in most of the reconstruction 
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programme. It can therefore be concluded that there was no community rrumagement 
in the government's emergency help or the reconstruction programme. The 
reconstruction programme suffered from several constraints within the organisation 
which could probably have been avoided if the government was less involved in 
management of the programme. The community fully managed the implementation of 
the traditional houses and it was fully satisfied with these houses. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
"Who should draw the picture? The community should- not in the sense of actually 
drawing or reproducing it. There are photographic and reproduction methods available 
today, which are inexpensive and efficient - but in the sense of deciding the picture 
motif or theme". (Andreas Fuglasang, 1982) 
The 1982 earthquake in Yemen and the following immediate and long term measures 
to rehabilitate the surviving communities after the disaster presented an interesting case 
for detailed study. The nature and objectives of the study called for comprehensive 
field surveys in the disaster affected areas. Evaluation of the data collected from field 
surveys, and the bulk of discussion about the earthquake-victims and the following 
reconstruction programme is given in Chapter 8. Statistical analysis to test the 
hypothesis and the subsequent inferences are presented in Chapter 9. This chapter will 
summarise the findings of the previous two chapters and make an objective attempt to 
present the outcome. The conclusions drawn from the outcome will be discussed in the 
next chapter which will lead to the recommendations. 
10.1 The earthquake-victims 
The social evaluation and statistical analysis results show that the three categories of 
house-owners i.e. those living in the turnkey, self-help and traditional type of houses 
were not much different from each other in socio-economic and socio-cultural terms. 
The majority of them were poor people, with little education and major dependence on 
rain-fed agriculture earnings which is not very promising because of erratic rains. Their 
concepts of acceptability of the housing systems were also alike. They attached great 
importance to the location, design and sizes of their homes. They were equally keen 
about different components of a house such as the location and size of the kitchen, the 
location and size of the latrine, the availability of a store, a barn, a stable, a separate 
entrance for women, and a boundary wall to give some privacy to the inhabitants. 
Climatic comfort, appearance and affordability were the other major factors of their 
acceptability. 
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10.2 Housing in the study area 
The turnkey housing programme, fully funded by the government and distributed free 
of cost, came under strong criticism from the beneficiaries. These houses were not 
fully utilised and the beneficiaries still prefer to live in their traditional houses. Many 
of the beneficiaries were using the turnkey houses for other purposes than personal 
living such stable, barn, guest house, or for renting them out to tenants who are mostly 
outsiders. Others carried out major changes to suit their needs. The remaining few 
who did not carry out any changes, were mostly those poor people who could not afford 
any changes. Many turnkey house owners considered their houses as unaffordable and 
claimed that they would have made better and bigger houses if they were built by them. 
The self-help house owners, who contributed 30% to 50% of the total cost, were 
relatively more satisfied. Most of these houses were occupied by their original 
beneficiaries although quite a few of them had to make some additions and alterations 
to suit their individual needs. The self-help house owners were however more vocal 
about affordability because of the following reasons: 
a) they had to contribute an appreciable amount of money for their houses while 
the turnkey programme, being implemented simultaneously, was handing out the 
houses free of cost; 
b) they had to pay their contribution at a time when they were going through an 
economic crisis after the disaster; and 
c) they were paying a relatively higher price for a house in which they had little 
say in the design and size. 
The third category i.e. the traditional house owners were found to be the most satisfied 
people. They found their houses suitable and acceptable in almost every respect. These 
houses were also affordable to them because of their extremely low cost. Estimated 
costs of different types of houses under study are already presented in chapter 9. One 
common aspect observed among all categories of the respondents, and should be a 
matter of great concern to the government, was the people's lack of awareness about 
the safety of their houses against earthquakes. 
Those living in the government-built turnkey and self-help house, were not too 
confident about the earthquake-resistances of their new homes. The majority of them 
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simply said that only the next earthquake would tell whether their homes are safe. This 
attitude, at least for some respondents, could also be a corollary because of their overall 
disapproval of the reconstruction programme. In the traditional housing category only 
a few people were concerned about the safety of their homes, despite the fact that many 
of them saw several similar buildings raised to the ground or seriously damaged in the 
last earthquake. Most of them said that only Allah knew when the next earthquake will 
come and whether their homes will survive it. 
It can therefore be concluded from these discussions, and the previous chapters 8 and 
9, that the entire earthquake-victims had clear and similar perceptions about their shelter 
needs. Most of them were however not aware, and not concerned, that an earthquake 
is a geological event rather than simply an act of God against which preparedness is 
necessary. 
Considering the people's preferences for acceptability of their housing and affordability, 
on the basis of field observations where the researcher spent three years, some designs 
of different earthquake-resistance, costs and sizes were prepared. The purpose of this 
exercise was to examine what an earthquake-resistant house will cost if it were to be 
built in the light of the people's considerations for acceptability. The following sections 
discuss these designs in some detail. 
10.3 Some earthquake-resistant designs based on considerations of acceptability 
and affordability of the people living in the study area 
Table !0.1 presents three different type of houses of sizes 56.33 m2, 81.12 m2 and 
145.60 m2 keeping in view the above considerations. These houses were designed in 
the light of discussions held with the survivors of 1982 earthquake during field surveys, 
and by considering the use of different materials available in Yemen, and different 
strengthening methods in practice in the country to resist earthquakes of different 
magnitudes and intensities. These designs were based on traditional Yemeni designs. 
All these houses were initially single-storeyed houses on which further storeys could 
be added according to individual needs and resources. The heights of these buildings 
should however not be increased beyond the low-rise limits (not more than three 
storeys). 
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Table 10.1: Some proposed earthquake-resistant designs for Yemen 
Type of Foundations Columns Plinth beam Lintel beam Outer walls Inner walls Roofs 
House 
A Black Without Without Only above Solid cement Solid cement All wood 
basalt stone openings concrete concrete 
wall blocks blocks 
B As above As above Reinforced Continuous As above As above As above 
concrete 
c As above As above Without Only above Dressed Semi-dressed As above 
openings stone stone 
D As above As above Reinforced Continuous As above As above Reinforced 
concrete concrete 
E Reinforced Reinforced As above As above Solid cement Solid cement Reinforced 
concrete concrete concrete concrete concrete 
blocks blocks 
F As above As above As above As above Dressed As above As above 
stone 
Source: Field Surveys, 1994. 
The cost estimates of these houses, prepared on the basis of market rates prevailing in 
December 1994 are given in Table 10.1. Three different sizes of houses, made of 
different type of material have different costs. 
The small house of size 56.33 m2 consists of one bedroom, one divan or male visitors' 
room, one large kitchen, a toilet and a temporary shed for the domestic animals. 
The medium-sized house with a covered area of 81.12 m2 has two bedrooms, one divan, 
a large kitchen, a toilet, a stable for livestock and a courtyard for privacy of the women. 
The large house meant for an extended family system, a common practice in Yemen, 
with a covered area of 145.60 m2 comprises three bedrooms, one divan, one living 
room, two toilets, one store, one large stable and two courtyards. 
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Table 10.2: Cost estimates of proposed earthquake-resistant houses in Yemen 
Covered area A-type B-type C-type D-type E-type F-type 
(sqm) house house house house house house 
(US$) (US$) (US$) (US$) (US$) (US$) 
56.33 4,675 5,238 6,083 6,816 10,590 11,548 
81.12 6,732 7,544 8,761 9,816 15,250 16,630 
145.60 12,085 13,541 15,725 17,618 27,372 29,848 
Source: Field Surveys, 1994. 
10.3.1 A-type house: The least expensive of these houses has a covered area of 56.33 
m2 (Figure 10.1). This house comprises one bedroom with a divan, kitchen, toilet and 
temporary shed for use as a stable. The foundation walls are made of black basalt, a 
commonly used material in Yemen, covered with 10 cm thick plain cement concrete at 
plinth level. There are no ring beams or columns in this type of house. The lintels are 
provided only above' the door and the window openings. All inside and outside 
construction is in solid block masonry, the size of blocks being 40x20x20 cm'. The 
roof is made of plywood resting on wooden rafters. The wooden roof is covered with 
20 cm thick layer of clay. Polythene sheeting is placed in the middle of the soil, 10 cm 
from the top, to seal off water leakage and provide roof drainage. The estimated cost 
of this small house is about US$ 4,675 according to 1994 rates. The size of this house 
can be increased by adding another bedroom and a boundary wall. 
The cost of a medium sized house of covered area 81.12 m2, made of the same 
materials and by using the same construction method is estimated at US$ 6,732 (Figure 
10.2). This house also has the provision to be further extended whenever required. 
The cost of a large house of this category having a covered area of 145.60 m2 is about 
US 12,085 (Figure 10.3). This house can also be increased in size by adding another 
storey and a boundary wall and another stable for domestic animals. 
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Figure 10.1 ~ Proposed design of a small earthquake-resistant house for Yemen 
Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
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Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
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Source: Field Surveys, 1994 
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10.3.2 B-type house: This house also has black basalt stone masonry foundation. 
There is a reinforced concrete continuous beam at the plinth level and another at the 
lintel level. There are no concrete columns. Both inside and outside walls are made 
of solid cement concrete blocks of size 40x20x20 cm3• The roof is the same as for A-
Type house. 
The costs of small, medium and large houses in this category are estimated to be US$ 
5,238, 7,544 and 13,541 respectively. 
10.3.3 C-type house: The foundation wall is made of black basalt stone masonry. 
There are no columns or plinth beam. Reinforced concrete lintels are provided only 
above the doors and the windows. All outside walls are made of dressed stone and 
inside walls are made of semi-dressed stone. The roof is the same as for A-Type and 
B-Type houses. 
Estimated costs of small, medium and large houses are US$ 6,083, 8,761 and 15,725 
respectively. 
10.3.4 D-type house: The foundation wall is made of black basalt stone masonry. 
There are no columns. Reinforced concrete continuous beams are provided at plinth 
and lintel levels. All outside walls are made of dressed stone and inside walls are made 
of semi-dressed stone. The roof is made of reinforced concrete placed on reinforced 
concrete beams. 
The cost of small, medium and large houses are US$ 6,816, 9,816 and 17,618 
respectively. 
10.3.5 E-type house: The foundation is made of reinforced concrete in this type of 
house. Reinforced concrete continuous beams are provided at plinth and lintel levels 
together with reinforced columns for vertical support. All outside walls are made of 
solid block while the inside walls are made of hollow blocks, each of size 40x20x20 
cm3• The roof consists of reinforced concrete slab placed on reinforced concrete beams. 
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The small house in this case will cost US$ 10,590, the medium size US$ 15,250 and 
the large size 27,372. 
10.3.6 F-type house: The foundation, the continuous beams at plinth and lintel levels 
and the columns all are made of reinforced concrete. All outside walls are made of 
dressed stones while the inside walls are composed of hollow blocks. The roof slab and 
beams are made of reinforced concrete. 
The small, medium and large houses of this category are estimated to cost about US$ 
11,548, 16,630 and 29,848. 
Figure 10.4 presents the estimated costs of these houses with respect their earthquake-
resistance based on literature survey. 
Table 10.3: Comparison of government built houses with traditional houses and 
experimental designs 
Housing Typo Main building Eltpeeted ~&e in an App-oximate Estimated cost of a house 
Category materials earthquake unit costs US$ 
US$/sqm 
Modc:n.te s.~~ Smolt ~dium Lu,. 
56.33 sqm 8I.l2"1m 145.((1 sqm 
Government T""""y Blocb, a:rnent, 0 I 250 14,082 20,280 36,400 
aggn:gatc, 
reinfordng steel 
Se!f·l"clp Blocks, cement I 2 209 U,76S 115,942 30,409 
ag~gate, 
reinforcing steel, 
wood 
Private Old, mostly in Stone, clay, tn:e 4 s !:W 6,760 9,734 17,472 
rural aiCIIS branclles (economic) 
24 1,352 1,947 3,494 
(r~JW~cial) 
New, rnosdy in Stone, ce~nt, 3 4 ISO ·~· 13,790 24,752 suburban areu aggregate, 
reinforcing S!ecl, 
clay 
Proposed A Blocks, o:mcrtt, 2 3 83 4,675 6,732 12,085 
wood, stone 
B Stone, cc:ment, wood 2 3 
" 
5,238 7,5<4 13,541 
c Blocks, <;emern, I 2 108 6,083 8,761 15,725 
wood, reinforecd 
s~l. aggresatc, 
'""" 
D Stone:, cern::nt, I 2 121 6,816 9.816 17,618 
wood, rcinfon:cd 
steel, aggr<:gatc, 
E Blocks. cemc:r:u., 0 I 188 10,590 15,2.50 27,372• 
reinforced 'lee!, 
aggregate, $tone 
p Stone:, cern::n~. 0 I 205 11,548 16,630 29,848 
aggrcgatc, n:inforocd 
steel 
Notes: 0: undamaged; I: slight; 2: moderate; 3: heavy; 4: partial destruction; 5: 
total collapse. Economic cost: cost based on market rates. Financial cost: the 
cost actually borne by the owner. 
310 
Chapter Ten 
Earthqtwke inr~n~il)' JvlSK (epicentre) 
vii l'iii X xi xii 
30000 
v vi vii viii ix 
Earthquake intensiry MSK (shallow earthquakes) 
20000 
lOOOO 
0 
7 8 
Ennhquakc nw~ni!udc (Richter s<:alc) 
Figure 10.4: Earthquake-resistance of structures vs cost 
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Table 10.3 presents a comparison of houses built during the reconstruction programme 
(turnkey and self-help) with the private traditional houses and the experimental designs 
prepared by the researcher. The assessment of earthquake-resistance of these houses 
is based on literature review of the information available from several sources such as 
Spence and Coburn (1987), Arya (1991) and Coburn and Spence (1992). 
According to the figures available from EOR records, the turnkey houses on the average 
cost US$ 250 per m2 while the Self-help houses cost about US$ 209 per m2 based on 
the prevalent market prices in 1994. The market price of a traditional house, built of 
much cheaper and locally available materials, comes out to be about US$ 120 per m2• 
This cost is drastically curtailed in actual practice because of the local and almost free 
availability the required construction materials. The labour cost is also practically 
insignificant because the rural people build their houses by themselves. The only real 
money is spent on transporting the material to the building site and in buying doors, 
windows, Yemeni arches (qamariyyahs) and fixtures and fittings for the kitchen and 
latrine. Discussions with the traditional house owners and local engineers revealed that 
the actual or financial cost of these houses for the owners was not more than 20% of 
the economic cost. This is one of the major factors for the Yemeni people to prefer the 
traditional houses. Further discussion on the traditional houses and their vulnerability 
to earthquakes is given in Section 10.4.3. 
The above comparison induces us to look at our hypothesis in the light of evaluation 
and analysis of the field data. 
The hypothesis has earlier been stated as: 
'Efficient and effective reconstruction in an earthquake zone cannot be undertaken 
without community management'. 
For the convenience of interpretation, the definitions of some of the key words used in 
the hypothesis, and relevant to the following Table I 0.4, can be summarised in the 
following terms: 
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Efficient: The infrastructure: 
i) built with the least cost; 
ii) in minimal time; and 
iii) affordable to the users. 
Effective: The infrastructure should be: 
i) risk minimising (eanhquake-resistant); 
ii) fully utilised; 
iii) acceptable to the users; and 
iv) providing full coverage. 
Community management: The affected community's close involvement in decision 
taking and panicipation in every stage of the reconstruction work such as planning, 
siting, designing and construction. 
The following Table 10.4 is based on the information given in Table 10.3. It attempts 
to examine the government built housing, during the reconstruction programme, with 
the traditional housing. 
Table 10.4: Comparison of government housing with traditional housing in 
Yemen with respect to hypothesis 
llouinf, r,. EffoxtiY<l Efr~ient Community ll'llllll.lemcal 
e-tt:Jory 
""'' 
Tmdy Afford- ..... Fully A=p- Plm· Dcai&n Loootion c.... .... 
delivery ability 
•"""' 
utililtd ~~. .... (shin&) 
""" Rcaia-
~~ 
a.~- r"""'' lli&h No No Hi&h No (rn.jor No No No No No modiroca· 
-Aided .elf· Modo::n.&e No No Modcnw Yu (with 
""' 
No No ... ,, 
"""' O.lp rnoo:tir..:~~· fully 
-PriVIIe TraditLonal L- y., y., No Ya y., Yu y., Yu y., 
10.4.1 Turnkey houses: The above Table 10.4 shows that although the government 
built turnkey houses were probably resistant against some severe eanhquakes, but they 
could understandably not leave any positive impact on the their beneficiaries in 
particular, and the other people in panicular. This is because of their high cost (which 
made them unaffordable), belated delivery, and lack of acceptability for cultural and 
several other reasons discussed in detail in the previous chapters. One of the reasons 
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for high cost of these houses was the use of mostly imported material as shown in 
Table 10.3. A very didactic approach was applied while building these houses and the 
users were not involved at any stage of implementation of these this housing 
programme. No wonder that these houses remained unoccupied for a long time after 
completion and the beneficiaries started using them only after major modifications. 
10.4.2 Self-help houses: The aided self-help houses were probably strong enough to 
survive moderate earthquakes. These houses were also delivered much later than the 
scheduled delivery time. Though relatively cheaper when compared with the Turnkey 
houses, the beneficiaries still found their cost prohibitive for private building. This 
housing category was also considerably dependent on the use of imported materials but 
to a lesser degree than the Turnkey houses. The users were involved in the 
implementation of these house to some extent. These houses were relatively more 
acceptable to their beneficiaries and they were almost fully utilised on completion and 
handing over, although most of the users had to carry out some additions and alterations 
to suit their individual needs. 
10.4.3 Traditional houses: The traditional houses were found to be vulnerable to even 
moderate earthquakes which made them a serious hazard for their occupants. The 
people living in the earthquake-affected areas in Yemen have already suffered bitterly 
because of such construction. Another similar experience may cause even more serious 
damage because a number of the existing traditional houses must already have been 
shaken by the last earthquake. Even a light tremor can be fatal for the residents for 
these houses which has a probability of once in 25 years. These houses truly represent 
the Yemeni culture, traditions and needs. The owners take all decisions in their 
location, design and building. Such houses are usually built in different stages 
according to the immediate needs and availability of funds with the individuals. The 
economic cost of such houses (the cost based on prevalent market rates) is not very 
low. However, since most of the rural Yemenis are familiar with simple construction 
techniques required in a traditional house, and all materials are locally available at 
almost no cost, their tlnancial cost (the cost actually paid by the owner) is affordable 
even for a poor person. The main materials used in these houses are stone, clay and 
wood. 
314 
____ _j 
Chapter Ten 
Most of the rural Yemen has mountainous topography which makes availability of 
building stones easier. Clay is also easily available almost everywhere at no cost. 
Timber could be a costly item if purchased from market. However in the absence of 
any Jaws against cutting trees, the people go out and cut any tree not owned by an 
individual. Some trees are also grown on fannlands for shade and for use in house 
construction. The trunks and larger branches are used as beams while the smaller 
branches are used as rafters or purlins. The people carry out house construction, or the 
construction of a mosque or a Qur' anic school at such a time, when they are they not 
very busy in their agricultural farms. The most suitable times are usually the rainy 
season, when crops have been cultivated and the time for harvesting is still a long way 
off. The extended family system is very helpful in such activities when all male and 
female members of the family, including children, join in with the construction work. 
The traditional houses are very popular among their owners. They are very comfortable 
in the local temperate climate where there is a vast difference between the day and 
night temperatures. These houses have abundant space not only for the family needs 
but also for the domestic animals, storage of fann produce and fodder for the livestock, 
etc. Most of these people however do not have a clear concept about the vulnerability 
of their houses. The real need therefore seems to be an awareness and appreciation of 
the seriousness of the earthquake hazard for their lives and property. This awareness 
is needed as a preparedness measure not only for the welfare of the people living in the 
earthquake zone, but also for the government of Yemen, in order to minimise the 
chances of yet another inevitable disaster after the 1982 earthquake and the two other 
disasters of a different kind, the 1990 Gulf War and the 1994 civil war. 
As a consequence of the above discussion, and the evaluation and analysis contained 
in the foregoing Chapters 8 and 9, the review of the post 1982-earthquake government 
implemented reconstruction programme can be concluded and summarised in the 
following words that: 
i) it was not efficient; 
ii) it was not effective; and 
iii) the affected community was not given an opportunity to manage the programme 
despite the fact that it had well demonstrated its initiative and management skills 
in the form of initial responses immediately after the earthquake. 
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These conclusions lead us to delve into the concept of the value of safety and how 
individuals perceive it. The discussion on this topic is briefly presented in Section 10.5. 
10.5 The value of life and safety 
According to Jones-Lee (1989) the words safety and risk are so widely used and in so 
many different ways that it becomes necessary to define them. 
Safety is frequently related to human life. In this study however this word is intended 
to cover not only the safety of human life but also the property and economic resources 
of individuals and countries. Risk is a variable against safety. The greater the risk, the 
less the safety in terms of human life or property or both. Most people consider life 
exceedingly precious. Still quite often we see that everyone accepts small risks to his 
own life and to the life of his dear ones in return for some benefits such as saving of 
money or effort or some other gains (Bergstrom, 1982). Not only individuals but even 
societies continually make decisions demonstrating that the people are willing to make 
exchanges for safety and their other needs (Blomquist, 1982). 
Economics plays a vital part in a discussion about life and safety. An improved safety 
standards can be achieved only at a cost which requires the curtailment of certain other 
needs. The more a society or an individual spends on safety the less will be available 
for other needs such education, health and recreation, etc. Considering all these factors, 
most people prefer lower rather than higher levels of exposure to the risk of death or 
injury (Jones-Lee, 1989). It follows that the individual or social choice of an optimal 
level of safety in any context has a significant economic dimension. 
Even the most humane and affluent societies cannot afford to pay for apparently 
beneficial improvement in standards if they are too expensive in comparison to the 
benefits to be drawn out of them. The necessity of such decisions suggests that even 
in the matters of life and death their must be a logic of choice sometimes described as 
pricing the priceless (Bergstrom, 1982). The economic considerations require a decision 
concerning the appropriate trade-off or balance between various needs and the scarce 
resources. The underlying principle is how much an individual is willing to pay to have 
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better safety standards against a risk such as the earthquake hazard. The fundamental 
input to cost benefit analysis, is in all cases in an individuals willingness to pay. 
Bergstrom (1982) and Lee-Jones (1989) define willingness to pay as an individual's 
decision closely related to his marginal rates of substitution of wealth for physical risk. 
The most commonly employed principle of allocative decision-making is the cost-
benefit analysis in which an individual's life is valued in terms of human capital 
defined as the expected present value of his future earnings (Jones-Lee, 1976). 
However when we are dealing with human lives, it is very important to consider their 
common perceptions. These perceptions can be collective when infrastructure other 
than housing such water supply systems, sanitation, hospitals, roads and schools are 
under consideration. But for housing individual perceptions and their preferences are 
of great significance as seen from the data evaluation and analysis presented in the last 
two chapters. 
The inferences drawn in the last chapter clearly indicate that the people living in the 
earthquake--affected area place significant importance to the cultural and physical 
aspects of the their houses but they are not very clear about the persisting earthquake 
hazard in their area and most of them are not too concerned. The need is therefore to 
Jet them acknowledge the risk they unknowingly face in their everyday life but tend to 
be ignorant about it. 
Experts on the subject of value of life, such as Jones-Lee (1989), are of the opinion that 
individuals usually like to spend a small amount to achieve improved standards of 
safety. This is perhaps because of the reason that the money they spend is something 
physical which they can feel, whereas any assurance of improved safety is only 
imaginary. It therefore takes an effort to convince the people to spend more for better 
safety. These efforts can be really arduous when dealing with a conservative and 
primitive society, such as the rural Yemenis. This issue however does not seem to be 
as difficult as one would expect it to be for the following reasons: 
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a) the Yemeni people are generally familiar with simple building construction 
techniques. This has earlier been acknowledged by Davis (1978) in a 
generalised way by saying that the rural people are usually skilled in 
fundamental building skills; 
b) the building materials of their choice are also locally available at almost no cost; 
and 
c) as the literature review has revealed, they have been making earthquake-resistant 
buildings in the past. They turned to decorating their houses and ignored safety 
only in the later years, when they did not experience an earthquake disaster for 
a very long time. The way a humane government can help these people is by 
information dissemination through media, education, workshops and technical 
assistance programme with emphasis on the following two points: 
i) creating awareness about the earthquake hazard and the vulnerability of 
their houses; and 
ii) introducing simple techniques of improving the earthquake-resistance of 
their homes at no cost or very little cost. 
The real job for the government seems to be to motivate these people to use the simple 
and almost no-cost earthquake-resistant building techniques which are not alien to them 
and some of which have been used by their forefathers. According to Bergstrom 
(1982), such a motivation requires a humane government and its willingness to use its 
resources funds on creating awareness and motivation in the community to improve 
their safety conditions. 
Final conclusions and recommendations are presented in the next and final chapter. 
Summary 
It is not possible to mitigate the risk of disaster in a hazard-prone area, without the local 
community's active participation. This involves the individual's perception of the 
hazard risk and how much they are willing to trade off against the relative safety. In 
Yemen the problem of the people's willingness to pay seems to be less serious because 
of their ancient traditions of making earthquake-resistant houses. They only gave up 
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the safer techniques when disastrous earthquakes did not occur for a Iong time. The 
need is therefore to revive these people's earlier awareness and the;~ re-use of safer 
techniques. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
"If genuine change is desired, it will occur only through the social mechanisms for 
change which the community has established and to which it is accustomed". 
(Andreas Fuglasang, 1982) 
The literature review, field survey and observations, evaluation and analysis, and results 
and discussions, contained in Chapters 2 through 10 lead us to draw certain conclusions 
about the post-earthquake reconstruction programme in Yemen. These conclusions will 
be used to make some recommendations. The conclusions are given in the following 
paragraphs. The recommendations will be presented towards the end of this chapter. 
11.1 Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the earlier discussions: 
11.1.1 Earthquakes and secondary hazards 
a) Earthquakes are one of the most serious natural hazards. 
b) Earthquakes trigger off a series of secondary hazards such as landslides, 
rockfalls, liquefaction, subsidence, industrial fires and dam failures which add 
to the severity of this hazard. 
11.1.2 Causes of earthquakes 
a) The causes of earthquakes are not simply acts of God. 
b) Subsurface geological events are mainly responsible for earthquakes. 
c) Some artificial causes can also sometimes be responsible for earthquakes but 
such earthquakes are usually insignificant and localised. 
11.1.3 Earthquake prediction 
a) Earthquakes are unpredictable in most cases. 
b) Scientists' efforts in predicting earthquakes have not met much success to date. 
c) Even if it were possible to predict earthquakes accurately in terms of magnitude, 
intensity, location and time, only life losses could be saved but not the economic 
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losses which can be staggering in some cases. This reason makes it essential 
to concentrate on protection from earthquakes rather than their prediction. 
11.1.4 Causes of earthquake disasters 
a) Earthquakes are natural events which cannot be averted. 
b) There is no change in the world geology. It is the man-made structures which 
are responsible for earthquake losses. This rising earthquake losses (Figure 
11.1) and other natural disasters have prompted the United Nations to declare 
the period 1991-2000 as the decade for disaster reduction. 
Fatal Earthquakes by Decade 
60% .. ··· 
%of 50% ............................................... . 
Earthquakes 
M>6.0, 
on Land 40% ............................... .. 
(or near shore), 
Occurring 
each Decade 30% 
20% 
10%. 
0., •• 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Number of 
Earthauakes: 191 146 189 202 188 212 228 223 181 
Figure 11.1: The world's earthquake problem is increasing mainly because of man-
made structures 
Source: Cobum and Spence, 1992 
11.1.5 Earthquakes disasters and low-income countries 
a) Most of the life losses due to earthquakes occur in low-income and lower 
middle-income countries. 
b) The causes of life and property losses in such countries are usually the peoples' 
lack of awareness about the earthquake hazard, lack of concern about 
vulnerability of their homes, and continued use of unsafe building practices. 
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c) The main causes attributable to the governments of such countries include their 
lack of concern for creating awareness about the hazard in their people living 
in earthquake zones, and the lack of application of any building controls; 
11.1.6 Earthquake-resistant designs 
a) It is not possible to make earthquake-proof structural designs because great 
earthquakes of magnitude 8· and above cause total collapse of infrastructure. 
This leads to the need for earthquake-resistant designs. 
b) The standards of earthquake-resistance of structures vary from one geographic 
region to another depending upon the probability and intensity of severe 
earthquake in each region. Safety standards of structures also vary according 
to the type of buildings such as occupancy, important and hazard. 
11.1. 7 Infrastructure of greater concern 
a) The important and hazard buildings are much fewer in number than the 
occupancy buildings and are usually public owned. Such buildings are almost 
always state controlled and application of the required safety codes can be more 
strictly applied. 
a) The main source of concern are the privately owned occupancy buildings, 
particularly those located in the low-income and lower middle-income countries, 
in which cultural and climatic needs usually take priority over safety 
considerations. 
11.1.8 Impact of the reconstruction programme in Yemen 
The post-earthquake reconstruction programme failed to create any positive impact on 
the earthquake-victims because of the following reasons: 
a) It was not efficient in the sense that: 
it was not cost effective (Figure 11.2); 
it was not completed in minimal time; and 
it was not affordable. 
b) Although it was risk minimising but it was not effective in the sense that: 
buildings were not fully utilised; 
it was not acceptable to the users; and 
it did not provide coverage to all earthquake victims. 
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c) It was not managed by the community in the sense that: 
'·"' •/) 
.) 
·: 
.. 
·/; 
0 
') 
the community had no pan in decision taking in the location of Turnkey 
programme, which included houses and some other infrastructure, 
forming the bulk of the reconstruction programme (about 80%); 
the community had absolutely no say in the design of housing (hnllt 
Turnkey and Self-help) or any other infrastructure; and 
the community had no say in the construction of the Turnkey 
programme. 
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Figure. 11.2: Cost comparison of government-built houses with traditional houses 
The 1 ·"pact of the reconstruction programme in Yemen is not different from sinular 
progr'::nmes in some other low-income and lower middle-income countries. Liter:uun~ 
revie'" ~haws that most of these programmes have generally failed to achieve their mai 11 
objec ·. ;es of: 
a) ,nforming the affected communities about the risk of earthquakes which could 
·Je repeated in their respective areas anytime based on the seismicity of the :~r~ 1 ~: 
b) ·;onvincing the majority of the earthquake victims of the importance of ustug 
c:arthquake-resistant techniques in building their houses and other infrastructtut~ 
Nhich would minimise life and property losses; and 
c) ·;onvincing the concerned governments in not only creating hazard awareness 
among the people but also in the application of certain building controls ht 
minimise losses in future earthquakes. 
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11.2 Suggested measures 
Most experts agree on the following general measures which the governments of 
earthquake-prone countries can take to minimise the risk of earthquake disasters 
(Cobum and Spence, 1992): 
11.2.1 Earthquake prediction: There is no need for wasting resources, particularly in 
• 
the case of poorer countries, on earthquake prediction. 
11.2.2 Safety culture: Creation of a safety culture through legislation and by 
encouraging individual groups, private organisations and other social and cultural groups 
to help in informing the people about the consequences of earthquakes, and about the 
availability of some simple techniques for improving the strength of buildings against 
earthquakes. 
National disaster preparedness plans can be made to reduce future earthquake losses by 
taking several measures such as identifying the role of engineers, architects, geologists, 
economists and other experts for the integrated safety plans. 
11.2.3 Construction controls: Minimum standards for building design and construction 
can be specified through legislation to ensure a safe environment. Codes of practice 
for buildings should regulate all buildings to be based on seismic design. These codes 
should be under constant review for further improvement. The application of building 
codes in design and construction should be carefully monitored and there should be 
penalties for not following these codes. Engineers, architects, building owners and 
others involved in building design and construction should be aware of the 
consequences of not applying seismic design codes. The concerned authorities should 
be capable of checking building designs and other safety measures during construction 
and should be able to regulate and enforce the specified building codes. Life spans of 
buildings should also be specified during which inspection at regular intervals to assess 
the condition of building should be carried out. If the building under inspection is 
found to be deteriorating in maintenance standards which may affect its safety against 
an earthquake, mandatory repair measures should be suggested which should be 
monitored by the concerned municipal authorities. 
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11.2.4 Management of existing building stock: The existing buildings can be surveyed 
by engineers to categorise them according to their degree of vulnerability to 
earthquakes. The categorisation should be on the basis of improvement measures 
required to make these building safe. Those buildings which cannot be strengthened 
economically should be recommended for demolition. The landlords can be made 
responsible to improve the existing building stock through legislation and encouraged 
through the provision of soft loans. Poorer people can be given grants to improve the 
safety of their buildings. Insurance of buildings is another measure which can be 
applied to achieve a safer building environment. 
11.2.5 Education and training: Earthquake-prone countries can introduce the study of 
earthquakes and their consequences at different levels of education. Earthquake 
engineering and earthquake-resistant designs can be made part of the university syllabi. 
Vocational training and refresher courses for engineers in practice is also useful to 
improve their knowledge of earthquake issues and solutions. 
11.2.6 Community awareness: Community awareness of earthquake risks and the need 
for protection measures against possible losses is essential to get public support for all 
government activities in this regard. This can be achieved through community 
information campaigns, exposure of earthquake issues on mass media, speeches on 
earthquakes and protection measures at different other forums including educational 
institutions. 
11.2.7 Engineering research: Continued engineering research to increase knowledge 
about earthquakes and to improve the methods to protect against earthquakes losses 
should be a continuous process. Seismological records can be improved by establishing 
seismological observatories which record information about even minor earthquakes. 
11.2.8 Financial allocations: The unpredictable nature of earthquakes requires that 
earthquake-prone countries should keep special budgets to provide for relief and 
emergency needs in the case of a disaster. Earthquake risk analyses indicate the 
probable amount of earthquake damage to be expected in the next 10, 25, 50 or 100 
years. This data can be used to keep provisions for earthquake losses and protection 
measures. 
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11.2.9 Isoseismal maps and microzoning: Preparation of isoseismal maps and 
microzoning is discussed in Chapter 8. These information recording techniques can be 
well utilised in development planning for buildings and other infrastructure. 
The measures for engineers are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
11.3 Recommendations 
Figure 11.3 shows the measures prescribed by UNDRO (1979) for reducing the 
catastrophic effects of earthquake. Arya (1991), Coburn and Spence (1992) and Arya 
(1994) have described such measures in more detail which governments and engineers 
can take in mitigating the hazard. Some of these measures are discussed above while 
the rest have earlier been discussed in the literature review. 
All these measures seem to be of immense importance. Yet none of them seems always 
to succeed, as has been seen in the case of Yemen and learnt during literature review, 
if the people living in earthquake zones are not aware or concerned about the hazard. 
In view of earlier discussions and above it follows that the main task for the 
government of Yemen lies in creating an awareness about the lingering hazard among 
the people living in the earthquake zone. This awareness should be linked with their 
feeling of concern about the vulnerability of their homes which can be lethal in the next 
earthquake and which can come any time. This awareness will in effect be only a 
revival process because they have used the earthquake-resistant techniques in the past. 
Several measures can be used to achieve these goals. Some of these measures are 
described below: 
11.3.1 Preparedness measures 
a) The researcher observed during his field surveys that the Y emeni people are 
very fond of watching television programmes. They are even more engrossed 
in TV programmes during their qat chewing sessions in the afternoons. The TV 
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Figure 11.3: UNDRO's proposed planning for the mitigation of earthquake disasters 
327 
Chapter Eleven 
programmes in Yemen are mostly based on political activities in and around the country 
or some entertainment programmes. This hobby or habit can be very usefully exploited 
by showing some documentary films or plays which infortn the people about the 
earthquake hazard in their area and the fragility of their traditional homes. 
b) Many Y emenis are now realising the importance of education and more children 
are going to schools than in the past. The subject of earthquakes, with particular 
reference to Yemen, can be introduced in the school curriculum to create the 
awareness from an early age. 
c) Traditional earthquake-resistant building techniques used by the Yemenis in the 
past can be revived by holding village level workshops. 
d) Training programmes can be organised for the local masons for using 
earthquake-resistant techniques in the traditional construction by using local 
materials and local tools. 
11.3.2 Post-disaster measures 
In the case of a future disaster the affected community should be allowed a much 
stronger role in the reconstruction works. The poor people can be helped with building 
loa11s to be repaid in easy instalments. Grants can be given to extremely needy people 
in special cases, provided the facility is not misused. 
Community involvement is mistaken by many as merely infortning the concerned 
community that a certain programme will be implemented by the government in their 
area. In such cases the people's role is no more than therapeutic. The previous 
discussion shows us that a similar role was given to the beneficiaries of the so-called 
self-help house in the last reconstruction programme. This type of weak role is not 
very productive to achieve positive results, as seen in this study. 
The following strengths of the earthquake-affected community have already been 
discussed in the previous chapters: 
a) management skills while providing for its temporary shelter needs immediately 
after the earthquake; 
b) mutual cooperation shown in the last earthquake when the people, whose houses 
were badly damaged, were provided shelter by their friends or neighbours; 
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c) building skills in constructing traditional houses and other similar buildings; 
d) the knowledge and use of locally available construction materials; and 
e) the knowledge and skills of cost saving on procuring materials and labour house 
building. 
These are all very vital strengths for the community to manage its house building 
programmes. The only weakness this community has is its lack of awareness and 
concern about the eanhquake hazard in the area. This awareness can be revived, 
because it already existed in the past, by employing several low-cost measures some of 
which are discussed above. 
It can be said with conviction that as a consequence of this awareness and 
empowerment in the future reconstruction programmes, this community is capable of 
making earthquake-resistant houses and other infrastructure which will provide: 
a) a safe building environment to ensure safer life for them; 
b) positive affects on the local economy because the reconstructed houses will have 
longer lives; and 
c) better chances for survival and improvement of the country's economy as the 
scarce resources could be used for other public services such as health, 
education, etc. 
d) an example for other low-income and lower middle-income countries, located 
in eanhquake zones, and facing similar problems. 
This thesis refers to the post-eanhquake reconstruction in Yemen, a low-income country 
with mostly non-engineered traditional buildings. Societies and economic conditions 
vary from country to country. The findings and recommendations contained in this 
chapter are therefore valid for Yemen and other countries with similar structures and 
similar socio-economic conditions. 
11.4 Further research 
The interview of the government engineers surfaced several problems faced by them in 
the implementation of the reconstruction programme. These problems are discussed in 
detail in the literature review and the following chapters on evaluation and analysis. 
These difficulties include a wide range of problems such as: 
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a) centralisation in the government's decision making; 
b) political interference in the works and house allotment procedures; 
c) donor's preferences about projects, their location and the construction 
techniques; 
d) lack of experience of the local contractors; 
e) lack of the community's appreciation of the programme; 
f) tribal rivalries among the earthquake affected community; and 
g) harsh working conditions. 
Further research in these areas, which could prove helpful in the Yemeni government's 
implementation of similar work in future and other countries facing similar problems, 
will be interesting. 
Summary 
Sometimes the solutions to our problems are relatively more simple than we presume. 
In reconstruction and development of earthquake-prone or earthquake-affected areas, the 
local people's awareness of the hazard is the primary factor to mitigate the risk of 
future disasters. The government's efforts in information dissemination concerning the 
hazard can be vital in creating awareness among people. The development and 
reconstruction in such areas can meet its objectives of having a safer environment 
through: 
a) the local communities' awareness of the hazard; and 
b) the local communities' empowerment (Meethan&Kevin, 1995) and management 
to build their own houses by using earthquake-resistant techniques. 
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Annex 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE FORMS 
1982 Earthquake Disaster in Dhamar Governorate of Yemen and 
the Subsequent Reconstruction and Development Programme 
QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 1-A: BENEFICIARIES OF TURN KEY HOUSES 
Card number: Date: 
Location: (village/town) District: 
Respondent: Age: years 
Education Level: 0 1 2 3 I 4 I 5 
(0: illiterate; 1: primary; 2: middle; 3: secondary; 4: above) 
Occupation: ________ Average Annual Income YR _____ _ 
Number of Dependants _____ Surveyor __________ _ 
======================================= 
1. Was your home fully or partly damaged in the earthquake? 
a: fully damaged; 
b: partly damaged. 
2. What did you do immediately after the disaster? 
a: made temporary shelter yourself; 
b: repaired your old house; 
c: moved with friends or relatives; 
d: waited for government help; 
e: other (specify)----------
3. What material did you use in making your temporary shelter? 
a: tents; 
b: blankets; 
c: zinc sheets; 
d: wood; 
e: material recovered from debris of the old house; 
f: other. 
4. If your answer to question 2 above is 'a' or 'b' what was the cost of providing 
temporary shelter? 
YR _______ _ 
5. Did you use any skilled or unskilled labour in making your temporary shelter? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
6. Who provided the emergency help? 
a: self; 
b: government; 
c: other (specify) ______ _ 
7. What kind of help was provided by the above source/s? 
Source* 
Type of help 1 2 3 
a: building materials 
b: tents, blankets 
c: labour 
d: technical supervision 
e: cash 
f: other (specify) 
• 1: self; 2: government; 3: other (specify) _____ _ 
8. Who was mainly involved in various stages of the housing reconstruction 
programme? 
Reconstruction features Government Community Yourself 
a: site selection 
b: design 
c: construction 
d: other 
ii 
~--------------------------------~-----~----------------------------
9. If you were not involved at any stage of the housing reconstruction programme, 
what was the reason? 
a: no one invited you; 
b: your sheikh represented you; 
c: you are not an influential person and no one would have cared about 
your views; 
d: Any other reason (describe) ___________ _ 
10. Are you satisfied with the government provided house? 
a: yes; 
b: to some extent; 
c: no. 
11. If 'yes' what are the main reasons? 
a: it is free of cost including land; 
b: it was delivered in short time; 
c: it is an earthquake resistant structure; 
d: it meets family needs; 
e: it is culturally acceptable; 
f: any other factor (describe) ------------
12. If 'no' then what problems did you find in your new house? 
Features of acceptability Acceptable Unacceptable 
a: room sizes 
b: number of rooms 
c: location of rooms 
d: general appearance 
e: size of latrine 
f: location of latrine 
g: size of kitchen 
h: location of kitchen 
i: boundary wall 
j: other problems 
iii 
13. If the answer is 'unacceptable' then why? 
a: rooms too are small; 
b: number of rooms are too few; 
c: location of kitchen is inside the house; 
d: location of latrine is inside the house; 
e: non existence of a store; 
f: non existence of a barn; 
g: non existence of a stable for domestic animals; 
h: no separate entrance for women; 
i: general appearance is different from traditional houses; 
j: it is insufficient for family needs; 
k: it is not suitable for local climate; 
1: it is away from work place; 
m: it is away from the family village; 
n: any other reason (explain)-------------
14. Did you use the house as it was delivered? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
15. If 'yes', why? 
a: the government did not allow any changes; 
b: you did not have any money to make any changes; 
c: you reconciled with the new designs although different from traditional 
designs; 
d: any other reason----------------
16. If 'no', what changes did you carry out to make the new house more 
acceptable for your needs? 
a: changed the sizes of rooms; 
b: increased the number of rooms; 
c: built a kitchen outside the house; 
d: built a latrine outside the house; 
e: built a store; 
f: built a barn; 
g: built a stable for domestic animals; 
h: built a separate entrance for women; 
i: made changes to give traditional touch to the general appearance of the 
house; 
j: made changes to meet family needs; 
k: made changes to improve suitable for local climate; 
1: built a boundary wall around the house; 
iv 
m: any other changes ________________ _ 
17. Was any other infrastructure also built in your village? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
18. If 'yes', what was this other infrastructure? 
a: school; 
b: road; 
c: clinic; 
d: water supply scheme; 
e: sanitation scheme; 
f: electric supply scheme; 
g: mosque; 
h: other (specify)--------
19. Were you involved in planning, design and/or construction of other 
infrastructure? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
20. If 'no', what were the reasons? 
a: no one invited you to give your views; 
b: your sheikh represented you; 
c: your are not an influential person and nobody would have listened to 
your views; 
d: any other reason (describe) ____________ _ 
21. Are you satisfied with the sheikh's representation? 
a: yes; 
b: no; 
c: not always. 
V 
22. 
* 
-------------------------- - -
To summarise your overall impression of the reconstruction programme please 
give your comments on the following aspects: 
Reasons 1* 2 3 
a: timely delivery 
b: climatic suitability 
c: design 
d: location 
e: size 
f: safety against earthquakes & other hazards 
g: suitability of houses for family needs 
h: socio-cultural acceptability 
i: physical appearance 
j: quality of work (strong building/finishing) 
k: social equity 
1: affordability 
m: meets other traditional needs 
n: social costs 
1: acceptable; 2: minimally acceptable; 3: not acceptable. 
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1982 Earthquake Disaster in Dhamar Governorate of Yemen and 
the Subsequent Reconstruction and Development Programme 
QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 1-B: BENEFICIARIES OF SELF HELP HOUSES 
Card number: Date: 
location: (village/town) District: 
Respondent: Age: years 
Education Level: 0 1 2 3 I 4 I 5 
(0: illiterate; 1: primary; 2: middle; 3: secondary; 4: above) 
Occupation: ________ Average Annual Income YR. _____ _ 
Number of Dependents. _____ Surveyor __________ _ 
========~============================== 
1. Was your home fully or partly damaged in the earthquake? 
a: fully damaged; 
b: partly damaged. 
2. What did you do immediately after the disaster? 
a: made temporary shelter yourself; 
b: repaired your old house; 
c: moved with friends or relatives; 
d: waited for government help; 
e: other (specify) ----------
3. What material did you use in making your temporary shelter? 
a: tents; 
b: blankets; 
c: zinc sheets; 
d: wood; 
e: material recovered from debris of the old house; 
f: other. 
4. If your answer to question 2 above is 'a' or 'b' what was the cost of providing 
temporary shelter? 
YR ______ _ 
5. Did you use any skilled or unskilled labour in making your temporary shelter? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
6. Who provided the emergency help? 
a: self; 
b: government; 
c: other 
7. What kind of help was provided by the above source/s? 
Source* 
Type of help 1 2 3 
a: building materials 
b: tents, blankets 
c: labour 
d: technical supervision 
e: cash 
f: other (specify) 
• 1: self; 2: government; 3: other (specify) ------
8. Who was mainly responsible for the house reconstruction programme? 
Reconstruction features Government Community Yourself 
a: site selection 
b: design 
c: construction 
d: other 
9. Were you involved in the planning your house? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
ii 
1 0. Were you involved in designing your house? 
a: yes; 
b: to some extent; 
c: no. 
11. If the answer is 'a' or 'b', what was the nature of your involvement? 
a: decision on size of rooms; 
b: decision on number of rooms; 
c: decision on location of rooms; 
d: decision on size, number and location of other facilities eg latrine, store, 
barn, stable, other (explain) ---------------
e: given a limited choice of standard designs from which to choose one. 
12. If you were not involved in planning or designing your house, what was the 
reason? 
a: no one invited you; 
b: your sheikh represented you; 
c: you are not an influential person; 
d: Any other reason (describe) ____________ _ 
13. Who provided land for the house? 
a: yourself; 
b: government; 
c: your community; 
d: sheikh. 
14. Did you participate in reconstruction of your house? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
iii 
------------------------- -----
15. If 'yes', what was the nature of your participation? 
Nature of Contribution %age of Total cost 
a: local materials (sand, stone, et c) 
b: water for construction 
c: skilled labour 
d: unskilled labour 
e: cash 
f: food for labourers 
g: transport for materials/labourers 
h: other (specify) 
16. Did you face any problems in making your contribution? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
17. If 'yes', what were these problems? 
a: shortage of funds; 
b: non availability of materials in the vicinity; 
c: difficulties in finding labour; 
d: other (specify)---------------
18. Are you satisfied with your self-help house? 
a: yes; 
b: to some extent; 
c: no. 
19 If 'yes' what are the main reasons? 
a: completed and delivered in short time; 
b: earthquake resistant structure; 
c: met family needs; 
d: culturally acceptable; 
e: any other factor (describe) ------------
iv 
---------------------------- - - - - - - ---
20. If 'no' or 'to some extent', what problems did you find in your new house? 
Features of acceptability Acceptable Unacceptable 
a: room sizes 
b: number of rooms 
c: location of rooms 
d: general appearance 
e: size of latrine 
f: location of latrine 
g: size of kitchen 
h: location of kitchen 
i: boundary wall 
j: other problems 
21. If the answer is 'unacceptable' then why? 
a: rooms are too small; 
b: number of rooms are too few; 
c: location of kitchen is inside the house; 
d: location of latrine is inside the house; 
e: non existence of a store; 
f: non existence of a barn; 
g: non existence of a stable for domestic animals; 
h: no separate entrance for women; 
i: general appearance is different from traditional houses; 
j: insufficient for family needs; 
k: not suitable for local climate; 
1: away from work place; 
m: away from family village; 
n: any other reason (explain)-------------
22. Did you use the house as it was delivered? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
V 
23. If 'yes', why? 
a: the government did not allow any changes; 
b: you did not have any money to make any changes; 
c: you reconciled with the new designs although different from traditional 
designs; 
d: any other reason ----------------
24. If 'no', what changes did you carry out to make the new house more 
acceptable for your needs? 
a: changed the sizes of rooms; 
b: increased the number of rooms; 
c: built a kitchen outside the house; 
d: built a latrine outside the house; 
e: built a store; 
f: built a barn; 
g: built a stable for domestic animals; 
h: built a separate entrance for women; 
i: made changes to give traditional touch to the general appearance of the 
house; 
j: made changes to meet family needs; 
k: made changes to improve suitable for local climate; 
1: built a boundary wall around the house; 
m: any other changes, ________________ _ 
25. Was any other infrastructure built in your village? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
26. If 'yes', what did the other infrastructure comprise of? 
a: school; 
b: road; 
c: clinic; 
d: water supply scheme; 
e: sanitation scheme; 
f: electric supply scheme; 
g: mosque; 
h: other (specify) --------
27. Were you involved in planning, design and/or construction of other 
infrastructure? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
vi 
28. If 'no', what were the reasons? 
a: no one invited you to give your views; 
b: your sheikh represented you; 
c: your are not an influential person and nobody would have listened; 
d: any other reason (describe) ____________ _ 
29. Are you satisfied with the sheikh's representation? 
30. 
• 
a: yes; 
b: no; 
c: not always. 
To summarise your overall impression of the reconstruction programme please 
give your comments on the following aspects: 
Reasons 1* 2 3 
a: timely delivery 
b: climatic suitability 
c: design 
d: size 
e: safety against earthquakes & other hazards 
f: suitability of the house for family needs 
g: socio-cultural acceptability 
h: physical appearance 
i: quality of work (strong building/finishing) 
j : social equity 
k: affordability 
1: meets other traditional needs 
m: social costs 
1: acceptable; 2: minimally acceptable; 3: not acceptable 
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1982 Earthquake Disaster in Dhamar Governorate of Yemen and 
the Subsequent Reconstruction and Development Programme 
QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 1-C: BENEFICIARIES OF REPAIR PROGRAMME 
Card number: Date: 
Location: (village/town) District: 
Respondent: Age: years 
Education Level: 0 1 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 
(0: illiterate; 1: primary; 2: middle; 3: secondary; 4: above) 
Occupation:. ________ Average Annual Income YR. _____ _ 
Number of Dependents. _____ Surveyor __________ _ 
======================================= 
1. Was your home or fully or partly damaged in earthquake? 
a: fully damaged; 
b: partly damaged. 
2. What did you do immediately after the disaster? 
a: made temporary shelter yourself; 
b: repaired your old house; 
c: moved with friends or relatives; 
d: waited for government help; 
e: other (specify)----------
3. What material did you use in making your temporary shelter? 
a: tents; 
b: blankets; 
c: zinc sheets; 
d: wood; 
e: material recovered from debris of the old house; 
f: other. 
4. If your answer to question 2 above is 'a' or 'b' what was the cost of providing 
temporary shelter? 
YR ______________ _ 
5. Did you use any skilled or unskilled labour in making your temporary shelter? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
6. Who provided the emergency help? 
a: self; 
b: government; 
c: other 
7. What kind of help was provided by the above source/s? 
Source* 
Type of help 1 2 3 
a: building materials 
b: tents 
c: labour 
d: technical supervision 
e: cash 
f: other (specify) 
* 1: self; 2: government; 3: other (specify) _____ _ 
8. Who decided for repair of your house? 
a: Yourself; 
b: government; 
c: community; 
d: other (specify)--------
9. Were you involved in designing the repair or rehabilitation of your house? 
a: yes; 
b: to some extent; 
c: no. 
10. If 'yes' or 'to some extent', what was the nature of your involvement? 
a: decision on strengthening the roofs; 
b: decision on strengthening the walls; 
c: decision on strengthening the foundations; 
d: decision on any other alteration or repair (explain) 
ii 
11. If you were not involved in planning and designing the repair of your hous e, 
what was the reason? 
a: no one asked you; 
b: your sheikh represented you; 
c: you are not an influential person and no one would have listened to yo ur 
views; 
d: Any other reason (describe) 
. 
12. Did you contribute in repair/rehabilitation of your existing house? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
13. If 'yes' then what was the nature of your contribution? 
Nature of Contribution %age of Total cost 
a: local materials (sand, stone, et c) 
b: water for repair work 
c: skilled labour 
d: unskilled labour 
e: cash 
f: food for labourers 
g: transport for materials/labourers 
h: other (specify) 
14. Did you face any problems in making your contribution? 
a: yes 
b: no. 
15. If 'yes', what were these problems? 
a: shortage of funds; 
b: non availability of materials; 
c: difficulties in finding labour; 
d: other (specify) 
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16. Are you satisfied with the repair works? 
a: yes; 
b: to some extent; 
c: no. 
17. If 'no' or 'to some extent', what problems did you find in your repaired house? 
a: repair work spoiled the appearance of the house; 
b: repair works took a long time and caused inconvenience; 
c: repair was not carried out as planned; 
d: repair was not undertaken according to the actual needs; 
e: repair work was of sub-standard quality (below specifications); 
c: any other problem specify. 
18 Did you use the repaired house as it was delivered? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
19. If 'yes', why? 
a: the government did not allow any changes; 
b: you did not have any money to make any changes; 
c: you reconciled with the repair work, to avoid further expenses, although 
it was not satisfactory; 
d: you accepted the repaired house to avoid any further waste of time 
because you did not have any other shelter; 
e: any other reason ----------------
20. If the answer is 'no', what changes did you carry out to make the repair work 
more acceptable for your needs? 
a: completed the rema1n1ng repair work left incomplete in the 
repair/reconstruction programme; 
b: improved the finishing work to cover defects in cement plaster work, tile 
work, etc; 
b: repainted the house to conceal patch work done by govt; 
d: any other changes. _________________ _ 
21. Was any other infrastructure built in your village besides housing? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
22. If 'yes', what did the other infrastructure comprise of? 
a: school; 
iv 
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b: road; 
c: clinic; 
d: water supply scheme; 
e: sanitation scheme; 
f: electric supply scheme; 
g: mosque; 
h: other (specify)--------
23. Were you involved in planning, design and/or construction of other 
infrastructure? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
24. If 'no', what were the reasons? 
a: no one asked for your views; 
b: your sheikh represented you; 
c: your are not an influential person and nobody would have listened to 
your views; 
d: any other reason (describe) ____________ _ 
25. Are you satisfied with the sheikh's representation? 
26. 
• 
a: yes; 
b: no; 
c: not always. 
To summarise your overall impression of the reconstruction programme please 
give your final comments on the following: 
Reasons 1* 2 3 
a: timely delivery 
b: design 
c: safety against earthquakes & other hazards 
d: physical appearance 
e: quality of work (strong building/finishing) 
f: affordability 
g: social costs 
1: acceptable; 2: minimally acceptable; 3: not acceptable 
V 
1982 Earthquake Disaster in Dhamar Governorate of Yemen and 
the Subsequent Reconstruction and Development Programme 
QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 1-D: NON-RECIPIENTS OF ASSISTANCE 
Card number: Date: 
Location: (village/town) District: 
Respondent: Age: years 
Education Level: 0 I 1 I 2 3 I 4 I 5 
(0: illiterate; 1: primary; 2: middle; 3: secondary; 4: above) 
Occupation:_· __________ Age Ann Income YR _____ _ 
Number of Dependants _____ Surveyor __________ _ 
======================================= 
1. Was your home fully or partly damaged in the earthquake? 
a: fully damaged; 
b: partly damaged. 
2. What did you do immediately after the disaster? 
a: made temporary shelter yourself; 
b: repaired your old house; 
c: moved with friends or relatives; 
d: waited for government help; 
e: other (specify) ----------
3. What material did you use in making your temporary shelter? 
a: tents; 
b: blankets; 
c: zinc sheets; 
d: wood; 
e: material recovered from debris of the old house; 
f: other. 
4. If your answer to question 2 above is 'a' or 'b' what was the cost of providing 
temporary shelter? 
YR ____________ __ 
5. Did you use any skilled or unskilled labour in making your temporary shelter? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
6. Who provided the emergency help? 
a: self; 
b: government; 
c: other 
7. What kind of help was provided by the above source/s? 
Source* 
Type of help 1 2 3 
a: building materials 
b: tents 
c: labour 
d: technical supervision 
e: cash 
f: other (specify) 
1: self; 2: government; 3: other (specify)----,---..,.----
If the answer is 'd' (for non recipients of any assistance) then: 
8. Why did you not receive a new house or get at least the old house repaired? 
a: new house or repair facilities not offered by the government; 
b: not influential enough to push your case through normal channels; 
c: could not afford the social costs; 
d: unable to give contribution for self help scheme; 
e: any other reason (specify): ------------
9. What did you do when you did not receive government assistance in any form? 
a: accepted it as a matter of luck or Allah's will; 
b: directly protested to the concerned government agency; 
c: complained to the village sheikh; 
d: took any other action (specify) 
1 0. What did you do to provide yourself with a shelter? 
a: continued to live in the damaged house; 
b: repaired the old house through your own means; 
c: built a new house; 
d: other means (specify) _______________ _ 
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11. If the answer is 'b' or 'c' above, did you follow the new design techniques 
introduced in the reconstruction programme? 
a: yes; 
b: to some extent; 
c: no. 
12. If 'yes', why? 
a: to ensure safety against earthquakes; 
b: to ensure economy because the new designs are cost effective; 
c: to ensure climatic suitability because the new designs have given due 
consideration to this necessity; 
d: to have traditional appearance which is an important aspect of the new 
designs; 
e: to have sufficient accommodation to meet family needs which is a 
salient feature of the new designs; 
f: to benefit from other socio-cultural considerations made in the new 
designs; 
g: to have modern and more attractive design than the existing old and 
obsolete designs; 
h: any other reason-----------------
13. If no, why? 
a: earthquakes come under Allah's will and no one can stop them. What is 
the use of earthquake resistant designs when the destruction occurs 
anyway; 
b: the earthquake resistant designs introduced in the reconstruction 
programme are uneconomical and non-affordable for a common man in 
Yemen? 
c: the new designs are not suitable climatically whereas the traditional 
houses comfortable in all climates; 
d: the new designs are completely different from the traditional designs; 
e: the new designs provide very small accommodation not sufficient to 
meet a Yemeni family needs; 
f: the new designs have little consideration of Yemeni socio-cultural needs 
and cannot be used without major changes; 
g: the new designs are hardly attractive as compared to the traditional 
designs in Yemen; 
h: any other reason-----------------
14. If your answer is 'to some extent', why? 
a: to ensure safety against earthquakes; 
b: to ensure economy because the new designs are cost effective; 
iii 
c·· to ensure climatic suitability because the new designs have given due 
consideration to this necessity; 
<l: to have modern and more attractive design than the existing old and 
obsolete designs; 
''" any other reason-----------------
15. Was any other infrastructure built in your village besides housing? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
16. If 'yes' what did the other infrastructure comprise of it? 
a: school; 
b: road; 
c: clinic; 
d: water supply scheme; 
e: sanitation scheme; 
f: electric supply scheme; 
g: mosque; 
h: other (specify) _______ _ 
17. Were you involved in planning, design and/or construction of other 
infrastructure? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
18. If the answer is 'no', what were the reasons? 
a: no one invited you to give your views; 
b: your sheikh represented you; 
c: your are not an influential person and nobody would have listened; 
d: any other reason (describe) __________ ~--
19. Are you satisfied with the sheikh's representation? 
a: yes; 
b: no; 
c: not always. 
20. What is your overall impression of the reconstruction programme as a whole? 
a: successful; 
b: moderately successful; or 
c: unsuccessful. 
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1982 Earthquake Disaster in Dhamar Governorate of Yemen and 
the Subsequent Reconstruction and Development Programme 
QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 2: FOR SHEIKHS OF THE SURVIVING COMMUNITIES 
Card number: ____ _ Date: ____ _ 
Location: ___ _:_ __ (village/town) District: ______ _ 
Respondent: ________ _ Surveyor: ________ _ 
3 4 5 Respondent's Education Level: I 0 I 1 I 2 
~~-~~~-L-~~ 
(0: illiterate; 1: primary; 2: middle; 3: secondary; 4: above) 
============================~========== 
1. Since when are you sheikh of this village? 
19_. 
2. What was the approximate number of houses in the village at the time of the 
disaster? 
3. About how many houses were destroyed? 
4. What was the population of your village at that time? 
5. Was their any skilled labour available in the village? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
6. Did the government announce any immediate relief measure? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
7. If yes, what were these measures? 
a: supply of tents; 
b: supply corrugated iron sheet huts; 
c: supply of building materials; 
d: technical advice; 
e: financial assistance; 
f: other (specify) _____________ _ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
8. How much time did the government take in providing immediate relief to your 
village? 
__ days. 
9. About what percentage of victims in your village occupied the temporary 
shelters provided by the government? 
%. 
-----
10. How did the survivors in your area respond to provide for their relief needs? 
a: by making temporary shelters on their own; 
b: by doing minor repairs to their damaged houses; 
c: by moving to the houses of their relatives or friends; 
c: through local community cooperation; 
d: any other (specify)----------------
11. Did you have any other infrastructure in your village, besides houses? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
12. If yes. what type of infrastructure was it? 
a: mosque; 
b: school; 
c: health centre; 
d: water supply system; 
f: electric supply system; 
g: other (specify)----------------
13. Did any of this infrastructure suffer any losses? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
14. If yes, what was the extent of damage? 
Nature Water sanit- Elec Health Other 
of loss School supply tion Mosqu supp Roads infras 
repair-
able 
total 
damage 
15. Did the government announce a programme to reconstruct houses and build 
other infrastructure in your area? 
ii 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
16. What was the government announced commitment for your area? 
a: houses no. 
b: roads km. 
c: clinics __________ ,no. 
d: mosques no. 
e: water supply scheme no. 
f: sanitation scheme no. 
g: electric supply scheme no. 
17. Were you involved in assessing the infrastructure reconstruction needs of your 
area? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
18. Were you asked to give your op1mon in determining location of the 
infrastructure to be reconstructed in your area? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
19. Were you consulted in the design of the infrastructure to be rebuilt? 
a: yes 
b: no. 
20. If your answer to questions 17 to 19 is 'no', what do you think was the 
reason? 
a: the government did not consider necessary to consult anyone; 
b: the reconstruction programme was carried out in a emergency and there 
was no time for consulting every sheikh or community about their views; 
c: tribal rivalries would have created lot of difficulties and waste of time; 
d: literacy level in the disaster area is low and most of the sheikhs would 
not have understood the technical details particularly with respect to 
earthquake resistance; 
e: any other reason (describe) ____________ _ 
21. Did the government meet its commitment? 
a: yes; 
b: to some extent; 
c: no. 
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22. If 'yes' or 'to some extent', approximately how many houses and other 
infrastructure was built in your area? 
Water San it- Elec Health Other 
Houses School supply tion Mosqu supp Roads infras 
23. If 'no' give reasons to the best of your knowledge: 
a: government could not mobilise enough resources; 
b: government assisted politically stronger areas more than others; 
c: concerned government agency helped those areas and individuals more 
who gave them favours; 
d: local tribal rivalries caused abandonment of the infrastructure building 
programme in your area; 
e: any other reason (specify) ____________ _ 
24. About what percentage of people in your area did not house under any of the 
schemes (turn key/self help/repair)? 
_____ %. 
25. What did you do to assist the people in you village who did not receive houses 
or repair facilities? 
a: raised concern with the government; 
b: raised funds at community level to repair the damaged houses; 
c: contacted NGOs for their assistance; 
d: could not do anything; 
e: other 
---------------------
26. If no, it was because: 
a: there is no use complaining to the government because it listen's to only 
politically stronger areas; 
b: LCCD is only a tool of the government and does not much care about 
peoples problems; 
c: tribal rivalries have made the local communities weaker and there is little 
chance to get their support on such issues; 
d; any other reason (specify)-------------
27. Did the government provide any further assistance after your protest? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 3: FOR GOVERNMENT ENGINEERS AND 
OTHER OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME 
Card number: ____ _ Date: ____ _ 
Respondent: _________ Occupation __________ _ 
Ministry: _____ Present position ____ Surveyor _____ _ 
=============~========================= 
Part A: Before the Earthquake 
1. What was your position/occupation in Supreme Council for Reconstruction of 
Earthquake Affected Areas (SCREAA) at the time of its creation 
__________________ ? 
2. Do you know of the existence of any earthquake warning system in the country 
prior to the disaster? · 
a: yes, there was such a system; 
b: no, I don't such a system existed in the country. 
3. Are you aware if any foreign or local agency predict or warn against the 
earthquake? 
a: yes, we did receive a prior warning through external agencies; 
b: no, I don't think any such warning was received. 
4. If 'yes', do you know if the government took any preparatory steps to minimise 
losses as a result of the warning? 
a: yes, the government did take some preparatory measures; 
b: no, the government could not take any advance measures. 
5. Do you know if any individual or agency expressed concern about vulnerability 
of infrastructure in the country, particularly in rural areas, prior to the 
earthquake? 
a: yes, local engineers had expressed their concerns at times; 
b: no, I don't think anybody expressed any concern. 
6. Are you aware if any safety measures were considered for resistance against 
earthquakes, in location of infrastructure? 
a: yes, safety measures with regards to location of infrastructure were 
generally considered; 
b: no, I don't think much attention was paid in this regard. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -
7. Are you aware if any safety measures were considered for resistance against 
earthquakes in design of infrastructure? 
a: yes, safety measures were generally considered; 
b: no, I don't think any serious attention was paid. 
8. If 'yes', what were these measures? 
a: reducing roof load; 
b: providing tie beams in walls; 
c: increasing bond between roofs and walls; 
d: strengthening of foundations; 
e:. other ________________ _ 
9. Do you know if any safety code was introduced in the country's building by-
laws to make earthquake resistant structures? 
a: yes, there was such a code of practice; 
b: no, I don't think such a code was introduced. 
Part B: Emergency Relief Work Immediately after the Earthquake 
10. What immediate relief measures were provided to the victims? 
a: temporary shelters; 
b: water supply; 
c: sanitation; 
d: electric supply; 
e: clinics; 
f: schools; 
g: other ____ _ 
11. How much time these emergency measures take from the date of the disaster? 
12. Were the relief measure available to all victims? 
a: yes; 
b: most of them; 
c: some of them; 
d: no. 
13. If 'no' or 'to some of them', what were the reasons? 
a: lack of resources; 
b: lack of information of about the victims; 
c: lack of organisation within SCREAA; 
d: lack of desire on part of the victims to use alien relief materials; 
e: other constraints (specify)------------
14. What was the criteria for providing relief to the victims? 
a: nature of damage to the existing house; 
b: number of members in the household; 
c: social status of the household; 
d: first come first served; 
e: other (specify)----------------
15. Do you think that the victims were satisfied with the government's emergency 
relief operations? 
a: yes; 
b; no. 
16. If 'no' what to your knowledge were the main causes of victims' 
dissatisfaction? 
a: inadequate shelter for minimal needs; 
b: culturally unacceptable shelter; 
c: lack of essential services eg water supply, sanitation, electricity; 
d: unsuitable location from victims' considerations; 
e: lengthy and cumbersome official procedures; 
f: unequal treatment of victims; 
g: other-----------
Part C: Reconstruction Programme with Development Objectives 
HOUSING PROGRAMME 
17. Do you think the reconstruction programme implemented as initially planned by 
the government? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
18. If no, what was the main cause of the government not meeting its envisaged 
reconstruction programme? 
a: lack of local resources; 
b: lack of committed support by donors; 
c: lack of planning and management; 
d: institutional deficiencies; 
e: lack of community support; 
f: other constraints -----------------
19. Were the beneficiaries satisfied with the houses they received under the 
reconstruction programme? 
_ a: yes; 
b: to great extent; 
c: to some extent; 
b: no. 
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20. If the answer is 'a' or 'b', what were the main reasons of their satisfaction? 
a: finished houses were delivered in a reasonable time; 
b: the houses were provided free of cost (turn key) project or with a small· 
contribution (self help); 
c: the new houses (in case of total damage) or repaired houses (in case of 
repairable damage) covered almost all victim households and there were 
no serious complaints; 
d: the new house designs met the usual accommodation needs of the 
victims; 
e: although the new houses had a different appearance from the traditional 
north Yemeni houses but cultural acceptability did not pose any 
problems; 
f: the new houses are earthquake resistant with minimal danger to life and 
property should such a catastrophe occur in future; 
g: the new houses were located in safe locations with little chances of 
earth failure, sliding or overturning; 
h: repair to less damaged houses was. carried out by strengthening the 
existing structures by adding reinforced beams and columns. This did not 
affect the former shape so acceptability was not a problem in this case 
as well; 
i: any other positive factor (specify) ___________________ _ 
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21 . If the answer is 'c' or 'd' what were the main reasons for the beneficiaries' 
dissatisfaction? 
Turn Self 
Reasons Key Help 
a: delays in delivery due cumbersome procedures 
b: unsuitable location 
c: one design without family size consideration 
d: size of house too small for normal household 
e: rooms size too small 
f: number of rooms too few 
g: location of kitchen not suitable 
h: location of latrine not suitable 
i: only one entrance not suitable culturally 
j : unfamiliar design 
k: climatic unsuitability 
1: victims' contribution beyond their capacity 
. 
m: social costs 
n: other (specify) 
22. Were the beneficiaries consulted about the location of new houses? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
23. Were the beneficiaries consulted about the design of new houses? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
24. Do you know if any code of safety, for resistance against earthquakes, was 
introduced in building designs after the 1982 disaster? 
a; yes, a safety code was introduced; 
b: no code was introduced but most engineers started following 
V 
25. 
international design codes; 
c: no, I don't think such a code was introduced. 
If 'no' why? 
a: earthquakes do not occur in Yemen very often; 
b: cost of construction in earthquake resistant designs sharply rises which 
the common people cannot afford; 
c: 
d: 
e: 
literacy in Yemen is low and most people do not follow any building 
codes; 
Yemeni people, particularly in rural areas, are conservative in every 
respect and do not accept any changes in their traditional building 
practices; 
any other reason 
OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE 
26. Who identified the need of the infrastructure, other than housing, in the 
disaster affected area? 
a: government; 
b: donor; 
c; community; 
d: other ____ _ 
27. Were the victims consulted about location, design or construction of this 'other 
infrastructure'? 
28. 
29. 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
If 'no', why? 
a: the reconstruction programme was carried out in an emergency and 
there was no time to consult the beneficiaries; 
b: 
c: 
d: 
e: 
most of the beneficiaries were illiterate and they could not understand 
technical details; 
tribal system is strong in the project area. Mutual rivalries among 
beneficiaries would not have allowed any common decision; 
the donors provided help under certain conditions which included design 
and site selection by them; 
any other reason 
What was the main criteria for determining the size of infrastructure? 
a: extent of damage; 
b: political importance of the area; 
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c: population size; 
d: donors' preferences; 
e: socioeconomic factors; 
f: resource availability; 
g: other-------------------' 
30. Did you face any constraints during implementation of the reconstruction 
programme? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
31. If 'yes', what were these constraints? 
a: governmental: 
institutional deficiencies; 
delays in approval procedures; 
lack of technical capability of implementing agency; 
lack of resource availability; 
donors' interventions; 
management problems; 
social interventions; 
other ________ _ 
b: contractor level: 
lack of technical and management know how; 
lack of resource mobilisation capability; 
lack of experience in emergency works; 
lack of skilled labour for reconstruction works; 
other _________ __ 
c: community level: 
lack of organisation; 
lack of trust on government functionaries; 
lack of social set up for decision making; 
lack of appreciation of the reconstruction programme; 
other _________ __ 
32. Are you satisfied with the way SCREAA implemented the reconstruction 
programme? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
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33. If 'no', why? 
a: centralisation in decision making; 
b: lack of economic incentives; 
c: difficult working conditions; 
d: Inability of top management in making rational decisions; 
e: deficient working environment; 
f: lack of flow of information among concerned organisations; 
g: undue influence of some donors; 
h: other 
---------------------------
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QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER 4: TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
Card number: ____ _ Date: ________ _ 
Location: _________ _ District: 
------------
Surveyor: __________ Occupation: _________ _ 
Type of Infrastructure: 10 House; 20 other----------
Built in: 19 __ (before/after earthquake) Owner: _______ _ 
======================================= 
PART A: For Houses Only 
10 What is the type of house? 
a: turn key; 
b: self help; 
c: repair programme; 
d: owner financed 0 
2o What are the dimensions of various rooms in the house? 
size 
a: divan (drawing room) 
b: room no 1 
c: room no 2 
d: room no 3 
e: room no 4 
f: room no 5 
g: kitchen 
h: latrine 
i; stable for domestic animals 
j: barn 
k: store 
1: boundary wall 
m: other 
3o Who built this house? 
a: government; 
b: owner; 
c: other 0 
4. Has any additional construction been done to this house? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
5. Who financed this additional construction? 
a: government; 
b: owner. 
6. What does this additional construction comprise of? 
size 
a: room 
---------------------------b: kitchen 
c: latrine 
d: stable for domestic animals 
-------
e: barn 
---------------------------
f: store,----,~------------
g: boundary wall-------------h: other ______________ _ 
7. What is the location of the following with respect to the main house? 
a: kitchen outside/inside/roof top; 
b: latrine outside/inside; 
c: stable for domestic animals outside/inside; 
d: barn outside/inside; 
e: store outside/inside; 
f: other----------------
8. How is the house being used? 
a: as residence; 
b: as guest house; 
c: as stable for domestic animals; 
d: as barn (store for animal feed); 
e: as teachers hostel for local school; 
f: deserted/abandoned; 
g: other _____________ _ 
PART B: For Houses and Other Infrastructure 
9. What is the general condition of Maintenance of the Building? 
a: good; 
b: fair; 
c: poor; 
d: in fair condition but in disuse; 
e: deserted and scavenged; 
f: other ___________ _ 
9. What materials are used in the building? 
a: stone; 
b: clay; 
c: wood; 
d: cement; 
e: reinforcing steel; 
f: other _________ _ 
10. Who designed the building? 
a: engineer/architect; 
b: local artisan. 
11. How can you describe the ground conditions regarding location of the building 
with respect to safety against earthquakes? 
a: flat ground away from tall buildings or mountain sides; 
b: flat ground but lose back fill; 
c: safe ground but close to another vulnerable structure; 
d: steep gradient and vulnerable ground; 
e: other (specify), ______________ _ 
12. What is the load bearing capacity of the natural ground in this area? 
____ kg/cm sq. 
13. What material is used in the building foundation? 
a: plain concrete; 
b: reinforced concrete; 
c: stone masonry; 
d: block masonry; 
e: other 
------------------
14. Have any tie beams been provided throughout the walls? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
15. What is the location of the tie beams? 
a: foundation level; 
b: floor level; 
c: lintel level; 
d: roof level. 
16. What are the cross sectional dimensions of the tie beams? 
___ cmx cm. 
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17. What material is used in the super structure? 
a: stone masonry; 
b: block masonry; 
c: adobe (unburnt mud bricks); 
d: other 
------------------------------
18. How the roof load is transferred to foundation? 
a: load transmitted through thick bearing walls; 
b: load transmitted to foundation through reinforced framed structure; 
c: other 
~--~~----~---------------------19. What material is used in the roof structure? 
a: reinforced concrete; 
b: wood; 
c: corrugated galvanised iron (GI) sheets; 
d: thatch material 
e: other 
-----------------------------------
20. What are the protection measures against roof leakage? 
a: roof slope 1 in _____ __ 
b: bitumen coat -----------
c: other 
-----------------
21. What are the measures for foundation protection? 
a: plinth above natural drainage level; 
b: provision of a drainage system around the house; 
c: plain cement concrete apron all around; 
d: other 
-----------------------------------
22. What was the overall cost of the building at the time of construction? 
YR ________________ __ 
23. Are any laboratory test results available for the this infrastructure? 
a: yes; 
b: no. 
24. If 'yes', what are these tests? 
a: load bearing capacity of the natural ground; 
b: concrete cube tests for RCC and PCC works; 
c: concrete blocks tests; 
d: water penetration tests for stones; 
c: sieve analyses tests; 
d: other -----------------
(Note: Attach the available test results with the questionnaire). 
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List of villages where social surveys were conducted 
1. Bab Al-Falak 21. 
2. Hammam Ali 22. 
3. Al-Kola 23. 
4. AI-Marwan 24. 
5. Al-Mahillah 25. 
6. Hijrat Manqadah 26. 
7. Ar-Rusabah 27. 
8. Qam Dhamar 28. 
9. Al-Husain 29. 
10. Al-Sheikh 30. 
11. Beihan 31. 
12. Mowghar 32. 
13. Jarf Al-Tahir 33. 
14. Ar-Rizwah 34. 
15. Wathan 35. 
16. Dubah 36. 
17. Madinat Ash-Sharq 37. 
18. Mawshak 38. 
19. Juma'ah 39. 
20. Al-Harf 40. 
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Source: Executive Office for Reconstruction, Yemen, 1992 
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Annex 3 
LIST OF RESPONDENT SHEIKHS 
Annex 3: List of the community sheikhs interviewed 
Name Village District 
I. Ahmad Ali Al-Koli Al-Kola Ans 
2. Ali Mohammed Al-Marwan Dawran 
3. Saleh Ali Al-Sisi Mowghar Ans 
4. Ahmad Al-Jahrani Al-Rusabah Jahran 
5. Hamud Husain Abdallah Al-Husain Ans 
6. Izzi Ghalib Sanad Wathan Uthma 
7. Mohammed Abdur-Razzaq Dubah Maghrib Ans 
8. Mohammed Haji Ali Al-Mahal Dhamar 
9. Ahmad Badr Hatim Al-Harf Dawran 
10. Abdurrahman Ali Ahmad Ar-Rizwah Dawran 
11. Abdallah Husain Izzi Al-Mahal Dhamar 
12. Ali Mabkhut Al-Mujari Al-Salah Dhamar 
13. Saleh bin Sa1eh Al-Huda Dhamar 
14. Ali Husein Al-Mowshaki Al-Mowshak Maghrib Ans 
15. Ali Ahmad Saleh Al-Huda Dhamar 
16. Husein Yahya Gheylan Al-Nasir Dhamar 
17. Mohammed Al-Reymi Al-Khadar Dhamar 
18. Abdulkarim Al-Hajj Al-Guhaifah Dhamar 
19. Abdallah bin Ahmad Jab-Jab Dhamar 
20. Saleh AI-Tulabi Madinah Sakaniyyah Dhamar 
Source: Field surveys, 1994. 
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Annex 4 
LIST OF GOVERNMENT RESPONDENTS 
Annex 4· List of the !!Overnment officials interviewed 
No Name Occupation Employing Position during reconstruction Present position 
ministry programme 
I Mohammed Architect Construction Architect Self-help Programme Deputy Manager 
Hamud Sharaabi Dhamar 
2 Abdur Rahman Civil Engineer Urban Planning Civil Engineer Turnkey Senior Civil 
Samawi Housing Programme Engineer 
3 Waheed Hasan Civil Engineer Urban Planning Civil Engineer Turnkey Director Civil 
Mu sa Housing Programme Works 
4 Munir Yusuf Civil Engineer Construction General Manager Self-help Director General 
Hashim Programme O&M 
5 Alawy A wad Civil Engineer Construction Deputy Manager Self-help Deputy Manager 
Al-Ziadi Programme O&M 
6 Khalid Hazza'a Civil Engineer Construction Civil Engineer Aided Self-help Project Engineer 
Nuo'man Programme Schools 
7 Abdul Salam Civil Engineer Construction Manager Construction Director 
Kassem Supervision General Dhamar 
8 Abdul Habib Structural Engineer Construction Civil Engineer Soil Testing Manager Soil 
AI wan Laboratory Testing 
9 Abdul Saeed Civil Works Construction Supervisor Self-help Programme Foreman Civil 
Farah Supervisor Works 
lO Mohammed Civil Works Construction Foreman Self-help Programme Foreman Civil 
Umar Salim Supervisor Works 
11 Mohammed Civil Works Construction Supervisor Self-help Programme Foreman Civil 
Ahmad Mansoor Supervisor Works 
12 Mohamed Thabit Civil Engineer Construction Director Repair Programme Director General 
l-Iassan (civil works) 
13 Kamal Ahmad Architect Construction Civil Engineer Turnkey Deputy Manager 
Turki Programme Hodeidah 
14 Nasir Ali Civil Engineer Construction Civil Engineer Turnkey Senior Engineer 
Dirham Programme Sana'a 
15 Abdi llah Civil Engineer Construction Civil Engineer Repair Senior Engineer 
Mansoor Programme Sana'a 
16 Abdul Ghafoor Civil Engineer Construction Deputy Manager Self-help Senior Engineer 
Ta'izzi Programme Dhamar 
17 Nasir Ali Civil Engineer Oil and Mineral Civil Engineer, civil works Senior Engineer 
AI-Mukhadiri Resources (geology) Dhamar 
18 Najeeb Husein Geologist Oil and Mineral Senior Geologist Senior Geologist 
Ali Resources Dhamar 
19 Othman Geologist Oil and Mineral Senior Geologist Deputy General 
Abda!!ah Thabit Resources Manager Dhamar 
120 Jamal Mohamed Geologist Oil and Mineral Senior Geologist General Manager 
Shu'lan Resources Dhamar 
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·do· ·do· ·do· 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' 
·do· ·do· ·do· 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' 
·do· ·do- ·do-
' ' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' 
-do- -do- ·do-
' ' ' 
X X X X 
' ' 
-do- -do- ·do· X 
' ' 
X X X 
' 
' ' 
-do- -do- -do· X 
' 
X X X X 
' 
' ' 
X 
' ' 
X X X X 
' 
' ' 
·do· ·do· DIN 
' 
X X X X 
' 
' 
X 
' ' 
X X 
' 
X X 
' X X X 
' ' 
X X X X X 
X 
' ' ' ' ' 
X X X X 
' ' ' ' 
X 
' 
X X X 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
X X X 
' 
' 
X X 
' ' 
X X X 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' 
' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' 
x 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
x 
' 
x x 
' ' 
' 
x 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' 
x 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
38 2 2 3 20 18 8 22 6 2 10 30 3 32 7 1o 2o 2 11 23 8 7 31 4 0 21 21 0 23 19 None 
90 • • 7 48 46 19 62 14 6 24 71 7 78 17 36 80 6 28 " 
19 17 74 9 0 60 60 0 
" 
46 
- --
QUESTIONNAIRE 1-C: BENEFICIARIES OF REPAIR PROGRAMME 
Respondent's Particulars Victims Immediate f\esponse Government's Response/Immediate Relief 
House- 6 Education Occupation Av Ann hold 1 2 3 4 6 Resp Ao• lnc YA Size 
• b ' No 
0 1 2 3 4 GS PS HW 
• b • b 
' 
d y, • b • b i ii i ii i ii 
1 46 
' ' 
160,000 9 
' ' ' ' 2 
" ' ' 
100.000 7 
' ' ' ' 3 26 
' ' 
160,000 a 
' ' ' ' 4 22 
' ' 
400,000 7 
' ' ' ' • 40 ' ' 80,000 ' ' ' ' 
, 
' 
46 
' 
, 300,000 10 
' 
, 
' ' 7 22 ' ' 
76,000 6 , 
' ' 
, 
• 60 ' ' 100,000 10 ' ' ' ' 9 46 
' ' 
60,000 
' ' ' ' 
,
10 52 
' ' 
36,000 • ' ' ' 
, 
1\ 
" ' 
, 150,000 7 
' ' ' 
, 
12 ,,
' ' 
80,000 
' ' 
,
' ' 13 60 ' ' 
90,000 4 
' ' ' ' 14 60 , 
' 
80,000 6 
' ' ' ' 16 46 
' ' 
100,000 10 
' ' ' ' 
" " ' 
, 60,000 5 
' 
, , , 
11 so ,
' 
336,000 
" ' ' ' ' " " ' ' 
70,000 2 
' ' ' ' 
" 
60 , 
' 
200,000 10 , 
' ' ' 20 36 , 
' 
90,000 3 
' ' ' ' 21 60 
' ' 
60,000 3 
' ' ' ' 22 42 
' ' 
70,000 6 
' ' ' ' 23 26 
' ' 
70,000 6 
' ' ' ' 24 36 
' ' 
60,000 2 
' ' ' ' 26 46 
' ' 
70,000 3 
' ' ' ' 26 30 ' ' 
80,000 6 
' ' ' ' 27 37 
' ' 
100,000 6 
' ' ' ' 28 36 
' ' 
66,000 
' ' ' ' ' 
28 S6 
' ' 
160,000 6 
' ' ' ' I 30 •• ' ' ac.ooo 4 ' ' ' ' I 31 43 ' ' 
160,000 • ' ' ' ' 32 27 
' ' 
90,000 2 
' ' ' ' I 33 37 
' ' 
86,000 4 
' ' ' ' I 
34 26 
' ' 
86,000 2 
' ' ' ' 3S 36 
' ' 
80,000 7 
' ' ' ' 
I 30 40 
' ' ' 
150,000 7 
' ' ' ' I 37 28 
' 
70,000 4 
' ' ' ' 38 66 
' ' 
160,000 13 
' ' ' ' 
I 30 26 
' ' 
60,000 1 
' 
, 
' ' I 40 28 
' ' 
60,000 4 ,
' ' ' 
41 
" ' ' 
100,000 3 
' ' ' ' 
I 
I 
10 1877 10 10 1\ 7 3 17 23 1 4,661,000 247 3 38 22 2 16 2 0 0 41 12 
" 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 
I 
" 
41 24 24 27 17 a 41 56 3 111,000 6 
' 
03 64 6 36 6 0 0 10 
" 
71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
' 
0 
QUESTIONNAIRE 1-C: BENEFICIARIES OF REPAIR PROGRAMME 
ReeonstructiQrl P!Pgra:mme 
d • 1 • • 10 11 12 13 14 
' 
,, i jj • b 
' 
d • 
' 
• b 
' • 
b 
' • 
b • b 
' 
d • f 
' 
• b • b ' 
X 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
' ' 
' 
' 
' 
X X X X X X X 
' 
' X X X X 
' 
X X 
' 
' 
X X X X 
' 
X X X X ' 
' ' X X X 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
' 
X X X X X 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
' 
X X X X X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
X X X X X X 
' 
X 
X X 
' ' 
X X X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' 
X 
' 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
' 
X X 
X X 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' X X X 
' ' 
X 
' ' ' X X 
' 
X X X X 
X X 
' 
X X 
' 
X X X 
' 
X X 
X X X X 
' ' ' 
X 
X X X 
' 
X X X X 
X X X X X 
' 
X X 
X X X X X 
' ' X X X 
' 
X 
' 
X X 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
' 
X X 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
' 
X X X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' 
X X X X X X X 
X X 
' 
X X X X X X 
X X 
' 
X X X X X 
X X 
' ' 
X X X X 
' X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
' 
X X 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' X 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' 
X ' 
' X X X 
' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X X 
' ' 
X 
' ' 
X X ' 
' ' X 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
' 
' 
' 
' 
X X X X X X X ' 
' X X X X X X 
' ' 
' X X X X 
' ' 
X X 
' 
' 
X X X X X X X X X 
' 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
X X X X 
0 0 12 ,. 41 0 0 2 39 • 3 2 
'' 
0 12 41 0 3 3 0 2 38 3 0 34 7 28 4 0 
0 0 
" 
71 100 0 0 • 96 20 1 • 71 0 29 100 0 7 7 0 • 93 7 0 83 17 •• 10 0 ' 
' 
' 
--------
QUESTIONNAIRE 1-C: BENEFICIARIES OF REPAIR PROGRAMME 
Other lnfr.ntructUTe 
16 16 17 18 
" 
20 
" 
22 
• ' • 
b 
' 
d 
' 
• b • b ' 
d • b ' 
d • b • b ' 
d • f 9 h • b • 
' 
X 
' 
X X 
' 
' ' ' ' ' 
X X 
' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' 
X X 
' ' ' ' ' 
• ' • 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
X X 
' 
X X X X 
X 
' • 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
' 
X X X X 
' 
X X X 
' X X 
' 
X 
' ' ' X 
' 
, 
' ' 
X 
' ' 
,
' 
X 
' ' 
' • 
X X X X X 
' 
, 
' ' X 
' 
X , 
' 
X , 
X X X , X 
X X 
' 
X X 
' 
X 
X X X 
' 
X 
X X X X 
X X X X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' X X X X X 
' 
X X X X X X 
, , X X X 
, X X , , X 
, 
' 
, , 
' 
X X X 
X X X X 
X X X X X 
' 
X X 
' 
X X X X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
X X 
' 
X X X 
' X X X X 
' 
X , , 
' 
X X X X 
' 
X X X 
X X X 
' 
X 
' X X X X 
' 
' ' ' 
X X , X 
, X , , X 
' 
X X X , X X X 
11 ,. 1 4 4 
" 
2 26 18 2 20 3 1 14 1 0 0 • 29 • 1 0 1 1 1 • 0 1 36 16 
41 .. 2 10 20 29 • 61 39 6 49 ' 
2 34 2 0 0 22 71 16 2 0 2 2 2 ,. 0 2 86 39 
b 
X 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
X 
X 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
QUESTIONNAIRE 1-C: BENEFICIARIES OF REPAIR PROGRAMME 
b iii iii iii 
' 
' 
' 
QUESTIONNAIRE 1 D: NON BENEFICIARIES OF HOUSING PROGRAMME 
Respondent's Particulars Victims Immediate Response Government's I 
Response/Immediate Relief I 
6 I Resp Ago Education Occupation Average Annual M in 1 2 3 4 6 
No y, Income (YRJ Size 
• b ' I 
0 1 2 3 4 GS PS HW • b • b 
' 
d YR • b • b ; ii ; ii ; ii 
I 1 46 X X 100,000 14 X X X X 
2 37 X X 200,000 14 X X 20,000 X X 
3 60 X X 120,000 17 X X X X 
4 
" 
X X 100,000 8 X X X X 
6 36 X X 80,000 8 X X X X 
6 
" 
X X 300,000 16 X X X X 
7 60 X X 60,000 10 
' 
X X X 
' ' ' 8 40 X 
' 
90,000 10 X 
' ' ' 9 
" ' ' 
70,000 6 
' 
X X 
' 10 27 X 
' 
60,000 4 X 
' ' ' 11 36 X X 90,000 4 
' ' 
X 
' 12 
" ' 
X 70,000 6 
' 
X X 
13 43 
' ' ' 
100,000 9 X X X X X 
14 42 
' 
60,000 12 
' ' ' 
" 
38 X 70,000 11 X 
' 
X X 
16 30 
' ' 
X 60,000 4 X X 
' 17 60 X X ao,ooo 12 X X X X X X 
18 46 x 100,000 9 x 
' ' 
x 
19 
" ' ' 
x 90,000 7 x x X 
20 46 X x 160,000 4 X X X X 
21 37 X 90,000 6 x X 
-
X X 
22 .. X x 160,000 16 X X x X 
23 40 X X X 60,000 8 X 
' ' ' 
X 
24 46 x 120,000 6 X 
' ' 26 63 
' 
X 90,000 6 
' ' 
X X X 
26 
" ' 
100,000 6 
' ' 
x x 
27 34 X X X 160,000 14 
' 
X X X X 
28 34 
' 
X 70,000 7 X X X 
29 48 X X 100,000 8 
' 
X X X 
30 66 x 60,000 11 X X X x 
31 37 X x x X 200,000 6 x x X x X x 
" 
36 x 90,000 8 x x x 
33 46 x x 76,000 10 x x 
34 30 x 90,000 4 X x X x 
' 
x 
36 28 X X X 60,000 3 x X 
-
x x 
38 29 
' ' 
90,000 6 x x 
' ' ' 37 26 
' 
60,000 2 X x X 
38 26 x X 70,000 4 
' 
X X X 
39 36 X x 180,000 6 X X X 
' 40 46 
' 
x 100,000 10 x x x x 
41 30 x x ao.ooo 
' 
x x x x 
lotal 1634 19 6 8 6 
' 
10 29 2 4,086,000 330 33 8 26 6 8 0 0 41 • 33 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
% 40 44 16 21 16 6 24 74 6 99634 8 80 20 
" 
16 22 0 0 100 20 80 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
6 
7 B 
' 
10 11 12 
d f 
j ii j ii • b ' 
d • b ' • 
b 
' • ' • • 
f • b 
' 
d • 
' ' 
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X 
X x X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X X X 
' 
X X 
X X X X 
X X X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X 
X X X X X X 
X X X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X X X 
' 
X 
X X X 
' 
X 
' ' 
X X X 
' 
X X X X X X X 
X X 
' 
X 
X X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X 
' 
X X X 
' 
X 
X X X X 
' 
X X 
' ' X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X 
X X 
' 
X X X 
X X X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X 
X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X X 
' 
X X 
7 
" " 
6 1 2 14 10 17 12 16 14 • 36 2 1 1 27 7 4 10 B • f 
17 83 eo 13 2 6 34 26 41 29 37 34 16 86 6 2 2 •• 17 10 26 16 16 2 
--~----------------------------------
. .--
13 14 15 16 11 18 
• b ' 
d • b • b 
' 
d • f 
' 
h • b • b 
' • 
b 
' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
X X 
' 
X X X 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' 
X X X 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' 
X 
' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
2 . 1 1 0 0 41 • 7 11 • 0 0 10 0 41 0 • 11 19 1 15 25 
• 2 2 0 0 100 22 11 41 20 0 0 24 0 100 0 13 41 •• 3 37 &1 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 2: SHEIKHS OF THE SURVIVING COMMUNITIES 
THE RESPONDENT INFRASTRUCTURE DETAILES IMMEDIATE RESPONSES 
EdtiC111ion Sheikh 2 3 4 • 6 7 ' ' 
10 
,., 
Location District since 
No 0 1 2 3 4 (year) No No No • b • b • b ' 
d • 
, DAYS 
" 
• b 
' 
• d 
1 AL-KOLA ANS 
' 
1973 G7 43 4GO 
' ' ' 
16 so 
' 2 Al-MARWAN OAWF\AN 
' 
1970 120 100 100 
' 
X 
' ' 
1G GO 
' 3 MOWOHAR ANS X 1970 4G 24 360 
' 
X 
' 
30 0 
4 RUSABAH JAHRAN 
' 
1960 1400 1400 3400 
' ' ' 
01 70 
' 5 Al-HUSE!N ANS 
' 
1962 50 3G 400 
' ' ' ' 
15 GO 
' ' 6 WATHAN OUBAH 
' 
1964 600 60 6000 
' 
• ' ' 
20 60 
' 7 OVSAH DUBAH 1980 1000 1GO 10,000 
' 
• 
' 
20 90 • 
' 
AL-MAH!LLA OHAMAR • 1976 260 126 3000 ' ' • 
16 0 • 
9 Al-HARF DAWAAN 
' 
1976 60 10 460 
' • • 
X 30 50 X 
10 AA RIZWAH OAWRAN 
' 
1970 76 19 690 
' 
• • 20 60 ' 
TOTAl. 4 3 3 0 3647 1986 Z6740 10 10 • 0 0 0 0 • 161 610 6 1 2 2 
11 AL-SULAH DHAMAR 1964 440 
" 
3500 X • ' 12 HAMMAM HAM All 1984 200 120 120 
' ' ' 13 MOWSHAK DUBAH 
' ' 
1964 650 300 4900 
' ' ' 
" 
Al-HUOAH DHAMAR 
' 
1960 1200 360 10,600 
' 
X • 
16 AL·MAHAL OHAMAR • ' 
1974 l3G BO 680 
' • ' 16 AL·NASIR OHAMAR 197'6 G50 ,. 2760 
' ' ' 17 AL·KHADAR DHAMAR • • 1969 300 60 1800 • • ' 18 AL·GUHAIFAH DHAMAR 1970 700 110 4000 • • • 
18 JAB JAB OH AM AI'\ • 
' 
1965 400 30 2000 
' 
• • 
20 5AITAL DHAMAR 
' 
1954 360 10 1160 
' ' • ,, M.SAK.ANlYAN bHAMAR 1972 300 96 1600 X 
' ' 
TOTAl 1 • 7 6 0 8772 3257 60320 21 21 
,. 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 232 1376 14 
' 
3 3 
Averages/ '*~e.$ 417.1 166.6 2872 lOO 100% 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 11.0 
''" " ' 
14 14 
" 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 2: SHEIKHS OF THE SURVIVING COMMUNITIES 
LOSSES ASSESSMENT, PLANNING AND COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT 
14 
, , 13 
• b ' 
d • f 
' 
h 
• b • b ' ' • 
f • b i " 
i ii i ii I ii I ii i ii i ii i ii 
' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
10 0 • • 1 2 0 1 7 3 0 3 2 2 0 0 1 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' 
' ' 
' 
' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
16 6 13 14 1 6 0 4 , 7 2 6 4 2 0 0 4 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
, ,. 
" 
67 6 29 0 19 62 33 fO 24 19 10 0 0 19 , 14 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 2: SHEIKHS OF THE SURVIVING COMMUNITIES 
LOSSES ASSESSMENT, PLANNING AND COMMUN!TY MANAGEMENT RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME 
15 16 17 16 19 20 21 22 
' 
b • b ' 
d 
' 
f h • b ' 
b 
' 
b • b ' 
d • b ' • 
b 
' 
d 
' 
26 
' ' ' ' 
X 15 1 1 
' 
120 2 1 1 
' ' ' ' ' 
40 1 1 
' " ' ' ' ' ' 
11 
' 
640 1 1 1 1 
' ' ' ' 
X 100 1 1 
' 
36 1 1 
' 
X X 
' ' 
13 
' 
60 1 1 1 
' ' 
X 
' ' 
36 1 1 
' 
110 40 1 
' ' 
X 
' ' 
95 1 
' 
120 1 1 
' ' ' ' ' 
60 1 
' 
10 1 1 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
6 
' 
19 1 1 
' ' ' ' ' 
12 
10 0 1046 42 3 7 3 0 6 6 6 6 4 0 10 9 1 0 0 3 4 3 361 6 4 0 
' 
60 X 
' ' ' ' 
60 
' 
96 
' ' ' ' ' 
76 
' 
300 1 1 
' ' ' ' ' 
160 1 
' 
360 
' ' ' ' ' 
100 
' 
66 
' ' ' ' 
X • 20 
' 
76 
' ' ' ' ' 
60 
' 
60 
' ' ' ' ' 
46 
' 
110 
' ' ' ' ' " X 30 
' ' ' 
X 
' 
16 
' 
10 1 1 
' ' ' 
X 
' ' 
1 1 
' " 
1 1 1 
' ' ' 
X X 60 1 1 
21 0 22BB 42 3 9 • 0 ' 
6 16 6 15 0 21 20 1 0 0 6 11 • 10'01 • • 0 
100 0 109 29 71 0 100 •• • 0 0 24 52 24 60 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 2: SHEIKHS OF THE SURVIVING COMMUNITIES 
RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME 
22 23 24 26 26 27 
• ' ' 
h ; • • ' 
d • % • b ' 
d • • b ' 
d • • 
1 40 
' ' 
' 
70 
' ' 30 
' ' 1 1 
' 
so 
' ' 
' " ' ' 1 1 30 
' ' ' 1 1 90 
' ' 1 60 
' ' 40 
' ' ' 
" ' ' 
4 c 2 2 0 0 1 0 c 2 630 9 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
" ' ' 20 
' ' 1 60 
' ' 70 
' ' 30 
' ' 36 
' ' ' ' 10 
' ' 
" ' ' ' ' 60 
' 
X 
40 X X 
1 1 37 X X X X 
6 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 2 903 19 4 3 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 20 
43% 90 19 14 10 0 
' • 
0 
""' 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 3: GOVERNMENT ENGINEERS AND OTHERS 
PARTICULARS OF RESPONDENT SITUATION BEFORE THE 1982 EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY RELIEF 
AFTER 
EARTHQUAKE 
Position during 2 3 4 • 6 7 • 9 10 
"" 
Occupation Employer Present position Reconstruction 
No Ministry programme • b • b • b • b • b • b • b • b • b 
' 
d • • 
1 Architect Construction Dy Gen ManaQer Res Architect 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 2 Civil Engineer Urban Planning Senior Engineer Res Engineer 
' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' 
X 
3 -do· -do- Director -do-
' ' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
4 -do· Construction Director General Gen Man IS/H) X 
' 
X 
' ' 
X X 
' 
X 
6 -do· -do- Oy Dir Gen IMJ D/Dir Gen (S/HJ X X 
' ' 
X X X 
' 
X 
6 -do- ·do- Civil Engineer Civil Engineer 
' 
X 
' 
X X X 
' ' 7 -do- -do- Dir Gen (Recons) Manaoer (Cons) X X 
' 
X X X X X X X 
' 8 -do- -do- Manager \Lab) Res Enqr (Cons) X X X 
' ' 
X X 
' 
X X X 
9 Civil Tech -do- Civ Works Supr. Supervisor (T/K) 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' ' 10 -do· -do- ·do· Foreman (S/H) 
' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' ' 11 -do· -do- ·do· ·do-
' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
12 Civil Engineer -do- Dir Gen (Maint) Oir (Repairs) X 
' ' ' ' ' ' 13 Architect -·~ Senior Architect Res Architect X X ' ' X ' ' 14 Ci.,.il Engineer ·do· Senior Engineer Res Engr IS/HI X X 
' 
X 
' ' ' 16 ·do· ·do· Dy Dir General Ci.,. Engr IT/KI 
' ' 
. 
' ' 
X 
' ' 16 ·do· ·do· Civ Engr [R & M) Ci.,.i! Engr IR/PI 
' ' ' 
X X 
-
X 
' 17 -d~ 0/M i'.t.SCUIC<!S Civi\ Engir-.eer -d~ 
' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' 19 Geologist ·do· Senior Geologist Geologist 
' ' ' 
X 
' ' 
X 
19 ·do· ·do· Dy Dit General Sr Geologist 
' ' 
X X 
' ' ' 20 ·do· ·do· Director General Chairman IE/0) 
' ' ' 
X X 
' ' 
X 
Total 0 20 1 19 0 1 2 18 0 20 0 20 0 0 0 20 20 9 1 2 2 7 
Percentage 100 6 96 6 10 90 100 100 100 100 40 6 10 10 36 
- -
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 3: GOVERNMENT ENGINEERS AND OTHERS 
EMERGENCY RELIEF AFTER EARTHQUAKE HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME 
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Annex 6 
TECHNICAL SURVEY DATA 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 4: TECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE SURVEYORS 
GENERAL INFORMATION HOUSING PROGRAMME 
Year of 
s, Location District Type of Construe- Surveyor Owner 1 ' 
No Building tion 
'""' 
Supr Tech Govt 
'" 
• ' ' 
d • ' ' 
d • f 
' 
h i j k I m 
1 Manqadah Dh11rnar House 1986 X X X X X X 
' ' 
' 
Marwan An is -·~ 1988 X ' ' ' X X ' .x ' ' X X ' ' 3 Marwan Anis ·do- 1984 X X 
' ' ' ' ' ' 4 Marw1n Anis Mosque 1983 X X 
• Marwan An is School 1984 ' ' 
' 
Marwan Anis House 1984 X 
' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
7 Beihan Oawran -·~ 1968 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' X X ' 8 Beihan Dawran -do- 1988 X X X X X X X X 
8 Beihan Oawran -do- 1988 X 
' ' ' ' 
X X 
' 10 Beihan Oawran -do· 1988 X X X 
' 
X X X X 
11 AI-Jami Dhamar -do· 1966 
' 
X 
' 
X X X X X 
' ' 
X X 
12 AI·Jami Ohamar -·~ 1962 X X X X ' X ' X X X X X X X X 13 J At·Tahir Dawran -do· 1986 X X X X 
' 
X X X 
14 J At-Tehir Dawran -do- 1986 X X X 
' 
X X X X 
16 J At-Tahir Dawran -do- 1920 X X X X X 
' 
X X X X X X 
' ' 
X X 
16 J At·Tahir Dawran -do· 1926 X X X 
' 
X X X X X X X X X X 
17 Manqad~h Ohamar -·~ 1987 X X X ' ' X X X X X X X X X X 18 Ar-AizWIIh Dawran -do· 1968 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
18 Bit t<habut Dhamar -do· 1946 X X X X 
' 
X X X X X X 
' ' 
X 
20 Sir Khabut Ohamar H/Centre 1986 
' ' 21 Bab AI·Falak Dhamar Ho ()Se 1994 X 
' ' 
X X 
' 
X X 
22 Bab A/-Falak Dhamar House 1970 X X 
' 
X 
' 
X X X X 
' ' 
X X X 
" 
Bab AI-Falak Dham.v House 1984 
' ' 
X X X 
' 
X 
' 
" 
AI-Salah Dhamar House 1955 
' ' ' ' 
X X X X X X 
' ' 
X X X 
25 Ar·RU$Sbah Jahran House 1950 
' 
X 
' 
X X X X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
25 Ar-Rusabah Jahran Mosque 1984 
' ' 27 Ar-Rusabah Jahran Houao 1984 
' 
X X 
' ' ' ' ,. AI-Kola Aoo House 1984 
' 
X X X X X X 
" 
AI-Kol1 Aoo House 1985 X X X 
' 
X X X X X 
' 
X X 
' ' ' 30 AI-Kola Aoo House 1984 
' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
31 AI-Kola Ao. House 1984 X X 
' ' 
X X 
' 32 M Ash-Sharq MIA-Sharq House 1985 
' 
X 
' ' 
X X X 
33 Hammam Ali An is House 1985 
' 
X 
' ' 
X X 
' 34 Ma'abar Jehran House 1988 
' ' ' ' 
X X X X X X 
3S Dhamar Dhamar HoU$e 1989 
' 
X 
' ' 
X X 
' 
X 
' 
X X X 
36 D1wran Dawran House 1984 
' 
X X X X X 
' 37 Oawran Dawran H/Centre 1984 X 
' 38 Oawun Dawran School 1984 
' ' 
Total 16 If 
" 
6 32 11 • 4 " 
32 32 32 1S 14 \4 32 32 13 8 14 13 2 
Percentages 42 29 ,. 16 84 34 ,. 13 34 100 100 100 47 44 44 100 100 41 ,. 
" 
41 6 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 4: TECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE SURVEYORS 
HOUSING PROGRAMME 
3 4 5 • EXISTING ADDITIONAL 
• b ' 
d • • b 
' 
• b • b • b • b ' 
d • f 
' 
h R 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 
X X X X X X 
' 
X 
' • 
X X 
' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' ' 
X X 
' ' ' ' 
' ' 
X 
' 
X 
X X 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' ' X 
' ' 
X 
' ' ' ' 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' 
X 
' ' 
X 
' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
X 
' 
X 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' X 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' 
X X 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
18 20 13 18 0 13 3 13 7 
" 
2 10 7 1 
" 
0 17 0 32 0 16 14 0 0 14 
" 
0 8 0 • 0 
47 63 40 60 0 
" 
10 41 22 34 8 31 22 3 47 0 63 0 100 0 47 44 0 0 44 34 0 26 0 28 0 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 4: TECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE SURVEYORS 
HOUSING PROGRAMME HOUSING AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE 
7 
ADDITIONAL 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
d 
' 
0 I 0 I 
' ' 
I 
' 
b 
' ' 
b 
' 
d • f 
' 
b 
' ' 
d Kg/Cm1 b 
' 
d 
' 
b 
X X X X X X X X X 2.5 X X 
X X X X X X X 3.0 X X 
X X X X X X X X X 2.8 X X 
X X X X X X X 2.3 X X 
X X X X X X X 3.1 X X 
X X X X X X X X 2.3 X X 
X X X X X X X 2.5 
' ' 
' ' 
X 
' 
X X X X 
' 
2.7 X X 
X X X X 
' 
X X X 2.9 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' 
X X X 3.2 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
X 
' ' ' 
X X X 2.8 
' 
X 
X 
' ' 
X X X X X X X 2.8 X X 
' 
X X X X X X X 2.4 X X 
X X X X X 
' 
X 2.2 X X 
' 
X X X X 
' 
X 2.6 X 
' X X X X X X X 2.3 
' ' X X X X 
' 
X X X 2.7 X 
' X X X X X X 
' 
X X 
' 
2.8 X X 
X 
' ' ' 
X X X X X X 2.8 
' 
X 
' ' 
X X X X 
' 
3.1 X X 
X X X X X X 2.5 X X 
X X X X X X X 2.3 X 
' 
' 
X X 
' 
X X X X 2.5 X 
' X X 
' 
X X X 
' 
X X X 3.0 X X 
X X 
' 
X X X X 3.0 X X 
' ' 
X X X X X 2.7 X X 
' 
X 
' 
X X X X X X 2.9 
' 
X 
X X X X X X X X 2.6 
' 
X 
X X X X 
' 
X X X 2.7 X X 
X X X X X 
' 
X X 2.9 
' ' 
' ' ' ' 
X 
' ' 
X 2.8 
' 
X 
' ' ' ' ' 
X X 
' 
2.7 X X 
X X X X X X X X 2.7 X X 
X X X X X X X X 2.6 X X 
X X X X X X X X 3.0 X X 
X X 
' 
X X X X 3.1 X X 
X X X X X X X 2.9 X X 
X X X X X X X 2.8 X X 
2 0 9 0 30 1 1 15 19 4 28 12 14 32 31 28 26 12 29 5 4 12 24 2 34 4 
5 0 28 0 94 3 3 39 50 11 74 32 37 34 82 74 68 32 76 13 , 32 63 5 89 11 
QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 4: TECHNICAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE SURVEYORS 
-. 
HOUSING AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE 
16 17 18 19 20 , 
" 
23 24 25 
• b ' 
d X-section • b • b • b • olb • b d Cost IYRI • b b ' 
d • 
'm' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1!30 
' 
715,000 
' ' ' ' 
' 
40x25 
' ' ' ' 
1/26 
' 
260,000 
' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
76,000 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
300,000 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
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' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
76,000 
' ' ' 
' 
40x30 
' ' ' 
1/40 
' 
120,000 
' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
100,000 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
100,000 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
100,000 
' ' ' 
' 
30x20 
' ' ' ' 
1/60 
' 
38,000 
' ' 
' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
40,000 
' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
100,000 
' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' 
X 
' ' 
1{30 
' 
100,000 X 
' 
' ' ' ' 
1/40 
' 
1,800 
' 
X 
' ' ' 
1/26 X 2,000 
' ' 
' ' ' ' 
1/60 
' 
260,000 
' 
' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/40 
' 
42,000 
' X 30x20 
' ' ' 
1/40 
' 
10,000 X 
' 
' 
30x20 X 
' 
X 1/30 
' 
80,000 X X X 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' 
X 1/30 
' 
70,000 X 
' 
' ' 
X X 1!26 
' 
62,000 
' 
' ' 
X 30x20 
' ' 
X 1/30 
' 
70,000 X 
' 
' 
30x20 X X X 1/40 X 30,000 X 
' 
' 
60x30 X X 
' ' 
1/60 
' 
20,000 
' 
' ' ' 
30K20 X 
' 
X 1/30 
' 
200,000 
' ' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
76,000 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' 
X 1/30 
' 
70,000 
' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
160,000 
' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1130 
' 
70,000 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
70,000 
' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
100,000 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1{30 
' 
70,000 
' ' ' 
' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1{30 
' 
210,000 
' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
260,000 
' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
70,000 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
:260,000 
' ' ' 
' ' ' 
30x20 
' ' ' 
1/30 
' 
300,000 X 
' ' ' 
" 
1 32 24 18 20 12 
" 
20 18 8 32 5 1 28 • 28 18 6 2 
68 3 84 63 47 53 32 68 53 47 
" 
84 13 3 76 24 68 42 16 5 
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CHARTS 
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